area handbook series 

Zaire 

a country study 



Zaire 

a country study 



Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Edited by 
Sandra W. Meditz 
and Tim Merrill 
Research Completed 
December 1 993 



On the cover: Traditional wooden mask 



Fourth Edition, First Printing, 1994. 

Library of Congress Cataloging- in-Publication Data 

Zaire, a country study / Federal Research Division, Library of 
Congress ; edited by Sandra W. Meditz and Tim Merrill. — 4th ed. 

p. cm. — (Area handbook series, ISSN 1057-5294) 
(DA pam ; 550-67) 

"Research completed December 1993." 
Rev. ed. of: Zaire, a country study / American University 
(Washington, D.C.). Foreign Area Studies. 3rd ed. 1979. 
Includes bibliographical references (pp. 343-363) and index. 
ISBN 0-8444-0795-X 

1. Zaire. I. Meditz, Sandra W., 1950- . II. Merrill, Tim, 
1949- . III. Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. 
IV. American University (Washington, D.C.). Foreign Area 
Studies. Zaire, a country study. V. Series. VI. Series: DA Pam ; 



550-67. 
DT644.Z3425 1994 
[Z663.275] 
967.51— dc20 



94-25092 
CIP 



Headquarters, Department of the Army 



DA Pam 550-67 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared by 
the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress under 
the Country Studies/ Area Handbook Program sponsored by the 
Department of the Army. The last two pages of this book list the 
other published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, 
describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national 
security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelation- 
ships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural 
factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social 
scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of 
the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static 
portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make 
up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- 
mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature 
and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their 
attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and 
political order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not 
be construed as an expression of an official United States govern- 
ment position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to 
adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, 
additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be wel- 
comed for use in future editions. 

Louis R. Mortimer 
Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, DC 20540-5220 



iii 



Acknowledgments 



The authors wish to acknowledge their use and adaptation of 
information in the 1979 edition of Zaire: A Country Study, edited by 
Irving Kaplan. The authors are also grateful to numerous individu- 
als in various government agencies and private institutions who 
generously shared their time, expertise, and knowledge about Zaire. 
These people include Ralph K. Benesch, who oversees the Coun- 
try Studies/Area Handbook Program for the Department of the 
Army. 

The authors also wish to thank those who contributed directly 
to the preparation of the manuscript. These include Marilyn Majes- 
ka, who managed editing and book production; Catherine 
Schwartzstein, who edited the chapters and performed the final 
prepublication editorial review; Andrea T. Merrill, who reviewed 
all tabular and graphic materials; Joshua Sinai and Laverle Ber- 
ry, who updated portions of the manuscript; Barbara Edgerton, 
Janie L. Gilchrist, and Izella Watson, who did the word process- 
ing; Joan C. Cook, who compiled the index; and Linda Peterson 
of the Printing and Processing Section, Library of Congress, who 
prepared the camera-ready copy under the supervision of Peggy 
Pixley. 

David P. Cabitto, the firm of Greenhorne and O'Mara, and Har- 
riett R. Blood provided invaluable graphics support. David P. 
Cabitto prepared the illustrations for the book's cover and each 
of the chapter title pages, as well as some of the charts. He also 
reviewed and finalized all of the maps, which were drafted by Tim 
Merrill and Laverle Berry. Greenhorne and O'Mara prepared some 
charts and all of the maps except the topography and drainage map, 
which was prepared by Harriett R. Blood. 

Finally, the authors would like to acknowledge the generosity 
of the individuals and public and private organizations who allowed 
their photographs to be used in this study. They are indebted es- 
pecially to those who contributed work not previously published. 



v 



Contents 



Page 

Foreword iii 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface . xiii 

Table A. Chronology of Important Events xv 

Table B. City Name Changes, 1966-72 xxiii 

Country Profile XXV 

Introduction XXXV 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 

Rene Lemarchand 

HUMAN ORIGINS 4 

EARLY HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 5 

State Systems Versus Segmentary Societies 5 

Rulers and Ruled 7 

External Pressures 9 

THE COLONIAL STATE 13 

The Leopoldian Legacy 14 

Belgian Paternalism: Underlying Postulates 16 

The Apparatus of Control . . . 18 

Postwar Reforms 20 

NATIONALIST AWAKENINGS 23 

The Rise of Militant Ethnicity: Abako 23 

The Challenge of Territorial Nationalism: 

Lumumba and the MNC 24 

Settler Politics in Katanga 25 

THE CRISIS OF DECOLONIZATION 28 

The Road to Independence 28 

The Mutiny of the Force Publique 30 

The Center No Longer Holds 31 

The Secession of Katanga 33 

The UN Intervention 36 

THE FIRST REPUBLIC, 1960-65 37 

The Adoula Government, August 1961 -July 1964 ... 38 

Rural Insurgencies: The "Second Independence" ... 39 

Mobutu's Second Coming 43 



vii 



THE SECOND REPUBLIC, 1965-90: THE REBIRTH 

OF BULA MATARI 44 

Mobutu, Self-Proclaimed Father of the Nation 44 

Toward Political Reconstruction 47 

The Quest for Legitimacy 48 

The Expansion of State Authority 51 

Zairianization, Radicalization, and Retrocession 53 

External Threats to Regime Stability 55 

The Durability of the Patrimonial State 58 

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 61 

Alden Almquist 

GEOGRAPHY AND ENVIRONMENT 64 

Rivers and Lakes 67 

Geographic Regions 67 

Climate 68 

Environmental Trends 69 

POPULATION 70 

Size and Growth 70 

Population Distribution 72 

Urbanization: Causes and Characteristics 75 

LANGUAGES 76 

Officially Recognized Languages 76 

Other Indigenous Languages 78 

ETHNIC GROUPS 79 

Non-Bantu Speakers of the Northern Savannas and 

Forest Fringe 80 

Bantu Speakers of the Congo River Basin and Its 

Environs 82 

Bantu Speakers of the Eastern Forest and Plain 83 

Bantu Speakers of the Eastern Highlands 84 

Peoples of the Savannas: Southeastern Zaire 85 

Peoples of the Savannas: Lunda Region 85 

Peoples of the Southern Uplands: Kasai-Shaba 86 

Peoples of the Lower Kasai and Its Tributaries 86 

Peoples Between the Kwango and the Kasai 88 

The Kongo Peoples 89 

The Significance of Ethnic Identification 90 

INDIGENOUS SOCIAL SYSTEMS 92 

ZAIRIAN SOCIAL CLASSES 96 

The External Estate 96 

The Politico-Commercial Class 97 

The New Commercial Class 98 

Other High-Status Groups 99 



vin 



The Subbourgeoisie 99 

The Working Class 100 

The Informal Sector 101 

Peasants 101 

POLARIZATION AND PROSPECTS FOR CONFLICT ... 102 

STRATEGIES OF SURVIVAL 105 

Coping and Hustling 105 

Theft and Bribery 105 

Patron-Client Relations 107 

Resistance 107 

Flight 109 

THE STATUS OF WOMEN 109 

RELIGION 112 

The Roman Catholic Church 112 

Protestant Churches 116 

The Kimbanguist Church 118 

Other African Christian Movements 119 

Traditional African Religions 121 

EDUCATION 122 

Policy Changes 123 

Institutional Problems 125 

HEALTH AND MEDICAL SERVICES 126 

Incidence of Disease 126 

Health Care System 128 

Sanitation and Nutrition 130 

Family Planning 131 

Chapter 3. The Economy 135 

Hampton Smith, Tim Merrill, and Sandra W. Meditz 

BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF THE ECONOMY . . 138 

Early Economic Activity 138 

From Colonial Times to Independence 139 

Postindependence 141 

Zairianization 142 

Economic Decline 145 

The 1983 Reforms 147 

The 1987 Plan 148 

The 1989 Reform 149 

ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 151 

Parastatals 151 

Patrimonial Politics and Corruption 152 

Investment Projects 154 

STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF THE ECONOMY ... 155 

Gross Domestic Product 155 



ix 



The Informal Economy 156 

Currency 159 

Inflation 161 

Budget 162 

Debt 163 

Banking 164 

Labor 165 

AGRICULTURE 167 

National Land Law System 170 

Crops 171 

Forestry 174 

Fishing and Livestock . 176 

MINING 176 

Copper and Zinc 177 

Cobalt 179 

Manganese 179 

Tin and Related Minerals 179 

Gold 180 

Diamonds 181 

INDUSTRY 182 

ENERGY 184 

Petroleum and Other Fuels 186 

Electricity 187 

TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS ... 188 

FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS 194 

Trade and Balance of Payments 194 

Foreign Aid 196 

Foreign Investment 197 

PROSPECTS FOR GROWTH 198 

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 201 

Thomas Turner 

POSTINDEPENDENCE POLITICAL 

DEVELOPMENT 204 

Establishment of a Personalistic Regime 204 

The Party-State as a System of Rule 206 

POLITICAL REFORM IN THE 1990s 211 

Proclamation of the Third Republic 211 

Subsequent Political Developments, 1990-93 212 

STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT 220 

The Presidency 220 

The National Executive Council 223 

The Legislature 224 

The Judiciary and the Courts 226 



x 



Local Government 228 

POLITICAL DYNAMICS 232 

Managing the Military 232 

Opposition to the Regime prior to 1990 233 

Opposition since 1990 237 

Interest Groups 239 

The Media 248 

FOREIGN POLICY 250 

Relations with the West 250 

Relations with the Communist World 260 

Regional Relations 263 

Chapter 5. National Security 275 

Roger C. Glickson and Joshua Sinai 

NATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 279 

EVOLUTION OF THE ARMED FORCES 282 

The Colonial Period 282 

The Congolese National Army 286 

The Military under Mobutu 288 

Creation of the Zairian Armed Forces 290 

Involvement in Angola 291 

Shaba I 292 

Shaba II 294 

PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD THE MILITARY 297 

ARMED FORCES MISSIONS AND ORGANIZATION .... 298 

Army 299 

Navy 302 

Air Force 303 

National Gendarmerie 303 

ARMED FORCES MANPOWER AND TRAINING 304 

Recruitment and Retention 304 

Conditions of Service 306 

Military Schools 307 

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia 308 

FOREIGN MILITARY RELATIONS 308 

Foreign Influences 308 

Zaire as a Military Aid Donor 312 

PUBLIC ORDER AND INTERNAL SECURITY 313 

THE CIVIL SECURITY APPARATUS 315 

Development of a National Police Force 315 

Local Police 318 

The Intelligence Apparatus and Security Forces 319 

The Party Security Apparatus 321 



xi 



Popular Attitudes Toward the Civil 

Security Apparatus 321 

THE LEGAL AND PENAL SYSTEMS 322 

Criminal Law and the Penal Code 322 

The Judicial System 323 

The Prison System 324 

CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS 325 

Appendix. Tables 329 

Bibliography 343 

Glossary 365 

Index 369 

List of Figures 

1 Administrative Divisions of Zaire, 1993 xxxiv 

2 Major Kingdoms in Central Africa, Sixteenth 

Century 8 

3 Major States in the Southern Savannas, 

Mid-Nineteenth Century 10 

4 Provinces at Independence, 1960 26 

5 Political Fragmentation and Territorial Control, 

1960-61 34 

6 Rural Insurgencies, 1964 40 

7 Topography and Drainage 66 

8 Population by Age and Gender, 1990 72 

9 Distribution of Principal Ethnic Groups 80 

10 Mineral Resources, 1993 178 

11 Transportation System, 1993 190 

12 Officer Ranks and Insignia, 1993 310 

13 Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 1993 311 



xii 



Preface 



This study replaces Zaire: A Country Study, which was completed 
in 1978, during the height of the personalistic regime of Mobutu 
Sese Seke, president since 1965. Since 1990, following an ostensi- 
ble move toward multiparty democracy, Mobutu has presided over 
a nation in political, economic, and social disarray. This edition 
of Zaire: A Country Study focuses primarily on the Zaire of the early 
1990s, during which time the Mobutu regime has appeared to be 
on the verge of collapse and yet has clung tenaciously to power, 
using its continued control of key military and security forces to 
obstruct the functioning of the transitional government, to intimi- 
date the opposition, and to promote instability throughout the 
country. 

Like its predecessor, this study is an attempt to treat in a con- 
cise and objective manner the dominant historical, social, economic, 
political, and national security aspects of contemporary Zaire. 
Sources of information included scholarly books, journals, and 
monographs; official reports of governments and international or- 
ganizations; foreign and domestic newspapers; the authors' previous 
research and observations; and numerous periodicals. Chapter bib- 
liographies appear at the end of the book; brief comments on some 
of the more valuable sources suggested as possible further reading 
appear at the end of each chapter. 

Place-names follow the system adopted by the United States 
Board on Geographic Names (BGN). Place-names in Zaire present 
a particular problem to the reader in that most, including the name 
of the country itself, have been subject to change. At independence 
in 1960, the former Belgian Congo adopted the name Republic 
of the Congo. This name was changed in August 1964 to Democrat- 
ic Republic of the Congo, and then in 1971 to Republic of Zaire. 
In all cases, this country is to be distinguished from its neighbor, 
the Republic of the Congo, formerly the People's Republic of the 
Congo. At times in the past, the two have been differentiated by 
indicating the names of their capital cities, as in Congo-Kinshasa 
(now Zaire) and Congo-Brazzaville. Most place-names in Zaire 
were changed between 1966 and 1972 as part of a campaign to 
eliminate vestiges of colonialism. The older place-names are used 
in this volume in historical contexts. To assist the reader in track- 
ing the changes, former and new names of major cities are given 
in Table B. In addition, a comparison of fig. 1 and fig. 4 will help 
the reader to attain a clearer understanding of the relationship 



xiii 



between the old provinces and the new regions that replaced them 
in 1972. 

Most personal names in Zaire also changed as part of the authen- 
ticity (see Glossary) campaign. For example, Mobutu Sese Seko 
was formerly Joseph-Desire Mobutu. By the 1990s, however, many 
Zairians had resumed the use of their given forename, including, 
for example, opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba. 
In general, the authors have used the name by which individuals 
are (or were) most commonly known. In second references to in- 
dividuals, only the surname is given. In the case of Zairian names, 
readers should note that the first name is the surname. Thus, 
Mobutu Sese Seku becomes Mobutu after the first use. 

All measurements in this book are given in the metric system; 
a conversion table is provided to assist those readers who are un- 
familiar with metric measurements (see table 1 , Appendix). A glos- 
sary is also included to explain terms with which the reader may 
not be familiar. 

The body of the text reflects information available as of Decem- 
ber 1993. Certain other portions of the text, however, have been 
updated: the Introduction discusses significant events that have oc- 
curred since the information cutoff date; the Country Profile and 
Chronology include updated information as available; and the Bib- 
liograhy lists recently published sources thought to be particularly 
helpful to the reader. 



xiv 



Table A. Chronology of Important Events 



Period 



Description 



EARLY HISTORY 
ca. 10,000 B.C. 

first millennium B.C. 

ca. late first millennium B.C. 



ca. A.D. 100 

first millennium A.D. 

FOURTEENTH CENTURY 
late 1300s 

FIFTEENTH CENTURY 



1483 



SIXTEENTH CENTURY 



Late Stone Age cultures start to flourish in southern 
savannas. 

In long series of migrations, lasting well into first millen- 
nium A.D., Bantu-speaking peoples from north of 
the Congo Basin disperse throughout Zaire, bring- 
ing an economy based on yam and palm farming. 

Non-Bantu speakers arrive in northern grasslands, then 
penetrate forest area, intermingling with Bantu speak- 
ers who preceded them; Central Sudanic speakers in- 
troduce cattle herding and cultivation of cereals into 
northeastern Zaire. 

Related food complex based on cereals and hunting 
separately introduced into southeastern Zaire from 
East Africa. 

Bananas introduced from East Africa; iron and cop- 
per implements come into use; smelting introduced. 



Kongo Kingdom established, beginning expansion that 
continues until mid-seventeenth century. 



Luba Empire "founded" in late fifteenth century by 
legendary figures, Nkongolo and Ilunga Kalala; other 
Luba chiefs settle among neighboring peoples, includ- 
ing Lunda, and introduce Luba concepts of state or- 
ganization; Luba state based on patrilineal farming 
villages governed by divine king whose authority de- 
rived from bulopwe — an inherited, supernatural power 
conferring the right to kingly office and title. Luba 
noted for artistic achievements in sculpture, praise 
poetry, and polyphonic music. Lunda chiefdoms unite 
to form Lunda Kingdom. 

Portuguese explorers reach Congo River, beginning 
long-term relationship between Portugal and Kon- 
go Kingdom that lasts until destruction of Kongo in 
early eighteenth century. 



Lunda kingdom comes under Luba influence; legen- 
dary founders of Lunda include Kinguri, Chinyama, 
and Mwaant Yaav; Kinguri and Chinyama migrate 
west and found Lunda-like states in Angola; Mwaant 



XV 



Table A. — Continued 



Period 



Description 



Yaav's name becomes perpetual title in and royal 
name for central Lunda kingdom; beginning in six- 
teenth century, and continuing to eighteenth centu- 
ry, Lunda expand west, east, and south, creating 
series of related kingdoms governed joindy by kings 
and councils of tided officials; Lunda expansion facili- 
tated by devices of positional succession and perpetual 
kinship, which made it possible to incorporate non- 
Lunda into the Lunda administrative system; hunt- 
ing important among the matrilineal Lunda; despite 
their political genius, their culture, in general less de- 
veloped than that of Luba. 



1500 



Zande appear in northern Zaire and found a number 
of agriculturally based kingdoms. 



early 1500s 



Kongo king Affonso requests technical help from Por- 
tugal, agreeing to make payment in copper, ivory, 
and slaves; Affonso declares Roman Catholicism 
Kongo state religion. 



mid- 1500s 



Corn introduced to Kongo by Portuguese, followed by 
cassava shortly after 1600 and tobacco by late seven- 
teenth century. 



SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 



1630 



Kuba Kingdom founded by King Shyaam aMbul 
aNgoong; a highly centralized agricultural and trad- 
ing state, it reached its zenith in mid-eighteenth cen- 
tury and remained stable into nineteenth century. 



EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 



Europeans in west and Arabs in east become heavily 
involved in slave trade. 



ca. 1750 



Kazembe Kingdom founded in Luapula Valley as Lun- 
da offshoot following Lunda expansion to control salt 
pans and copper mines in Katanga; loosely part of 
Lunda Empire but autonomous in practice. 



NINETEENTH CENTURY 
1840-72 
1871 



David Livingstone explores Congo River basin. 

Livingstone and Henry Morton Stanley, journalist com- 
missioned to search for him, meet on eastern shore 
of Lake Tanganyika. 



1874-77 



Stanley commissioned by New York and London 
newspapers to continue Livingstone's explorations; 
Stanley completes descent of Congo River in 1877. 



XVI 



Table A. — Continued 



Period 



Description 



1878 



1878-87 



1884-85 



1890s 



King Leopold II forms consortium of bankers to finance 
exploration and colonization of Congo. 

Under auspices of consortium, Stanley sets out to es- 
tablish trading posts and make treaties with local 
chiefs, eventually returning with 450 treaties in hand. 

At Conference of Berlin, November 1884-February 
1885, major European powers acknowledge claim of 
Leopold II 's International Association of the Congo; 
colony named Congo Free State. 

Construction of transportation network and exploita- 
tion of mineral resources begin; forced labor used 
extensively to harvest rubber, ivory, and other com- 
modities; mutinies within Force Publique in 1895 and 
1897. 



1890-94 



Belgian military campaign expels Afro-Arab traders 
from Zaire and ends slave trade. 



TWENTIETH CENTURY 
1908 

1914-17 



In response to growing criticism of treatment of Afri- 
can population, Belgian parliament annexes Congo 
Free State and renames it Belgian Congo. 

Units of Belgian colonial forces see action alongside Brit- 
ish forces in German East Africa. 



1921 

1920s-30s 
1940-45 



1952-58 



1956 



late 1950s 



Simon Kimbangu founds Kimbanguist Church. 

Early nationalistic aspirations expressed by Kimban- 
guist Church and Kitawala religious movement. 

Production of goods and minerals greatly increased to 
finance Belgian effort in World War II; large-scale 
social and economic changes occur as many rural Afri- 
cans relocate to urban areas; demands for political 
reforms grow. 

Legal reforms enacted permitting Africans to own land, 
granting them free access to public establishments, 
and the right to trial in all courts of law as well as 
some political participation. 

Alliance of the Kongo People (Alliance des Bakongo — 
Abako) issues manifesto calling for immediate in- 
dependence. 

Calls for independence of Katanga grow, and separatist 
party, Confederation of Katanga Associations (Con- 
federation des Associations du Katanga — Conakat), 
headed by Moi'se Tshombe organized. 



XVll 



Period 



Description 



1957 March 

May 

1959 January 

July 

1960 January 
May 

June 

July 



August 
September 



Statute passed allowing urban Africans to elect local 
communal councils; Abako wins majority of seats in 
urban elections. 

Appointed rural councils established. 

Belgian authorities disperse crowd of Abako members 
at political meeting; widespread rioting follows; Bel- 
gium recognizes total independence as goal for Bel- 
gian Congo. 

Congolese National Movement (Mouvement National 
Congolais — MNC), which had emerged as standard- 
bearer of independence movement in 1958-59, splits 
into two camps: radicals headed by Patrice Lumum- 
ba and moderate wing led by Joseph Ileo, Cyrille 
Adoula, and Albert Kalonji. 

Round Table Conference held in Brussels to discuss in- 
dependence. 

In national legislative elections, MNC -Lumumba wins 
largest number of votes; Belgian authorities name 
MNC's Patrice Lumumba prime minister; colonial 
government promulgates Loi Fondamentale (Fun- 
damental Law) to guide nation to independence and 
to serve as first constitution. 

Abako leader Joseph Kasavubu elected president; Con- 
go becomes independent and First Republic estab- 
lished June 30. 

Army mutinies against its European officers, July 4-5; 
officer corps Africanized and Joseph-Desire Mobutu 
(later Mobutu Sese Seko) named chief of staff, July 
6-9; mutiny spreads to Equateur and Katanga, and 
Belgium sends in paratroopers; Moise Tshombe 
declares Katanga an independent state and Belgian 
naval forces bombard Matadi on July 1 1 ; Lumum- 
ba and Kasavubu request United Nations (UN) mili- 
tary assistance in face of Belgian aggression and 
Katangan secession, July 12; UN Security Council 
resolution calls for Belgian withdrawal and authorizes 
UN intervention, July 14; first UN troops arrive in 
Congo, July 15, begin military intervention against 
Katanga in support of central government. 

South Kasai headed by Albert Kalonji secedes, August 8. 



President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba for- 
mally break and fire each other from their posts; 
Kasavubu names Joseph Ileo as new prime minister 
on September 5; on September 14, Mobutu steps in 



Table A. — Continued 



Period 



Description 



November 

1961 January 
February 

July 

August 

1963 January 

1964 January 
May 

July 

August 
December 

1965 November 



December 



and assumes power while keeping Kasavubu as nom- 
inal president; government to be run by the so-called 
College of Commissioners; United Nations and 
most Western nations recognize Kasavubu govern- 
ment. 

Antoine Gizenga leaves for Stanleyville to establish rival 
national regime. Lumumba, under house arrest since 
dismissal by Kasavubu, leaves to join Gizenga, but 
is arrested and transferred to Katanga. 

Lumumba killed on January 17, but death not an- 
nounced until February. 

College of Commissioners dissolved, and provisional 
government formed, headed by Joseph Ileo. 

Continuing deliberations undertaken at three confer- 
ences earlier in 1961, parliament meets close to 
Leopold ville' to work out framework for a reunified 
Congo; deputies from all provinces attend; secession 
of South Kasai ends. 

Cyrille Adoula named prime minister, August 2. 

After two and a half years of conflict, Tshombe con- 
cedes defeat, and Katanga secession ends, January 
14; Tshombe arrested and sent into exile. 

Led by Pierre Mulele, rebellion breaks out in Kwilu 
area around Kikwit. 

Second rebellion, headed by Gaston Soumialot, begins 
in east and rapidly spreads. 

Tshombe recalled from exile and replaces Adoula as 
prime minister. 

First postindependence constitution adopted. 

Eastern rebellion put down and Soumialot sent into 
exile. 

Rivalry between Prime Minister Tshombe and Presi- 
dent Kasavubu leads to government paralysis; 
Mobutu leads successful coup, November 24, dismiss- 
es Kasavubu and Tshombe, names himself as presi- 
dent, and appoints figurehead prime minister, 
Colonel Leonard Mulamba; these actions mark end 
of First Republic. 

Kwilu uprising ends, and Mulele goes into exile in Braz- 
zaville; he later (1968) returns to Congo under am- 
nesty but is executed. 



XIX 



Table A. — Continued 



Period 



Description 



1966 July 
December 

1967 January 
April 
May 
June 

July 

1969 June 

1970 November 
1971-72 

1973 November 

1974 August 

1975 November 
1977 March 



Former Katangan gendarmes mutiny in Kisangani. 

Cities with European names gradually given African 
names, in process that continues until 1972. 

Upper Katanga Mining Union (Union Miniere du 
Haut-Katanga — UMHK) nationalized. 

Popular Revolutionary Movement (Mouvement 
Populaire de la Revolution — MPR) created, April 17. 

In Manifesto of N'Sele, Mobutu proclaims official 
ideologies. 

Second postindependence constitution proclaimed, 
removing virtually all political power from provinces 
and allowing president to rule by decree. 

Former Katangan gendarmes again mutiny in 
Kisangani. 

About thirty Lovanium University students killed in 
clashes with security forces. 

Mobutu elected president in first presidential election, 
having already held office for five years. 

Country's name changed to Zaire, October 1971; un- 
der policy of authenticity, all colonial or Christian 
names changed to Zairian ones, 1972; provinces now 
called regions and given non-European names. 

Policy of Zairianization proclaimed; foreign-owned bus- 
inesses and property expropriated and distributed to 
Zairian government officials, resulting in increasing 
economic chaos. 

Revised version of 1967 constitution promulgated, mak- 
ing MPR synonymous with state. 

Policy of retrocession announced, returning much ex- 
propriated property to foreign owners. 

Shaba I: Zairian insurgency group invades Shaba 
Region from Angola and is defeated, only with help 
from France and Morocco, by May. 



October 
December 
1978 February 



Legislative elections held. 

Mobutu reelected president, running unopposed. 

Constitution revised; military establishment purged fol- 
lowing discovery of coup plot. 



XX 



Table A. — Continued 



Period 



Description 



May 
June 

1982 September 

1984 July 
November 

1985 June 

1987 September 

1989 February 

1990 April 
May 

December 

1991 April-May 
August 

September 



Shaba II: Same insurgent group launches another in- 
vasion of Shaba from Zambia and is again defeated 
only with help of French and Belgians. 

Pan-African peacekeeping force installed in Shaba and 
stays for over a year. 

Legislative elections held; multiple candidates allowed 
for first time; more than three-quarters of incumbents 
voted out; thirteen parliamentarians attempt to form 
second party and are arrested. 

Mobutu reelected without opposition. 

Rebel forces occupy Moba in Shaba Region for two days 
before town recaptured by Zairian forces. 

Zaire celebrates twenty-five years of independence; on 
eve of celebration, guerrillas briefly occupy Moba 
again. 

Legislative elections held. 

Student disturbances break out in Kinshasa and Lu- 
bumbashi and result in violent clashes with armed 
police. 

Third Republic declared on April 24; Mobutu promises 
national multiparty elections the following year. 

Protesting students at University of Lubumbashi mas- 
sacred by government forces; as a result, Belgium, 
European Community, Canada, and United States 
ultimately cut off all but humanitarian aid to Zaire. 

Legislation permitting political parties to register finally 



October 



Security forces intervene violendy against demon- 
strators. 

National conference on political reform convened with 
ostensible mandate to draft new constitution as 
prelude to new elections; conference suspended, Au- 
gust 15. 

Unpaid paratroopers mutiny in Kinshasa and go on 
rampage; looting and violence spread; France and 
Belgium send troops to restore order and evacuate 
foreign nationals. 

Opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi named prime 
minister in early October but fired by Mobutu a week 
later, spurring violent demonstrations; France joins 



XXI 



Table A. — Continued 



Period 



Description 



November 



December 



other Western nations in cutting off economic aid to 
Zaire; Mobutu appoints Bernardin Mungul-Diaka to 
succeed Tshisekedi. 

Mobutu names another opposition leader, Nguza Karl- 
i-Bond, prime minister. 

National conference reconvenes. 



1992 



National conference activities periodically suspended 
by Mobutu; economy continues to deteriorate; 
Western nations call for Mobutu to step down, but 
he clings to power. 



February 



Peaceful demonstrations by Christian groups violendy 
broken up by security forces; up to forty-five killed 
and 100 injured. 



April 



National conference meets, declares itself to have sover- 
eign powers not only to draw up new constitution but 
also to legislate multiparty system; Transitional Act 
passed establishing new, transitional government; 
these actions constitute a direct challenge to Mobutu, 
who does not accept conference's authority. 



August 



Newly named Sovereign National Conference elects 
Tshisekedi prime minister, precipitating violent con- 
frontations in Shaba Region between supporters of 
Tshisekedi and Nguza; conflict between Tshisekedi 
and Mobutu over who runs government continues. 



1993 January 



Soldiers riot and loot following refusal by merchants 
to accept new Z5 million notes with which military 
personnel paid; in ensuing violence, dozens of soldi- 
ers killed by elite army unit loyal to Mobutu; French 
ambassador killed while watching violence from office 
window. 



March 



Mobutu dismisses Tshisekedi and names Faustin Bi- 
rindwa prime minister of so-called government of na- 
tional salvation; Birindwa names cabinet in April; 
Zaire now has two rival, parallel governments. 



October 



More rioting and looting occur when opposition par- 
ties promote boycott of new currency issue used to 
pay troops. 



XXII 



Table B. City Name Changes, 1966-72 



T XT 

rormer Name 


New Name 


Albertville 


Kalemie 


Bakwanga 


Mbuji-Mayi 


Banmngville 


Ranniinnii 
DAIIUUIIUU 


Baudoinville * 


Moba 


Coquilhatville 


Mbandaka 


Elisabethville 


Lubumbashi 


Leopoldville 


Kinshasa 


Luluabourg 


Kananga 


Stanleyville 


Kisangani 


Thysville 


Mbanza-Ngungu 



New Name 


Former Name 


Bandundu 


Banningville 


Kalemie 


Albertville 


Kananga 


Luluabourg 


Kinshasa 


Leopoldville 


Kisangani 


Stanleyville 


Lubumbashi 


Elisabethville 


Mbandaka 


Coquilhatville 


Mbanza-Ngungu 


Thysville 


Mbuji-Mayi 


Bakwanga 


Moba * 


Baudoinville 



* The city now called Moba was known as Virungu for some time after its name was changed 
from the colonial Baudoinville. 



Country Profile 




COUNTRY 

Formal Name: Republic of Zaire. 
Short Form: Zaire. 
Term for Citizen(s): Zairian(s). 
Capital: Kinshasa. 

Date of Independence: June 30, 1960, from Belgium. 

National Holidays: June 30, Independence Day; November 24, 
celebrating establishment of Second Republic on November 24, 1965. 

Geography 

Size: Second largest country in sub-Saharan Africa; about 2,344,885 
NOTE — The Country Profile contains updated information as available. 



XXV 



square kilometers, roughly size of United States east of Mississippi 
River. 

Topography: Major geographic regions include central Congo Ba- 
sin, uplands north and south of basin, and eastern highlands. Core 
region is central Congo Basin, large depression with average ele- 
vation of about forty-four meters, constituting about one-third of 
Zaire. North and south of basin lie higher plains and hills covered 
with mixtures of savanna grasses and woodlands. Southern uplands 
region also constitutes about one-third of Zaire, with elevations be- 
tween 500 meters and 1,000 meters. Eastern highlands region 
highest and most rugged portion, bounded by Great Rift Valley, 
with some mountains more than 5,000 meters. Eastern border ex- 
tends through valley and its system of lakes. 

Drainage: Most of Zaire served by Congo River system. Congo 
and its tributaries provide Zaire with Africa's most extensive net- 
work of navigable waterways as well as vast hydroelectric poten- 
tial. Flow of Congo unusually regular because tributaries feed in 
from both sides of equator. 

Climate: Ranges from tropical rain forest in Congo River basin 
to tropical wet-and-dry in southern uplands to tropical highland 
in eastern areas above 2,000 meters. In general, temperatures and 
humidity quite high, but with much variation; many places on both 
sides of equator have two wet and two dry seasons. Average an- 
nual temperature 25°C. Average annual rainfall between 1,000 
millimeters and 2,200 millimeters, highest in heart of Congo River 
basin and highlands west of Bukavu. 

Society 

Population: Estimated at 39. 1 million in 1992; annual growth rate 
estimated at 3.3 percent. Estimated at 42.7 million in 1994, with 
estimated annual growth rate of 3.2 percent. 

Language: About 250 languages spoken. French remains primary 
language of government, formal economy, and most education. 
Four indigenous languages also have official status: Kikongo, 
Tshiluba, Lingala, and Kiswahili. 

Ethnic Groups: As many as 250 different groups, mostly Bantu- 
speaking. Largest Bantu- speaking groups are Luba, Kongo, Mon- 
go, and Lunda. 

Religion: Majority of population Christian: 46 to 48 percent Roman 
Catholic, 24 to 28 percent Protestant, up to 16.5 percent members 



xxvi 



of indigenous Kimbanguist Church. About 1 percent of popula- 
tion Muslim. Most other people practice traditional African 
religions. 

Education and Literacy: Numbers of schools, teachers, and pupils 
have increased, but enrollment ratios relatively low — 78 percent 
for primary school and 23 percent for secondary school in 1990. 
Only 56 percent of primary school- aged children reach fourth grade. 
Pervasive and accelerating qualitative decline at all levels. In ear- 
ly 1990s, most state-run schools reported to have closed. Adult liter- 
acy rate estimated at 72 percent (84 percent for males, 61 percent 
for females) in 1992. 

Health and Welfare: Life expectancy at birth in 1991 estimated 
at fifty- two for males and fifty-six for females. In 1994 overall life 
expectancy estimated at forty-seven years, forty-nine for females 
and forty- six for males. Infectious and parasitic diseases — including 
malaria, trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness), onchocerciasis (river 
blindness), and schistosomiasis — major health threat. Measles, di- 
arrheal diseases, tetanus, diphtheria, pertussis, poliomyelitis, tuber- 
culosis, and leprosy also prevalent. Majority of population also 
infected with intestinal worms. Acquired immune deficiency syn- 
drome (AIDS) and other sexually transmitted diseases spreading 
rapidly. State-run health care system in virtual collapse in early 
1990s. Private sources of health care reach only 50 percent of popu- 
lation. Only 14 percent of population has access to safe water. Mal- 
nutrition widespread, especially among children. 

Economy 

General Character: Since colonial times, dependent on exports 
of few commodities, particularly copper, cobalt, and coffee. Heavy 
government participation in and ownership of enterprises in all sec- 
tors, especially mining; management often inefficient, corrupt. 
Postindependence development undermined by misguided, over- 
ambitious economic policies. Key sectors and infrastructure neglec- 
ted. In early 1990s, economy on verge of collapse despite vast 
mineral resources; formal sector barely operational; most activity 
in informal economy. 

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): GDP growth negative since 1989, 
estimated at - 8.0 percent in 1992. Statistics rough approximations, 
do not include large informal economy, estimated to be three times 
size of official economy. 

Currency and Exchange Rate: Consistently overvalued zaire (Z) 



xxvn 



leading to huge discrepancy between official and black-market ex- 
change rates. Dramatic decline in value since 1985. Exchange rate 
in 1985: Z50 = US$1; rate in December 1993 estimated at 
Zl 10,000,000 = US$1. 

Budget: Government regularly overspent since independence. Finan- 
cial administration characterized by widespread mismanagement, 
corruption, and poor budgetary control. Budget deficit Z703,632 mil- 
lion in 1992, projected to total Zl, 097,909,000 million in 1993. 
Government generally regarded as bankrupt in early 1990s. 

Debt: Massive foreign debt, estimated at US$10,705 million in 1991. 
Debt-service ratio 15.4 percent in 1990. In 1992 Zaire essentially 
terminated debt repayment, paying only US$79 million of US$3,450 
million due. Main bilateral and multilateral lenders froze financial 
aid programs in early 1990s, regarded as unlikely to agree to resched- 
ule or cancel existing debt or to approve further borrowing. 

Agriculture: Main economic sector, employing 65 percent of work 
force, accounting for approximately 32 percent of GDP through- 
out 1980s. Potential to be net exporter of agricultural produce, but 
greatiy underutilized; as little as 1 percent of land under cultiva- 
tion. Zaire not self-sufficient in food production in 1990s. Sector 
neglected, suffered from nationalizations in 1970s, lack of invest- 
ment funds, and inadequate infrastructure for transport of produce. 
Major food crops cassava, corn, rice, and plantains, followed by 
bananas, beans, peanuts, millet, sorghum, yams, potatoes, and fruits. 
Main staple food cassava. Principal cash crops coffee, palm oil and 
palm kernel oil, sugar, cocoa, rubber, and tea. Coffee most impor- 
tant cash crop; prices, exports, and quotas tighdy controlled by 
government. Estimated 30 to 60 percent of coffee crop smuggled 
out of country. 

Mining: Mining, mineral processing, and petroleum extraction 17 
percent of GDP in 1990. Mineral exports, principally copper, cobalt, 
diamonds, and gold, provided nearly 75 percent of export earnings 
in 1990. Sector major source of government revenues. Traditional- 
ly world's largest producer of cobalt, fifth largest copper producer, 
second or third largest producer of industrial diamonds. Copper min- 
ing mainstay of economy, but had virtually collapsed from many 
years of neglect and from economic chaos in 1990s. 

Industry: Manufacturing sector accounted for only 1.7 percent of 
GDP in 1988. Concentrated in Kinshasa and mining area of Sha- 
ba, consists largely of consumer goods, mainly food processing, textile 
manufacturing, beer, cigarettes, metalworking, woodworking, and 



xxviii 



vehicle assembly. Manufacturing in formal economy virtually at 
standstill by 1992 in wake of general economic chaos and military- 
led looting and rioting. Many enterprises in informal sector. 

Energy: Sector largely government- controlled, but lacks coordi- 
nation and planning. Tremendous hydroelectric potential, estimated 
at 100,000 megawatts. Installed capacity estimated at 2,486 mega- 
watts in 1987, with 95 percent hydropower. Largest hydroelec- 
tric site at Inga dams on lower Congo River supplies mining center, 
main power consumer, in Shaba Region via 1 , 725-kilometer high- 
voltage transmission line. Operational status of line precarious in 
early 1990s because of lack of maintenance. Fuelwood and char- 
coal primary household energy sources and used by small in- 
dustries, contributing to deforestation. Offshore oil production since 
1975, onshore since 1979. Reserves estimated at 140 million bar- 
rels in early 1990s, likely to be depleted unless new exploration 
successful. Domestic production heavy crude that cannot be re- 
fined domestically; all production (9.9 million barrels in 1991) ex- 
ported for refining. Petroleum imported for refining to meet 
domestic need for fuel and other finished petroleum products. 

Foreign Trade and Balance of Payments: Copper, cobalt, crude 
petroleum, diamonds, coffee, and gold most significant exports. 
Primary imports machinery and other capital goods for mining in - 
dustry as well as fuels, consumer goods, and foodstuffs. Belgium, 
United States, and other West European countries main partners. 
Trade balance positive in 1980s but dropped by 1991 because of 
decrease in world commodity prices, drops in production, and rises 
in import prices. Current account balance consistently negative be- 
cause of massive increase in external debt service. Overall balance 
of payments generally negative; net capital transfers insufficient 
to cover current account deficit. Cross-border smuggling wide- 
spread. 

Foreign Aid: Multilateral aid and bilateral aid from West, espe- 
cially Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and United States, once 
significant. All but humanitarian assistance (primarily food aid) 
cut off in 1990-91 because of Zaire's economic chaos and human 
rights abuses. 

Fiscal Year: Calendar year. 

Transportation and Telecommunications 

Roads: Network of approximately 145,000 kilometers, but only 



xxix 



2,500 kilometers paved. Vast interior virtually devoid of roads. En- 
tire network in serious disrepair in early 1990s. 

Railroads: 5, 138 kilometers in three discontinuous lines: one linking 
Kinshasa and Matadi, another in northeastern Zaire, and another 
in southeastern Zaire to export minerals. National Route (Voie 
Nationale) combines rail and river transport network between 
copper-mining region of Shaba and principal port of Matadi. En- 
tire rail system in desperate need of repair in early 1990s. 

Inland Waterways: Traditionally important, but limited in early 
1990s because barges old and in short supply and marking of naviga- 
ble channels neglected. Congo River most significant waterway for 
passengers and freight between Kinshasa and Kisangani. In late 
1993, riverboats between Kinshasa and Kisangani said to have 
ceased operating because of lack of fuel and spare parts. 

Ports: Ports limited because Zaire has tiny Atlantic coastline of 
about forty kilometers. Matadi on lower Congo River principal 
port, but not accessible by large vessels, also Atlantic port at Boma 
and inland ports at Kinshasa and at Ilebo on Kasai River. 

Air Transport: Principal airport at Kinshasa badly damaged by 
looting in late 1991, subsequently used by few foreign airlines. 
Travelers could fly to Brazzaville in Congo and continue to Kin- 
shasa by ferry across Congo River. Domestic air services deterio- 
rated in 1980s and 1990s. National carrier, Air Zaire, virtually 
bankrupt. 

Telecommunications: In 1990 about 32,000 telephones, most in 
Kinshasa. Adequate international service, domestic service limit- 
ed. In early 1990s, entire system dysfunctional. Residents of most 
larger towns could receive radio and television programming. In 
1990 estimated 40,000 television sets and 3.7 million radio receivers, 
but system in poor condition. Only reliable national radio network 
said to be that run by Roman Catholic Church. 

Government and Politics 

Government: Republic with strong presidential authority domi- 
nated since 1965 by Mobutu Sese Seko. Personalistic regime often 
described as "presidential monarchy," in which Mobutu has run 
government as personal fiefdom, using national treasury as check- 
book and disbursing rewards and punishments at will. Corruption, 
nepotism, and cronyism pervasive. Administrative structure effec- 
tively fused with sole legal political party, Popular Revolutionary 



xxx 



Movement (Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution — MPR). 

Regime ostensibly changed in April 1990 with announcement 
of move toward multiparty democracy. In mid- 1991 national con- 
ference, ultimately known as Sovereign National Conference (Con- 
ference Souveraine Nationale — CSN) convened to oversee drafting 
of new constitution and smooth political transition. Transitional 
Act adopted August 1992 to serve as provisional constitution, 
provided for parliamentary system with figurehead president, High 
Council of the Republic (Haut Conseil de la Republique — HCR) 
provisional legislature,^ and first state commissioner (prime minister) 
head of government. Etienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba elected head 
of two-year transitional government, recognized by Western pow- 
ers, unable to govern because of Mobutu's continued control of 
key military and security forces, treasury, media, and administra- 
tive facilities. Mobutu also reconvened former legislature, National 
Legislative Council (Conseil National Legislatif — CNL), attempted 
to obtain more favorable draft constitution, and, in March 1993, 
appointed rival government under Prime Minister Faustin Birind- 
wa. Since then, government stalemate, with two parallel govern- 
ments vying for political supremacy. Agreement reportedly reached 
in October 1993 on new transitional constitution, transitional parlia- 
ment, and electoral schedule, but no action taken by mid- 1994. 

Politics: From 1967 until 1990, MPR sole legal political party. 
Formal registration of political parties allowed December 1990, and 
numerous parties sprang up. Principal opposition party Union for 
Democracy and Social Progress (Union pour la Democratic et le 
Progres Social — UDPS) led by Tshisekedi. Also Union of Feder- 
alists and Independent Republicans (Union des Federalistes et des 
Republicains Independants — UFERI) led by Jean Nguza Karl-i- 
Bond, Democratic and Social Christian Party (Parti Democrate 
et Social Chretien — PDSC) led by Joseph Ileo Nsongo Amba, Con- 
golese National Movement-Lumumba (Mouvement National 
Congolais-Lumumba — MNC-Lumumba) led by Christophe 
Gbenye, and Unified Lumumbist Party under Antoine Gizenga. 
Major opposition parties united in Sacred Union (Union Sacree) 
during 1991-92. In November 1991, Nguza and UFERI formed 
Alliance of Patriotic Forces as rival opposition force within 
CSN. Other schisms occurred in opposition. In September 1993, 
Tshisekedi formed another coalition called Democratic Forces of 
the Congo-Kinshasa. Pro-Mobutu forces, led by MPR, worked 
together in coalition known as United Democratic Forces (Forces 
Democratiques Unies — FDU). MPR retained the same abbrevia- 
tion and same political orientation, reportedly changed name to 



xxxi 



Popular Movement for the Revival (Mouvement Populaire pour 
le Renouveau). 

Administrative Divisions: Administratively, country divided into 
ten regions plus capital of Kinshasa. Highly centralized system with 
little autonomy at regional or local level. 

Foreign Relations: Foreign policy orientation officially nonaligned 
but generally pro- Western under Mobutu. Mobutu regime tradi- 
tionally perceived as enjoying, and depending on, support of Bel- 
gium, France, and United States. Because of Zaire's size, mineral 
wealth, and strategic location, as well as Mobutu's willingness to 
support Western foreign policy goals (e.g., in Angola and Chad), 
Mobutu able to capitalize on Cold War tensions to garner support 
and substantial economic and military assistance. Until early 1990s, 
Western powers mostly disregarded growing evidence of human 
rights abuses and corruption of Mobutu regime. But following end 
of Cold War and chaotic events in Zaire in early 1990s, Belgium, 
France, and United States terminated all but humanitarian aid to 
Zaire, have increasingly pressured Mobutu to improve human 
rights record and institute multiparty democracy. All three nations 
have voiced support for transitional government under Tshiseke- 
di, have refused to recognize rival, Mobutu-appointed Birindwa 
government, but have stopped short of adopting stronger mea- 
sures against Mobutu, such as confiscating his assets abroad or im- 
posing economic sanctions. 

Regional relations significant because Zaire borders on nine other 
states. But relations with neighbors often tense because of refu- 
gees, smuggling, mutual harboring of antigovernment rebels, and 
border violations by security forces. 

International Agreements and Memberships: Member of many 
international and regional organizations, including United Nations 
(UN) and its specialized agencies, World Bank, International Mone- 
tary Fund, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, International 
Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), International Telecom- 
munications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), Nonaligned Move- 
ment, Organization of African Unity (OAU), African Development 
Bank, Economic Community of Central African States (Com- 
munaute Economique des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale — CEEAC), 
and Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (Com- 
munaute Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs — CEPGL). 

National Security 

Armed Forces: Zairian Armed Forces (Forces Armees Zairoises — 



xxxn 



FAZ) consisting of army, navy, air force, and paramilitary gen- 
darmerie, which also functions as nation's primary police organi- 
zation. Total FAZ strength estimated at 49,100 in 1993, including 
25,000 army, 1,300 navy, 1,600 air force, and 21,000 gendarmerie 
personnel. In addition, 10,000-member Civil Guard, not techni- 
cally part of the FAZ, performs integral national security and police 
role. Official FAZ mission is to defend country against all internal 
and external threats, but in practice primary task has been sup- 
pressing perceived internal threats to the Mobutu regime. 

Major Military Units: Army most significant military force; most 
capable and trusted unit is elite Special Presidential Division (Di- 
vision Speciale Presidentielle — DSP). In chaotic political and secu- 
rity situation of early 1990s, DSP only military unit regularly paid, 
and thus loyal and effective instrument of control. 

Military Equipment: Wide variety of poorly maintained equip- 
ment, mostly of United States, French, and Chinese origin. Most 
equipment not operational because of shortages of spare parts, poor 
maintenance, and theft. 

Foreign Military Relations: Since independence, country has 
benefited from variety of foreign military assistance, especially from 
Belgium, France, United States, and Israel, also China and 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea). But 
Western nations terminated military assistance in early 1990s be- 
cause of widespread human rights abuses and prevailing nation- 
wide chaos. 

Internal Security Forces: Two national organizations perform- 
ing police and internal security functions: 21,000-member National 
Gendarmerie and 10,000-member Civil Guard, both ineffective, 
suffering from poor training, discipline, and equipment, and un- 
reliable pay. Many members contribute to lawlessness by practic- 
ing banditry and extortion. 



xxxin 



ho 

OABON 



CAMEROON 



! 




X7 



j SUDAN 



HAUT-ZAIRE 



( CONGO 



EQUATEUR 
Mbandaka 



Lafe. 
Albert X'' 



■ Kisangani 
\ ® 




W Mai- 
" 9{dombe 

) Bandundu 
BANDUNDU 



Kinshasa 



1i BAS- ^ KINSHASA 
^ZAIQEl 



r 



i i 

KASAI- 



V. 



KASAI- 
ORIENTAL 



UGANDA 

. — x . ~» • 

J • RWANDA j 

/ (. GomaJ^X 



Kindu 

m 



SUD-KIVU 
>. L/Wra ®j 



{MANIEMA \ 
; BURUNDI 



ANGOLA 



MCcmtic 
Ocean 





International boundary 




Region boundary 


® 


National capital 


® 


Region capital 





100 200 Kilometers 





100 200 Miles 



) OCCIDENTAL^ 

y 

i. 

> 



* • i. i i , < mi.,, " J 

I 

; 24 




representation 



Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of Zaire, 1993 



xxxiv 



Introduction 



ZAIRE HAS LONG BEEN CONSIDERED SIGNIFICANT be- 
cause of its location, its resources, its potential, and (perhaps para- 
doxically) because of its weakness. The country has been at the 
center of a number of crises over the years, most notably follow- 
ing independence, during the Congo crisis of the 1960s, when there 
was a threat of the Cold War spilling over and heating up in Cen- 
tral Africa. Again in the 1990s, Zaire is threatening to become a 
source of international instability. 

Zaire's importance is to some extent geopolitical. It borders on 
no fewer than nine other states. These countries range from Arab- 
dominated Sudan in the north, to Angola in the south. Hence, in 
defending its borders Zaire can — and has — become entangled in 
political rivalries extending all the way from Libya and Egypt to 
South Africa, i.e., the length of the continent. During the 1990s, 
Zaire's borders with Angola and especially Rwanda have been in- 
ternational flash points. 

Zaire's minerals add to the country's importance. Although the 
value attached to them by outsiders has varied over the years, the 
country's resources remain impressive. In recent years, Zaire has 
been the world's largest producer of cobalt, second or third largest 
producer of industrial diamonds, and fifth largest producer of cop- 
per. Zinc, tin, manganese, gold, tungsten-bearing wolframite, nio- 
bium, and tantalum also are found in Zaire. In addition, the 
Atlantic coast contains important oil reserves, and the country also 
has some coal deposits. Also intriguing, in terms of Zaire's develop- 
ment prospects, is the country's immense agricultural and hydro- 
lectric potential, believed to be sufficient to feed and power the entire 
continent. Obviously, however, the potential represented by these 
resources has yet to result in any significant benefit for the vast 
majority of Zaire's impoverished population. For example, failure 
to reinvest in the mining sector, since the mid-1980s at least, has 
diminished Zaire's ability to profit from its mineral resources. By 
1994 it appeared that copper and cobalt production had declined 
to the point that diamonds were Zaire's most import export. 

Indigenous developments laid the groundwork for what has be- 
come Zaire. Well before Europeans arrived in the fifteenth entury, 
the indigenous peoples had developed iron-working and long- 
distance trade. Large states had emerged, notably among the Kongo 
and Luba peoples of the southern savannas. Artistic traditions that 



xxxv 



have become world renowned had begun, particularly in the areas 
of sculpture, weaving, and music. 

For the last five centuries, the area of present-day Zaire has also 
been influenced by the outside world. The Portuguese navigator 
Diogo Cao reached the estuary of the Congo River in 1483. Shortly 
thereafter commercial and diplomatic relations were established be- 
tween Portugal and the coastal Kongo Kingdom; the slave trade 
soon came to dominate the relationship, however. Over the cen- 
turies, a larger and larger portion of the Congo Basin was drawn 
into trade networks connected to the Adantic Coast. By the founding 
of the Congo Free State in 1885, most of its territory was linked 
to one of these Atlantic networks or to two newer ones that tied 
the country to the Nile Valley and the Indian Ocean. 

"Traditional" culture in Zaire has been substantially modified 
by these precolonial contacts with the outside world. The so-called 
traditional diet of many Zairian communities, for example, includes 
crops from the Western Hemisphere introduced by the Portuguese 
(notably cassava, or manioc as it is called in Zaire) and rice, in- 
troduced from the East coast of Africa by the Afro- Arabs in the 
nineteenth century. 

The colonization of what became Zaire took place in an atmos- 
phere of intense international competition. The Scottish mission- 
ary, David Livingstone, first brought the Congo to the attention 
of the Western world through his explorations of the Congo River 
basin, beginning in the mid-nineteenth century. Then, in 1878 jour- 
nalist Henry Morton Stanley was commissioned by Leopold II, 
king of Belgium, to undertake additional explorations and to es- 
tablish Belgian sovereignty along the Congo. In 1884-85, Leopold's 
claims to the Congo River basin were recognized by the major pow- 
ers at the Conference of Berlin, and the Congo Free State was es- 
tablished under his personal rule. In 1908, following international 
criticism of the brutalities tolerated by Leopold, Belgium assumed 
direct control of the colony, which henceforth was called the Bel- 
gian Congo. 

Once Leopold's personal fiefdom had been replaced by a more 
orthodox arrangement, the Belgian Congo largely disappeared from 
international view. However, Belgium remained very nervous 
regarding the intentions of the major powers toward the colony 
and with good reason. Germany planned to link its colonies in West 
and East Africa by annexing the Belgian Congo, had it won World 
War I. Adolf Hider had designs on the Belgian Congo during World 
War II. Moreover, in the late 1930s, the British apparently consid- 
ered trying to buy Hitler's good will by giving him the Belgian 



xxxvi 



Congo. In both cases, the colony's strategic position as well as its 
minerals made the acquisition appealing. 

France had only recognized Leopold's sovereignty over the lion's 
share of the Congo Basin with a reservation, namely a right of first 
refusal should Leopold give up the territory. The French raised 
this supposed right when Belgium took over the Congo Free State 
and again in 1960 when Belgium proposed to grant independence 
to the colony. 

The legacy of nervousness regarding the threat to its colony helps 
to explain the ambiguity of Belgium's response to the Katanga (now 
Shaba) secession of 1960 — i.e., supporting the secessionist regime 
while denying it the official recognition that might have enabled 
it to consolidate its independence. Had the Katangan leaders 
achieved full independence, they might have opened the door to 
non-Belgian investors in Katangan minerals, as indeed occurred 
during the 1970s. 

Bula matari ("he who breaks rocks" in Kikongo, the language 
of the Kongo people) became the name of the Leopoldian state at 
its very beginning and is still used to refer to the state, for exam- 
ple in radio broadcasts in indigenous languages. The name graphi- 
cally symbolizes the brutal form of extortion — extracting ivory and 
natural rubber from the Congolese — by which Leopold attempted 
to pay the cost of penetration of the territory and development of 
infrastructure. 

The Belgian Congo was run on a somewhat different basis. 
Philosophically, "paternalism" served to guide and justify the ac- 
tions of the administration. But coercion or the threat of coercion 
never was far from the surface. The brutality of colonial rule, par- 
ticularly in its early years, left a double legacy. On the one hand, 
it created strong resentments on which nationalist movements could 
draw. At the same time, it generated a mood of fear and hopeless- 
ness that deterred the appearance of nationalist movements. 

The state shared responsibility for administration and develop- 
ment with the Roman Catholic Church and business interests in- 
volved in mining and plantations. State, church, and business thus 
constituted what was called, even by Belgian officials, the "colonial 
trinity." It was not simply a question of the state's taking care of 
administration, the church of evangelization, and the business com- 
munity of economic development. Rather, the tasks of the three 
overlapped and reinforced one another. In the postcolonial era, 
particularly after 1965 under Mobutu, finding a new equilibrium 
among the members of the "trinity" and sorting out the areas of 
responsibility of each would pose major problems, particularly with 
regard to education and management of the economy. 



xxxvn 



The troubled role of the military in Zairian politics also has its 
roots in the colonial era. Since the days of the Congo Free State, 
the Zairian state has had a strong military dimension. The Force 
Publique, or colonial army, was essentially used to subdue and con- 
trol the indigenous population, although it served outside the colony 
during the two world wars. Many of the Free State's administra- 
tive personnel were military officers, drawn not only from Belgium 
but also from the United States, Canada, and European countries 
ranging from Norway to Turkey. Although courses were set up 
to train civilian administrators, the Force Publique remained the 
backbone of the Congo Free State and the Belgian Congo. 

The first rank-and-file troops were foreigners from the coasts of 
East Africa and West Africa, but as the Free State began to recruit 
Congolese, it tended to rely on what were seen as "martial races," 
first people of the middle reaches of the Congo River (the so-called 
Ngala or Bangala) and then the Tetela from southeastern Zaire. 
Although later quotas spread recruitment more evenly across the 
colony, there is some reason to think that the early imbalances were 
perpetuated by differential re-enlistment and promotion. During 
decolonization, military men of Ngala and Luba-Kasai back- 
grounds, in particular, played major roles in the fall and murder 
of the first prime minister, Patrice Lumumba. 

After a series of revolts had demonstrated the danger of ethni- 
cally defined units, the Belgians made sure that all units down to 
the lowest levels were ethnically mixed. The Force Publique sup- 
posedly was the most "national" institution of the Belgian Con- 
go, as well as the guarantor of the Pax Belgica. But with the benefit 
of hindsight, it is evident that both the Pax Belgica and the na- 
tional quality of the Force Publique were somewhat mythical. 

The unity of the Force Publique was also mythical, or at least 
exaggerated. Certainly, by the time independence arrived in 1960, 
various politicians had established contact with adjutants from their 
respective ethnic groups. These contacts laid the groundwork for 
division of the army into warring camps in the tense atmosphere 
surrounding accession to independence and for the Force Publique 
mutiny of July 1960. The mutiny obviously was directed at the 
Belgian officers; less obviously, it was directed at Prime Minister 
Lumumba, instigated in particular by soldiers whose ethnic affinities 
led them to sympathize with Lumumba's rivals such as President 
Joseph Kasavubu, Albert Kalonji, and Jean Bolikango. 

Failed decolonization was to a large extent responsible for the 
Congo crisis of the early 1960s. Considerable economic develop- 
ment took place under Belgian rule, but within a highly paternalistic 
framework in which Africans were confined to the lowest ranks of 



xxxvm 



the administration and the economic enterprises. Although oppo- 
sition to Belgian rule became manifest in the late 1950s, Belgium 
made no preparations for decolonization. Rioting in Leopoldville 
(now Kinshasa) in January 1959, however, forced Belgium's hand 
and led to an agreement whereby the colony gained independence 
as the Republic of the Congo on June 30, 1960, and the First. 
Republic was established. 

Independence was followed immediately by crisis, dramatized 
by the mutiny of the Force Publique on July 5 and the secession 
of the country's richest province, Katanga, on July 11, soon fol- 
lowed by a similar move in southeastern Kasai Province (now Kasai- 
Oriental Region and Kasai-Occidental Region). The crisis was fur- 
ther compounded by the power struggle between Prime Minister 
Lumumba and President Kasavubu, ultimately culminating in Lu- 
mumba's assassination in January 1961 at the hands of Katangan 
secessionists, and also, according to most accounts, with the con- 
nivance of Mobutu and others in Kinshasa as well as the United 
States and Belgian governments. 

From its inception, the Congo crisis had an international dimen- 
sion. The chaos that followed on the heels of independence was 
caused not only by conflict among Congolese but also by foreign 
interference. Politics in the First Republic involved numerous rival- 
ries among political leaders on behalf of various Congolese constit- 
uencies, ethnic or otherwise. At the same time, however, outside 
forces clearly intervened in Congolese politics and decisively de- 
termined outcomes. The Force Publique mutinied in large part be- 
cause Belgium had persistently refused to Africanize the officer 
corps, even following independence. In response to the mutiny, 
Belgium sent in troops, ostensibly to protect Belgian lives, but the 
intervention was seen by many Congolese as an act of unwarrant- 
ed aggression, perhaps even an attempt by Belgium to reoccupy 
the Congo. Belgium also played a role in the secession of Katan- 
ga. Moi'se Tshombe was backed by Belgian settlers and financial 
interests when he declared the independence of Katanga. 

The crisis acquired a broader international dimension when a 
multinational United Nations (UN) force was sent in, at the invi- 
tation of President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba, to 
restore peace and bring Katanga back into the fold. Lumumba's 
own actions then inexorably drew the fledgling nation into the Cold 
War and, ultimately, sealed Lumumba's own fate. 

The conflict between President Kasavubu and Prime Minister 
Lumumba had several dimensions, including a personality clash, 
different bases of support, and diametrically opposed conceptions 
of the ultimate character of the Congolese polity. But international 



xxxix 



factors helped precipitate the crisis between the two — specifically, 
Lumumba's policies toward Belgium, the UN, and the secessionists, 
including his insistence on converting the newly arrived UN forces 
into a military instrument for bringing Katanga and Kasai back 
under the control of the central government. Lumumba's greatest 
mistake, however, was his decision to accept substantial Soviet aid 
in order to attack secessionist areas. This move brought to a cli- 
max the issue of communist influence, which had been a source 
of growing concern to the West and to more moderate Africans 
alike. 

Indeed, historical accounts of the Congo crisis almost uniform- 
ly place it in a Cold War context. In particular, United States policy 
toward the Congo is seen as a response to a perceived threat of 
Soviet involvement in the region. (More recently some scholars 
have also attempted to demonstrate the involvement of American 
mining interests in the shaping of United States policy toward the 
Congo.) Certainly, United States opposition to Lumumba and con- 
sistent support over the years for his eventual successor, Mobutu 
Sese Seko, were dictated by Cold War concerns. 

The secession of Katanga was finally suppressed in January 1963 
by UN forces, but the next year the nation's viability was threat- 
ened by "Lumumbist" rural insurgencies in Kwilu and in the east 
that soon controlled about half of the national territory. Once again, 
international assistance proved pivotal in the survival of the na- 
tion. The rebellion was defeated by the national government only 
because of support from Belgium and the United States. 

In 1965, when the tide had turned against the Lumumbist re- 
bellion but the threat was not over and national politics was again 
paralyzed by a rivalry between the president and the prime minister, 
army commander General Joseph-Desire Mobutu (later Mobutu 
Sese Seko) seized power. He abolished parties, then established 
a single party, the Popular Revolutionary Movement (Mouvement 
Populaire de la Revolution — MPR). The logic of single-party rule 
was pushed to its limits in the 1974 constitution, when all public 
institutions (including the army and the university) became sub- 
sidiaries of the MPR. Despite the rhetoric of party rule, however, 
most observers agree that what emerged was a personalisitic dic- 
tatorship, dominated by Mobutu and a clique of close associates. 

The chaos of the First Republic obviously provided a justifica- 
tion for Mobutu's coup of 1965, and for his subsequent establish- 
ment of a single-party dictatorship. However, as Zairians struggle 
to establish multiparty democracy in the 1990s, it is important to 
remember that the legacy of the First Republic was not all nega- 
tive. When political debate was opened after 1990, a number of 



xl 



politicians invoked the 1964 Constitution of Luluabourg (Lulua- 
bourg is now called Kananga) as a model for a new federalist con- 
stitutional order. 

Once in power, Mobutu reversed the process of territorial frag- 
mentation that had begun in 1960. From twenty-one provincettes 
in 1965, the number of administrative divisions was cut first to 
twelve provinces (known as regions after 1972), then to eight, plus 
Kinshasa, representing a nearly complete restoration of the colonial 
boundaries. (In the early 1990s, the most populous region, Kivu, 
was divided into three regions — Nord-Kivu, Sud-Kivu, and Manie- 
ma, corresponding to the three provincettes of the 1960s.) Under 
Mobutu the regions, once quasi-federal political units with their 
own governments, were reduced to administrative subdivisions of 
the unitary state. Not until 1984, when Mobutu accepted sugges- 
tions from external aid donors that he carry out political "liberali- 
zation," were the regions given legislative assemblies and a degree 
of politico-administrative autonomy. The extreme centralization 
of power under Mobutu, and the abuses that followed from that 
centralization, led to a push for decentralization once political de- 
bate emerged after 1990. The push for democratization is attributa- 
ble, above all, to the courage of opposition groups and of ordinary 
Zairians. Yet external linkages were important, notably the pub- 
licity given to the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (Union 
pour la Democratic et le Progres Social — UDPS) in Europe and 
North America. 

Mobutu's style of governance reflects both continuity and change. 
Much analysis has focused on the changes wrought by Mobutu, 
but outside observers often fail to understand an important area 
of cultural continuity from which the Mobutu regime has derived 
much of its power and legitimacy. Mobutu is a president, not a 
king. He travels in jet aircraft and appears on television. Yet some 
of his ideas, and some of the ideas that his subjects have about him, 
are based on traditional Zairian sources and uses of power. 

First, it is important to distinguish between the ideology and the 
practice of leadership. Ideologically, a precolonial Congolese rul- 
er (emperor, king, or chief) was seen as a father to his people. He 
had a priestly function, as intermediary between the material and 
spiritual worlds. The symbols of rule expressed his uniqueness; only 
the ruler could wear the skin of the leopard or the feathers of the 
eagle, for these beasts were kings of their respective spheres of the 
animal world. 

At the same time, and particularly in the vast equatorial forest 
(Mobutu's home area), the ruler was an entrepreneur. He built 
up wealth, which he used on his own behalf, but also on behalf 



xli 



of his people. The successful ' 'big man" {mokonzi in Lingala) built 
up a community of blood relatives, allies, clients, dependents, wives, 
slaves, and others. Copper, the symbol of wealth in precolonial 
Zaire, adorned the chiefs and elders. However — and this point was 
missed by many analysts until recently — the community was 
described in terms of genealogy, the ruler being presented (and 
his rule justified) in terms of his being the head of the family. 

This model of the ruler as father (ideologically) and entrepreneur 
(behaviorally) has carried over into postcolonial Zaire. For exam- 
ple, in reconstructing the army after the mutinies and secessions 
of the early 1960s, Mobutu behaved very much as the "big man." 
He tied other officers to him by means of resources, often from 
his foreign backers, which he channeled to them, meaning that 
troops loyal to Mobutu were more likely to be paid, and to be paid 
on time, than other troops. 

After 1965, and especially after 1970, Mobutu's relationship 
with his principal political associates — government ministers, ad- 
visers, and high-ranking military personnel — also was based on the 
"big man" model. Indeed, the term presidential monarch has been 
used, appropriately, to describe Mobutu. Acting as "Father of the 
Nation," his self-awarded title, Mobutu presided over a political 
system that had the formal trappings of a republic but was in real- 
ity the personal fiefdom of the president, who used the national 
treasury as his personal checkbook and disbursed both rewards and 
punishments at will. Cabinet ministers, for example, were routinely 
shuffled in and out and political allies exiled or "recuperated," 
as political fortunes rose and fell — or as Mobutu's whims dictated. 

The Mobutu regime also sought legitimacy through ideology. 
The MPR initially espoused a doctrine of nationalism, borrowed 
from Lumumba's Congolese National Movement (Mouvement Na- 
tional Congolais — MNC) and other parties of the early postindepen- 
dence era. By 1971 it was promoting authenticity (see Glossary), 
espousing "authentic" Zairian nationalism and rejecting foreign 
cultural influences. The most dramatic symbol of this Zairianiza- 
tion (see Glossary) process was the change of the country's name 
to Zaire in October 1971 and the gradual renaming of its cities 
and provinces (later regions). By 1974 the official ideology had 
metamorphosed into Mobutism (see Glossary), in which the acts 
and sayings of the leader were glorified, increasingly to a ridiculous 
degree. To "Founder-President" were added ever more extrava- 
gant praise-names: "Guide of the Revolution," "Helmsman" (bor- 
rowed from Mao Zedong), "Mulopwe" (emperor, or even god- 
king), and finally "Messiah." At this point, the ideology of the 
regime had become so overblown that many Zairians and most 



xlii 



foreign observers found it impossible to take seriously. But many 
of the themes in the Mobutist ideology — the yearning for cultural 
and economic autonomy and for strong, paternalistic leadership — 
resonated with deeply held opinions on the part of Zairians, among 
both the elite and the general poulace. Nevertheless, it is difficult 
to avoid the conclusion that this ideology served to justify the domi- 
nation of the political system by a self-serving ruling class. 

Cultural nationalism inevitably brought the Mobutu regime into 
conflict with the Roman Catholic Church, which, along with the 
state and the business community, made up the "colonial trinity." 
But the church, whose active following includes 46 to 48 percent 
of the population of Zaire, possesses worldwide links and a resilient 
institutional infrastructure and thus was able to withstand the re- 
gime's pressures. Roman Catholic institutions, for example, particu- 
larly schools and health services were — and remain — comparable 
in extent and vastly superior in quality to those of the state. 

Although the church had welcomed the Mobutu regime, the 
hegemonic ambitions of the MPR aroused suspicion, and a con- 
ference of bishops in 1969 privately noted "dictatorial tendencies" 
in the regime. The following year, Joseph Cardinal Malula ex- 
pressed fears about the regime's intentions at a mass celebrating 
the tenth anniversary of independence. In the presence of both King 
Baudouin of Belgium and Mobutu, he denounced political elites 
for "a fascination with the triumphant and the superficial, and a 
hunger for the lavish." 

The Roman Catholic Church also viewed as an affront the ab- 
sorption of the jewel of its educational system, Lovanium Univer- 
sity, into the secular National University of Zaire (Universite 
Nationale du Zaire — UNAZA) in August 1971. Even more seri- 
ous was the regime's announcement in December 1971 that party 
youth branches had to be established in the seminaries. 

Another battle took place over the concept of authenticity. The 
regime's stress on "mental decolonization" and "cultural disalien- 
ation" could be seen as a disguised attack on Christianity as an 
import from the West. One symbolic accoutrement of the authen- 
ticity campaign, the 1972 elimination of Christian forenames, was 
treated by the church as a particular affront. The church's opposi- 
tion to the name changes led to a dramatic riposte. Cardinal Mal- 
ula, archbishop of Kinshasa, became the target of attacks as a 
"renegade of the revolution"; he was evicted from the residence 
the regime had built for him and was forced to leave the country 
for three months in 1972. 

In late 1972, the regime moved to monopolize the socialization 
process, banning all religious broadcasts and dissolving church- 



xliii 



sponsored youth movements. The zenith of this campaign came 
at the end of 1974 when the religious school networks were na- 
tionalized, celebration of Christmas as a public holiday was end- 
ed, and the display of religious artifacts was limited to the interior 
of churches. (The school networks were, however, returned to the 
churches eighteen months later when the state proved unable to 
operate them effectively.) 

Over the following years, the Roman Catholic bishops in Zaire 
continued to criticize the Mobutu regime. In 1976 Monsignor 
Kabanga, archbishop of Lubumbashi, issued a pastoral letter 
denouncing a system under which, "Whoever holds a morsel of 
authority, or means of pressure, profits from it to impose on peo- 
ple and exploit them, especially in rural areas. All means are good 
to obtain money, or humiliate the human being. . . ."It was small 
wonder, then, that the Roman Catholic Church maintained moral 
standing in the eyes of the population and that Monsignor Lau- 
rent Monsengwo Pasinya, archbishop of Kisangani, was chosen 
president of the national conference that was convened in the ear- 
ly 1990s to oversee a transition to a democratic, multiparty politi- 
cal system. 

Despite the importance of cultural nationalism, over which church 
and state battled, the primary component of Zairian nationalism 
was economic and was designed to wrest control of the economy 
from foreign interests and place it firmly in Zairian hands. As early 
as 1967, this desire had led to a clash with Belgium over control 
of Zaire's major industrial concern, the Upper Katanga Mining 
Union (Union Miniere du Haut-Katanga — UMHK), which mined 
copper and cobalt. Eventually, a compromise was reached under 
which a state-owned mining company, General Quarries and Mines 
(Generale des Carrieres et des Mines — Gecamines), was created. 
The settlement proved lucrative to UMHK and brought unantici- 
pated costs to Zaire. 

The linkage between politics and the economy became increas- 
ingly clear in the 1970s. In 1973 the government seized 2,000 eco- 
nomic enterprises owned by foreigners (but not those owned by 
Americans) and turned them over to Zairians, mainly members 
of the political elite. Mobutu was the leading beneficiary. Within 
a few months, the scope of the disaster of this Zairianization was 
clear, but instead of turning back, Mobutu plunged forward into 
the "radicalization of the revolution," apparently inspired by his 
visit to China and North Korea. "Radicalization" supposedly in- 
cluded the nationalization of trade and the mobilization of agricul- 
tural brigades to relieve food shortages. But in its application, the 
new measure became an assault on the primarily Belgian-owned 



xliv 



industrial sector. The effect was to extend the chaos of Zairianiza- 
tion to virtually all spheres of the economy. 

As the Zairian economy went into a tailspin, Mobutu finally came 
to realize the magnitude of the catastrophe ushered in by Zairi- 
anization and radicalization. In November 1975, he introduced 
a new policy of retrocession (see Glossary), under which a substan- 
tial portion of Zairianized enterprises were returned to their origi- 
nal owners. Meanwhile, however, almost irreparable damage had 
been inflicted upon the economy. 

The economic disaster resulting from Zairianization was com- 
pounded by the regime's insistence on undertaking large-scale in- 
dustrialization, in the process squandering the country's mineral 
wealth and neglecting the agricultural sector. To fund its grandi- 
ose industrial projects, the regime resorted to heavy foreign bor- 
rowing. When the prices of commodities (especially copper), on 
which Zaire was heavily dependent, dropped drastically and the 
cost of vital imports, such as petroleum products, skyrocketed in 
the mid-1970s, export earnings and government revenues dropped 
sharply, and Zaire faced a grave economic and financial crisis. 

Since 1975, Zaire's massive foreign debt has had a major im- 
pact on policy, both foreign and domestic. Some causes of the huge 
debt, such as the rise in the price of petroleum imports and the 
fall in the price of copper exports, were beyond Zaire's control. 
Others were not, notably Zairianization and radicalization, the 
squandering of funds on prestige projects, and their diversion into 
overseas bank accounts by the president and the elite. 

As a consequence of the debt, foreign creditors became major 
actors in the Zairian political process — and in economic develop- 
ment, thus making a mockery of Mobutu's much- vaunted quest 
for economic independence. In 1976 the first of a series of economic 
stabilization programs was adopted under the guidance of the In- 
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF — see Glossary) and other exter- 
nal forces. During the next eighteen years, Zairian authorities 
alternately cooperated with and struggled against the internation- 
al financial institutions. In 1994 this era came to an end (for a time, 
at any rate) as the World Bank (see Glossary) closed its office in 
Kinshasa, and Zaire was expelled from the IMF. 

In line with the IMF's economic orthodoxy, the "Mobutu Plan" 
of 1976 and each successive plan was supposed to reduce corrup- 
tion, rationalize and control expenditures, increase tax revenues, 
limit imports, boost production, improve the transportation infra- 
structure, eliminate arrears on interest payments, ensure that prin- 
cipal payments were made on time, and improve financial manage- 
ment and economic planning. But ultimately all efforts at reform or 



xlv 



significant change were undercut by the patrimonialism (see Glos- 
sary) and rampant corruption that characterized the regime. 

Zaire's public and publicly insured debt was rescheduled by the 
Paris Club (see Glossary) at least seven times between 1976 and 
1987. Zaire's private creditors also rescheduled their part of the 
debt in 1980 and at various times thereafter, and numerous meet- 
ings of World Bank and Western aid consortia were held to gener- 
ate further official assistance, starting in 1979. 

When the first two standby agreements with the IMF yielded 
meager results, the IMF and the World Bank decided in the early 
1980s to send their own teams of experts to run key posts in the 
Bank of Zaire (the country's central bank), the Customs Office, 
and the Ministries of Finance and Planning. The head of the Bank 
of Zaire team, Erwin Blumenthal of the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many (West Germany), cut off credit and exchange facilities to firms 
of members of the political elite and imposed very strict foreign 
exchange quotas. However, Mobutu and his colleagues were able 
to evade many of the restrictions and to wear down Blumenthal 
and the other experts. After Blumenthal 's departure, the interna- 
tional teams were careful to avoid what one member called the "po- 
litical hotspots," and the regime continued on its self- destructive 
course. 

In 1981 Zaire began to cooperate with the IMF, laying off large 
numbers of civil servants and teachers. In 1983 it agreed to devalue 
its currency by 80 percent and to liberalize the economy. In 
response, the IMF agreed to a fifth standby agreement, and the 
Paris Club agreed to roll over more than US$1 billion of debt, with 
a maturity of eleven years, in contrast to the eight years normally 
approved for debtor nations. In 1985 and 1987, the Paris Club 
rescheduled Zaire's debt for ten years and fifteen years, respec- 
tively, making it clear that the greater leniency being shown to Zaire 
was a reward for following IMF guidelines. 

Although Zaire appeared to be following the IMF guidelines, 
benefits were slow to appear in terms of improved economic ac- 
tivity within the country, not to mention improved living condi- 
tions. Mobutu, said to be one of the ten wealthiest men in the world, 
continued to enrich himself at the expense of the people, whose 
living standards continued to decline. 

During the years when lenders and Western governments were 
somewhat successful in controlling the financial practices of Zaire's 
rulers, they paid dearly for their success in that they were forced 
to provide the regime with additional support to compensate for 
the withdrawn financial opportunities. Belgium, France, Israel, and 
the United States, among others, provided both symbolic and 



xlvi 



instrumental backing in the form of military assistance. In the case 
of the United States, the military relationship increased when the 
two countries found themselves supporting the same faction in the 
Angolan civil war in 1975. In 1986-87 Mobutu reportedly agreed 
to allow the United States to ship arms to Angolan rebels via Zaire 
and to refurbish the air base at Kamina (in southeastern Zaire), 
in exchange for increased aid as well as United States pressure on 
the IMF to treat Zaire leniently. Mobutu and his regime thus 
benefitted substantially from the perceived United States need to 
assure a stable Zaire and to garner Zairian support for United States 
strategic interests in sub-Saharan Africa. 

Over the years, the Western powers rewarded Mobutu both eco- 
nomically and militarily and for the most part maintained silence 
in the face of increasing evidence of his regime's abuses. Only since 
the end of the Cold War has support for Zaire become more con- 
ditional. By early in the 1990s, the West had terminated most aid 
to the Mobutu regime and was putting increasing pressure on 
Mobutu to improve his human rights record and institute multiparty 
democracy. 

In the early years of his regime, many Zairians gave Mobutu 
credit for restoring order and securing the country's borders. In- 
creasingly, however, the forces of order have become sources of 
disorder within the country. Rather than protecting the Zairian 
people, the armed forces and security forces prey upon them and 
are perceived, justifiably, as instruments of repression. Examples 
of their excesses abound. One of the most egregious instances oc- 
curred in Bandundu in 1978, when the security forces summarily 
executed about 500 people following a minor uprising set off by 
a self-proclaimed prophet. Another occurred in 1981, when perhaps 
100 diamond miners were killed in Kasai-Oriental. The incident 
that gained the greatest international attention and that had the 
most serious repercussions for the Mobutu regime was the May 
1990 massacre of students at the University of Lubumbashi. Up 
to 100 students were killed in the incident, ultimately prompting 
most multilateral and bilateral donors to terminate all but hu- 
manitarian aid to Zaire. 

Just as they have failed to provide internal order, so, too, have 
the armed forces failed to secure Zaire's borders. In 1977 and 1978, 
Shaba Region was invaded by Angola-based rebels, who had to 
be repulsed by foreign troops. In 1984 and again in 1985, another 
opposition group briefly held the town of Moba on the shore of 
Lake Tanganyika, again demonstrating the Zairian military's lack 
of capability — and the government's lack of control of its territory. 
In 1993 there were reports that the Zairian army had clashed with 



xlvii 



troops of yet another opposition group, this time along the Ugan- 
da border. In 1994 Zaire's border with Rwanda also became a major 
source of insecurity, as over one million refugees fled from per- 
ceived danger in their home country. 

In 1977, following the first Shaba invasion, Mobutu responded 
to Western pressure for reform by paying lip service to the notion 
of democracy in Zaire. Competitive elections among multiple can- 
didates for the legislature were permitted — but only within the 
single-party framework, which is to say that the system still offered 
no real political choice. All electoral choice, or competition, took 
place solely within the MPR. Nevertheless, by 1980, some of the 
deputies elected in 1977 — The Thirteen, as they were called — had 
challenged Mobutu's system of rule through an open letter catalog- 
ing regime abuses. The Thirteen ultimately evolved into an inter- 
nal opposition party, the UDPS. Despite being banned, with its 
leaders largely exiled or under internal house arrest, the UDPS 
was to prove remarkably resilient and formed the core of opposi- 
tion to the regime when a political opening occurred in the early 
1990s. 

In April 1990, Mobutu radically transformed the political en- 
vironment by announcing the establishment of the Third Republic, 
ostensibly a new, multiparty system of government. The initiative 
was presented as a magnanimous gesture on the part of the presi- 
dent, but in fact Mobutu was bowing to renewed pressure for 
change from Western governments and international financial in- 
stitutions. In addition, his move was a calculated attempt to quell 
growing domestic discontent. 

It soon became clear that Mobutu's announcement had unleashed 
volatile forces that he would be hard-pressed to contain. And, in 
fact, Mobutu proceeded to embark on a checkered course of half- 
hearted moves toward democratization, interspersed with periodic 
brutal crackdowns on dissent. 

The immediate result of Mobutu's announcement was the un- 
leashing of efforts to publicize existing organizations and to found 
new ones. Although Mobutu backpedaled furiously, attempting to 
constrict the political space he had appeared to open up, by De- 
cember 1990, independent political parties were permitted to 
register. By mid- 1991, over 200 political parties had been recog- 
nized. Most significant among them was the UDPS, which had 
emerged as the main opposition party. Other major opposition par- 
ties were the Democratic and Social Christian Party (Parti Demo- 
crate et Social Chretien — PDSC) led by Joseph Ileo and the Union 
of Federalists and Independent Republicans (Union des Federalistes 
et des Republicains Independants — UFERI) led by Jean Nguza 



xlviii 



Karl-i-Bond. Opposition activities were spearheaded by a mul- 
tiparty coalition, the Sacred Union (Union Sacree). 

In August 1991 , Mobutu also convened a long-promised national 
conference ultimately known as the Sovereign National Confer- 
ence (Conference Nationale Souveraine — CNS), which was osten- 
sibly designed to oversee the drafting of a new constitution and 
to manage the transition to a democratic, multiparty political sys- 
tem. But inevitably conflicts arose between a conference determined 
to assert its sovereign powers and a president equally determined 
not to cede control of the government, and the conference was very 
much an on-again-off-again institution throughout 1991 and most 
of 1992. 

Nevertheless, the conference, encompassing over 2,800 delegates, 
did meet — intermittently — to debate the country's political future 
from August 1991 until it finished its work in December 1992. In 
August 1992, the conference passed a Transitional Act to serve as 
a provisional constitution. That act established a parliamentary sys- 
tem with a figurehead president, a 453-member High Council of 
the Republic (Haut Conseil de la Republique — HCR) to serve as 
a provisional legislature, and a first state commissioner (prime 
minister) to serve as head of government. Mobutu and the confer- 
ence also agreed to abide by the Comprehensive Political Agree- 
ment (Compromis Politique Global), which included ten principles, 
the most significant being that no institution or organ of the tran- 
sition should use its constitutional powers to prevent any other in- 
stitution from functioning. In essence, all parties agreed to share 
power and to abide by the constitutional provisions embodied in 
the Transitional Act. 

UDPS leader Etienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba was duly elected 
as the transitional prime minister by the CNS on August 15, 1992. 
On August 30, he appointed a transitional government of "na- 
tional union," including various Mobutu opponents, but no 
Mobutu supporters. In December 1992, the CNS dissolved itself 
and was succeeded by the HCR, headed by Archbishop Monseng- 
wo. As the supreme interim legislative authority, the HCR was 
authorized to formulate and adopt a new constitution and to or- 
ganize legislative and presidential elections. But Mobutu refused 
to accept the authority of the HCR or the legitimacy of any con- 
stitution it might formulate, instead reconvening the former legis- 
lature, which had been suspended, and entrusting it with drafting 
a rival constitution more to his liking. In March 1993, Mobutu 
further undermined the Tshisekedi transitional government when 
he convened a special "conclave" of political forces to chart the 
nation's future, including devising a new constitution. Mobutu then 



xlix 



dismissed the Tshisekedi government, although according to the 
Transitional Act he did not have the authority to do so. At his urg- 
ing, the conclave then named Faustin Birindwa as prime minister 
of a so-called government of national salvation. 

Since that time, Zaire has had two parallel, rival governments 
vying for domestic and international acceptance. The Birindwa 
government did not receive international recognition. But the 
Tshisekedi government, although recognized internationally, has 
from the beginning lacked the power or resources to govern. In- 
deed, it has never been able to govern effectively because of its in- 
ability to limit Mobutu's powers except on paper. The result of 
this situation is government stalemate, which has worked to Mobu- 
tu's advantage. 

Mobutu has been able to cling to power because of three main 
factors. First, he has maintained control of key institutions, includ- 
ing the central bank, state radio and television facilities, the security 
police, and the military, particularly the elite Special Presidential 
Division (Division Speciale Presidentielle — DSP). In fact, control 
of key military units has been critical to Mobutu's continued ex- 
ercise of power. He has used those units to obstruct the function- 
ing of the transitional government, to intimidate critical opposition 
leaders and the media, to promote anarchy and chaos, to disperse 
popular demonstrations, and to incite ethnic violence. Mobutu has 
also retained control over the network of diplomatic representa- 
tives abroad, in particular Zaire's delegations to the UN and its 
specialized agencies. Likewise, he apparently has maintained control 
over the network of regional, subregional, and local administra- 
tors in the interior of the country. 

Mobutu's position also has been strengthened by his ability — 
and that of his allies — to incite ethnic violence, thereby promoting 
instability, fostering anarchy, weakening the opposition, and un- 
dermining mass political mobilization against his regime. Officially 
instigated cases of ethnic violence clearly occurred in Shaba, where, 
beginning in August 1992, attacks on Luba-Kasai — Tshisekedi 's 
ethnic group — were incited by Nguza and other former opposition 
figures, including the governor of Shaba, Gabriel Kyungu wa Kum- 
wanza. Officials may also have played a role in ethnic violence in 
Nord-Kivu, where indigenous local people attacked immigrants 
from Burundi and Rwanda, collectively known in Zaire as the 
Banyarwanda. Both instances of ethnic tension reflect a history of 
enmity and resentment. But most observers believe that the re- 
cent violence is less historical than the result of deliberate govern- 
ment manipulation designed to divert popular resentment of the 
Mobutu regime. In the Nord-Kivu case, Mobutu also was able 



1 



to demonstrate his control of the use of force, sending in the DSP 
to quell the violence. 

In Shaba, however, Mobutu stood aside and let events proceed 
without interference, no doubt because they appeared to be work- 
ing to his advantage. In addition to instigating the ethnic cleans- 
ing campaign in Shaba, Nguza and Kyungu have raised the specter 
of Shaban autonomy, at times threatening to pursue it if Tshisekedi 
were to be "forced on" the nation as prime minister in a political 
settlement. Observers note that both issues have been used to the 
detriment of Tshisekedi and the UDPS and to the benefit of 
Mobutu, who can thus present himself as the only political figure 
who can hold Zaire together, including Zaire's most vital region, 
mineral-rich Shaba. 

A final factor in Mobutu's ability to retain power is his con- 
summate political skill. Over and over again, he has succeeded in 
dividing the opposition and in co-opting key opponents. For ex- 
ample, in October 1991, Mobutu appointed Tshisekedi as prime 
minister of a transitional coalition government, but fired him just 
one week later following a dispute over the apportionment of 
ministerial portfolios. When the Sacred Union refused to choose 
a successor, Mobutu named Bernardin Mungul-Diaka, leader of 
a small opposition party, as prime minister. Then, in late Novem- 
ber 1991, Mobutu formed another transitional government, this 
time under Nguza. The appointment of Nguza proved to be high- 
ly beneficial to Mobutu, in that it brought Mobutu the support 
of Nguza and his followers while at the same time fracturing the 
opposition. At the time, Nguza was a Tshisekedi rival in the Sacred 
Union, but he subsequently left the Sacred Union, after other mem- 
bers termed his nomination as prime minister a "betrayal." He 
then created a rival political coalition within the CNS, the Alli- 
ance of Patriotic Forces. Encompassing some thirty parties, led by 
UFERI, the Alliance ostensibly remained committed to political 
change but rejected "extremist" stands. 

Mobutu's appointment of Birindwa as prime minister in March 
1993 further undercut opposition forces. Birindwa proved to have 
little difficulty in recruiting ministers for a government. Political 
expediency aside, co-optation of political figures by Mobutu and 
Birindwa was facilitated by the disastrous economic situation. In 
June 1993, six political leaders from the Sacred Union joined the 
Birindwa government and then left the Sacred Union, claiming 
that the Sacred Union had become too extremist. They then formed 
their own coalition, which they called the Restored Sacred Union 
(Union Sacree Renovee). Having joined the Mobutu-appointed 
Birindwa government, the six could no longer be regarded as ardent 



li 



proponents of political change. The same could be said of Nguza, 
given his acceptance of a position as first deputy prime minister 
in charge of defense in the Birindwa government. 

In 1994 Mobutu's tactics of stalling and dividing the opposition 
bore further fruit. Birindwa resigned as prime minister of the rival, 
Mobutu-appointed government. The selection of a successor then 
fell to the new 780-member legislature created in late 1993. That 
body, the High Council of the Republic (Haut Conseil de la 
Republique — HCR)-Parliament of the Transition (Parlement de 
la Transition — PT), or HCR-PT, encompassed both the HCR and 
Zaire's former, pro-Mobutu legislature. After five months of po- 
litical vacuum, in June 1994 the HCR-PT finally elected a candi- 
date from the moderate opposition, Leon Kengo wa Dondo, to 
replace Birindwa. The election was an affront and setback for 
Tshisekedi. Although continuing to assert his claim to be the sole 
legitimate head of government, Tshisekedi was not among the seven 
candidates for the job of government leader. Instead, he simply 
called upon members of the HCR-PT to ' 'confirm" his position 
as prime minister. 

Kengo was a founder of the Union of Independent Democrats 
(Union des Democrates Independants — UDI) in 1990. Although 
denounced at its founding as "MPR II," the UDI in fact represent- 
ed a claim to an independent future by politicians and business- 
men formerly close to Mobutu. Kengo had been premier twice 
before, in the 1980s, and was considered an advocate of fiscal 
austerity as promoted by the IMF. His candidacy in 1994 was put 
forward by the Union for the Republic and Democracy (Union 
pour la Republique et la Democratic — URD), a coalition includ- 
ing the UDI and other moderate groups within the Sacred Union. 
The radical wing of the Sacred Union, driven primarily by the 
UDPS, termed Kengo's selection ' 'illegal and anticonstitutional" 
and continued to regard Tshisekedi as the country's only legiti- 
mate prime minister. 

For its part, the HCR-PT claimed to be acting in accord with 
popular sentiment. But observers note that the HCR-PT' s claim 
to represent popular feeling is questionable, given the swelling of 
its ranks by members of the pro-Mobutu parliament. In fact, no- 
body can say whether or to what extent the Mobutists and their 
allies in Kengo's UDI as well as the other moderate parties really 
represent a majority of the Zairian people. 

Political unrest continued as Tshisekedi attempted to assert his 
authority and pro-Mobutu forces strove to discredit Tshisekedi. 
On June 5, Tshisekedi, speaking publicly for the first time in three 
months in front of a large crowd in Kinshasa, threatened to paralyze 



lii 



the diamond extraction industry if Mobutu continued to refuse him 
the job of prime minister. He called on diamond workers to go 
on indefinite strike to halt production and exports of diamonds. 
The threat was regarded as credible because Tshisekedi has con- 
tinued to enjoy broad support from the working class, especially 
in his home region of Kasai-Oriental, where diamond mining is 
centered. If successful, such a strike would have a major impact 
on the Mobutu regime, which has come to rely on the diamond 
industry for revenue since the demise of Gecamines and the cop- 
per industry. 

One response to Tshisekedi' s threat was further harassment and 
the concoction of what he termed, credibly, ' 'a plot" against him. 
A week after his speech, Tshisekedi was arrested and detained for 
ten hours. According to the official version of events, Tshisekedi 
had been driving within a military camp near the presidential resi- 
dence at N'Sele, east of Kinshasa, in a car containing arms and am- 
munition. In protest of Tshisekedi 's arrest, demonstrators burned 
cars and set tires alight in a Kinshasa suburb. During the demon- 
stration, one of Tshisekedi' s advisers was arrested by the Civil 
Guard and allegedly tortured. The demonstration was just one sign 
that the task confronting Kengo — guiding the country through the 
transition toward the Third Republic — is a daunting one given the 
extremely confused political situation in the country and the general 
state of collapse at all levels. As he said in a brief speech after his 
election, his priority will be to restore the authority of the state. 
He also promised to promote ' ' national harmony, reconciliation, 
tolerance, democracy, and the exercise of freedom." It appeared 
to most observers, however, that these goals would be extremely 
difficult to achieve, considering the economic and social situation. 

While the struggle between Mobutu and the opposition has 
dragged on, the nation's economic and financial situation has con- 
tinued to deteriorate. The country remains heavily indebted and 
impoverished. A large proportion of its population lives outside 
of the formal economy, eking out a marginal existence through sub- 
sistence agriculture and informal trade or barter. The standard of 
living for most of the population has continued to decline. 

The export-oriented Zairian economy has been in a free fall for 
a number of years, suffering the effects of monumental, institu- 
tionalized corruption, neglect, and mismanagement. The economic 
crisis was worsened by the rampant looting and rioting by unpaid 
troops in late 1991 and again in early 1993, which in turn led to 
the mass exodus of the foreign technicians who had kept the econ- 
omy going — in particular copper production and economic infra- 
structure. 



liii 



Throughout the 1990s, Zaire's economy has been described in 
only the direst of terms. It has been characterized as desperate, 
in ruins, dysfunctional. In fact, the formal economy has almost 
ceased to function. The banking system has collapsed because of 
the rampant hyperinflation and the drastic fall in the value of the 
currency. The central bank, which in the past served as Mobutu's 
personal piggy bank, is for all practical purposes bankrupt. Most 
other banks have closed, and those that have remained open deal 
in cash transactions only. The state takes in few revenues: the tax 
collection system is defunct, few if any customs revenues are col- 
lected, most foreign aid has been cut off, and copper production, 
long the mainstay of the economy and the main source of govern- 
ment revenues, has dropped off significantly. The government has 
been able to pay its bills only by printing new currency. 

The effects of the economic chaos on Zairian society are enor- 
mous: unemployment and poverty are widespread, the economic 
infrastructure has decayed, state institutions have ceased to func- 
tion, and most state-run hospitals and schools have closed. Civil 
servants, teachers, and health- care workers have largely ceased 
working because they have not been paid, and medical equipment 
and medicine are scarce. As a result, diseases once eradicated have 
begun to reappear. Acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), 
sleeping sickness, and malnutrition have become increasingly preva- 
lent. Malnutrition is particularly common among children, as the 
price of food exceeds the financial resources of more and more Zair- 
ian families. The availability of safe drinking water also has be- 
come problematic. 

Most observers of Zaire's deplorable economic and social con- 
ditions marvel at how a land of such superlative natural endow- 
ments — enormous mineral deposits, immense forests, mighty rivers, 
and abundant fertile soils — could have sunk so low. By rights, Zaire 
should have become one of sub-Saharan Africa's most developed 
and wealthiest states. But instead it is an impoverished nation in 
a rich land, with its economy and society in total disarray and most 
of its citizens (80 percent by some estimates) living in absolute 
poverty. When ethnic conflict — which has resulted in the internal 
displacement of several hundred thousand Zairians in the early 
1990s — is taken into account as well, Zaire's characterization as 
"an African horror story" in a recent article by Bill Berkeley in 
the Atlantic Monthly appears well founded. 

And yet, as press accounts continue to emphasize, Zairians have 
somehow survived, their ability to do so a reflection of their abili- 
ty to fend for themselves. In the absence of a functioning govern- 
ment, economy, or social services sector, enterprising individuals 



liv 



have resorted to the informal economy to make a living and to ob- 
tain the goods and services they need. In essence, government 
services — such as health care, schools, road maintenance — have 
been "privatized." Moreover, a de facto decentralization of govern- 
ment power has occurred. Recognizing the weakness of the cen- 
tral government, which can no longer project its power or offer 
its services much beyond the capital city, regions and local commu- 
nities have stepped into the void to provide what order and services 
they can. For example, local businesses may pay for maintenance 
of local infrastructure, and local merchants may band together to 
pay local military and security forces to provide peace and pro- 
tection. 

A less positive result of the individual Zairian's quest for sur- 
vival is, of course, the widespread corruption that has resulted. Re- 
cent travelers to Zaire note the proliferation of "enterprising" 
individuals and "facilitators" who prey on those entering the coun- 
try, attempting to extract payment for a multitude of services. Simi- 
larly, anyone traveling in Zaire encounters frequent roadblocks set 
up by security officials who then extort money in exchange for the 
right to pass. 

On a larger scale, the massive official corruption and greed 
characterizing the Mobutu regime have had disastrous results for 
the country and its people. In an August 1994 article in the Washing- 
ton Post, "An African Giant Falls under Its Own Weight," Keith 
Richburg examines the causes of Zaire's desperate state in the 
1990s. He notes that Zaire has not broken up into civil war like 
Liberia or been overcome by tribal slaughter like neighboring 
Rwanda. Rather, it has crumbled under the weight of years of ram- 
pant corruption, greed, incompetence, neglect, and decay. 

Since the end of the Cold War, Africa has appeared to lose much 
of its significance to the developed world, and African nations gener- 
ally make headlines only when their situation has become catas- 
trophic. Throughout the mid-1990s, Zaire has occasionally been 
featured in the Western media, attention focusing on the mystery 
of how the nation could continue to operate and how Mobutu could 
continue to survive. But as the status quo continued in Zaire, in- 
ternational attention largely shifted elsewhere. 

Zaire entered the spotlight, indirectly, in July 1994 as over 1 
million refugees fleeing ethnic violence in neighboring Rwanda 
crossed the border into Goma in eastern Zaire. In August there 
were fears of an additional mass exodus from Rwanda into Bukavu, 
Zaire, when the French withdrew their troops from Rwanda. The 
number of new refugees into Bukaku remained much lower than 
expected, however, estimated at about 70,000 at the end of August 



lv 



(but the area as a whole was inundated by a total refugee popula- 
tion of about 400,000). 

That Zaire could appear as a safehaven is supremely ironic given 
the condition of Zaire's economy, society, and polity in 1994. The 
irony of the situation was further dramatized by the behavior of 
Zairian border and security forces, who allowed the flood of refu- 
gees to pass, but not before robbing them of whatever food, 
weapons, and other valuables they had managed to bring with them. 
In addition, there were reports of attempts by Zairian officials to 
extort cash payoffs to permit international relief flights to land (or 
to depart), although such flights are supposed to be exempt from 
landing charges. Zairian soldiers reportedly also helped themselves 
to relief supplies. 

The massive influx of Rwandan refugees poses enormous 
problems for Zaire, a country already gripped by anarchy and law- 
lessness and demonstrably unable to meet the needs of its own popu- 
lation, including the many internally displaced Zairians. The area 
is quite inaccessible and is served by a very limited transportation 
infrastructure in very poor condition. This situation hampers the 
ability of international relief organizations, the UN, and foreign 
governments to deliver the food, clean water, and health care sup- 
plies and personnel that are so desperately needed. In addition, 
security has become a major problem as well. The refugee camps 
are beset by common thievery as well as attacks by Hutu extremists, 
loyal to the deposed Rwandan government, seeking Tutsi spies. 
Maintaining control in the camps is the responsibility of Zairian 
military and security forces, but doing so is beyond their capabili- 
ty, despite the presence of several thousand troops in the area, in- 
cluding 400 elite troops dispatched to Goma in response to the 
Rwandan refugee crisis. Moreover, the security forces themselves 
have contributed to the lawlessness in the region by preying on 
both the local populace and the refugees. A popular protest erupt- 
ed in one of the camps in Goma after a soldier killed a money- 
changer who apparently refused to comply with a demand for 
money. 

The squalid, disease-ridden refugee camps that have proliferat- 
ed in the scenic areas surrounding Goma and Bukavu on Lac Kivu 
represent public health hazards, as witness the cholera epidemic 
among refugees in Goma. In addition, some individual refugees, 
eschewing the camps, reportedly have flooded the towns, pitching 
tents in the streets, chopping down trees for firewood, using side- 
walks as toilets, and grazing livestock on lawns and open spaces. 
Even if the toll on Zairians were not so great, it should come as 
no surprise that local Zairians have not welcomed the refugees. 



Ivi 



To understand why, one need only recall the ethnic violence against 
the Banyarwanda — earlier immigrants from Rwanda and 
Burundi — that spread throughout Nord-Kivu in the early 1990s. 

Given all of these factors, the refugee influx appears likely to 
add unbearably to the existing chaos in Zaire. Moreover, some 
analysts fear the prospect of regional conflict if Zaire were to per- 
mit Rwandan Hutu refugees to set up an exile government or stage 
commando raids into Rwanda. Mobutu apparently met with the 
new Rwandan government and pledged not to permit such anti- 
regime activities, but there is substantial room for skepticism. 
Contributing to this skepticism is Mobutu's love of meddling, as 
demonstrated by his involvement in the Angolan civil war. In ad- 
dition, Mobutu supported the Rwandan regime ousted in 1994. 
The Zairian opposition also has accused Mobutu of complicity in 
ethnic violence in Rwanda in May 1994. Mobutu allegedly allowed 
arms to be sent to Hutu hardliners who attacked both Tutsis and 
Hutu moderates; those same Hutu extremists are among the refu- 
gees who have now fled to Zaire. 

There are also indications that Mobutu might somehow turn the 
crisis to his advantage. Before the crisis, Mobutu had become a 
pariah in the eyes of the West. But as the likelihood of Mobutu's 
overthrow receded, and in the face of the overwhelming human 
tragedy in Rwanda, Western leaders appear to have become recon- 
ciled to the idea of working with Mobutu. Mobutu reportedly played 
a role in facilitating the French intervention in Rwanda in sup- 
port of the collapsing Hutu regime, and there are reports that Bi- 
rindwa's replacement by Kengo was brokered by the French, who 
wanted to ensure Mobutu's compliance with its Rwanda policy. 
The United States, too, has been forced to deal with Mobutu and 
has at last replaced its ambassador, long absent from Kinshasa as 
a sign of official United States displeasure with the Mobutu regime. 

Thus, as the summer of 1994 drew to a close, Mobutu appeared 
to have profited from the Rwandan refugee crisis, consolidating 
his political position domestically and rehabilitating his image in- 
ternationally. Despite the deterioration of Zaire and the deplora- 
ble conditions in which most Zairians live, Mobutu appears so 
strongly entrenched that many observers believe he might succeed 
in winning the presidential election set for 1995 — even if he does 
not rig the election. Unfortunately, such an electoral result will only 
bring more stagnation and disintegration to Zaire. 

September 9, 1994 Thomas Turner and Sandra W. Meditz 



lvii 



Chapter 1. Historical Setting 



Wooden figurine 



THIRTY YEARS AFTER ITS BIRTH as an independent state, 
Zaire still bore the imprint of its colonial past. Behind the om- 
nipresent apparatus of control forged by President Mobutu Sese 
Seko since 1965 lurked the shadow of King Leopold II of Belgium, 
whose absolute and arbitrary sovereignty found symbolic expres- 
sion in the Kikongo (language of the Kongo people) phrase bula 
matari ("he who breaks rocks"), a name also applied to the colonial 
armed forces, the Force Publique, and generally evocative of brute 
force. The modern version of the bula matari state was nowhere more 
evident than in the Mobutu regime's extreme centralization of 
authority, highly personalized style of governance, and readiness 
to use force whenever the circumstances seemed to require it. 

The Mobutist state is, however, the product of a complex con- 
catenation of forces that go far beyond the years of Leopoldian au- 
tocracy. Between the formal proclamation of the Congo Free State 
in 1885 and Mobutu's second seizure of power in 1965, a number 
of events occurred that had a profound and lasting effect on the 
Zairian polity and on society. The first occurred in 1908 when the 
Belgian parliament assumed full administrative and political respon- 
sibility for the colony, which until independence in 1960 would be 
known as the Belgian Congo. The second involved the rise of or- 
ganized nationalist activity, symbolized by the 1956 manifesto of 
the Alliance of the Kongo People (Alliance des Bakongo — Abako) 
calling for immediate independence. The crisis of decolonization, 
dramatized by the mutiny of the Force Publique in July 1960, con- 
stituted the third, and by far the most consequential, event. The 
final stage in Zaire's precipitous leap to independence began with 
the proclamation of the First Republic immediately after indepen- 
dence, extended through the convulsive aftereffects of regional seces- 
sions and rural insurgencies, and reached a plateau of sorts after 
the proclamation of the Second Republic in 1965. 

In Zaire, as elsewhere in Africa, both indigenous and Western 
influences have been significant. The impact of the West has been 
felt most strongly through the import of institutions, policies, and 
culture that were radically new to the area. Zairian traditions are 
represented by many different ethnic groups with historically differ- 
ent beliefs, loyalties, and tensions. Whatever their exposure to these 
various historical influences, modern-day Zairians are alike in be- 
ing repressed or neglected by a small and highly centralized politi- 
cal elite. 



3 



Zaire: A Country Study 

Human Origins 

Archaeological evidence of and research on past societies in Zaire 
are scanty, in no small part because of the tropical climate and the 
rain forest covering most of the northern half of Zaire and encom- 
passing much of the Congo River basin. Nonetheless, equatorial 
Africa has been inhabited since at least the middle Stone Age. Late 
Stone Age cultures flourished in the southern savanna after ca. 
10,000 B.C. and remained viable until the arrival of Bantu-speaking 
peoples during the first millennium B.C. Evidence suggests that 
these Stone Age populations lived in small groups, relying for sub- 
sistence on hunting and gathering and the use of stone tools. Some 
of these groups may have remained long enough in one vicinity 
to be considered permanent residents, but others moved, follow- 
ing game along the extensive river network and through the rain 
forest. 

The development of food-producing communities in Zaire is as- 
sociated with the expansion of Bantu-speaking peoples. In a long 
series of migrations beginning ca. 1000 B.C. and lasting well into 
the mid-first millennium A.D., Bantu speakers dispersed from a 
point west of the Ubangi-Congo River swamp across the forests 
and savannas of modern Zaire. A northern group moved north- 
eastward around the swamp and across the northern regions of Zaire 
and setded in the forest zone. Meanwhile, other groups moved south 
and southwest, the former then migrating up the Congo as well 
as into the inner part of the Congo Basin, while the southwestern 
Bantu-speakers spread into modern Gabon, Congo, and lower 
Zaire. 

It was apparently after these movements that Bantu speakers 
spread south and southeastward across the southern Zairian savan- 
nas as far as present-day Angola and Zambia, thereafter continu- 
ing to expand into eastern and southern Africa. These migrating 
groups generally brought with them a technology superior to that 
of the existing inhabitants. The Bantu speakers were better able 
to exploit an area's resources through the practice of agriculture, 
based on yam and oil palm cultivation, and, as time went on, by 
adopting iron tools and technology. 

Bantu-speaking peoples settled in the rain forests and southern 
savannas. Non-Bantu-speaking peoples are found in the grasslands 
north of the forest. Information on the settlement dates and routes 
of migration of these peoples remains vague at best, but they seem 
to have dwelt at first in the northern grasslands and only later 
penetrated the forest. Since perhaps late in the first millennium 
B.C., they have intermingled with the Bantu-speaking groups who 



4 



Historical Setting 



preceded them, in the process creating a complex ethnic mosaic 
(see Ethnic Groups, ch. 2). 

The significance of some of these peoples extends beyond purely 
linguistic considerations. The peoples speaking Central Sudanic 
languages brought with them a new food complex involving cereal 
cultivation and herding. A related food pattern based on cereals 
and hunting was separately introduced to southeastern Zaire from 
East Africa after ca. A.D. 100. Cereal cultivation, hunting, and 
herding were much better adapted to conditions in the savannas 
than the oil palm and yam farming that the Bantu speakers had 
brought with them, and, hence, spread rapidly, especially in the 
southern grasslands. The banana, another important food crop, 
was introduced, apparently, from southern Asia into East Africa 
in the early centuries of the present era and thereafter diffused across 
Central Africa. These new food sources allowed for greater settle- 
ment and population growth in the grasslands; they also contributed 
in no small way to the growth of trade and to increasingly com- 
plex social and political organization among those peoples who dwelt 
in the savannas. 

Early Historical Perspectives 

Zaire's precolonial past is characterized by considerable com- 
plexity. A diversity of social aggregates developed in Zaire, rang- 
ing from the small, autonomous groups of hunters and gatherers 
of the Ituri Forest in the northeast to the centralized chiefdoms and 
large-scale state systems of the savannas, from the settled village 
communities of the interior to the predominantly Muslim and Arab 
trading communities of the eastern region. In order to bring a mea- 
sure of coherence to our understanding of this otherwise confus- 
ing mix of peoples and cultures and to appreciate their enduring 
political, economic, and social legacies, it is important to specify 
the broad criteria by which they can best be differentiated from 
each other. One criterion is the size and scope of the societies con- 
cerned; another concerns the ways in which power was distribut- 
ed between rulers and ruled; a third focuses on the different impact 
of early Westernizing influences on their traditional social systems. 

State Systems Versus Segmentary Societies 

The first and most obvious distinction to be made between the 
various peoples who first populated the area of Zaire is between 
the small-scale, segmentary societies of the rain-forest zone and 
the state systems of the savannas. Segmentary societies, which may 
be defined as societies that are divided into a number of units, such 
as lineage (see Glossary) or clan (see Glossary) groups, which are 



5 



Zaire: A Country Study 

structurally similar and functionally equivalent, were widely dis- 
tributed across the interior north and south of the great bend of 
the Congo River. Most of the peoples of the rain-forest area were 
organized into village communities, under the leadership of chiefs 
or of dominant clans or lineages. Some of these communities were 
able to absorb or conquer neighboring villages and thus develop 
into sizable chiefdoms. In specific instances, as among the Mang- 
betu, these expanding societies provided the basis for a common 
sense of identity among otherwise unrelated peoples. Elsewhere, 
however, social fragmentation remained one of the most salient 
characteristics of the rain-forest peoples. 

A classic example of such fragmentation is offered by the vari- 
ous communities loosely referred to as the Mongo people, who oc- 
cupied most of the central basin. Divided as they were into congeries 
of smaller communities (Ntomba, Mbole, Kutu, etc.), they had 
nothing resembling a unifying political focus. Their social bound- 
aries were generally coterminous with village groups. The same 
applies to the so-called gens d'eau (water people), a generic term 
coined to designate the Bobangi, Lobala, Ngiri, and neighboring 
groups who lived along water courses to the north of the Congo 
River. Most of the peoples between the Congo and Ubangi, 
however, such as the Ngbandi, Ngbaka, Banda, and Ngombe, pos- 
sessed lineage-based systems that were more hierarchical than those 
found farther south. Finally, to emphasize the great diversity among 
the peoples and their social organization in this region, the Zande 
and the Mangbetu, who lived in the far northeast, were organized 
into states. 

A different picture emerges from the history of the southern 
savannas, the traditional habitat of several large-scale societies with 
centralized political systems, variously described as kingdoms, em- 
pires, and chiefdoms, that emerged between 1200 and 1500 A.D. 
(see fig. 2; fig. 3). These include the Kongo, Lunda, Luba, and 
Kuba state systems, all of which shared certain common features, 
such as a centralized structure of authority identified with a single 
ruler, more often than not enjoying the attributes of divine king- 
ship; a corpus of oral traditions tracing the birth N of the state to a 
mythical figure; and a tendency to incorporate and assimilate 
smaller neighboring societies. Cultural assimilation went hand in 
hand with political conquest. As recent historical research suggests, 
territorial expansion of the original nuclear kingdom involved var- 
ious methods, ranging from armed raids and military occupation 
to more peaceful forms of interaction. Yet in each case, the end 
result was the creation of large-scale political entities that were far 



6 



Historical Setting 



more capable of concerted action than the segmentary societies of 
the rain-forest zone. 

Rulers and Ruled 

Unlike the societies of the rain-forest zone, where power was 
diffused among a group of elders or else centered upon a clan head 
or a village chief, the kingdoms of the southern savannas developed 
elaborate political structures, buttressed by the symbolic force of 
monarchy as well as by military force. Despite significant varia- 
tions in the extent to which kings could be said to exercise an ef- 
fective monopoly of power, relations between rulers and ruled were 
structured along hierarchical lines. Typically, power emanated from 
the central seat of authority to the outer provinces through the in- 
termediation of appointed chiefs or local clan heads. Relations be- 
tween center and periphery, however, were by no means free of 
ambiguity. Ensuring the loyalty of subordinate chiefs was the crit- 
ical problem faced by African rulers throughout the southern savan- 
na zone. 

Although the origins of these kingdoms are shrouded in myths, 
their capacity to expand and conquer was directly related to their 
internal political structure. Thus, the expansion of the Lunda King- 
dom, which probably began in the late sixteenth century and result- 
ed in the so-called Lunda Empire that flourished in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, was critically related to what historian 
Jan Vansina calls "the twin mechanisms of perpetual succession 
and positional kinship." That is, each succeeding officeholder, 
monarch or otherwise, assumed the name, title, and personal iden- 
tity of the original occupant (founder) of the office (perpetual suc- 
cession). At the same time, the new officeholder adopted all kin 
relationships of the founder of the office as his own (positional kin- 
ship). In this manner, the personalized identity and kin ties of each 
founding official were perpetuated over time. These mechanisms 
were extremely useful in that they divorced the political structure 
from the actual descent structure. In so doing, they freed the pro- 
cesses of political recruitment from the constraints of kinship and 
facilitated the recruitment of new officials from within Lunda so- 
ciety and from the ranks of recently conquered peoples. 

By the same token, the Lunda governed through a hierarchy of 
subordinate chiefs, a form of indirect rule, in newly occupied lands, 
a practice that facilitated the adaptation of the political kingdom 
beyond its original homeland. This custom shows how the Lunda 
Kingdom differed in some fundamental ways from the Luba king- 
doms (fifteenth to nineteenth centuries) from which it split off, 
probably in the fifteenth century. Although both evolved out of 



7 



Zaire: A Country Study 




Source: Based on information from Jan Vansina, Kingdoms of the Savanna, Madison, 1968; 

and Jan Vansina, Paths in the Rainforests: Toward a History of Political Tradition in 
Equatorial Africa, Madison, 1990. 



Figure 2. Major Kingdoms in Central Africa, Sixteenth Century 

preexisting chiefdoms and shared many of the same political sym- 
bols, including the notion of divine kingship, only the Lunda were 
able to expand substantially beyond their core area. During the 
seventeenth century, the Lunda expanded toward the west and north- 
west into present-day Angola, initially to escape Luba domination, 



8 



Historical Setting 



and to the south and east, initially in search of copper and salt and 
control of the trade associated with these desirable commodities, 
and later in pursuit of ivory. In the course of that expansion, the 
Lunda established a number of subsidiary states, including an 
eastern branch known as the Kazembe Kingdom of the Luapula 
Valley in the mid-eighteenth century. That kingdom successfully 
controlled the ivory trade in the area and set up a tributary or- 
ganization of subordinate chiefs. 

The absence among the Luba of anything like positional suc- 
cession or perpetual kinship proved a major handicap. The rise 
and fall of at least three different Luba dynasties in the seventeenth 
century testifies to the relative weakness of the Luba monarchy. 
Competition for control of the throne led to incessant civil wars, 
and by the late nineteenth century, the kingdom had become easy 
prey for the Chokwe (often spelled Cokwe) people. 

The Chokwe were originally a seminomadic, Bantu-speaking 
people living near the headwaters of the Kwango and Kasai rivers. 
They were primarily hunters, although their movements permit- 
ted them to trade successfully in such commodities as wax. By the 
start of the nineteenth century, the Chokwe were still largely 
unknown. They expanded dramatically in the second half of the 
century, however, largely at the expense of the Lunda, whose ter- 
ritories they invaded and occupied. Chokwe warriors, armed with 
rifles, wreaked havoc among the Lunda, looting and burning vil- 
lages and either absorbing the local population or selling captives 
into slavery. After about 1885, the Chokwe began to attack the 
Luba as well, but by the end of the century, the Lunda had managed 
to defeat the Chokwe and to drive them back southward. 

Chokwe political structure was similar to that of the Lunda, un- 
der whose chiefs they had originally lived. This structure enabled 
the Chokwe to absorb people organized into small lineages over 
a wide area and to gain military superiority over the indigenous 
population of the lands into which they moved. Once they con- 
quered a people, the Chokwe rapidly assimilated them into their 
own social structure. The reason for their expansion seems to have 
been the rich trade in wax, ivory, slaves and, later, rubber; the 
avenues of Chokwe expansion were along the lines of preexisting 
trade routes. 

External Pressures 

By the late 1800s, new sets of players appeared on the African 
scene, the Arabs in the east and the Europeans in the west, both 
deeply involved in slave-trading activities. The tactical alliance be- 
tween the Luba king, Kasongo Kalombo, who ascended to the Luba 



9 



Zaire: A Country Study 




Present-day STATES 

international boundary 11 i i 1 1 r — = — n 

II 1 I 1 1 Luba kingdoms I : • J Lunda heartland 

100 200 Kilometers II II Luba-Kasai Lunda Empire 

o 100 200 Miles IHH Kuba kingdom 



Source: Based on information from Jan Vansina, Kingdoms of the Savanna, Madison, 1968. 

Figure 3. Major States in the Southern Savannas, Mid- Nineteenth Cen- 
tury 

throne in the 1860s, and Arab traders did little to prevent the dis- 
integration of his kingdom. As elsewhere through the savannas, 
externally inspired local revolts accelerated the process of fragmen- 
tation instigated by competition for the monarchy, causing out- 
lying provinces to break away and set themselves up as more or 
less independent political entities. 

From the inception of Portuguese penetration into the old Kongo 



10 



Historical Setting 



Kingdom in the late fifteenth century, and well into the beginning 
of the scramble for colonies in the nineteenth century, the Kongo 
monarchy was a major pawn in international struggles. These con- 
flicts pitted the Vatican against the Portuguese crown for control 
of African souls, the Dutch (who began arriving on the west coast 
of Africa in the seventeenth century) against the Portuguese for 
control of the slave trade, and ultimately Spain against Portugal 
for sovereignty over the Portuguese Empire. 

The Kongo Kingdom was the first state on the west coast of Cen- 
tral Africa to come into contact with Europeans. Portuguese sailors 
under Diogo Cao landed at the mouth of the Congo River in 1483. 
Cao traveled from Portugal to Kongo and back several times dur- 
ing the 1480s, bringing missionaries to the Kongo court and tak- 
ing Kongo nobles to Portugal in 1485. In the 1490s, the king of 
Kongo asked Portugal for missionaries and technical assistance in 
exchange for ivory and other desirable items, such as slaves and 
copperwares — a relationship, ultimately detrimental to the Kon- 
go, which continued for centuries. 

Competition over the slave trade had repercussions far beyond 
the boundaries of Kongo society. Slave-trading activities created 
powerful vested interests among both Africans and foreigners — 
the Portuguese and later the Dutch, French, British, and Arabs. 
A new source of instability was thus introduced into the coastal 
areas of Central Africa and its hinterland, which greatly hastened 
the decline of the kingdoms. Nowhere is this more evident than 
in the history of the Kongo Kingdom, which was a centralized state 
system ruled by an absolute monarch. 

In the late fourteenth century, a group of Kongo, led by the son 
of a chief from the area of present-day Boma, moved south of the 
Congo River into northern Angola, conquered the territory, and 
established Mbanza Kongo Dia Ntotila (Great City of the King) 
as the capital of their kingdom (the capital was later moved to Sao 
Salvador). By the middle of the fifteenth century, the Kongo king 
ruled the lands in northern Angola and the north bank of the Congo. 
By the early sixteenth century, the kingdom was divided into six 
provinces, each under a subchief or governor, who also held a 
religious title and authority. The last really effective years of the 
Kongo monarchy were from 1641 to 1661, although the kingdom 
endured into the next century. By the eighteenth century, however, 
most of the kingdom's provinces (Mbamba, Mbata, Mpemba, and 
Soyo) had become self-governing principalities. The king, though 
claiming a divine right to the monarchy, had little authority be- 
yond his capital, and internal bickerings that had surrounded his 



11 



Zaire: A Country Study 

throne and further diminished his power also contributed to the 
weakening of the provincial chiefdoms. 

The dynamics of internal fragmentation were directly linked to 
commercial activities. Just as the ownership of slaves became a 
major source of wealth and prestige, both in turn made it possible 
for the slave owners to challenge the authority of the king. Here, 
as elsewhere in the savannas, the competition for slaves introduced 
a major source of instability, creating a permanent state of social 
unrest and civil war. The history of the old Kongo Kingdom en- 
capsulates many of the crises experienced by several other states 
of the savannas in their efforts to cope with the challenge of the 
new economic forces. 

The area of the Congo was one of the principal sources of slaves 
for markets in Arabia, the Middle East, and the New World. The 
trade had devastating effects on both Kongo and non-Kongo com- 
munities for almost 400 years. By the late seventeenth century, up 
to 15,000 slaves a year were sent out of the lower Congo River 
area. The European slave traders were usually the final link in a 
chain of African and Arab merchants who brought slaves down 
to coastal trading posts. The slave trade in the eastern part of 
present-day Zaire was dominated by Arabs and continued until 
the late nineteenth century. All European nations had abolished 
the trade by the mid-nineteenth century, and the end of the Ameri- 
can Civil War in 1865 finally extinguished another main market. 
Besides the obvious depopulation, the slave trade in the Congo area 
had caused many local rebellions and increased ethnic warfare. 

On the eve of the Belgian conquest in the late nineteenth century, 
Congolese societies had reached a degree of internal dislocation 
that greatly lessened their capacity to resist a full-scale invasion. 
Resistance to outside forces was further hampered by the devastating 
raids and civil wars that followed in the wake of the slave trade, 
by the subsequent improvement in the capacity of Africans to des- 
troy each other through the use of firearms, and ultimately by the 
divisions between ''collaborators" and "resisters" and between 
the allies of the Arabs and the allies of the Europeans. In addition, 
a more enduring cleavage had emerged out of the varying exposure 
of Zairian societies to Western influences and early trade activi- 
ties. Long before the conquest of the vast hinterland, the coastal 
communities had had centuries of contact with Europeans; by the 
time the Conference of Berlin began in 1884, on the other hand, 
most of the societies of the interior had yet to experience the full 
impact of European rule. Out of these different historical ex- 
periences emerged different self-images and cultural dispositions. 
That the Kongo peoples were the first Zairian people to challenge 



12 



Historical Setting 



the legitimacy of the colonial state is perhaps not unrelated to their 
long and dramatic experience of European hegemony. 

The Colonial State 

From 1840 to 1872, the Scottish missionary, David Livingstone, 
engaged in a series of explorations that brought the Congo to the 
attention of the Western world. During these travels, Livingstone 
was out of touch with Europe for two years. Henry Morton Stan- 
ley, a journalist, was commissioned by the New York Herald to con- 
duct a search for him. The two met at Ujiji, on the eastern shore 
of Lake Tanganyika, in 1871. Three years later, Stanley was com- 
missioned by the New York Herald and London's Daily Telegraph to 
continue the explorations begun by Livingstone. With three Brit- 
ish companions, Stanley began the descent of the Congo from its 
upper reaches, completing his journey in 1877. Returning to Eu- 
rope, he tried to interest the British government in further explo- 
ration and development of the Congo but met with no success. His 
expeditions did, however, attract another European monarch. 

Stanley's adventures brought the Congo to the attention of Bel- 
gium's King Leopold II, a man of boundless energy and ambi- 
tion. The European occupation of Africa was well under way, but 
the Congo River basin remained for the most part unknown to 
Europeans. With no great powers contesting its control, the area 
appeared to present an ideal opportunity for Belgian expansion. 

Recruiting Stanley to help him from 1878, Leopold II founded 
the International Association of the Congo, financed by an inter- 
national consortium of bankers. Under the auspices of this associ- 
ation, Stanley arrived at the mouth of the Congo in 1879 and began 
the journey upriver. He founded Vivi, the first capital, across the 
river from present-day Matadi and then moved farther upriver, 
reaching a widening he named Stanley Pool (now Pool de Male- 
bo) in mid- 1881. There he founded a trading station and the set- 
tlement of Leopoldville (now Kinshasa) on the south bank. The 
north bank of the river had been claimed by France, leading ulti- 
mately to the creation of the colony of French Congo. The road 
from the coast to Vivi was completed by the end of 1881 , and Stan- 
ley returned to Europe. He was back in Africa by December 1882 
and sailed up the Congo to Stanleyville (now Kisangani), signing 
more than 450 treaties on behalf of Leopold II with persons 
described as local chieftains who had agreed to cede their rights 
of sovereignty over much of the Congo Basin. In 1884 Stanley 
returned to Europe. 

At the Conference of Berlin, held in 1884-85 to settle disputes 
among the European nations and in essence to partition Africa 



13 



Zaire: A Country Study 

among them, thirteen powers, following the example set by the 
United States, separately recognized Leopold IPs International As- 
sociation of the Congo, which had already adopted its own flag, 
as an independent entity. Shortly afterward the association became 
the Congo Free State. By the General Act of Berlin, signed at the 
conclusion of the conference in 1885, the powers also agreed that 
activities in the Congo Basin should be governed by certain prin- 
ciples, including freedom of trade and navigation, neutrality in the 
event of war, suppression of the slave traffic, and improvement 
of the condition of the indigenous population. The conference recog- 
nized Leopold II as sovereign of the new state. 

Shortly thereafter, in order to meet the conference's legal re- 
quirement of "effective occupation," Leopold II proceeded to trans- 
form the Congo Free State into an effective instrument of colonial 
hegemony. Indigenous conscripts were promptly recruited into his 
nascent army, the Force Publique, manned by European officers 
(see The Colonial Period, ch. 5). A corps of European adminis- 
trators was hastily assembled, which by 1906 numbered 1,500 peo- 
ple; and a skeletal transportation grid was eventually assembled 
to provide the necessary links between the coast and the interior. 
The cost of the enterprise proved far higher than had been antici- 
pated, however, as the penetration of the vast hinterland could not 
be achieved except at the price of numerous military campaigns. 
Some of these campaigns resulted in the suppression or expulsion 
of the previously powerful Afro-Arab slave traders and ivory mer- 
chants. Only through the ruthless and massive suppression of op- 
position and exploitation of African labor could Leopold II hold 
and exploit his personal fiefdom. 

The Lgopoldian Legacy 

"Without the railroad," said Leopold IPs agent, Henry Mor- 
ton Stanley, "the Congo is not worth a penny." Without recourse 
to forced labor, however, the railroad could not be built; nor could 
the huge concessions made to private companies become profita- 
ble unless African labor was freely used to locate and transport rub- 
ber and ivory; nor could African resistance in the east be overcome 
without a massive recruitment of indigenous troops. The cruel logic 
of the revenue imperative left the Leopoldian system with no ap- 
parent option but to extract a maximum output of labor and natural 
resources from the land (see From Colonial Times to Independence, 
ch. 3). 

At the heart of the system lay a perverse combination of rewards 
and penalties. Congo Free State agents and native auxiliaries (the 
so-called capitas) were given authority to use as much force as they 



14 




Waterfalls, such as this one on the Kasai River, hampered 
early European exploration of the interior. 

deemed appropriate to meet delivery norms, and because their 
profits were proportional to the amount of rubber and ivory col- 
lected, the inevitable consequence was the institutionalization of 
force on a huge scale. Although native chiefs were expected to 
cooperate, the incessant and arbitrary demands made on their 
authority were self-defeating. Many chiefs turned against the coloni- 
al state; others were quickly disposed of and replaced by state- 
appointed " straw chiefs." Countless revolts ensued, which had an 
immediate effect on the scale and frequency of military expeditions. 
As the cost of pacification soared, Leopold II declared a state mo- 
nopoly on rubber and ivory. The free- trade principle that had once 
been the cornerstone of the Congo Free State thus became a legal 
fiction, apdy summed up in this pithy commentary of the time: 
"Article one: trade is entirely free; article two: there is nothing 
to buy or sell." 

Protestant missionaries were the first to alert international pub- 
lic opinion to the extent of cruelties visited upon the African popu- 
lation, and with the creation of the Congo Reform Association in 
1904, the public outcry against the Congo Free State reached major 
proportions. Not until 1908, however, did the Belgian parliament 
vote in favor of annexation as the most sensible solution to the flood 
of criticisms generated by the reform movement. The Colonial 



15 



Zaire: A Country Study 

Charter provided for the government of what was thereafter known 
as the Belgian Congo. This charter permitted the king to retain 
a great deal of authority and influence over affairs in the colony 
through power of appointment and legislative authority, but his 
power was constitutional rather than personal and, therefore, limit- 
ed. The main purpose of the charter was to prevent the establish- 
ment of a royal autocracy in the colony similar to the one that had 
existed in the Congo Free State. 

For almost the entire period of the Congo Free State (1885-1908), 
the peoples of present-day Zaire were subjected to a staggering se- 
quence of wars, repression, and regimentation. The impact of this 
colonial experience was so devastating, and its aftereffects so dis- 
ruptive, because the initial shock of European intrusion was fol- 
lowed almost immediately by a ruthless exploitation of human and 
natural resources. In terms of its psychological impact, the bula matari 
state left a legacy of latent hostility on which subsequent genera- 
tions of nationalists were able to capitalize; on the other hand, the 
sheer brutality of its methods generated a sense of fear and hope- 
lessness, which, initially at least, discouraged the rise of organized 
nationalist activity. 

Belgian Paternalism: Underlying Postulates 

Reduced to its essentials, Belgian paternalism meant that basic 
political rights could be withheld indefinitely from Africans as long 
as their material and spiritual needs were properly met. Paternal- 
ism drew its rationale from a vision of Africans as essentially "big 
children," whose moral upbringing required a proper mixture of 
authority and dedication. Its essence is perhaps best captured in 
the opening sentence of a celebrated work by a former colonial 
governor general, Pierre Ryckmans: "Dominer pour servir (Domi- 
nate in order to serve. . . . This is the only excuse for colonial con- 
quest; it is also its complete justification.)." 

Putting into effect the social welfare postulate of paternalism was 
largely the responsibility of parastatal organizations, semipublic 
corporations enjoying a substantial measure of autonomy in or- 
ganizing and dispensing social services. Their names became iden- 
tified with a wide spectrum of social welfare activities ranging from 
medical services to housing projects, from education and health 
care programs to family allowances and social centers {foyers sociaux) 
for African women. An extensive network of social welfare pro- 
grams thus reached out to the governed to ensure their material 
well-being 4 'from the womb to the tomb." Roman Catholic and 
Protestant missions, meanwhile, assumed full responsibility for 
their spiritual well-being, the former being more numerous in the 



16 



Historical Setting 



endeavor. Through their teaching and evangelical activities, and 
with the help of generous subsidies from the state, missions thus 
formed a major element in the armature of paternalism. 

The darker side of this paternalism was the political control and 
compulsion underlying Belgian colonial policies. Extensive restric- 
tions affected Africans in their everyday life — ranging from prohi- 
bition of the purchase of liquor (until 1955) to stringent police 
surveillance and curfew regulations in the urban centers, and from 
compulsory crop cultivation to various forms of administrative and 
social regimentation in the countryside. 

Part of the Belgian goal was to teach Africans to work, not in 
the "childish" pursuits of their own culture, but in organized, ra- 
tional routines of productive wage labor in the European manner, 
for European employers. Such labor was considered to exercise a 
civilizing influence. A profitable by-product was the provision of 
cheap labor. The Colonial Charter had declared that no one could 
be compelled to work, and by 1912 the forced delivery of rubber 
and other natural products had come to a stop, but until the depres- 
sion of the 1930s, mining and agricultural companies resorted to 
recruiting methods little different from forced labor. 

The colonial government believed that Africans could be "civi- 
lized" through agricultural as well as industrial labor. Agricultur- 
al programs began as early as 1917, when the administration first 
required Africans to raise certain designated crops. The crops most 
often raised were cotton for export or food crops for towns and mines 
within the colony, neither of which threatened European interests, 
nor did either ensure the health and well-being of the indigenous 
population. 

To help boost production, Belgium set up a national institute 
that introduced improved agricultural technology to the colony dur- 
ing the 1930s. But a program that had greater influence on Afri- 
can life eventually was the establishment of native farming 
settlements {paysannats indigenes). African peasants were resettled 
on them in order to intensify the cultivation of cash crops or ex- 
port crops, to conserve the fertility of the soil, and to facilitate the 
introduction of modern farming methods. The settlements were 
generally successful but represented another European intrusion 
into African culture. As such, most of the settlements collapsed af- 
ter independence. 

In the political realm, Belgian policy was theoretically to respect 
the authority of African chiefs and political leaders, permitting Afri- 
cans to be ruled by their own customs unless these customs were 
judged disruptive of public order or harmful to development. Coloni- 
al administrators divided the entire Belgian Congo into chiefdoms 



17 



Zaire: A Country Study 

(chefferies), later grouped into sectors. Chiefs, salaried by the state 
and given administrative and police powers, were expected to pro- 
vide the link between Africans and the colonial administration. But 
the Belgian division of its territory into chiefdoms often did not 
reflect ethnic boundaries or indigenous political units, and Belgian 
authorities were generally ignorant of African custom. Moreover, 
the Belgian colonial system did not encourage indigenous involve- 
ment in the colony's political life. By placing the inculcation of 
colonial moral principles above political education, and social wel- 
fare benefits above the apprenticeship of social responsibility, Bel- 
gian policies inevitably ruled out the introduction of institutions 
and procedures designed to nurture political experience and respon- 
sibility. 

Not until 1957, with the introduction of a major local govern- 
ment reform, were Africans given the opportunity to elect local 
communal councils (see Postwar Reforms, this ch.). Important as 
this step was in laying the foundation for local self-government and 
a major departure from the postulates of paternalism, it was heav- 
ily mortgaged by previous decades of enforced political passivity. 
When independence began to seem imminent in the late 1950s and 
the future Zairians could make a limited use of their political free- 
dom, few had acquired the necessary practical experience to guide 
their first steps toward democracy. 

The Apparatus of Control 

State, church, and business formed the trinity of powers upon 
which the royal hegemony rested during most of the colonial era. 
By virtue of their special relationship with the state, formalized by 
the 1906 Concordat between the Vatican and Belgium, Catholic 
missions were the privileged instrument of primary and vocation- 
al education for the colony's people; the operating costs of their 
educational and missionary activities were almost entirely covered 
by state subsidies. According to some estimates, the mission es- 
tablishment had virtually as many personnel as the state and three 
times as many outposts. The business corporations, involved in 
plantations and mining, were given virtually a free hand to recruit 
African labor, to organize food production for the labor camps, 
and to provide social services for African workers and their fami- 
lies. Both missionary and business interests were given direct ac- 
cess to the state through the appointment of representatives to 
advisory organs, such as the Government Council in Leopoldville 
and the Colonial Council in Brussels. The result was a close and, 
most of the time, mutually supportive relationship between the state 
on the one hand and the church and business interests on the other. 



18 



Traditional tombs 
in Bas-Zaire Region 
Courtesy Zaire National 
Tourism Office 



The colonial state was, of course, the pivotal element in this coa- 
lition of interests, because of its unchallenged monopoly of force 
and highly visible administrative presence. From the time of its 
creation in 1888 until its dissolution in the wake of the 1960 muti- 
ny, the Force Publique provided the colonial state with a formida- 
ble instrument of coercion, whose reputation for brutality was well 
established. The everyday tasks of administration were mostly per- 
formed by a corps of colonial civil servants whose density on the 
ground was without equivalent elsewhere on the continent. By in- 
dependence there were some 10,000 European civil servants and 
officers serving in the Belgian Congo. From the territorial adminis- 
trators to the district commissioners and provincial governors, the 
network of colonial functionaries reached out from remote areas 
of the colony to its administrative nerve center in Leopoldville, 
where the governor general held court. Except for the 1957 local 
government reform, the grid of administrative control fashioned 
by Belgium remained virtually unchanged throughout the coloni- 
al era. 

Adding to the weight of the European hegemony, a system of 
native tribunals and local councils was introduced in the 1920s to 
enlist local chiefs in administration of the colony. Few of the chiefs, 
however, claimed as much as a glimmer of legitimacy, as most of 
them acted as the agents of the colonial state. The machinery of 
African participation in local government was a far cry from the 



19 



Zaire: A Country Study 

native authority systems established in British colonies, for exam- 
ple. Ultimate control over local affairs always rested with Europe- 
an administrators. 

Equally restrictive of African participation was the system of ad- 
ministration prevailing in urban sectors, the so-called centres extra- 
coutumiers. Under the arrangement introduced in 1931, urban areas 
were administered by a special sector chief (chef de centre) assisted 
by a separate sector council (conseil de centre) appointed by the local 
district commissioner; urban centers were in turn divided into zone 
councils (conseils de zone), headed by appointed authorities, called 
zone chiefs (chefs de zone). As the system proved increasingly in- 
effective, however, the tendency, especially after World War II, 
was to resort to a more direct form of administration, in which 
European territorial agents ran the affairs of the so-called native 
townships (cites indigenes) as they deemed fit. 

Not until the postwar years was this complex system of inter- 
locking structures among the colonial state, the church, and big 
business much called into question. The decisive factor then was 
the intrusion of metropolitan politics into the colonial arena, fol- 
lowing the election in 1954 of a Socialist- Liberal cabinet in Brus- 
sels whose anticlerical program had a profound effect on colonial 
policies. 

Postwar Reforms 

World War II marks a watershed in the history of the Belgian 
colony. Profound social and economic changes stirred up the col- 
lective consciousness of Africans both in the rural and urban sec- 
tors. The heavy demands made upon the rural milieus by the war 
effort accelerated the flow of migrants to the towns; a new class 
of educated, French-speaking Africans called evolues (sing. , evolue — 
see Glossary) came into being, increasingly vocal in their demands 
for reforms; and the frequency of labor disputes and strikes in the 
industrial centers of Katanga Province (now Shaba Region) drew 
attention to the changing attitude of African mine workers. Nor 
were the changes limited to the domestic arena. Anticolonial sen- 
timent was quickly emerging as a fundamental reality of the inter- 
national scene, and the United Nations (UN) was becoming a major 
forum for promoting the aspirations of the colonized. No longer 
could the Belgian Congo be kept in a state of splendid isolation. 
These pressures and challenges on Belgian officials resulted in the 
idea of a Bel go-Congolese community, articulated for the first time 
in 1952. Rather than a radical change in the constitutional rela- 
tionship, what the Belgians envisioned was a polity in which Afri- 
cans and Europeans would learn to live in harmony with each other, 



20 



Historical Setting 



share the same interests, and ultimately become equal participants 
in the political life of the Belgian Congo. 

As a first step toward this goal, the 1952 decree on immatricu- 
lation (see Glossary) provided for the juridical assimilation (i.e., 
transferring the persons concerned from the jurisdiction of cus- 
tomary law to that of European law) of Africans who were able 
to show "by their upbringing and way of life" that they had reached 
an adequate "state of civilization." The decree, which reasserted 
the provisions for immatriculation in the Colonial Charter, was 
followed by a series of measures designed to break down the barri- 
er of racial discrimination between Africans, whether matriculat- 
ed or not, and Europeans. A decree of February 1953 allowed 
Africans to own land in urban and rural areas, and in 1955 they 
were allowed free access to public establishments and authorized 
to buy alcoholic beverages. Several years later, in 1958, substan- 
tial changes were introduced in the judicial system of the colony. 
From then on, offenses committed by Africans could be tried in 
all courts of law instead of just in native tribunals. 

The really critical step toward political participation came with 
the March 26, 1957, introduction of the urban statute, a move in- 
tended to give urban Africans a meaningful share of power at the 
local level. In each of the several communes included in the major 
towns, Africans were given the opportunity to elect communal coun- 
cils, to be headed by burgomasters nominated by the councils from 
among their members. At the city level, a town council would be 
appointed by the provincial governor from among the members 
of the communal councils and headed by a first burgomaster. A 
May 10, 1957, decree introduced equally significant changes in 
rural administration. The most noteworthy involved the establish- 
ment of rural councils (consetls de secteur), whose members were to 
be appointed ' ' after taking into account the preferences of the in- 
habitants." The highly ambiguous phrasing of the decree meant 
that considerable leeway would be allowed to the provincial authori- 
ties in designating council members. 

The psychological impact of these reforms on the political cons- 
ciousness of Africans cannot be overstated. For the first time in 
the history of the colony, the basic premises of paternalism were 
openly called into question: a legitimate alternative to the status 
quo had come into view; new opportunities suddenly materialized 
for genuine political participation at the local level. From this per- 
spective, the 1957 urban reform must be seen as the decisive factor 
behind the crystallization of aspirations for political independence. 
On the other hand, the official ban on the organization of political 
parties, combined with the growth of ethnic self- awareness in the 



21 



Zaire: A Country Study 

urban sectors, meant that electoral competition was structured along 
ethnic lines. 

Ethnic distinctions among the inhabitants of the Congo area had 
always been fluid: the concept of who was or was not a member 
of a specific ethnic group had never been as rigid as Europeans 
believed. Yet the Belgian administration acted as if rigid distinc- 
tions did exist. The identity cards of Congolese listed the ethnic 
group to which they belonged, and they were required to supply 
this information in filling out forms. The European emphasis on 
ethnic identity helped reinforce the concept of such an identity 
among the Congolese. 

Another critical factor that contributed to the increase in ethnic 
awareness was the process of urbanization. Congolese migrated to 
population centers to look for work. Once in the cities and towns, 
they came into contact on the one hand with other individuals with 
whom they shared language, culture, and history and on the other 
with quite different peoples. To promote their culture and to offer 
mutual support, these people formed ethnically based associations, 
the benefits of which they communicated to family and friends who 
had remained behind in rural areas. 

The formation of ethnic associations reinforced ethnic lines be- 
tween groups and at the same time made more apparent their rela- 
tive size and social, economic, and political status. If members of 
one ethnic group were perceived as having the best jobs, whether 
or not this was so, indignation among the others might be aroused. 
One of the most notable examples of this response was in Leopold- 
ville, where the Kongo people, who believed that they had always 
been the leading ethnic group in the Belgian Congo, felt threatened 
by the influx of people from far upriver. It was in large measure 
in response to this perceived threat to their position that some of 
the Kongo formed in 1950 the Association for the Maintenance, 
Unity, and Expansion of the Kikongo Language (Association pour 
le Maintien, 1' Unite, et 1' Expansion de la Langue Kikongo). This 
organization later became the Alliance of the Kongo People, or 
Alliance des Bakongo, known as Abako (see Nationalist Awaken- 
ings, this ch.). 

Thus, in most instances, and particularly in Leopoldville and 
Elisabethville (now Lubumbashi), electoral processes had a cata- 
lytic effect on the rise of ethnic sentiment. Almost everywhere eth- 
nic associations served as the main vehicles of political mobilization, 
and in some regions ethnic conflict reached alarming proportions. 
The flurry of ethno-nationalist activity generated by the 1957 de- 
crees brought further pressure to bear upon the Belgian authori- 
ties to accelerate the pace of political reforms. 



22 



Historical Setting 



Nationalist Awakenings 

Congolese resistance to Belgian rule has a long history, trace- 
able to the countless uprisings against Belgian rule instigated by 
local chiefs — as among the Babua in 1903, 1904, and 1910, and 
the Budja in 1903 and 1905 — and the mutinies of the Force Pub- 
lique in 1895 and 1897. To these early "primary resistance" move- 
ments must be added the various independent African religious 
movements that flourished in the 1920s and 1930s. The Kimban- 
guist Church, founded by Simon Kimbangu in 1921 , upheld a vi- 
sion of spiritual salvation that attracted thousands of followers 
among the Kongo people and that the Belgians perceived as a threat 
(see The Kimbanguist Church, ch. 2). Much the same kind of mes- 
sianic message was conveyed through other indigenous African 
religions, such as the Kitawala movement, which first appeared 
in the urban centers of Katanga in the 1920s. Although immedi- 
ate measures were taken by Belgian officials to repress activities 
of these groups and to exile their members to distant areas, there 
can be little doubt that each of these early, proto-nationalist move- 
ments played an important role in forcing social protest into reli- 
gious channels, and, in the case of Kimbanguism, into a powerful 
ethno-religious framework that helped structure and legitimize the 
nationalist aspirations of subsequent generations of Kongo poli- 
ticians. 

The Rise of Militant Ethnicity: Abako 

Because of its long exposure to the West and rich heritage of 
messianic unrest, the lower Congo region, homeland of the Kon- 
go people, was the first area to emerge as a focal point of militant- 
ly anti-Belgian sentiment and activity. The spearhead of ethnic 
nationalism there was the cultural association headed by Joseph 
Kasavubu, known as Abako, which in 1956 issued a manifesto call- 
ing for immediate independence. The move came about as a 
response to a far more conciliatory statement by a group of non- 
Kongo intellectuals identified with the editorial committee of a 
Leopoldville newspaper, Conscience Africaine. In it they gave their 
full endorsement to the ideas set forth by Professor A.A.J. Van 
Bilsen in his newly published Thirty- Year Plan for the Political Eman- 
cipation of Belgian Africa. Far more impatient in tone and radical 
in its objectives, the Abako manifesto stated: ''Rather than post- 
poning emancipation for another thirty years, we should be granted 
self-government today." 

The metamorphosis of Abako into a major vehicle of anticolonial 
protest unleashed considerable unrest throughout the lower Congo. 



23 



Zaire: A Country Study 

In the capital city, the party emerged as the dominant force: the 
urban elections of December 1957 gave Abako candidates 133 com- 
munal council seats out a total of 170, thus vesting unfettered control 
of the African communes in the hands of the partisans of " com- 
plete independence." While the Abako victory at the polls greatly 
strengthened its bargaining position vis-a-vis the administration, 
in the countryside its local sections quickly proliferated, creating 
a de facto power structure almost entirely beyond the control of 
the colonial civil servants. In Leopoldville, meanwhile, the situa- 
tion was rapidly getting out of hand. The turning point came on 
January 4, 1959, when Belgian administrators took the fatal step 
of dispersing a large crowd of Abako supporters gathered to at- 
tend a political meeting. Widespread rioting throughout the city 
immediately followed, resulting in the wholesale plunder of Euro- 
pean property. When order was finally restored, at the price of 
an exceedingly brutal repression, forty-nine Congolese were offi- 
cially reported killed and 101 wounded. A week later, on January 
1 3 , the Belgian government formally recognized independence as 
the ultimate goal of its policies. "It is our firm intention," King 
Baudouin I (1951-93) solemnly announced, "without undue 
procrastination, but without fatal haste, to lead the Congolese for- 
ward to independence in prosperity and peace." Although no pre- 
cise date was set for independence, the tide of nationalist sentiment 
could not be stemmed. A year later, the Belgian Congo would be 
hurtling toward independence (see The Crisis of Decolonization, 
this ch.). 

Its anti-Belgian orientation notwithstanding, Abako was first and 
foremost a Kongo movement. Its concentration on the past splen- 
dors of the Kongo Kingdom and on the cultural values inherent 
in the Kikongo language was entirely consonant with its proclaimed 
objective of working toward the reconstruction of the Kongo poli- 
ty, and, at one point, of advocating secession as the quickest way 
of achieving this all-consuming goal. Thus, while inspiring other 
groups of Congolese to emulate its demands for immediate indepen- 
dence, another consequence of Abako militancy was to structure 
political competition along ethnic lines. Kongo elements in Leopold- 
ville came into conflict with a group of Lingala- speaking upriver 
people; in 1959 and 1960, the rivalry became a major trial of 
strength between the forces of ethno-regionalism and the claims 
of territorial nationalism. 

The Challenge of Territorial Nationalism: Lumumba and the MNC 

In the welter of political formations that appeared after the Bel- 
gian declaration of January 13, 1959, at least one party stood as 



24 



Historical Setting 



the standard-bearer of pan- territorial nationalist aspirations: the 
Congolese National Movement (Mouvement National Congolais — 
MNC). Technically, the MNC was formed in August 1956. Its 
declared objective was to "pursue the political emancipation of the 
Congo," while fostering among its members "a consciousness of 
their national unity and responsibilities." Although the party never 
disavowed its commitment to national unity, not until the arrival 
of Patrice Lumumba in Leopoldville in 1958 did it enter its mili- 
tant phase. 

There can be little doubt that the MNC owed a great deal of 
its success to Lumumba's charisma, to his uncanny ability to gal- 
vanize crowds, never more impressive than when venting the col- 
lective grievances of his followers against Belgian colonialism. His 
undeniable talent as a political organizer and an activist, coupled 
with his passionate commitment to the idea of a united Congo— 
perhaps reflective of his Tetela origins, the Tetela being a relatively 
small group located in Kasai — were critical factors as well behind 
the rapid extension of the MNC in at least four of the Belgian Con- 
go's six provinces (see fig. 4). On the other hand, his well-known 
propensity to arrogate to himself unfettered control over the af- 
fairs of the party led to serious frictions within its leadership. In- 
ternal dissension came to a head in July 1959 when Joseph Ileo, 
Cyrille Adoula, and Albert Kalonji decided to set up their own 
moderate wing, from then on known as the MNC-Kalonji. The 
result was to deprive the main part of the party of some of its most 
capable leaders and to considerably narrow its bases of support in 
Kasai and Katanga. 

In spite of these handicaps, the MNC -Lumumba was to claim 
the largest number of votes (though not a majority) in the May 
1960 national elections, leaving the Belgian authorities no choice 
but to formally recognize Lumumba as prime minister of the new 
country. The subsequent election of the Abako leader, Joseph 
Kasavubu, as president in June 1960 institutionalized in particu- 
larly awkward fashion a latent conflict between the two radically 
different brands of nationalism. Behind the constitutional crisis that 
developed in the weeks following independence, on June 30, 1960, 
loomed a more fundamental crisis of legitimacy, reflecting diametri- 
cally opposed conceptions of the Congolese polity (see The Center 
No Longer Holds, this ch.). 

Settler Politics in Katanga 

The major challenges posed to the MNC in its early years were 
the rise of ethno-nationalism and the threat of regional separatism in 
Katanga. Settler interests played a determining role in manipulating 



25 



Zaire: A Country Study 



— — — — ■ — — 



ORIENTALE 



IN 

A 



EQUATEUR s 



^Coquilhatville 
/ LEOPOLDVILLE ' 



\ Stanleyville 
\ ® 
\ 



KIVU 




[ Luluabourg 

j ,u ^i 

/ 
\ 



i 



KATANGA 




International boundary 

Province boundary 

%■ National capital 

® Province capital 

100 200 Kilometers 



100 200 Miles 



ILjsm^ Elisabethville 

JL.. 




Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative 



Figure 4. Provinces at Independence, 1960 



the regional balance of power to the advantage of secessionist forces. 

Because of its industrial base and comparatively large Europe- 
an population, Katanga differed in some essential ways from other 
regions. By 1956 it claimed a non- African population of approxi- 
mately 34,000, about 31 percent of the total European population 
of the colony. Many Europeans became active members of the 
Union for the Colonization of Katanga (Union pour la Colonisation 
du Katanga — Ucol-Katanga), a setder organization founded in 1944 
for the specific purpose of ' ' securing for the white population of 
Katanga the liberties granted by the Belgian constitution, and to 
promote, by all available means, the growth of European coloni- 
zation." Yet, as it became increasingly clear that self-government 
under settler rule was not a viable option, and as the extension 



26 



Historical Setting 



of the vote to Africans in 1957 brought into existence a new con- 
stellation of political forces, settler politics took on a radically differ- 
ent objective. The aim was no longer to prevent Africans from 
gaining power, but to work toward a close political collaboration 
with those Africans who shared both the settlers' distrust of cen- 
tralized control and their separatist goals. 

The most likely catalyst for this collaborative partnership was 
the Confederation of Katanga Associations (Confederation des As- 
sociations du Katanga — Conakat), headed by Moise Tshombe. 
Describing themselves as "authentic Katangese," Conakat sup- 
porters were essentially drawn from the Lunda and Yeke peoples 
of southern Katanga, that is, from those elements who were most 
resentful of the presence of Luba immigrants from Kasai, many 
of whom found employment in the mining centers. The decisive 
victory scored by these "strangers" during the 1957 urban coun- 
cil elections sharply intensified the animus of Conakat leaders 
toward immigrants from Kasai, while bringing into clearer focus 
the common aspirations of European settlers and "authentic 
Katangese." 

As time went on, however, another threat to Conakat emerged 
from the north, not from Luba-Kasai but from Luba elements in- 
digenous to northern Katanga. Led by Jason Sendwe, they even- 
tually set up their own political organization, the Association of 
the Luba People of Katanga (Association des Baluba du Katanga — 
Balubakat), soon to enter into an alliance with Lumumba's branch 
of the MNC. Despite strong cultural affinities between the two 
groups, the Luba-Kasai went their own way, directing their loyal- 
ties to the Federation of Kasai (Federation Kasaienne — Fedeka). 
Their political aloofness was in large part motivated by the rift in 
Kasai between the MNC -Lumumba and the MNC-Kalonji, iden- 
tified, respectively, with Lulua and Luba elements in the Kasaian 
arena. Thus, the alliance of Balubakat with the MNC-Lumumba 
made it highly unlikely that a similar rapprochement would ever 
materialize between Balubakat and Fedeka. The split between 
Kasaian and Katangese Luba thus played directly into the hands 
of Conakat and its European partners. 

The victory of the MNC-Lumumba in the May 1960 national 
legislative elections transformed the alliance between European set- 
tlers and Conakat into an increasingly close partnership, and 
Conakat' s relationship with Balubakat into a protracted trial of 
strength. The conflict with Balubakat began with the provincial 
elections of May 1960, when Conakat won twenty-five seats, 
Balubakat twenty-two, and independents the remaining thirteen. 
Although Balubakat appealed the results, the Belgian magistrate 



27 



Zaire: A Country Study 

rejected the appeal, and after the thirteen independents joined 
Conakat, the latter emerged with a solid majority in the Katan- 
gan provincial assembly. On June 1 , the Balubakat deputies walked 
out of the assembly, depriving it of the necessary quorum to start 
its deliberations. At this point, the provincial governor, yielding 
to the urgings of European settlers, appealed to Brussels to promul- 
gate an amendment to the constitution, the Fundamental Law (Loi 
Fondamentale), which had been enacted on May 19. On June 15, 
despite the prophetic warning of Balubakat that "the promulga- 
tion of (the amendment) would inevitably lead to civil war after 
June 30," the Belgian parliament nevertheless enacted the amend- 
ment, thus making it legally possible for Conakat to gain full con- 
trol of the provincial institutions. On July 11, Tshombe formally 
declared Katanga an independent state (see The Secession of Katan- 
ga, this ch.). 

The Crisis of Decolonization 

The crisis that suddenly burst upon the Republic of the Congo, 
as the new nation was called, in the wake of independence, on June 
30, 1960, has several dimensions: the mutiny of the Force Pub- 
lique on July 5; the secession of the country's richest region, Katan- 
ga, on July 1 1 , soon followed by a similar move in southeastern 
Kasai Province (now Kasai-Oriental Region), which declared it- 
self the Independent Mining State of South Kasai on August 8; 
and the role of the United Nations, first as a peacekeeping force 
and ultimately as the chosen instrument for bringing Katanga back 
into the fold of the central government. The crisis was further com- 
pounded by the trial of strength at the center between President 
Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba, culminating in Lumum- 
ba's assassination at the hands of the Katangan secessionists in Janu- 
ary 1961. 

The Road to Independence 

The rioting that swept across Leopoldville in early January 1959, 
did more than induce the Belgian government to recognize indepen- 
dence formally as the ultimate goal of its policies; it also set in mo- 
tion a decolonization plan designed to lay the foundation for major 
constitutional reforms. The Colonial Council, renamed the Legis- 
lative Council, would include twelve indigenous Congolese mem- 
bers and provide the embryo of an upper chamber; the Government 
Council and provincial councils would be transformed into advi- 
sory bodies to monitor the decisions of the Belgian governor general 
and provincial governors. By late 1959, local councils would be 
elected to serve as an electoral college for the establishment of 



28 



Historical Setting 



provincial councils. No provision was made, however, for the trans- 
fer of executive or administrative power to non-Europeans. And 
the few Congolese selected for membership in the new advisory 
organs could scarcely be seen as representative of their country- 
men's interests. 

In view of its omissions and ambiguities, it is easy to see why 
the Belgian plan fell short of the expectations of most politically 
conscious Congolese. Even before it began to be put into effect, 
the Belgian blueprint had been largely outstripped by the pace and 
intensity of nationalist activity. Faced with an impasse, the Bel- 
gian government finally agreed to the Round Table Conference, 
held in Brussels in January 1960, involving the participation of a 
broad spectrum of nationalist organizations. At the conference, June 
30, 1960, was agreed upon as the date of independence. Elections 
would be held in May, on the basis of universal suffrage, for the 
election of a bicameral parliament and provincial councils. Final- 
ly, a special commission was appointed to frame a new constitu- 
tional system, which became the Fundamental Law. 

The constitutional formula adopted by the Round Table Con- 
ference was a carbon copy of the Belgian constitution. Its essential 
feature was a threefold division of powers, between the central 
government and the provinces, between the Senate and the Cham- 
ber of Representatives, and between the head of state and the prime 
minister. The duality of executive powers meant in theory that the 
president would be cast in the role of the Belgian king, acting largely 
as a figurehead, with effective executive power vested in the hands 
of the prime minister. In the context of the newly emergent Con- 
golese polity, however, this system incorporated within itself the 
seeds of a major conflict of jurisdiction between the president and 
the prime minister. 

The national legislative elections of May 1960 and the setting 
up of national and provincial executives almost completed the 
process of decolonization. At the national level, Lumumba's MNC 
was able to control a slim majority of seats in both chambers, thanks 
to its alliance with smaller parties. Lumumba thus became the coun- 
try's first prime minister, but the presidency went to Abako lead- 
er Kasavubu. At the provincial level, there emerged a more complex 
situation. Only in Orientale (now Haut-Zaire Region) did the MNC 
win a solid majority. Katanga was split between separatists (iden- 
tified with Tshombe's Conakat) and unitarists. Kasai was about 
to become the scene of a major ethnic confrontation between Lu- 
lua and Luba elements. And in Leopoldville Province, Abako failed 
to win a majority of seats, thus paving the way for serious tensions 
between Kongo and upriver deputies. In at least three provinces 



29 



Zaire: A Country Study 

out of six, the political arenas were fraught with incipient ethno- 
regional conflicts, and these in turn quickly generated a vicious 
circle at the center. 

The Mutiny of the Force Publique 

Maintaining stability in the provinces would have been difficult 
enough with the help of a reliable security apparatus; the mutiny 
of the Force Publique rendered the Lumumba government utterly 
impotent (see The Congolese National Army, ch. 5). The first acts 
of indiscipline were recorded in the capital on July 4; as other units 
were called in from Thysville (now Mbanza-Ngungu) to attend to 
the situation, they turned against their European officers. On July 
5, bands of mutineers could be seen roaming through the streets 
of the capital, causing panic among both Africans and Europeans. 

This extraordinary situation was, in large part, caused by Force 
Publique commander Lieutenant General Janssens, who had per- 
sistently refused to Africanize the officer corps, and who, on the 
very day that the mutiny broke out flatly declared that the Force 
Publique would continue as before. But with the mutiny in full 
swing, urgent and sweeping changes were needed to restore a meas- 
ure of order. On July 6, Lumumba dismissed General Janssens, 
and the following day the entire officer corps was Africanized, with 
only a small number of European officers retained as advisers. 
Shortly thereafter, the decision was made to promote all enlisted 
men to the next higher rank, thereby eliminating all privates from 
the army. On July 9 Lumumba promoted Victor Lundula to major 
general and commander in chief of the renamed Congolese Na- 
tional Army (Armee Nationale Congolaise — ANC), with Joseph- 
Desire Mobutu (later Mobutu Sese Seko) as chief of staff. 

Unrest nonetheless persisted. By July 9 the mutiny had reached 
Equateur and Katanga provinces; panic-stricken Europeans be- 
gan to arrive in Leopoldville, telling their own grisly stories. Os- 
tensibly to protect Belgian lives, Brussels sent in two companies 
of paratroopers, in turn causing Lumumba to denounce Belgian 
intervention as an unwarranted aggression. The troop landings — a 
breach of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed by the 
two countries the day before independence — convinced the Con- 
golese authorities that Belgium was attempting to reoccupy the 
country. Meanwhile, on July 11 Belgian naval forces took the un- 
fortunate step of bombarding Matadi, which by then had already 
been evacuated by Europeans. On the same day, Katanga formally 
proclaimed its independence, an act supported by Belgians in 
Katanga. As tension rapidly mounted between Brussels and Leo- 
poldville, Lumumba and Kasavubu agreed for once to send a 



30 



Historical Setting 



formed cable to the UN secretary general on July 12 to solicit "ur- 
gent UN military assistance" in the face of Belgian aggression and 
support of the secession of Katanga. 

A United Nations Security Council resolution on July 14, 1960, 
responding to the Congo government's request for aid, called for 
the withdrawal of Belgian troops and authorized Secretary Gener- 
al Dag Hammarskjold to take the necessary steps, in consultation 
with the Congo government, to provide military and technical as- 
sistance for the Congolese security forces. Although the first UN 
troops landed in Leopoldville the next day, Kasavubu and Lumum- 
ba were dissatisfied with the pace of UN action and threatened to 
request Soviet help unless Belgian troops were withdrawn in two 
days. By July 20, the UN force had several thousand troops under 
its command, and Lumumba withdrew the threat when Belgium 
agreed to remove its troops from Leopoldville. 

The Center No Longer Holds 

In this rapidly deteriorating situation, mistrust, suspicion, and 
bitterness increased between the Congolese and the Belgians and 
among different factions of Congolese. The new government, preoc- 
cupied with soliciting external aid, had been unable to attack the 
massive problems of organizing its administration, and adminis- 
trative problems were compounded by the mass departure of Bel- 
gian civil servants and technicians. In the meantime, the Katangan 
secessionist regime was consolidating its position. 

Between the outbreak of the Force Publique mutiny and the over- 
throw of the Lumumba government on September 14, a situation 
of near anarchy spread through much of the country, reflecting 
the total breakdown of authority at the center. Adding to the con- 
fusion created by the collapse of the security forces and the inter- 
vention of the Belgian paratroopers, the constitutional impasse 
arising from the fundamental opposition between president and 
prime minister brought the machinery of government to a virtual 
standstill. 

Several factors lay at the root of the conflict between president 
and prime minister, including a personality clash, their different 
bases of support, and their diametrically opposed conceptions of 
the ultimate character of the Congolese polity. What precipitated 
the crisis was growing opposition to Lumumba's policies toward 
Belgium, the UN, and the secessionists in Katanga and Kasai. Par- 
ticularly divisive were Lumumba's insistence on converting the new- 
ly arrived UN forces into a military instrument for bringing 
Katanga and Kasai back into the fold of the central government 



31 



Zaire: A Country Study 

(despite the fact that the UN mandate did not permit the organi- 
zation to interfere in the Congo's internal conflicts) and his even- 
tual decision to use those units of the ANC that were loyal to him 
to launch a major offensive against both Katanga and Kasai. 
Although Congolese units never made it to Katanga, their attack 
on Kasai in August 1960 led to a large-scale massacre of the Luba. 

Against the warning of a number of his colleagues, Lumumba 
made a trip abroad with a number of his officials from July 2 1 to 
August 8, a critical time for the country and the new government. 
After his return, Lumumba intensified his quarrel with the UN 
authorities, especially when he failed to secure UN aid to force the 
end of the secession of Katanga. In late August, amid more in- 
tense opposition, Lumumba declared martial law for six months 
and arrested a number of his political opponents. 

Lumumba's greatest affront, however, was his decision to ac- 
cept substantial Soviet aid in order to attack the secessionist areas. 
This move brought to a climax the issue of communist influence, 
which had been a source of growing concern to the West and to 
more moderate Africans alike. As a result, on September 5 Presi- 
dent Kasavubu announced the dismissal of Lumumba, Vice Prime 
Minister Antoine Gizenga, Minister of Information Anicet 
Kashamura, and several others from the government. At the same 
time, Kasavubu also appointed Mobutu as head of the ANC. Joseph 
Ileo was chosen as the new prime minister and began trying to form 
a new government. 

Lumumba and his cabinet responded by accusing Kasavubu of 
high treason and voted to dismiss him. Parliament refused to con- 
firm the dismissal of either Lumumba or Kasavubu and sought 
to bring about a reconciliation between them. After a week's dead- 
lock, Mobutu announced on September 14 that he was assuming 
power until December 31, 1960, in order to "neutralize" both 
Kasavubu and Lumumba. 

Mobutu emphasized from the beginning that his action was not 
an army coup but was rather a "peaceful revolution" during which 
the country would be run by a group of technicians. Mobutu's first 
acts were an ultimatum demanding the departure within forty-eight 
hours of Soviet and East European diplomatic personnel and the 
release by troops loyal to him of political prisoners. 

But the period of government by the so-called College of Com- 
missioners (made up of recent university graduates, students, and a 
few members of Lumumba's cabinet under the leadership of Justin- 
Marie Bomboko), formally installed on September 29, was marked 
by constant political conflict. The legitimacy of the government 



32 



Historical Setting 



was challenged by political factions within the Congo and by the 
more radical African nations and communist countries. Relations 
between the college and the UN became progressively worse. In 
the meantime, the inability of the central government to regain 
any significant amount of authority enabled the secessionists to 
strengthen their administrative arrangements and armies. 

As the process of fragmentation set in motion by the secession 
of Katanga reached its peak, the former Belgian colony essentially 
had broken up into four separate fragments (see fig. 5). The 
"unitarists" found themselves divided into two separate political 
arenas. The Lumumbist radicals joined forces with Antoine Gizen- 
ga, who was head of the African Solidarity Party (Parti Solidaire 
Africain — PSA), who had moved his forces to Stanleyville (now 
Kisangani). The moderates rallied to the Mobutu government in 
Leopoldville. South Kasai and Katanga, headed, respectively, by 
Albert Kalonji and Moi'se Tshombe, were left in the hands of ethno- 
regional separatists. 

The major event leading to the move by the Lumumbists to es- 
tablish themselves at Stanleyville, the area of Lumumba's strong- 
est support, was the recommendation by the United Nations 
Credentials Committee on November 10 to seat the delegation to 
the UN appointed by Mobutu. Gizenga left for Stanleyville on 
November 13 to form a rival national government. Soon there- 
after, Lumumba, who had been under house arrest since his dis- 
missal by Kasavubu, also left for Stanleyville to join Gizenga. But 
Lumumba was arrested, transferred to Katanga, and assassinated 
in January 1961. The assassination, when announced on Febru- 
ary 13, 1961, prompted anarchy in many areas. But the incident 
helped Gizenga consolidate his regime, and a number of African 
and East European countries accorded it official recognition. The 
Tshombe government, on the other hand, remained utterly iso- 
lated diplomatically. And yet it was in Elisabethville, not Stan- 
leyville, that the central authorities and the UN encountered their 
most serious challenge. 

During the prolonged crisis after Lumumba's arrest and death, 
a new government was finally established in Leopoldville. On 
February 9, 1961, the College of Commissioners was dissolved, 
and a provisional government formed by Joseph Ileo. The events 
of February had so weakened Leopoldville 's position, however, that 
the provisional government was unable to exert its authority much 
beyond the provinces of Leopoldville and Equateur. 

The Secession of Katanga 

Katanga had always been a special case, administered until 1910 



33 



Zaire: A Country Study 




_ International boundary 
Province boundary 
National capital 
Populated place 

100 200 Kilometers 



I I "Official" national government under Mobutu 
\//A Rival national regime under Antoine Gizenga, 

formed November 1960 
!'■"-! Independent Mining State of South Kasai, 

under Albert Kalonji, seceded August 8,1960 

I 1 Independent Katanga, under MoVse Tshombe, 

seceded July 11, 1960 



Source: Based on information from Hermann Kinder and Werner Hilgemann, The Anchor 
Atlas of World History, 2, Garden City, New York, 1978, 268. 



Figure 5. Political Fragmentation and Territorial Control, 1960-61 

by the privately owned Special Committee of Katanga (Comite 
Special du Katanga). In 1910 administration of Katanga was placed 
in the hands of a vice governor general, still separate from the rest 
of the Belgian Congo. The administrative reorganization of 1933, 
which brought Katanga administratively in line with the rest of 
the provinces under the central colonial authorities in Leopoldville, 



34 



Historical Setting 



was strongly resented by Katangan residents, both local and for- 
eign. The predominant role Katanga played in the country's econ- 
omy reinforced this regional pride and sense of separateness. In 
the months preceding independence, pressure to restore Katan- 
gan autonomy grew. 

The breakdown of central authority offered Tshombe an ideal 
pretext for proclaiming the long- planned independence of Katan- 
ga on July 11, 1960. Although Brussels withheld formal recog- 
nition, through the legal fiction that any province could receive 
Belgian technical assistance if it so desired, the Belgian govern- 
ment played a crucial role in providing military, economic, and 
technical assistance to the secessionist province. 

Under Belgian supervision, immediate steps were taken to con- 
vert the Katangan Gendarmerie into an effective security force. 
Recruitment agencies were set up in Brussels for the enlistment 
of mercenaries. A variety of Belgian advisers surfaced in various 
administrative organs of the breakaway state. Professor Rene Cle- 
mens, of the University of Liege, was invited to draft the Katan- 
gan constitution. 

That the secession lasted as long as it did (from July 11, 1960, 
to January 14, 1963) is largely a reflection of the efforts of Belgian 
civilian and military authorities to prop up their client state. Yet 
from the very beginning, the operation ran into serious difficul- 
ties. A major handicap faced by "authentic Katangese" stemmed 
from their inability to come to terms with the Balubakat-instigated 
revolt in the north. Despite the numerous military expeditions 
against northern "rebels," at no time was the Tshombe regime 
able to claim effective control of the Luba areas. Further discredit 
was cast on Tshombe when, in January 1961, Balubakat leaders 
proclaimed the secession of their own northern province, presuma- 
bly out of loyalty to the principle of a united Congo. Balubakat 
seceding from the secessionists for the sake of unity was a painful 
logic for Conakat to assimilate. 

Diplomatic isolation was another major weakness. In spite of 
countless demarches, overtures, bribes, and promises, the seces- 
sionist state never gained international recognition. Even Bel- 
gium never officially recognized Katanga. But perhaps the most 
serious diplomatic blow against the Tshombe regime came on 
February 21, 1961, when the UN Security Council passed a reso- 
lution urging the UN "to take immediately all appropriate measures 
to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including ar- 
rangements for cease-fire, the halting of all military operations, 
the prevention of clashes, and the use of force, if necessary, in the 
last resort." 



35 



Zaire: A Country Study 

The UN Security Council's February resolution was an attempt 
to check the trend toward total anarchy in the Congo and to bring 
about international pressure for reintegration of the Congo. The 
resolution gave the UN forces greater authority to act in order to 
prevent civil war and called for the removal of foreign advisers and 
mercenaries attached to the Congo governments, the convening 
of parliament, and the reorganization of the ANC. 

This entirely new construction of the UN mandate, allowing the 
use of force as a last resort, was the direct, though largely unantic- 
ipated, outcome of Lumumba's death. The worldwide commotion 
caused by Lumumba's death had an immediate repercussion in 
the UN General Assembly. The new mandate given to the UN 
forces in Zaire did litde more than articulate in legal terms the sense 
of shock and anger of most developing nations in the face of the 
cold-blooded murder of the man who best symbolized the struggle 
of African nationalism against the forces of neocolonialism. 

The UN Intervention 

Ambiguous as it was, the phrasing of the UN February 21 reso- 
lution left little doubt about the sense of frustration felt by Secre- 
tary General Dag Hammarskjold in dealing with the Katanga 
secession. Keeping the peace without meddling in the internal af- 
fairs of Katanga proved a contradiction; UN efforts to act as a me- 
diator between Katanga and the central government met with 
repeated setbacks. As one reconciliation formula after another was 
tried and found wanting, it dawned on many people at the UN 
that the scope of permissible action had to be substantially broad- 
ened, which is what the February 21 resolution sought to achieve. 

The new mandate provided the basis for Operation Rumpunch 
on August 28, 1961 . As it became clear that Tshombe had no in- 
tention of complying with the UN request that mercenaries and 
European officers be withdrawn from Katanga — a move that he 
realized would cripple his security forces and quickly bring the col- 
lapse of his regime — UN troops at last sprang into action, secur- 
ing the Katangan post office, radio, and residences of key European 
and Congolese officials and rounding up mercenaries and Euro- 
pean officers. The operation, however, was suddenly halted when 
the Belgian consul in Leopoldville persuaded local UN officials that 
he would complete the operation by himself, a pledge that turned 
out to be a ruse as only regular Belgian officers and not mercenar- 
ies were expelled from the province. 

Anger and frustration on both sides mounted rapidly. A new UN 
plan, Operation Morthor, following rapidly after Rumpunch and 
expected to go into effect on September 13, was no longer merely 



36 



Historical Setting 



to rid the province of mercenaries and foreign advisers but to ter- 
minate the secession by force. Forewarned of the impending at- 
tack, the Katangan gendarmes put up a stiff resistance, while a 
lone jet fighter strafed the UN troops. News of UN attacks on 
civilian installations was received with indignation in European cap- 
itals. Morthor ended in a total fiasco. It was at this point, on Sep- 
tember 17, that Hammarskjold decided to give up force and once 
again try to arrive at a negotiated solution with Tshombe. Ham- 
marskjold never made it to the site of their meeting in Ndola, North- 
ern Rhodesia (now Zambia), however; shortly before it was due 
to land, his aircraft crashed into a wooded hillside, killing all pas- 
sengers. 

The next and final phase in the Katangan imbroglio began with 
the so-called "U Thant Plan," made public on August 10, 1962, 
and ended with Tshombe 's announcement, on January 14, 1963, 
that ''the secession was now terminated." The plan, which offered 
yet another constitutional formula for reunification, at first met 
with Tshombe 's approval; then equivocation ensued, and the work 
of the joint Leopoldville-Elisabethville commissions soon bogged 
down. As tensions mounted between UN troops and Katangan gen- 
darmes, little was needed to trigger an explosion. It came on Christ- 
mas Eve, when UN troops accused the Katangan forces of shooting 
down a UN helicopter. On December 28 Tshombe called for a 
general uprising of the population, to which the UN responded 
by moving against key points. This time the tide moved decisively 
against the gendarmes. In the end, Tshombe had no alternative 
but to concede defeat. After two and a half years of conflict and 
crisis, the Katangan secession had finally come to an end. Many 
of the remaining Katangan gendarmes went into exile in Angola. 
Others were incorporated into the Congolese military. 

The First Republic, 1960-65 

Much of the history of the First Republic revolves around two 
critical issues: the abortive efforts of the central government to 
negotiate the end of the Katangan secession and the reentry of 
Katanga into the framework of a united Congo, and the threats 
posed to the survival of the republic by the 1964 outbreak of major 
rebellions in Kwilu (some 400 kilometers east of Leopoldville) and 
the eastern region. Not the least of the ironies brought to light in 
the course of this tormented era in the country's history is that the 
man who once stood as the standard-bearer of the secession of 
Katanga ended up as the key figure in the struggle of the central 
authorities against rebel forces. With the appointment of Tshombe 
as prime minister in July 1964, following the resignation of the 



37 



Zaire: A Country Study 

government of Cyrille Adoula, the First Republic entered the last 
phase of its brief and tumultuous existence. 

The Adoula Government, August 1961 -July 1964 

In the months preceding the investiture of the Adoula govern- 
ment, several conferences were held between the representatives 
of the central caretaker government and the Katangan authorities 
for the specific purpose of reaching agreement on the constitutional 
framework of a reunified Congo. These meetings included the 
Leopoldville Round Table (January-February 1961), the Tanana- 
rive Conference (in Madagascar in March), and the Coquilhat- 
ville Conference (Coquilhatville is now Mbandaka, April-May). 
The Tananarive Conference called for a confederated form of 
government, but the notion of confederation met with strong op- 
position in Leopoldville. By contrast, the Coquilhatville Confer- 
ence recommended the establishment of a federal system as the 
future form of government. Tshombe opposed this plan. 

Finally, after extensive negotiations, parliament met at Lovani- 
um University outside Leopoldville on July 25, 1961, with the par- 
ticipation of deputies from all provinces, including Katanga and 
South Kasai (which ended its secession at that time). On August 
2, Adoula was elected prime minister by a unanimous vote of con- 
fidence, thus bringing to an end the constitutional crisis triggered 
by the conflict between Lumumba and Kasavubu. There remained 
the more arduous task of resolving once and for all the Katangan 
secession, reducing the last vestiges of dissidence in Stanleyville, 
and elaborating the constitutional framework that would replace 
the Fundamental Law. 

As noted earlier, not until January 1963, and only after a vio- 
lent showdown with UN forces, was the secession of Katanga deci- 
sively crushed; and it took another year before the rival claimant 
to national power, the Stanleyville government, was brought to 
heel. Meanwhile, Adoula gave immediate priority to the task out- 
lined in his inaugural declaration, "to take adequate measures 
permitting each region to administer itself according to its pro- 
found aspirations," and to initiate the constitutional revisions 
required by this objective. The result was the elimination of the 
former six provinces and their replacement by twenty-one small- 
er administrative entities, known as provincettes . The new formula 
proved thoroughly unworkable, however. Reducing the size of the 
provinces merely shifted the focus of ethnic conflict to a smaller 
arena, a phenomenon further encouraged by the sheer arbitra- 
riness of their boundaries and the emergence of several bitterly con- 
tested areas. While sharply reinforcing ethnic animosities, the 



38 



Historical Setting 



creation of the new provincettes was made more problematic still by 
the dearth of competent administrators, frequent recourse to force 
and skulduggery, and rampant corruption. 

Despite its inauspicious beginnings, the new arrangement was 
formalized in the new constitution adopted by referendum in June 
and July 1964. And arrangements were made to change the coun- 
try's name to Democratic Republic of the Congo with effect from 
August 1, 1964. By then, however, many of the provincettes were 
in a state of semi-anarchy, and at least three had fallen into the 
hands of rebel forces. The stage was set for yet another trial of 
strength between the central government and dissident forces. 

Rural Insurgencies: The "Second Independence" 

From January to August 1964, rural insurgency engulfed five 
provincettes out of twenty-one and made substantial inroads into 
another five, raising the distinct possibility of a total collapse of 
the central government (see fig. 6). The extraordinary speed with 
which the rebellions spread among the rural masses attests to the 
enormous insurrectionary potential that had been building up in 
previous years. Prolonged neglect of the rural sectors, coupled with 
the growing disparities of wealth and privilege between the politi- 
cal elites and the peasant masses, inefficient and corrupt govern- 
ment, and ANC abuses, created a situation ripe for major uprising. 
Further aggravating the frustration of the rural masses, the promise 
of a life more abundant made at the time of independence had re- 
mained unfulfilled. It seemed to many, especially disaffected youths, 
that nothing short of a "second independence" would bring them 
salvation. 

Among the several factors that combined to precipitate rebel- 
lion, none was more consequential than the dissolution of parlia- 
ment in September 1963, a move spurred by the incessant divisions 
and bickerings among deputies. The immediate result was to de- 
prive the opposition of the only remaining legitimate avenue for 
political participation. Faced with this situation, several deputies 
affiliated with the MNC -Lumumba, among them Christophe 
Gbenye and Bocheley Davidson, decided to move to Brazzaville, 
in the former French Congo, and organize a National Liberation 
Council (Conseil National de Liberation — CNL). In time the CNL 
became the central coordinating apparatus for the eastern rebellion. 

Another major factor behind the insurrection was the anticipat- 
ed withdrawal of the UN forces by June 30, 1964. The prospec- 
tive elimination of the only reliable crutch available to the central 
government acted as a major incentive for the opposition to mobi- 
lize against Adoula. 



39 



Zaire: A Country Study 



Lisa la 



N 

A 



Boende 




'Leopoldville 



Kikwit 



International boundary 

National capital 

Populated place 

Kwilu rebellion 

Maximum area of control 
of the eastern rebellion 

100 200 Kilometers 



; ;.; 




Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative 



Source: Based on information from Hermann Kinder and Werner Hilgemann, The Anchor 
Atlas of World History, 2, Garden City, New York, 1978, 268. 



Figure 6. Rural Insurgencies, 1964 



Finally, with the arrival in the Kwilu area of Pierre Mulele in 
July 1963, a key revolutionary figure entered the arena. Once af- 
filiated with Antoine Gizenga's PSA, Mulele traveled widely in 
Eastern Europe before reaching China, where he received sustained 
training in guerrilla warfare. Upon arriving in Kwilu, Mulele 
proceeded to recruit a solid phalanx of followers among members 
of his own ethnic group, the Mbunda, as well as among Gizenga's 
kinsmen, the Pende, both of whom had long been the target of 
government repression. The Kwilu rebellion began in January 
1964, when Mulelist insurgents attacked government outposts, mis- 
sion stations, and company installations. On January 22 and 23, 
four European missionaries were killed, and on February 5 the chief 



40 



Historical Setting 



of staff of the ANC was ambushed and killed. Troops were im- 
mediately sent to the area, and by April a measure of stability had 
been restored. The Kwilu rebellion did not finally end until De- 
cember 1965, however. 

The central figure behind the eastern rebellion was Gaston Sou- 
mialot, who, in January 1964, was sent to Burundi by the CNL, 
with the mission of organizing the rebellion. With the full support 
of the Burundi authorities, and thanks to his own skill in exploit- 
ing local conflicts and working out tactical alliances with Tutsi ex- 
iles from Rwanda, Soumialot was able to recruit thousands of 
dedicated supporters in eastern Kivu, along the border with Burun- 
di. On May 15, the town of Uvira fell to the rebels, and, shortly 
thereafter, so did Fizi. From then on, the rebels (now widely known 
as Simbas, from the Swahili for lions) made increasing use of magic 
to claim immunity to bullets. Panic-stricken, two heavily armed 
ANC battalions were routed by spear-toting Simbas believed to 
have been rendered invincible by their antibullet concoctions. 

As the rebel movement spread, discipline became more difficult 
to maintain, and acts of violence and terror increased. Thousands 
of Congolese were executed, including government officials, po- 
litical leaders of opposition parties, provincial and local police, school 
teachers, and others believed to have been Westernized. 

In Kivu, Maniema, and north Katanga, the administrative vacu- 
um caused by the utter failure of the provincette experiment was a 
key factor behind the initial success of the rebellion. In north Katan- 
ga, Baudoinville (later Virungu, now Moba) fell on July 19; Kin- 
du, in Maniema, was taken on July 24; and in early August the 
Soumialot forces, now calling themselves the National Liberation 
Army (Armee Nationale de Liberation — ANL), captured the Lu- 
mumbist stronghold of Stanleyville. Equipped with armaments left 
by the routed ANC units, the Simbas pushed on north and west 
of Stanleyville, eventually penetrating as far west as Lisala on the 
Congo River. On September 5, with the proclamation of a revolu- 
tionary government in Stanleyville, the eastern rebellion reached 
its high- water mark: almost half of Zaire and seven local capitals 
out of twenty-one were in rebel hands. 

No less astonishing than the swiftness of rebel victories was the 
inability of the insurgents to consolidate their gains and establish 
an alternative system of administration to the one they had so eas- 
ily destroyed. Corruption, administrative inefficiency, and ethnic 
favoritism turned out to be liabilities for the rebel leaders as much 
as they had been for previous provincial administrators. Heavy reli- 
ance on specific ethnic communities (Tetela-Kusu in the east, Pende 
and Mbunda in Kwilu) for manning the military and administrative 



41 



Zaire: A Country Study 

apparatuses of the rebellions was seen by many as a reversion to 
tribalism. Further complicating ethnic tensions between the ANL 
leadership and the Simbas, serious conflicts erupted at the provin- 
cette level over who should get the lion's share of the property seized 
from the enemy. Finally, countless disputes disrupted the CNL 
leadership in exile, stemming from personality differences as well 
as disagreements over questions of tactics and organization. 

The rapid decline of popular support for the eastern rebellion 
is in large part a reflection of the very inadequate leadership offered 
by the CNL and local cadres. The military setbacks suffered by 
the ANL in the fall of 1964 were not just the result of poor leader- 
ship, however; even more important in turning the tide against 
the insurgents was the decisive contribution made by European 
mercenaries in helping the central government regain control over 
rebel-held areas. Much of the credit for the government's success 
went to Tshombe, who in July 1964 had been recalled from exile 
and replaced Adoula as prime minister. A year and a half after 
his defeat at the hands of the UN forces, the most vocal advocate 
of secessionism had suddenly emerged as the providential leader 
of a besieged central government. 

As he set about the task of quashing the rebellions, Tshombe 
could rely on two major assets denied to Adoula, i.e., the Katan- 
gan gendarmes, recalled from exile in Angola, and a few hundred 
battle-hardened white mercenaries. The former were immediately 
integrated into the ANC , with the latter providing the much-needed 
leadership for the conduct of military operations against rebel forces. 
Supported by air strikes, these units spearheaded attacks against 
rebel strongholds. As the white mercenaries took the offensive and, 
with their technical superiority and discipline, began to recapture 
rebel strongholds, the fighting grew progressively more brutal, and 
numerous atrocities were committed by all of those involved. Merce- 
nary elements played a decisive role in retaking Lisala on Septem- 
ber 15, Boende on October 24, and Kindu on November 6. By 
then, the revolutionary government in Stanleyville had decided to 
hold local European residents hostage, in the hope of using them 
as bargaining chips in negotiations with the central authorities. 
Their action resulted in the joint Belgian- American parachute rescue 
operation (code-named Dragon Rouge, or Red Dragon) on Stan- 
leyville, on November 24, scheduled to coincide with the arrival 
of ANC and mercenary units in the vicinity of the provincial capi- 
tal. The capture of Stanleyville dealt a devastating blow to the 
eastern rebellion. The two key rebel leaders, Gbenye and Soumi- 
alot, went into exile in Cairo; demoralization quickly set in among 
the Simbas; by the end of the year, the eastern rebellion was reduced 



42 



Historical Setting 



to isolated pockets of resistance. Nonetheless, for months there- 
after insecurity was widespread in the northeast, as well as along 
the Fizi-Uvira axis in Kivu. 

Tshombe's popularity within the Congo and his prestige through- 
out Africa were severely damaged by the Belgo- American opera- 
tion against Stanleyville, which had also provoked heated debates 
in the UN. Moreover, political opposition to Tshombe's conduct 
of the government greatly increased in the capital. In particular, 
Tshombe had antagonized both Kasavubu and Mobutu. 

Mobutu's Second Coming 

Mobutu's second coup, on November 25, 1965, occurred in cir- 
cumstances strikingly similar to those that had led to his first 
takeover — a struggle for power between the incumbent president, 
Joseph Kasavubu, and Prime Minister Moise Tshombe. The Kasa- 
vubu-Tshombe friction began to gain momentum during the legis- 
lative elections in the spring of 1965. The immediate task facing 
the new parliament was the election of a new president, whose role 
was defined by the constitution as the chief executive, leaving the 
prime minister in charge of the day-to-day tasks of government. 
Determined to seize the presidency from Kasavubu, Tshombe had 
organized a new party, the National Confederation of Congo- 
lese Associations (Confederation Nationale des Associations Congo- 
laises — Conaco), which in effect was little more than a loose alliance 
of forty-nine, primarily southern, parties from among the more 
than 200 parties that mushroomed into existence to participate in 
the electoral process. 

Although Conaco emerged triumphant from the March 1965 
elections, with a total of 1 22^ out of 167 parliamentary seats, 
Kasavubu decided to appoint Evariste Kimba, a leading figure of 
the anti-Tshombe forces, as prime minister-designate. Complex 
maneuverings followed the nomination of Kimba. When the time 
came for a vote of confidence, on November 14, the Tshombe coa- 
lition, with its clear majority in parliament, managed to block his 
investiture by a vote of 121 to 134. Another candidate, Victor Nen- 
daka, then sought the investiture, only to be faced with further ob- 
duracy from Kasavubu, who went on to renominate Kimba. As 
in 1960, the constitutional impasse threatened the machinery of 
government with total paralysis. 

The constitutional deadlock paved the way for Mobutu's second 
military takeover. On November 24, fourteen members of the ANC 
high command met in Leopoldville with Mobutu in an emergen- 
cy session. The following day, the announcement was made that 
Kasavubu and Kimba had been removed from office as president 



43 



Zaire: A Country Study 

and prime minister-designate, and that Mobutu had been named 
as chief of state by the army. Colonel Leonard Mulamba became 
prime minister of the new ' ' government of national union." Parlia- 
ment, meanwhile, approved by acclamation the new government, 
which announced that it could remain in office for five years un- 
der a state of emergency. 

The new regime received considerable initial approval from other 
African states and from the United States. Indeed, United States 
support for the new regime was to prove remarkably durable (see 
Relations with the West, ch. 4). 

The Second Republic, 1965-90: The Rebirth of Bula 
Matari 

In retrospective justification of his 1965 seizure of power, Mobutu 
later summed up the record of the First Republic as one of " chaos, 
disorder, negligence, and incompetence." Rejection of the legacy 
of the First Republic went far beyond rhetoric. In the first two years 
of its existence, the new regime turned to the urgent tasks of politi- 
cal reconstruction and consolidation. Creating a new basis of 
legitimacy for the state, in the form of a single party, came next 
in Mobutu's order of priority. A third imperative was to expand 
the reach of the state in the social and political realms, a process 
that began in 1970 and culminated in the adoption of a new con- 
stitution in 1974. By 1976, however, this effort had begun to gener- 
ate its own inner contradictions, thus paving the way for the 
resurrection of a bula matari ("he who breaks rocks") system of 
repression and brutality. 

Mobutu, Self-Proclaimed Father of the Nation 

Ever since 1965, Mobutu Sese Seko has dominated the political 
life of Zaire, restructuring the state on more than one occasion, 
and earning his self-appointed title of "Father of the Nation." Any 
discussion of Zaire's political structures and processes must there- 
fore be based on an understanding of the man who literally gave 
the country its name. 

Mobutu was born in the town of Lisala, on the Congo River, 
on October 4, 1930. His father, Alberic Gbemani, was a cook for 
a colonial magistrate in Lisala. Despite his birthplace, however, 
Mobutu belonged not to the dominant ethnic group of that region 
but rather to the Ngbandi, a small ethnic community whose do- 
main lay far to the north, along the border with the Central Afri- 
can Republic. 

Mobutu referred frequently both to his humble background as 



44 



Historical Setting 



the son of a cook and to the renown of his father's uncle, a warrior 
and diviner from the village of Gbadolite. Although officially known 
as Joseph-Desire Mobutu, Mobutu was also given the name of his 
great-uncle, Sese Seko Nkuku wa za Banga, meaning "all-con- 
quering warrior, who goes from triumph to triumph." When, under 
the authenticity (see Glossary) policy of the early 1970s, Zairians 
were obliged to adopt "authentic" names, Mobutu dropped Joseph- 
Desire and became Mobutu Sese Seko Nkuku wa za Banga — or, 
more commonly, Mobutu Sese Seko (see Zairianization, Radicali- 
zation, and Retrocession, this ch.). 

Mobutu, who had completed four years of primary school in 
Leopoldville, took seven more years to reach the secondary level, 
moving in and out of different schools. He had frequent conflicts 
with the Catholic missionaries whose schools he attended, and in 
1950, at the age of nineteen, he was definitively expelled. A seven- 
year disciplinary conscription into the Force Publique followed. 

Military service proved crucial in shaping Mobutu's career. Un- 
like many recruits, he spoke excellent French, which quickly won 
him a desk job. By November 1950, he was sent to the school for 
noncommissioned officers, where he came to know many mem- 
bers of the military generation who would assume control of the 
army after the flight of the Belgian officers in 1960. By the time 
of his discharge in 1956, Mobutu, had risen to the rank of sergeant- 
major, the highest rank open to Congolese. He also had begun to 
write newspaper articles under a pseudonym. 

Mobutu returned to civilian life just as decolonization began to 
seem possible. His newspaper articles had brought him to the at- 
tention of Pierre Davister, a Belgian editor of the Leopoldville paper 
L 'Avenir. At that time, a European patron was of enormous benefit 
to an ambitious Congolese; under Davister' s tutelage, Mobutu be- 
came an editorial writer for the new African weekly, Actualites Afri- 
caines. Davister later would provide valuable services by giving 
favorable coverage to the Mobutu regime as editor of his own Bel- 
gian magazine, Special. 

Mobutu thus acquired visibility among the emergent African 
elite of Leopoldville. Yet one portal to status in colonial society 
remained closed to him: full recognition as an evolue depended upon 
approval by the Roman Catholic Church. Denied this recognition, 
Mobutu rejected the church. 

During 1959-60, politically ambitious young Congolese were busy 
constructing political networks for themselves. Residence in Bel- 
gium prevented Mobutu from taking the path of many of his peers 
at home, who were building ethno-regional clienteles. But their 
approach would have been unpromising for him in any case, since 



45 



Zaire: A Country Study 

the Ngbandi were a small and peripheral community, and among 
the so-called Ngala (Lingala- speaking immigrants in Leopoldville) 
such figures as Jean Bolikango were potential opponents. Mobutu 
pursued another route, as Belgian diplomatic, intelligence, and 
financial interests sought clients among the Congolese students and 
interns in Brussels. 

Fatefully, Mobutu also had met Patrice Lumumba, when the 
latter arrived in Brussels. He allied himself with Lumumba (whose 
school background, like that of Mobutu, inclined him to anticlerical- 
ism), when the Congolese National Movement (Mouvement Na- 
tional Congolais — MNC) split into two wings identified, respectively, 
with Lumumba and Albert Kalonji. By early 1960, Mobutu had 
been named head of the MNC -Lumumba office in Brussels. He 
attended the Round Table Conference on independence held in 
Brussels in January 1960 and returned home only three weeks be- 
fore Independence Day, June 30. When the army mutinied against 
its Belgian officers, Mobutu was a logical choice to help fill the 
void. Lumumba, elected prime minister in May 1960, named as 
commander in chief a member of his own ethnic group, Victor Lun- 
dula, but Mobutu was Lumumba's choice as chief of staff. 

During the crucial period of July- August 1960, Mobutu built 
up "his" national army by channeling foreign aid to units loyal 
to him, by exiling unreliable units to remote areas, and by absorbing 
or dispersing rival armies. He tied individual officers to him by 
controlling their promotion and the flow of money for payrolls. 
Lundula, older and less competitive, apparently did little to rival 
Mobutu. 

After President Kasavubu dismissed Lumumba as premier on 
September 5 and Lumumba sought to block this action through 
parliament, Mobutu staged his first coup on September 14. On 
his own authority (but with United States backing), he installed 
an interim government, the so-called College of Commissioners, 
composed primarily of university students and graduates, which 
replaced parliament for six months in 1960-61. 

During the next four years, as weak civilian governments rose 
and fell in Leopoldville, real power was held behind the scenes by 
the "Binza Group," a group of Mobutu supporters named for the 
prosperous suburb where its members lived. 

When in 1965, as in 1960, the division of power between presi- 
dent and prime minister led to a stalemate and threatened the coun- 
try 's stability, Mobutu again seized power (again with United States 
backing). Unlike the first time, however, Mobutu assumed the 
presidency, rather than remaining behind the scenes. 



46 



Historical Setting 



Toward Political Reconstruction 

From 1965 to 1967, the Mobutist state set out to establish its 
authority by gradually dismantling the institutions of the First 
Republic and at the same time bringing about a substantial mea- 
sure of centralization around the president. Although parliament 
continued to meet occasionally, its legislative powers were reduced 
to a mere ritual because key decisions were taken through execu- 
tive decrees (prdonnances-lois). All political parties were dissolved and 
political activities banned, in line with Mobutu's promise that "for 
five years there will be no political party activity." By 1966 the 
twenty-one provincettes had been reduced to twelve and then to eight 
provinces plus the capital, which were redesignated as regions in 
1972 (see fig. 1). They were transformed into purely administra- 
tive entities whose officials were directly responsible to the central 
government and whose assemblies were consultative rather than 
legislative bodies. After the elimination of the office of prime 
minister in October 1966, the presidency became the fulcrum of 
all executive power. 

Most of the remnants of the Tshombist opposition were quickly 
absorbed into the state through various patronage operations. Just 
as quickly, summary justice disposed of the more obdurate oppo- 
nents of the regime. On May 30, 1966, four key personalities of 
the First Republic, including former Prime Minister-designate 
Evariste Kimba, were charged with conspiring against the state, 
tried in a parody of justice, and publicly hanged in Kinshasa (for- 
merly Leopoldville). Threats to the regime nonetheless persisted. 
Pockets of insurgency continued to confront the regime with seri- 
ous challenges to its authority in Kivu (since the early 1990s, divided 
into Nord-Kivu, Sud-Kivu, and Maniema) and Haut-Zaire (for- 
merly Orientale Province). Months went by before these residual 
areas of dissidence were brought under control. 

Meanwhile, rumors that Tshombe was plotting a comeback from 
his Spanish retreat hardened into ominous certainty when in July 
1966 some of Tshombe 's former Katangan gendarmes, led by a 
handful of mercenaries, mutinied in Kisangani (formerly Stan- 
leyville). Two months later, the gendarmes were finally brought 
to heel after French mercenary Bob Denard was persuaded to take 
the lead in crushing the mutiny. By July 1967, however, another 
major mutiny broke out in Kisangani, triggered by the news that 
Tshombe 's airplane had been hijacked over the Mediterranean and 
forced to land in Algiers, where Tshombe was held prisoner. As 
the rebels were forced out of Kisangani by the ANC , they made 
their way to Bukavu, near the Rwandan border, which they held 



47 



Zaire: A Country Study 



for three months. They unsuccessfully tried to fight back the at- 
tacks of the ANC, but by November, faced with imminent defeat, 
the entire group crossed the border into Rwanda where it surren- 
dered to local authorities. The unexpectedly brilliant performance 
of the ANC in Bukavu gave the regime a renewed sense of pride 
and self-confidence. The time was ripe for consolidating its institu- 
tional legitimacy. 

Already in January 1966, a major step toward political consolida- 
tion had taken place with the creation of the Corps of Volunteers 
of the Republic (Corps des Volontaires de la Republique — CVR), 
a loosely knit organization whose membership was mainly recruited 
from the students associated with the General Union of Congolese 
Students (Union Generale des Etudiants Congolais — UGEC). 
Many of the ideas set forth by the CVR came to reflect a brand 
of student radicalism in which the themes of nationalism, economic 
independence, and socialization received pride of place. Rather than 
a party, the CVR is better seen as a vanguard movement designed 
to mobilize popular energies behind Mobutu, ' 'our Second Na- 
tional Hero" (after Lumumba). The very mixed record of the CVR 
as an agent of political mobilization, reflecting in part its exces- 
sive reliance on student activists, must have been an important con- 
sideration in prompting Mobutu to launch a more broadly based 
movement — a movement which, in Mobutu's words, "will be ani- 
mated by the Chief of State himself, and of which the CVR is not 
at all the embryo." 

The Quest for Legitimacy 

By 1967 Mobutu had consolidated his rule and proceeded to give 
the country a new constitution and a single party. The new con- 
stitution was submitted to popular referendum in June 1967 and 
approved by 98 percent of those voting. It provided that executive 
powers be centralized in the president, who was to be head of state, 
head of government, commander in chief of the armed forces and 
the police, and in charge of foreign policy. The president was to 
appoint and dismiss cabinet members and determine their areas 
of responsibility. The ministers, as heads of their respective depart- 
ments, were to execute the programs and decisions of the presi- 
dent. The president also was to have the power to appoint and 
dismiss the governors of the provinces and the judges of all courts, 
including those of the Supreme Court of Justice. 

The bicameral parliament was replaced by a unicameral legis- 
lative body called the National Assembly. Governors of provinces 
were no longer elected by provincial assemblies but appointed by 
the central government. The president had the power to issue 



48 




President 
Mobutu Sese Seko 
with the secretary general 
of the United Nations, 
Kurt Waldheim, 1979 
Courtesy 
The United Nations 




autonomous regulations on matters other than those pertaining 
to the domain of law, without prejudice to other provisions of 
the constitution. Under certain conditions, the president was em- 
powered to govern by executive order, which carried the force 
of law. 

But the most far-reaching change was the creation of the Popu- 
lar Revolutionary Movement (Mouvement Populaire de la Re- 
volution — MPR) on April 17, 1967, marking the emergence of "the 
nation politically organized." Rather than being the emanation 
of the state, the state was henceforth defined as the emanation of 
the party. Thus, in October 1967 party and administrative respon- 
sibilities were merged into a single framework, thereby automati- 
cally extending the role of the party to all administrative organs 
at the central and provincial levels, as well as to the trade unions, 
youth movements, and student organizations. In short, the MPR 
had now become the sole legitimate vehicle for participating in the 
political life of the country. Or, as one official put it, "the MPR 
must be considered as a Church and its Founder as its Messiah." 

The doctrinal foundation was disclosed shortly after its birth, 
in the form of the Manifesto of N'Sele (so named because it was 
issued from the president's rural residence at N'Sele, sixty kilo- 
meters upriver from Kinshasa), made public in May 1967. Na- 
tionalism, revolution, and authenticity were identified as the major 
themes of what came to be known as Mobutism (see Glossary). 



49 



Zaire: A Country Study 



Nationalism implied the achievement of economic independence. 
Revolution, described as a "truly national revolution, essentially 
pragmatic," meant "the repudiation of both capitalism and com- 
munism. "Neither right nor left" thus became one of the legitimiz- 
ing slogans of the regime, along with "authenticity." The concept 
of authenticity was derived from the MPR's professed doctrine of 
"authentic Zairian nationalism and condemnation of regionalism 
and tribalism." Mobutu defined it as being conscious of one's own 
personality and one's own values and of being at home in one's 
culture. In line with the dictates of authenticity, the name of the 
country was changed to the Republic of Zaire in October 1971, 
and that of the armed forces to Zairian Armed Forces (Forces Ar- 
mees Zairoises — FAZ). Many other geographic name changes had 
already taken place, between 1966 and 1971. The adoption of Zair- 
ian, as opposed to Western or Christian, names in 1972 and the 
abandonment of Western dress in favor of the wearing of the aba- 
cost (see Glossary) were subsequently promoted as expressions of 
authenticity. 

Authenticity provided Mobutu with his strongest claim to philo- 
sophical originality. So far from implying a rejection of modern- 
ity, authenticity is perhaps best seen as an effort to reconcile the 
claims of the traditional Zairian culture with the exigencies of 
modernization. Exactly how this synthesis was to be accomplished 
remained unclear, however. What is beyond doubt is Mobutu's 
effort to use the concept of authenticity as a means of vindicating 
his own brand of leadership. As he himself stated, "in our African 
tradition there are never two chiefs .... That is why we Congo- 
lese, in the desire to conform to the traditions of our continent, 
have resolved to group all the energies of the citizens of our coun- 
try under the banner of a single national party." 

Critics of the regime were quick to point out the shortcomings 
of Mobutism as a legitimizing formula, in particular its self-serving 
qualities and inherent vagueness; nonetheless, the MPR's ideologi- 
cal training center, the Makanda Kabobi Institute, took seriously 
its assigned task of propagating through the land "the teachings 
of the Founder-President, which must be given and interpreted in 
the same fashion throughout the country." Members of the MPR 
Political Bureau, meanwhile, were entrusted with the responsibility 
of serving as "the repositories and guarantors of Mobutism." 

Quite aside from the merits or weaknesses of Mobutism, the 
MPR drew much of its legitimacy from the model of the overarching 
mass parties that had come into existence in Africa in the 1960s, 
a model which had also been a source of inspiration for the MNC- 
Lumumba. It was this Lumumbist heritage which the MPR tried 



50 



Historical Setting 



to appropriate in its effort to mobilize the Zairian masses behind 
its founder-president. Intimately tied up with the doctrine of 
Mobutism was the vision of an all-encompassing single party reach- 
ing out to all sectors of the nation (see The Party-State as a Sys- 
tem of Rule, ch. 4). 

The Expansion of State Authority 

Translating the concept of "the nation politically organized" 
into reality implied a major expansion of state control of civil soci- 
ety. It meant, to begin with, the incorporation of youth groups and 
worker organizations into the matrix of the MPR. In July 1967, 
the Political Bureau announced the creation of the Youth of the 
Popular Revolutionary Movement (Jeunesse du Mouvement 
Populaire de la Revolution — JMPR), following the launching a 
month earlier of the National Union of Zairian Workers (Union 
Nationale des Travailleurs Zairois — UNTZA), which brought 
together into a single organizational framework three preexisting 
trade unions. Ostensibly, the aim of the merger, in the terms of 
the Manifesto of N'Sele, was to transform the role of trade unions 
from ' 'being merely a force of confrontation" into "an organ of 
support for government policy," thus providing " a communica- 
tion link between the working class and the state." Similarly, the 
JMPR was to act as a major link between the student population 
and the state. In reality, the government was attempting to bring 
under its control those sectors where opposition to the regime might 
be centered. By appointing key labor and youth leaders to the MPR 
Political Bureau, the regime hoped to harness syndical and stu- 
dent forces to the machinery of the state. Nevertheless, as has been 
pointed out by numerous observers, there is little evidence that co- 
optation succeeded in mobilizing support for the regime beyond 
the most superficial level (see Political Dynamics, ch. 4). 

The trend toward co-optation of key social sectors continued in 
subsequent years. Women's associations were eventually brought 
under the control of the party, as was the press, and in December 
1971 Mobutu proceeded to emasculate the power of the churches. 
From then on, only three churches were recognized: the Church 
of Christ in Zaire, the Kimbanguist Church, and the Roman 
Catholic Church (see Religion, ch. 2). Nationalization of the univer- 
sities of Kinshasa and Kisangani, coupled with Mobutu's insis- 
tence on banning all Christian names and establishing JMPR 
sections in all seminaries, soon brought the Roman Catholic Church 
and the state into conflict. Not until 1975, and after considerable 
pressure from the Vatican, did the regime agree to tone down its 
attacks on the Roman Catholic Church and return some of its 



51 



Zaire: A Country Study 

control of the school system to the church. Meanwhile, in line with 
a December 1971 law, which allowed the state to dissolve "any 
church or sect that compromises or threatens to compromise pub- 
lic order," scores of unrecognized religious sects were dissolved 
and their leaders jailed. 

Mobutu was careful also to suppress all institutions that could 
mobilize ethnic loyalties. Avowedly opposed to ethnicity as a basis 
for political alignment, he outlawed such ethnic associations as the 
Association of Lulua Brothers (Association des Lulua Freres), which 
had been organized in Kasai in 1953 in reaction to the growing 
political and economic influence in Kasai of the rival Luba peo- 
ple, and Liboke lya Bangala (literally, "a bundle of Bangala"), 
an association formed in the 1950s to represent the interests of 
Lingala speakers in large cities. It helped Mobutu that his ethnic 
affiliation was blurred in the public mind. Nevertheless, as dis- 
satisfaction arose, ethnic tensions surfaced again. 

Running parallel to the efforts of the state to control all autono- 
mous sources of power, important administrative reforms were in- 
troduced in 1967 and 1973 to strengthen the hand of the central 
authorities in the provinces. The central objective of the 1967 re- 
form was to abolish provincial governments and replace them with 
state functionaries appointed by Kinshasa. The principle of cen- 
tralization was further extended to districts and territories, each 
headed by administrators appointed by the central government. 
The only units of government that still retained a fair measure of 
autonomy — but not for long — were the so-called local collectivi- 
ties, i.e., chiefdoms and sectors (the latter incorporating several 
chiefdoms). The unitary, centralized state system thus legislated 
into existence bore a striking resemblance to its colonial antece- 
dent, except that from July 1972 provinces were called regions. 

With the January 1973 reform, another major step was taken 
in the direction of further centralization. The aim, in essence, was 
to effect a complete fusion of political and administrative hierarchies 
by making the head of each administrative unit the president of 
the local party committee. Furthermore, another consequence of 
the reform was to severely curtail the power of traditional authori- 
ties at the local level. Hereditary claims to authority would no longer 
be recognized; instead, all chiefs were to be appointed and con- 
trolled by the state via the administrative hierarchy. By then, the 
process of centralization had theoretically eliminated all preexist- 
ing centers of local autonomy. 

The analogy with the colonial state becomes even more compel- 
ling if we take into account the introduction in 1973 of "obligatory 
civic work" (locally known as Salongo after the Lingala term for 



52 



Historical Setting 



work), in the form of one afternoon a week of compulsory labor 
on agricultural and development projects. Officially described as 
a revolutionary attempt to return to the values of communalism 
and solidarity inherent in the traditional society, Salongo was in- 
tended to mobilize the population into the performance of collec- 
tive work "with enthusiasm and without constraint." But, in fact 
Salongo was forced labor. The conspicuous lack of popular en- 
thusiasm for Salongo led to widespread resistance and foot drag- 
ging, causing many local administrators to look the other way. 
Although failure to comply carried penalties of one month to six 
months in jail, by the late 1970s few were the Zairians who did 
not shirk their Salongo obligations. By resuscitating one of the most 
bitterly resented features of the colonial state, obligatory civic work 
contributed in no small way to the erosion of legitimacy suffered 
by the Mobutist state. 

Zairianization, Radicalization, and Retrocession 

The conquest of economic independence figured prominently 
on Mobutu's agenda from the outset. Government moves to es- 
tablish greater control over foreign enterprises operating in the coun- 
try brought about a confrontation with the Belgian-owned Upper 
Katanga Mining Union (Union Miniere du Haut-Katanga — 
UMHK), which was nationalized in January 1967, and a new state- 
owned company formed (see Postindependence, ch. 3). 

It was not until November 1973, however, that specific and more 
extensive measures were announced to restore the control of the 
economy to Zairian nationals. "Zaire is the country that has been 
the most heavily exploited in the world," Mobutu declared on 
November 30. "That is why," he added, "farms, ranches, plan- 
tations, concessions, commerce, and real estate agencies will be 
turned over to sons of the country." In this way began the cam- 
paign that became known as Zairianization (see Glossary; Zair- 
ianization, ch. 3). 

At first, "the sons of the country" consisted essentially of high- 
ranking party members and government officials, in all approx- 
imately 300 people. Major plantations and ranches and large 
commercial business enterprises were given to the top political elite. 
Smaller enterprises were allocated to local notables. Army officers, 
judges, members of the regional administration, and aimbassadors 
failed to qualify as potential recipients {acquereurs) . 

The self-serving character of this decision caused immediate pub- 
lic indignation. Faced with mounting opposition to his Zairiani- 
zation policies, Mobutu announced that the economic activities 
covered by the November 30 measures would be entirely taken over 



53 



Zaire: A Country Study 

by the state. Those citizens who wished to acquire a plantation or 
a farm would have to buy it from the state. Considerable confu- 
sion followed in the wake of this announcement. For one thing, 
the criteria used for assessing individual qualifications — party 
militancy, integrity, commercial experience, solvency — could be 
interpreted in many different ways; for another, the screening proce- 
dure was at best arbitrary, and when a candidate failed to meet 
the stipulated conditions, a bribe (matabiche) was often the quick- 
est way to clinch a favorable decision from the local authorities. 
As Crawford Young and Thomas Turner observed, "what trans- 
pired was a tumultuous, disorderly and profoundly demeaning 
scramble for the loot .... Success in the scramble was above all 
a measure of political influence and proximity to the ultimate sources 
of power." 

Zairianization engendered economic disaster on an unprecedent- 
ed scale. In a matter of months, commercial networks were utter- 
ly disrupted; massive layoffs were reported; and shortages of basic 
commodities became increasingly widespread, along with liquida- 
tions of assets. Asset stripping in the retail sector became a com- 
mon practice. Efforts of the regime to introduce price controls did 
little to curb inflation. The plantation sector of the economy, mean- 
while, was brought to a virtual standstill. 

Confronted with a wholesale plunder of the Zairian economy, 
on December 30, 1974, Mobutu announced a ten-point "radi- 
calization" program intended to bring about "a revolution in the 
revolution." Officially, major economic initiatives remained the 
exclusive domain of the state. The main thrust of radicalization 
was aimed at the self-serving attitude of the acquereurs. Party lead- 
ers were expected to turn their properties over to the state and de- 
vote themselves to agricultural activities. Party cadres were chastised 
for their "mercenary behavior" and lack of civic sense. More im- 
portandy, the large-scale, Belgian-owned corporations that had been 
left untouched by the Zairianization decrees were now targeted for 
nationalization. Thus, the calamitous effects of Zairianization were 
extended to the commanding heights of the economy. While be- 
ing constantly reminded of their revolutionary duties, members 
of the political class were given yet another opportunity to draw 
further benefits from their control of an even larger sector of the 
economy. 

As the Zairian economy went into a tailspin, Mobutu finally came 
to realize the magnitude of the catastrophe ushered in by Zair- 
ianization and radicalization. In November 1975, he announced 
the creation of a stabilization committee in charge of examining 
a retrocession (see Glossary) formula designed to return a substantial 



54 



Presidential compound at Ngaliema on the Congo River near Kinshasa 

Courtesy Zaire National Tourism Office 

portion of Zairianized enterprises to their original owners. Agree- 
ment was reached on a return of 40 percent equity in both radical- 
ized and Zairianized businesses; in time, however, foreign owners 
were allowed to regain as much as 60 percent in equity, with the 
remaining 40 percent remaining in Zairian hands. 

Meanwhile, almost irreparable damage had been inflicted upon 
the economy, and the insatiable greed of the political class was made 
all the more intolerable by the conditions of acute penury now con- 
fronting the rural masses. The fall of copper prices and the sharp 
rise in the cost of oil imports in 1974 further propelled the econo- 
my into a period of prolonged stagnation (see Economic Decline, 
ch. 3). Zaire's growing dependence on foreign lending agencies 
made a mockery of Mobutu's insistence on the conquest of eco- 
nomic independence. And with the disparities of wealth and 
privilege between the political class and the populace only slightly 
diminished by "retrocession," growing social turbulence became 
inevitable (see Opposition to the Regime prior to 1990, ch. 4; Public 
Order and Internal Security, ch. 5). 

External Threats to Regime Stability 

Further aggravating the economic fiasco of Zairianization were 
the military setbacks suffered by the Zairian army in the course 



55 



Zaire: A Country Study 

of its intervention in the Angolan civil war. In late 1974, in order 
to counteract the growing influence of the neo-Marxist Popular 
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de 
Libertacao de Angola — MPLA), Mobutu chose to throw his weight 
behind Holden Roberto's pro- Western National Front for the Liber- 
ation of Angola (Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola— 
FNLA), and by July 1975, with Angolan independence just around 
the corner, units of the Zairian army made their way into Angola 
and joined the FNLA in an effort to seize control of the capital. 
But as the Zairian-FNLA forces approached the vicinity of Luan- 
da, they encountered stiff resistance from the MPLA, acting in 
concert with remnants of the old Katangan gendarmes. Eventual- 
ly, Cuban soldiers supporting the MPLA inflicted a devastating 
defeat upon the Zairian-FNLA units (see Involvement in Angola, 
ch. 5). 

While the defeat of the Zairian troops in Angola cast grave doubts 
on their military capabilities, their performance during the 1977 
and 1978 Shaba invasions proved equally disastrous. The FAZ not 
only failed to stop the invasions but showed its usual disposition 
to steal and loot civilian property. Only after the intervention of 
Moroccan troops in 1977, and of the French Foreign Legion in 
1978, were the invaders forced back into Angola, accompanied by 
thousands of civilians fleeing their homeland for fear of retribu- 
tion (see Shaba I; Shaba II, ch. 5). 

The 1977 and 1978 invasions were spearheaded by the Front 
for the National Liberation of the Congo (Front pour la Libera- 
tion Nationale du Congo — FLNC), the only Zairian opposition 
movement that at the time claimed a measure of credibility. The 
distant origins of the FLNC are traceable to Tshombe's Katan- 
gan gendarmes, many of whom had found refuge in Angola after 
the secession; others were incorporated into the Zairian army, and 
those few who survived the Kisangani mutinies of 1966 and 1967 
fled to Rwanda. Of the few thousand who found a haven in Angola 
in 1963, many joined the irregular units then being assembled by 
the Portuguese (the so-called Black Arrows) to fight the Angolan 
insurgents. In 1968 the Black Arrows transformed themselves into 
the FLNC . Understandably mistrustful of Mobutu and the FNLA 
with which he was allied, when Portuguese rule was about to crum- 
ble in 1974, the FLNC threw its support to the MPLA. 

After the independence of Angola, the FLNC returned to its origi- 
nal sanctuary, near the Shaba border. It was from this base area 
that the "rebels" launched their first invasion into Shaba, on March 
8, 1977. The towns of Dilolo, Kisenge, and Kapanga, all in south 
and west Shaba, fell into their hands with little or no resistance 



56 



Historical Setting 



from the FAZ. In. mid- April, as the FLNC closed in on Kolwezi, 
a major mining town in south Shaba, Mobutu issued an urgent 
call for military assistance to France and Morocco, and shortly 
thereafter French transport airplanes proceeded to airlift Moroc- 
can troops into Shaba. Unwilling to engage the Moroccans, the 
invaders quickly retreated into Angola. FAZ units then moved in 
to orchestrate a brutal "pacification campaign" that led to a mas- 
sive exodus of the civilian population into Angola. 

A year later, in May 1978, the FLNC launched another inva- 
sion into Shaba, this time from Zambia. Once again, the perfor- 
mance of the FAZ proved less than spectacular. Encountering 
virtually no resistance from the Zairian army, the attacking units 
moved into Kolwezi on May 13. Greeted as liberators by the young 
and the unemployed, many of whom bitterly resented the presence 
of a sizeable group of expatriates in this major industrial town, the 
FLNC leadership appeared utterly incapable of controlling its 
troops, much less those Zairians who had spontaneously cast in 
their lot with the invaders and who now took the law into their 
hands. Scores of Europeans were massacred, some by the FLNC, 
some by Zairian civilians, and many more, according to knowledge- 
able observers, by Zairian troops anxious to loot European property. 
As on previous occasions, the FAZ showed itself to be little more 
than a rabble. Not until May 19, after paratroops from the French 
Foreign Legion and Belgium were airlifted into Shaba, was Kolwezi 
recaptured. By then more than 100 European residents had lost 
their lives as well as large numbers of Kolwezi residents and FAZ 
and FLNC soldiers. Again hundreds of rebels withdrew into An- 
gola, anticipating vengeance from Mobutu's FAZ. 

Zairian allegations of joint Soviet-Cuban involvement in the Sha- 
ba invasions were instrumental in prompting a favorable response 
from Mobutu's friends (France, Belgium, and the United States) 
to his request for immediate military assistance. But the evidence 
in support of these allegations is scanty at best. Quite aside from 
the part played by the FLNC in spearheading the invasions, the 
sharp deterioration of the Zairian economy after 1975, coupled with 
the rapid growth of anti-Mobutist sentiment in the copper belt and 
elsewhere, were crucial factors behind the Shaba crises in 1977 and 
1978. His impeccable anti-Soviet credentials nonetheless gave 
Mobutu guarantees of Western backing against his domestic foes, 
as well as substantial rewards in the form of United States develop,- 
ment assistance and military aid. In later years, Mobutu convert- 
ed the Kamina Base into a major link in the supply route for arms 
shipments to Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total In- 
dependence of Angola (Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total 



57 



Zaire: A Country Study 

de Angola — UNITA). In so doing, he once again benefited from 
the convergence of his regional foreign policy goals and United 
States strategic objectives in southern Africa (see Regional Rela- 
tions, ch. 4). Mobutu's endorsement of United States security ob- 
jectives in southern Africa made it possible for his regime to benefit 
financially from foreign aid while resisting domestic pressures for 
economic, social, and political reforms. 

The Durability of the Patrimonial State 

Under Mobutu formal institutions have always been of litde con- 
sequence in explaining how power is distributed; the informal net- 
works of influence built around the president are the key to an 
understanding of the patrimonial (see Glossary) underpinnings of 
the regime (see Establishment of a Personalistic Regime, ch. 4). 
In accordance with his chiefly role, Mobutu's rule was from the 
outset based on bonds of personal loyalty between himself and his 
entourage. His hegemony has been absolute, extending to every 
level of government. In an effort to forestall the emergence of in- 
dependent power centers, administrative and government personnel 
have been constantly moved around; opposition members, alter- 
natively rusticated and rehabilitated; and security forces dissolved 
and restructured as the circumstances dictated. 

Prior to 1990, what has been termed the "presidential brother- 
hood" constituted the inner circle of Mobutu's clients, number- 
ing anywhere from fifteen to twenty people. Included in this group 
were the members of the Political Bureau of the MPR and certain 
key personalities of the security forces. A somewhat larger and 
shadowy entourage of courtiers and technocrats could be identi- 
fied as the next most important group of clients, overlapping with 
yet a third group represented by the provincial bosses. The bound- 
aries separating one group from the other were highly fluid, 
however, reflecting Mobutu's well-known disposition to constant- 
ly rearrange the structure and personnel of his government. What 
held these clients together was their presumed loyalty to the pat- 
rimonial ruler, a loyalty nurtured by the anticipation of rewards 
commensurate with their willingness and ability to comply with 
presidential orders. 

Penalties to the disloyal have always been just as important as 
rewards to the faithful in sustaining the Mobutist state. The coercive 
side of the patrimonial state is equally pertinent to an understanding 
of how Mobutu has managed to stay on top. His real power base 
lies in a wide array of paramilitary and intelligence-gathering agen- 
cies (see The Intelligence Apparatus and Security Forces, ch. 5). 
The most important are the Special Presidential Division (Division 



58 



Historical Setting 



Speciale Presidentielle — DSP), an elite force in charge of ensuring 
Mobutu's personal security; the Military Action and Intelligence 
Service (Service d'Action et de Renseignements Militaire — SARM), 
in charge of military intelligence; and SARM's civilian counter- 
part, the National Documentation Agency (Agence Nationale de 
Documentation — AND). Each agency has separate access to the 
president, and each has a history of rampant corruption and abuse 
of the civilian population. Agents are grossly underpaid, so bribery 
and extortion are common currency. Arresting innocent citizens 
and holding them captive until they pay the required amount is 
by no means unusual (see Popular Attitudes Toward the Civil Secu- 
rity Apparatus; Civil and Human Rights, ch. 5). Along with the 
sanctions facing all forms of organized opposition, the diffuse fear 
instilled among the masses by the security forces must be seen as 
the most obvious explanation for Mobutu's extraordinary record 
of political longevity. 

Servicing the networks of the patrimonial state is Mobutu's own 
responsibility. In practice, substantial amounts of the government's 
money have been regularly diverted into the presidential slush fund 
to be allocated to the faithful in accordance with the presidential 
whim. Just as the patrimonial state can best be visualized as an 
extension of the ruler's household, the coffers of the state have long 
been almost indistinguishable from Mobutu's private wealth (said 
to amount to approximately US$5 billion). The siphoning off of 
state funds into private networks is one of the norms of political 
clientage institutionalized under Mobutu (see Patrimonial Polit- 
ics and Corruption, ch. 3). 

The opportunity costs arising from the exigencies of the system 
are readily apparent in such deficiencies as the populace's low stan- 
dard of living, the utter neglect of the rural sectors, the absence 
of an investment budget for the development and maintenance of 
infrastructure, and the very modest amounts spent on education 
and health services (see Education; Health and Medical Services, 
ch. 2). Although Mobutu's personal style bears much of the blame 
for this dismal state of affairs, part of the explanation must also 
be found in the emergence in Zaire of a polity that combined some 
of the worst features of the absolutist, hula matari state with the in- 
efficiency and corruption of a patrimonial regime. 

* * * 

There is an excellent body of literature available in English on 
Zaire from the precolonial era to the present. Jan Vansina's King- 
doms of the Savanna, Paths in the Rainforests, and ' 4 The Peoples of the 



59 



Zaire: A Country Study 

Forest" offer authoritative accounts of the development of Zaire's 
diverse peoples and kingdoms. For the colonial and early indepen- 
dence era, the best sources are the numerous works by Crawford 
Young and Rene Lemarchand as well as Ruth Slade's King Leopold's 
Congo, Neil Ascherson's The King Incorporated, Jules Gerard- Libais's 
Katanga Secession, and Ernest Lefever's Crisis in the Congo: A United 
Nations Force in Action. Dominer pour servir, a celebrated work by former 
colonial governor Pierre Ryckmans, is also of interest in under- 
standing Belgian motivations and policies. 

The Mobutist era is amply covered in a number of authorita- 
tive works. Most notable are Thomas Callaghy's The State-Society 
Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective, Michael G. Schatzberg's Pol- 
itics and Class in Zaire and The Dialectics of Oppression in Zaire, Craw- 
ford Young and Thomas Turner's The Rise and Decline of the Zairi- 
an State, and David Gould's Bureaucratic Corruption and 
Underdevelopment in the Third World: The Case of Zaire. (For further 
information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



60 



Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 



Traditional mask made of rope 



ZAIRE'S ETHNIC DIVERSITY has frequently been stressed in 
discussions of its society and culture; as many as 250 different lan- 
guages can be identified within its borders. But overemphasis on 
ethnicity would be misplaced in discussing the social realities of 
the 1980s and early 1990s. Zairians have shared a prolonged ex- 
perience of state pauperization and oppression; the social polari- 
zation and strategies of survival that have evolved out of that 
experience shape them regardless of their individual ethnic iden- 
tities. 

Zairians have been increasingly divided into an elite class, most 
of whom are politically attached to the government of Mobutu Sese 
Seko (president, 1965- ), and the mass of peasants, workers, and 
low-ranking civil servants. The former have used the state to 
advance their economic interests, although their dependence on 
political favor has left them insecure. The latter have seen their 
standard of living drop year after year, watching while as much 
as half their income is taken in fees, fines, and taxes to support 
the state and its elite. 

Zairians' response to such deprivations has been differentiated 
not only by class but also by factors such as rural or urban status, 
gender, regionalism, and ethnicity. Villagers, for example, seeing 
road networks and educational and medical services collapse, have 
responded in part by fleeing to cities, increasing the country's rate 
of urbanization. Women have formed new alliances in both rural 
and urban areas to promote their interests and resist state exactions. 

Most striking has been the creativity of ordinary Zairians in con- 
structing an economic life outside the deteriorating formal economy. 
A major factor in the continuing survival and political quies- 
cence of the population in the face of their pauperization has been 
the growth of the informal economy, whose size, according to most 
analysts, exceeds that of the formal national economy. 

Notable, too, is the strength of institutions outside of or on the 
periphery of state control. Churches have continued to grow in 
membership, and their extensive networks of hospitals and schools 
have increased in importance since the collapse of state-run medi- 
cal and education institutions. 

Zaire is a land of superlative natural endowments — a vast terri- 
tory encompassing enormous mineral deposits, immense forests, 
mighty rivers, and abundant fertile soils. It is said to have suffi- 
cient arable land and hydroelectric potential to feed and power the 



63 



Zaire: A Country Study 

entire African continent. This situation, in combination with its 
legendary mineral wealth, should have made Zaire one of sub- 
Saharan Africa's most developed and wealthiest states. Instead, 
it is a poor nation in a rich land. Its economy and society are in 
disarray in the early 1990s, and most of its citizens (80 percent by 
some accounts) live in absolute poverty. 

Zaire's public health and welfare system has collapsed. Most 
state-run hospitals and schools have closed. Medical equipment and 
medicine are scarce. Blood banks have closed, blood screenings 
are rare, and the rate of immunization among infants and chil- 
dren has declined drastically. Acquired immune deficiency syn- 
drome (AIDS), tuberculosis, leprosy, trypanosomiasis, and malaria 
are widespread problems. Malnutrition has also become increas- 
ingly prevalent, particularly among children, as the price of food 
exceeds the financial resources of more and more Zairians. The 
availability of safe drinking water also has become problematic. 

The impoverishment of Zairians can be attributed in large part 
to the monumental corruption and institutionalized theft charac- 
terizing the Mobutu regime. Nevertheless, the country's large popu- 
lation (39. 1 million in 1992) and chronically high population growth 
rate (3.3 percent in 1992) have also played a role in the deteriora- 
tion of economic and social conditions, in that population growth 
has consistently outpaced official economic growth. Ethnic and social 
tensions are also on the rise, as Zairians compete for increasingly 
scarce resources. One serious result of this ethnic conflict is that 
thousands of Zairians have been displaced by ethnic violence, creat- 
ing a mass of internal refugees whose needs the state will not and 
cannot address. 

Geography and Environment 

The Republic of Zaire is the second largest country of sub- 
Saharan Africa, occupying some 2,344,885 square kilometers. 
It is roughly the size of the United States east of the Mississippi 
River. 

Most of the country lies within the vast hollow of the Congo River 
basin. The basin has the shape of an amphitheater, open to the 
north and northwest and closed in the south and east by high 
plateaus and mountains. The edges of the basin are breached in 
the west by the passage of the Congo River to the Atlantic Ocean; 
they are broken and raised in the east by an upheaval of the Great 
Rift Valley (where lakes Mweru, Tanganyika, Kivu, Edward, and 
Albert are found) and by overflow from volcanos in the Virunga 
Mountains. 



64 



The Society and Its Environment 

Rivers and Lakes 

The Congo River and its tributaries drain this basin and pro- 
vide the country with the most extensive network of navigable water- 
ways in Africa. Ten kilometers wide at mid-point of its length, the 
river carries a volume of water that is second only to the Amazon's. 
Its flow is unusually regular because it is fed by rivers and streams 
from both sides of the equator; the complementary alternation of 
rainy and dry seasons on each side of the equator guarantees a regu- 
lar supply of water for the main channel. At points where naviga- 
tion is blocked by rapids and waterfalls, the sudden descent of the 
river creates a hydroelectric potential greater than that found in 
any other river system on earth. 

Most of Zaire is served by the Congo River system, a fact that 
has facilitated both trade and outside penetration. Its network of 
waterways is dense and evenly distributed through the country, 
with three exceptions: northeastern Mayombe in Bas-Zaire Region 
in the west, which is drained by a small coastal river called the 
Shilango; a strip of land on the eastern border adjoining lakes Ed- 
ward and Albert, which is part of the Nile River basin; and a small 
part of extreme southeastern Zaire, which lies in the Zambezi River 
basin and drains into the Indian Ocean. 

Most of Zaire's lakes are also part of the Congo River basin. 
In the west are Lac Mai-Ndombe and Lac Tumba, which are rem- 
nants of a huge interior lake that once occupied the entire basin 
prior to the breach of the basin's edge by the Congo River and 
the subsequent drainage of the interior. In the southeast, Lake 
Mweru straddles the border with Zambia. On the eastern frontier, 
Lac Kivu, Central Africa's highest lake and a key tourist center, and 
Lake Tanganyika, just south of Lac Kivu, both feed into the Lualaba 
River, the name often given to the upper extension of the Congo 
River. Only the waters of the eastern frontier's northernmost great 
lakes, Edward and Albert, drain north, into the Nile Basin. 

Geographic Regions 

Several major geographic regions may be defined in terms of 
terrain and patterns of natural vegetation, namely the central Congo 
Basin, the uplands north and south of the basin, and the eastern 
highlands (see fig. 7). 

The country's core region is the central Congo Basin. Having 
an average elevation of about forty-four meters, it measures roughly 
800,000 square kilometers, constituting about a third of Zaire's 
territory. Much of the forest within the basin is swamp, and still 
more of it consists of a mixture of marshes and firm land. 



67 



The Society and Its Environment 



Rivers and Lakes 

The Congo River and its tributaries drain this basin and pro- 
vide the country with the most extensive network of navigable water- 
ways in Africa. Ten kilometers wide at mid-point of its length, the 
river carries a volume of water that is second only to the Amazon's. 
Its flow is unusually regular because it is fed by rivers and streams 
from both sides of the equator; the complementary alternation of 
rainy and dry seasons on each side of the equator guarantees a regu- 
lar supply of water for the main channel. At points where naviga- 
tion is blocked by rapids and waterfalls, the sudden descent of the 
river creates a hydroelectric potential greater than that found in 
any other river system on earth. 

Most of Zaire is served by the Congo River system, a fact that 
has facilitated both trade and outside penetration. Its network of 
waterways is dense and evenly distributed through the country, 
with three exceptions: northeastern Mayombe in Bas-Zaire Region 
in the west, which is drained by a small coastal river called the 
Shilango; a strip of land on the eastern border adjoining lakes Ed- 
ward and Albert, which is part of the Nile River basin; and a small 
part of extreme southeastern Zaire, which lies in the Zambezi River 
basin and drains into the Indian Ocean. 

Most of Zaire's lakes are also part of the Congo River basin. 
In the west are Lac Mai-Ndombe and Lac Tumba, which are rem- 
nants of a huge interior lake that once occupied the entire basin 
prior to the breach of the basin's edge by the Congo River and 
the subsequent drainage of the interior. In the southeast, Lake 
Mweru straddles the border with Zambia. On the eastern frontier, 
Lac Kivu, Central Africa's highest lake and a key tourist center, and 
Lake Tanganyika, just south of Lac Kivu, both feed into the Lualaba 
River, the name often given to the upper extension of the Congo 
River. Only the waters of the eastern frontier's northernmost great 
lakes, Edward and Albert, drain north, into the Nile Basin. 

Geographic Regions 

Several major geographic regions may be defined in terms of 
terrain and patterns of natural vegetation, namely the central Congo 
Basin, the uplands north and south of the basin, and the eastern 
highlands (see fig. 7). 

The country's core region is the central Congo Basin. Having 
an average elevation of about forty-four meters, it measures roughly 
800,000 square kilometers, constituting about a third of Zaire's 
territory. Much of the forest within the basin is swamp, and still 
more of it consists of a mixture of marshes and firm land. 



67 



Zaire: A Country Study 

North and south of the basin lie higher plains and, occasionally, 
hills covered with varying mixtures of savanna grasses and wood- 
lands. The southern uplands region, like the basin, constitutes about 
a third of Zaire's territory. The area slopes from south to north, 
starting at about 1,000 meters near the Angolan border and fall- 
ing to about 500 meters near the basin. Vegetation cover in the 
southern uplands territory is more varied than that of the north- 
ern uplands. In some areas, woodland is dominant; in others, savan- 
na grasses predominate. South of the basin, along the streams 
flowing into the Kasai River are extensive gallery forests. In the 
far southeast, most of Shaba Region (formerly Katanga Province) 
is characterized by somewhat higher plateaus and low mountains. 
The westernmost section of Zaire, a partly forested panhandle reach- 
ing the Atlantic Ocean, is an extension of the southern uplands 
that drops sharply to a very narrow shore about forty kilometers 
long. 

In the much narrower northern uplands, the cover is largely 
savanna, and woodlands are rarer. The average elevation of this 
region is about 600 meters, but it rises as high as 900 meters where 
it meets the western edge of the eastern highlands. 

The eastern highlands region is the highest and most rugged por- 
tion of the country. It extends for more than 1,500 kilometers from 
above Lake Albert to the southern tip of Shaba below Lubumbashi 
(formerly Elisabethville) and varies in width from eighty to 560 
kilometers. Its hills and mountains range in altitude from about 
1,000 meters to more than 5,000 meters. The western arm of the 
Great Rift Valley forms a natural eastern boundary to this region. 
The eastern border of Zaire extends through the valley and its sys- 
tem of lakes, which are separated from each other by plains situat- 
ed between high mountain ranges. 

In this region, changes in elevation bring marked changes in vege- 
tation, which ranges from montane savanna to heavy montane 
forest. The Massif du Ruwenzori (Ruwenzori Mountains or Moun- 
tains of the Moon) between lakes Albert and Edward constitutes 
the highest range in Africa. The height and location of these moun- 
tains on the equator make for a varied and spectacular flora. 
Together with the Virunga Mountains north of Lac Kivu, site of 
several active volcanos, and together with the game park situated 
between them, they constitute Zaire's most important potential 
touristic resource. 

Climate 

Climate ranges from tropical rain forest in the Congo River basin 
to tropical wet-and-dry in the southern uplands to tropical highland 



68 



The Society and Its Environment 



in eastern areas above 2,000 meters in elevation. In general, tem- 
peratures and humidity are quite high. The highest and least vari- 
able temperatures are to be found in the equatorial forest, where 
daytime highs range between 30°C and 35°C, and nighttime lows 
rarely go below 20°C. The average annual temperature is about 
25°C. In the southern uplands, particularly in southeastern Sha- 
ba, winters are cool and dry, whereas summers are warm and damp. 
The area embracing the chain of lakes from Lake Albert to Lake 
Tanganyika in the eastern highlands has a moist climate and a nar- 
row but not excessively warm temperature range. The mountain 
sections are cooler, but humidity increases with altitude until the 
saturation point is reached; a nearly constant falling mist prevails 
on some slopes, particularly in the Ruwenzori Mountains. 

The seasonal pattern of rainfall is affected by Zaire's straddling 
of the equator. In the third of the country that lies north of the 
equator, the dry season (roughly early November to late March) 
corresponds to the rainy season in the southern two-thirds. There 
is a great deal of variation, however, and a number of places on 
either side of the equator have two wet and two dry seasons. Rainfall 
averages range from about 1,000 millimeters to 2,200 millimeters. 
Annual rainfall is highest in the heart of the Congo River basin 
and in the highlands west of Bukavu and with some variation tends 
to diminish in direct relation to distance from these areas. The only 
areas marked by long four-month to five-month dry seasons and 
occasional droughts are parts of Shaba. 

Environmental Trends 

In the last decade, Africa's rain forests have been destroyed at 
a faster rate than anywhere else in the world, including the well- 
publicized Amazon region in South America; Nigeria, for exam- 
ple, is now 90 percent deforested. Environmental degradation has 
been less of a problem in Zaire than elsewhere in sub-Saharan Afri- 
ca. Nevertheless, although still 86 percent intact in the early 1990s, 
Zaire's vast forests will be increasingly at risk. A major threat has 
been the signing of contracts with foreign logging corporations. 
Some 37 percent of the total exploitable area of Zaire's rain forest 
has already been designated as timber concessions. 

The most intense logging to date has been in Bas-Zaire Region 
in the hinterlands of the capital of Kinshasa. Logging itself dis- 
rupts the forest ecology; worse, logging roads carved out of forest 
to export felled timber have become avenues for immigration into 
the forest by poor farmers who clear and burn more forest for fields. 
In 1993 one analyst reported that there was virtually no primary 
rain forest left in Bas-Zaire. 



69 



Zaire: A Country Study 

In the east, the appropriation of land for ranching and planta- 
tions in the Kivu highlands has simultaneously reduced forest hect- 
arage and increased the intensity of use of the remaining land by 
the existing population. The Ituri Forest of northeastern Zaire has 
also experienced substantial recent immigration by growing popu- 
lations in need of fertile soil for their crops. Extensive forest de- 
struction has been reported as a consequence. 

Population 

Size and Growth 

Zaire's population was estimated at 39.1 million in 1992, mak- 
ing the country among sub-Saharan Africa's most populous. This 
figure represents a substantial increase over the 29.7 million in- 
habitants recorded in the last official census, taken in July 1984, 
which in itself had indicated a near doubling of the 16.2 million 
population at independence in 1960 (see table 2, Appendix). 

Fluctuations in the country's population over time follow a clear 
pattern, correlating to political and economic developments. Be- 
tween 1880 and approximately 1920, a period of colonial conquest 
and consolidation, Zaire suffered a drastic decline in population. 
European and Arab penetration disrupted traditional agricultural 
organization and introduced diseases such as smallpox, influenza, 
and venereal diseases, devastating local populations and reducing 
their numbers by roughly one- third to one-half. In the 1940s, popu- 
lation decline was also hastened by the conditions under which man- 
datory labor was imposed by the colonial government during World 
War II. Compulsory labor for porterage, road construction, min- 
ing, and the harvesting of rubber disrupted the planting and har- 
vesting of food crops, provoking famine. 

Only after 1948 did the country's population show rapid growth, 
reflecting improved nutrition, health, and economic development. 
Since that time, the average annual rate of population growth has 
been consistently high even by African standards. It was estimat- 
ed at just above 2 percent for most of the period from 1950 to 1970. 
Thereafter, the rate has been near or above 3 percent. In 1992 the 
annual population growth rate was estimated at 3.3 percent (see 
table 3, Appendix). Moreover, the growth rate is projected to re- 
main at or above 3 percent until at least 2015. Zaire is thus ex- 
pected to continue to see its population grow at a faster rate than 
its economy, exacerbating the economic and social deterioration 
prevailing in the early 1990s. The United Nations (UN) estimates 
that Zaire's population will total between 78.4 million and 100.9 
million by 2025. 



70 



The Society and Its Environment 



Zaire's high population growth rate is fueled by a high crude 
birth rate: forty-five births per 1,000 population in 1992, little 
changed from the forty-seven births per 1,000 population record- 
ed in 1965 (see table 4, Appendix). The total fertility rate in 1992 
was estimated to be 6.1 children born per woman. In the same 
year, the crude death rate was estimated at thirteen per 1,000 popu- 
lation, down substantially from the twenty-one per 1,000 noted in 
1965 and thus another contributing factor to total population 
growth. The infant mortality rate, although substantially improved 
from the rate of 140 per 1,000 live births recorded in 1965, was, 
however, still high at ninety-seven per 1,000 live births in 1992. 
The under-five mortality rate was estimated at 150 per 1,000. Life 
expectancy was relatively low at fifty-two years for males and fifty- 
six for women in 1992. 

The distribution of Zaire's population by age and sex is typical 
of that of a developing nation and quite dissimilar from that of the 
developed world. Most striking is the youthfulness of the popula- 
tion. In 1990 approximately 45 percent of the population was un- 
der the age of fifteen, 71 percent under the age of thirty, and 87 
percent under the age of forty-five (see fig. 8). The number of males 
and females was nearly equal, estimated at 49 percent and 51 per- 
cent of the population, respectively, in 1990. Because of their greater 
longevity, females outnumbered males primarily in the older age- 
groups. 

The size and composition of the population are also affected by 
uncontrolled and continuing immigration to Zaire. Both prior to 
and since independence, there have been periodic influxes of refu- 
gees from neighboring countries, such as Angola, Sudan, Uganda, 
Rwanda, and Burundi (people from the last two known collective- 
ly in Zaire as the Banyarwanda). Emigration of Zairians has off- 
set only some of the population increases. In the 1960s, some sources 
indicate that Zaire gained 500,000 inhabitants through immigra- 
tion. In May 1985, the number of refugees in Zaire was estimated 
at about 330,000. 

In 1992 the U.S. Committee for Refugees estimated that Zaire 
was home to over 470,000 refugees: 310,000 from Angola, 104,000 
from southern Sudan, 45,000 from Burundi, 10,000 from Ugan- 
da, and 1,300 from other African nations. Most of the Angolan 
refugees had been in Zaire for over twenty years and were self- 
supporting and socially integrated into Zairian society. About 
80,000 were, however, more recent refugees, having fled to Zaire 
since 1985. 

In late 1991, an estimated 20,000 foreigners, mostly European 
and United States citizens, left Zaire because of the country's 



71 



Zaire: A Country Study 



TOTAL POPULATION IN MID-1990: 35.6 MILLION 



AGE-GROUP 

80 and over_ 
75-79 _ 
70-74 _ 
65-69 _ 
60-64 _ 
55-59 _ 
50-54 _ 
45-49 _ 
40-44 _ 
35-39 _ 
30-34 _ 
25-29 _ 
20-24 _ 
15-19 _ 
10-14 _ 
5-9 _ 
0-4 



MALES 



YZZZA 



Y77777A 



\///)/////\ 



III 



7ZZZ2ZZZZA 



7ZZZZZZZZZZA 



v/A////)/////)/^ 



1 1 [ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 













EMA 






F 


LES 


















































I 








■ 





































10 86420246 
POPULATION IN PERCENTAGES 



8 10 



Source: Based on information from Federal Republic of Germany, Statistisches Bundesamt, 
Landerbericht Zaire, 1990, Wiesbaden, 1990, 23. 



Figure 8. Population by Age and Gender, 1990 

political unrest and economic deterioration. A small number of Zair- 
ians are also reported to have fled from Zaire to Angola. However, 
by contrast with the repatriation of 15,000 Angolan refugees and 
the reduction of Western expatriates in Zaire during 1991, the num- 
ber of refugees from Burundi and Sudan increased in the early 1990s. 

In general, the Zairian government welcomed refugees, allowing 
them to setde on empty land or seek employment. Further assistance 
to displaced persons was provided by international relief agencies. 

Population Distribution 

Because of its large land area, Zaire as a whole is not overpopu- 
lated, but population distribution is uneven, and some regions are 



72 



The Society and Its Environment 



very densely populated. Although most of Zaire's land area is habit- 
able, more than half of the country is still thinly populated, and 
some 10 percent almost totally uninhabited. Two-thirds of the popu- 
lation is estimated to live on one-quarter of the land area. 

The population is least dense throughout the nation's center, 
in the Congo River basin. Two areas with relatively high densi- 
ties (greater than twenty-five inhabitants per square kilometer) are 
found along the eastern border north of Lake Tanganyika and from 
Bas-Zaire in the southwest intermittently throughout the southern 
savannas to Kasai-Oriental. The greater- than-average population 
density in the eastern highlands can be related to the superior soils 
and rainfall there, but no obvious natural reason accounts for the 
greater density of the southern savannas. 

Average population density throughout Zaire was relatively low 
at 14.9 persons per square kilometer in 1990, but regional distri- 
bution was uneven (see table 5, Appendix). Kinshasa was by far 
the most densely populated region in the country (266.3 inhabi- 
tants per square kilometer in 1984), followed by Bas-Zaire (36.5 
inhabitants per square kilometer) and Kivu (since the early 1990s 
divided into Nord-Kivu, Sud-Kivu, and Maniema; 20.2 inhabi- 
tants per square kilometer overall — however, Nord-Kivu and Sud- 
Kivu are very densely populated, but Maniema is sparsely popu- 
lated). Shaba was the least densely populated (7.8 inhabitants per 
square kilometer), exceeded only slightly, however, by Equateur 
and Haut-Zaire (both 8.4 inhabitants per square kilometer in 1984). 

In consonance with the high average annual growth rate of the 
total population, adjusted data from the five official censuses (1938, 
1948, 1958, 1970, and 1984) clearly show a high rate of popula- 
tion increase in all regions after 1948. There are, nevertheless, sub- 
stantial regional variations (see table 6, Appendix). 

Internal migration to the capital city of Kinshasa has caused a 
spectacular rate of population growth for that area since 1938. 
Although the growth rate is declining, it measured 6.2 percent for 
the 1970-84 period. Growth rates in Kivu, Shaba, and Kasai- 
Oriental were also higher than the national average (i.e., over 3 
percent) in the same period. 

Immigration also accounts for some of the discrepancies in region- 
al increases in population at various times. For example, refugees 
from the Angolan anticolonial struggle flooded parts of Bas-Zaire 
between 1958 and 1970, swelling statistics. Substantial numbers 
of refugees from what are now Rwanda and Burundi fled to Kivu, 
first under Belgian colonial rule in the 1927-45 and 1949-55 pe- 
riods, and later in response to domestic political unrest in the 



73 



Zaire: A Country Study 

1960s, in the 1970s, and in the early 1990s. Political unrest was 
also the major factor behind the entry of Sudanese and Ugandans 
into Haut-Zaire in 1970 and 1984. In Shaba the rising growth rate 
from 1958 to 1970 can be attributed to both foreign immigration 
and internal migration, particularly from Kasai-Oriental to Sha- 
ba's thriving mining centers. 

In the early 1990s, Zaire had to contend with an increasingly 
large population of internally displaced persons, the victims of ethnic 
conflict (see The Significance of Ethnic Identification, this ch.; In- 
terest Groups, ch. 4). In 1992-93 several hundred thousand Luba- 
Kasai residing in Shaba (many whose families had been there for 
three to four generations) were forced from their homes and busi- 
nesses. Most sought refuge in and around train stations (many liter- 
ally living on station platforms), awaiting transport to the Kasai 
area. Because of their lack of funds and the unreliability of the coun- 
try 's dilapidated rail system, many never made it out of Shaba, 
and in mid- 1993 there were reported to be 100,000 refugees try- 
ing to leave the region. There were also about 100,000 refugees 
in Kasai-Occidental and Kasai-Oriental who had succeeded in leav- 
ing Shaba but were awaiting resettlement in the 4 'homeland' ' that 
many had never before visited. 

In addition, densely populated Nord-Kivu had over 150,000 
internal refugees displaced by violence against the so-called Banya- 
rwanda, members of the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups originally 
from Rwanda and Burundi who had immigrated to Zaire over the 
years. Indigenous local groups, traditionally hunters, were locked 
in a struggle over land use with the more prosperous Banyarwanda, 
who were primarily farmers. The Banyarwanda, although num- 
bering about 2 million and constituting about one-half the popu- 
lation of Nord-Kivu, were still widely regarded as "foreigners," 
and many of them had in fact been deprived of citizenship by 
a 1981 law that was finally invoked in 1991. Thus, they made 
convenient targets. Attacks began in March 1993; by August 
1993, they had resulted in the deaths of over 7,000 Banyarwanda 
and the displacement of 150,000 people from both sides of the 
conflict. 

The Zairian government is unable to deal with the social and 
health care needs of the displaced. Church groups and international 
organizations are in essence the only agencies delivering health care 
and other assistance to these internal refugees. Yet even their ef- 
forts are hampered by the near total collapse of the country's in- 
frastructure, continuing corruption at all levels of officialdom, and 
widespread lawlessness and civil unrest. 



74 



The Society and Its Environment 

Urbanization: Causes and Characteristics 

Urbanization is a relatively recent phenomenon in Zaire, and 
in the early 1990s Zaire was still a predominantly rural nation. Since 
the 1940s, however, the population has increasingly shifted from 
rural to urban areas, especially Kinshasa. An estimated 39.5 per- 
cent of the population was classified as urban in 1990, up from 
30.3 percent in 1970 and 34.2 percent in 1980. Between 1940 and 
1970, all urban centers had grown in population by a factor of ten. 
Growth has continued at a relatively high rate since then. Indeed, 
the average annual urban population growth rate has been esti- 
mated at almost 4.7 percent for the 1985-90 period, as compared 
with an average annual rural population growth rate of less than 
2.3 percent during the same period. 

Kinshasa remains, overwhelmingly, the nation's largest city, with 
a population estimated at nearly 5 million in 1988. More than one- 
third of all city-dwellers lived in Kinshasa in 1988. There are, 
however, a number of other large cities as well, several of which 
(including Kananga, formerly Luluabourg, and Lubumbashi) had 
populations of nearly 1 million by 1985 (see table 7, Appendix). 

The concentration of resources in the cities has long drawn 
migrants from the countryside. Civil strife following independence 
intensified the shift of population to urban areas. Most recently, 
the chaotic economic and social conditions of the late 1980s and 
early 1990s have aggravated existing disparities between urban and 
rural standards of living. Urban residence has thus grown increas- 
ingly attractive as the conditions of rural life have deteriorated even 
more rapidly than the conditions of urban life. 

In the colonial era, influx controls kept large numbers of people 
from migrating to the cities. The controls also allowed more men 
(as workers) than women into the cities, resulting in a skewed 
urban sex ratio. But since independence, government attempts to 
discourage urban migration, including periodic roundups and 
deportations of the urban unemployed to the countryside, have 
failed. Ample evidence of the failure is provided by the numerous 
squatters' villages that have sprung up on the outskirts of Kinsha- 
sa and other cities. 

Indeed, state policies over the years actually accelerated the rural 
exodus to the cities. State investment funds were almost entirely 
targeted toward cities and the mining areas, further aggravating 
the resource disparity between rural and urban areas. State-fixed 
prices for food crops produced by villagers were kept deliberately 
low in order to keep urban populations quiescent. The state also 
continued the colonial-era policies of compulsory agricultural 



75 



Zaire: A Country Study 

production quotas and of heavy direct and indirect taxation for cash 
crops such as cotton. When indirect taxes, such as turnover and 
export taxes, on cash crops are added to direct taxes, Zaire specialist 
Crawford Young has estimated that as much as 50 percent of real 
and potential village income is routinely extracted by the state or 
its representatives. Moreover, the exactions levied by the state and 
its agents generally increase in severity in proportion to distance 
from urban centers. Rural public employees and soldiers frequently 
use their official powers to live off the land, or for extortion, par- 
ticularly when their salaries are either delayed or not paid by cor- 
rupt superiors. Given the scale of legal and illegal state exactions 
on the rural population, the flight of villagers to the cities is un- 
derstandable. 

Several particular aspects of the growing urban population are 
also noteworthy. Since independence, women have been particu- 
larly quick to migrate to cities and exploit the opportunities of ur- 
ban life, especially the opportunity to engage in economic activity 
in the informal sector. In the 1990s, women generally equaled or 
outnumbered men in Zaire's urban centers, in sharp contrast to 
the colonial era. Migration of the young to Zaire's urban centers 
in search of postprimary education has also been a strong factor 
in urban growth. 

Another striking feature of Zaire's urban populace has been the 
low number of wage earners in the formal economy relative to the 
total population. The most extreme known case is that of Kanan- 
ga, which was reported to have only 10,000 wage earners out of 
a population of 429,000 in 1973. The survival of most urban house- 
holds has been founded on activity outside of the formal economic 
sector. Much of the populace makes its living in the large and thriv- 
ing informal sector (see The Informal Sector, this ch.; The Infor- 
mal Economy, ch. 3). 

Languages 

Zaire has been cited as having as many as 250 languages spoken 
within its borders. In fact, the exact number is difficult to specify; 
it depends on whether or not a particular tongue is defined as a 
distinct language or merely as a dialect of a neighboring one. 

Officially Recognized Languages 

French, an inheritance from the Belgian colonial era, remains 
the primary language of government, of the formal economy, and 
of most educational instruction. Four indigenous languages have 
also been recognized as having official status since the colonial era, 
namely Kikongo, Tshiluba, Lingala, and Kiswahili. All have been 



76 



The Society and Its Environment 



used at various times in official documents, in religious works, in 
school instruction, and in various published works. Some of these 
languages have also been used in radio and television broadcasts. 

Early missionaries attempted the standardization of orthogra- 
phy and grammar for these and other languages. Lomongo, for 
example, has seen wide use in much of the Congo River basin, 
in large part because of its use and promotion by missionary evan- 
gelists and educators. Sango, a trade language used along the north- 
ern border with the Central African Republic, was similarly 
promoted, although on a smaller scale and with less success as a 
result of competition with Lingala. 

Of the four most widely used indigenous languages, two are iden- 
tified with Zaire's two largest ethnic groups, namely, Tshiluba with 
the Luba-Kasai of south-central Zaire and Kikongo with the Kongo 
of southwestern Zaire. Tshiluba orthography has been relatively 
standardized. Kikongo, however, has long existed in several di- 
alects, one of which evolved into a trade language called Fiote used 
in contact with Europeans. Its use by early Belgian colonial authori- 
ties led to its being called "state Kikongo." It is also known as 
Kituba or Monokutuba and has long been spoken across the border 
in Congo; radio broadcasts in the language are made in both 
countries. 

Kiswahili penetrated Zaire from the east, imported by Arab 
slavers in the latter half of the nineteenth century. It spread over 
time throughout eastern Zaire and quickly established itself in the 
ethnically mixed population of the copper-belt towns. Once estab- 
lished, it endured; even the influx of large numbers of Tshiluba- 
speaking migrants to the copper towns failed to displace Kiswahili. 

Since independence, the most prominent of the four principal 
indigenous languages has been Lingala. It first developed out of 
a trade language based on the Bangi tongue that was used on the 
lower Congo River between the Ubangi and Kasai tributaries in 
the late nineteenth century. Early European recruitment of sol- 
diers from upriver regions necessitated selection of a language of 
command and of communication. Lingala was considered suitable, 
and its adoption by the military resulted in its spread wherever 
soldiers or veterans went. In addition, Lingala established itself 
early as the language of the capital. As with Kiswahili in the copper- 
belt towns, even the influx of large numbers of same mother- tongue 
immigrants, in this case of Kikongo- speakers (particularly in the 
post- World War II period), failed to displace Lingala. 

The postindependence expansion of Lingala can be attributed 
to several additional factors. One is the enormous popularity of 
Zairian popular music, whose lyrics are mostly in Lingala. Lingala 



77 



Zaire: A Country Study 

songs can be heard playing from radios in even the most remote 
villages throughout Zaire. Zairian music has reached an extreme- 
ly wide area throughout sub-Saharan Africa and has established 
itself as one of the continent's most prestigious musical traditions. 
Another reason for Lingala's extensive penetration is its use by 
truck drivers and traders along most of the roads, railroads, and 
waterways in the country. On major routes, even through the heart 
of Kiswahili- speaking northeastern Zaire, travelers may use Lin- 
gala to order food and lodgings in small African restaurants and 
inns. 

In some cities, Lingala's expansion has been quantified. Kisan- 
gani, for example, which is in Haut-Zaire, sitting astride the east- 
west dividing line between Lingala- and Kiswahili-speaking areas 
and long harboring both Lingala- and Kiswahili-speaking commu- 
nities, has seen two communities shift from Kiswahili-speaking 
majority to Lingala-speaking majority since independence. More 
significant is the fact that Lingala in Lingala-speaking areas has 
become, as has Kiswahili in Kiswahili-speaking areas, the first lan- 
guage of the children of urban interethnic marriages. This develop- 
ment has occurred despite the fact that neither language was ever 
the first language of any historical, prenineteenth-century Zairian 
community. 

A map showing the distribution of major languages is only mar- 
ginally useful, however, as a guide to which languages are spoken 
where. Even where one ethnic group predominates, multilingual- 
ism may be common. An individual Zairian may speak French 
in the workplace, a regional trade language such as Lingala in mar- 
ketplace conversation, and the mother tongue of his or her ethnic 
group in the home or with other members of the ethnic group. 

Choice of language may be a vehicle for establishing a particu- 
lar relationship or even for making a political statement. A police 
officer or other low-level government official may begin a request 
for a favor (say a ride on a commercial truck) in French, switch- 
ing quickly to the more comfortable Kiswahili or Lingala once the 
"official" tone implied by the use of French has been set. And on 
a larger scale, President Mobutu's deliberate use of Lingala in his 
public addresses, even speaking to Kiswahili-speaking crowds in 
Bukavu and elsewhere, has given political expression to his reported 
rejection of Kiswahili as an acceptable Zaire- wide trade language 
because of its association with Arab slavers. Lingala is, in fact, the 
only African language Mobutu uses in public. 

Other Indigenous Languages 

The vast majority of languages spoken in Zaire are Bantu 



78 



The Society and Its Environment 



derivatives. Only in the north have other language groups been 
represented. Adamawa- Eastern languages are spoken in the en- 
tire northern portion of Zaire, interspersed in the east along the 
Uele River with Central Sudanic languages. In the far northeast 
(from Lake Albert north), the few Eastern Sudanic languages 
spoken in Zaire are heard, interspersed with Central Sudanic, 
Adamawa-Eastern, and an occasional Bantu language. Crude es- 
timates of the number of speakers of these language divisions have 
cited 80 percent of the population as speakers of Bantu languages. 
The remaining 20 percent may be divided, in declining numbers 
of speakers, among people speaking Adamawa-Eastern, Central 
Sudanic, and Eastern Sudanic languages. 

Ethnic Groups 

Zaire's population is composed of as many as 250 different eth- 
nic groups, most of which are Bantu speakers. The largest Bantu- 
speaking groups are the Luba, Kongo, Mongo, and Lunda. In 1992 
some sources reported that the Luba, Kongo, and Mongo groups 
as well as the non-Bantu-speaking Zande and Mangbetu together 
made up about 45 percent of the population. Calculations of the 
number and relative sizes of ethnic groups in Zaire are at best 
approximations, however. These groups are neither fixed entities 
nor the sole or even primary points of reference for all Zairians. 
On the contrary, for most purposes and in most contexts, rural 
Zairians see themselves primarily as members of a local commu- 
nity or of a clan (see Glossary) or lineage (see Glossary). Ethnic 
identity has become salient only under certain conditions, and 
the precise boundaries of ethnic groups have shifted with circum- 
stances. Ethnicity and regionalism (the latter based in part on 
ethnic considerations) were, and continue to be, of substantial 
importance in the political orientation of Zairians, but the units 
involved have always varied in composition, cohesion, and ideo- 
logical self- awareness. 

Given the difficulty of categorizing ethnic groups in such a way 
as to satisfy objective criteria on the one hand and the subjective 
standard of common identity on the other, and given the sheer num- 
ber of named groups, only a brief survey of the major entities based 
on common (or closely similar) language and culture is attempted 
here. A mapping of clusters of related or culturally similar entities 
shows a limited correspondence to the major geographic regions 
of Zaire, and these provide a framework for the survey. The basic 
source on this subject is Jan Vansina's work from the 1960s, In- 
troduction a Uethnographie du Congo. 



79 



Zaire: A Country Study 




1. Banda 


11. Nande 


2. Ngbaka 


12. Lega 


3. Ngbandi 


13. Lengola 


4. Binza 


14. Metoko 


5. Mbuja 


15. Ntomba 


6. Bua 


16. Ngombe 


7. Zande 


17. Bobangi 


8. Mamvu 


18. Mongo 


9. Alur 


19. Lia 


10. Mangbetu 


20. Sengele 



21. Boma 

22. Sakata 

23. Tetela 

24. Songye 

25. Luba-Kasai 

26. Kuba 

27. Lulua 

28. Leele 

29. Pende 

30. Lunda and Chokwe 



31. Yaka 

32. Mbala 

33. Yans 

34. Tio 

35. Kongo 

36. Hemba 

37. Luba-Katanga 

38. Bemba 

39. Kaonde 

40. Ndembu 



Source: Based on information from Jan Vansina, Introduction a I'ethnographie du Congo, Kin- 
shasa, 1966. 



Figure 9. Distribution of Principal Ethnic Groups 

Non-Bantu Speakers of the Northern Savannas and Forest Fringe 

Northwestern and north-central Zaire, more specifically the sub- 
regions of Ubangi and Mongala in Equateur Region, have been 
occupied by speakers of the eastern section of the Adamawa-Eastern 



80 



The Society and Its Environment 



language family since their arrival in the seventeenth or eighteenth 
century (see fig. 9). They are classed into three major ethnic groups, 
namely the Ngbandi, the Ngbaka, and the Banda- speaking groups 
(of which the Mbanja are the most important). Conflicts and migra- 
tions have dispersed these groups to some degree; the Mbanja in 
particular do not occupy a contiguous territory. 

Northeastern Zaire, specifically in the subregion of Bas-Uele and 
the northern portions of Haut-Uele — both in Haut-Zaire — is peo- 
pled by a heterogeneous group called the Zande, also speakers of 
the eastern section of the Adamawa-Eastern language family. The 
Zande are sometimes divided into two sections: to the east, the Vun- 
gara and to the west, the Bandiya. Each section has taken its name 
from the clan providing the ruling house in the areas included in 
it. The Vungara are the larger of the two, and the following sketch 
has been based on data from them. 

The Zande emerged as a people in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries when groups of hunters, probably divided into an aris- 
tocracy called the Vungara and commoners called the Mbomu, 
penetrated the area and subjugated the Bantu-speaking and 
Adamawa-Eastern-speaking peoples they found there. The dynamic 
of the conquest was influenced by the rules of succession to the 
monarchy among the Vungara. A man took his father's throne only 
when he had vanquished those of his brothers who chose to com- 
pete for it. One or more of the losing brothers, a prince or princes 
without land or people, then undertook to find and rule a previ- 
ously unconquered people. This process continued through the 
nineteenth century until a large area and a wide assortment of peo- 
ples had been dominated by the Zande Vungara. The outcome was 
a rich mixture of the cultures of conqueror and conquered. 

Most of the peoples speaking Central Sudanic languages entered 
the forest north and northeast of the Congo River basin. The Mang- 
betu and the Mamvu are the most important of these groups. Like 
the Zande, the Mangbetu established states incorporating other 
peoples and established distinctions between aristocrats and com- 
moners. Also like the Zande, their influence extended beyond their 
realm to neighboring groups. The Mamvu, grouped by one source 
together with the Mangutu, Mvuba, and Balese into a larger Mam- 
vu cluster, were characterized by small-scale political units; the Ba- 
lese and the Mvuba are even said to have lacked chiefs. 

In the far northeast, in the highlands area northwest of Lake 
Albert and bordered by Uganda and Sudan, live a collection of 
groups that speak languages from each of the four language fami- 
lies found in Zaire. In general, they traditionally constituted small- 
scale polities based on a system of patrilineal descent groups. The 



81 



Zaire: A Country Study 



one exception are the Alur, the only significant group in Zaire to 
speak an Eastern Sudanic language. The Alur, most of whom live 
in Uganda, erected fairly large-scale states but with a simple ad- 
ministrative structure. Chiefs were seen as primarily religious figures 
controlling rain and interceding with the ancestors. Politically, their 
main task was moderating and limiting conflict between lineages. 
Their fertility and peacekeeping roles made them attractive to neigh- 
boring groups and helped the Alur to expand and dominate the 
commoner groups. The indigenous people came to think of Alur 
chiefs as capable of putting a stop to interlineage feuds and invited 
nearby chiefs to send them a ruler. It was largely in this way rather 
than by conquest (as with the Zande and Mangbetu) that Alur chief- 
tainship expanded. 

In general, the peoples stretching from the far northwest to the 
far northeast stood on the sidelines during the ethnically based com- 
petition that characterized the independence and postindependence 
periods. Remote from the chief urban centers and penetrated rather 
late by missions and modern education, they have only recently 
become engaged in the Zairian polity and economy. Although 
Mobutu is of Ngbandi origin, he is more commonly seen in Kin- 
shasa and elsewhere as a man of Equateur Region, rather than as 
an ethnic Ngbandi or man of the far north. 

Bantu Speakers of the Congo River Basin and Its Environs 

Living just north and south of the Congo River, from Kisanga- 
ni (formerly Stanleyville) in the east to the juncture of the Ubangi 
River with the Congo in the west, are a large number of diverse 
Bantu-speaking groups; a handful of groups speaking languages 
of the Adamawa-Eastern family are interspersed among them. The 
movement of groups within this region and the riverine trade 
characteristic of the area have made for considerable sharing of 
cultural elements. 

This area typifies the house-village-district social structure that 
anthropologist Jan Vansina argues was the original tradition among 
Bantu speakers. Particularly among fishing and trading peoples 
such as the Bobangi, the basic social and political unit traditional- 
ly was the polygynous household. A cluster of such households 
formed the village. If the head of a household amassed sufficient 
wealth, through trade, the purchase of slaves, or acquisition of other 
clients, he could assume the tide of chief. The wealthiest of the 
house chiefs headed the village. In some cases, a powerful chief 
unified several villages under his authority and thus created a dis- 
trict. Such trade and fishing villages were not based on actual or 
alleged kinship. Status and power depended on wealth rather than 



82 



The Society and Its Environment 

on personal seniority or on the seniority of the lineage to which 
one belonged. 

Not all groups fit the above pattern. Most political units were 
small, but some specialized roles could be identified. Some groups 
had an official with special judicial powers in addition to a chief 
with largely ritual functions; still others had a war leader. 

In the precolonial era, the potential for conflict between com- 
munities sharing the same language and culture was at least as great 
as that between those lacking such commonalities. Awareness of 
shared ethnic identity did not extend to villages far from one's own 
and certainly did not define the boundaries of war and peace. Only 
in the colonial era did such identity take shape when members of 
some of these groups migrated to the ethnically heterogeneous 
towns. And such identity was situational. For example, Ngombe 
living in Mbandaka (formerly Coquilhatville) saw themselves as 
Ngombe and were so seen by others. Ngombe who lived in Kin- 
shasa, however, came to be defined as Ngala, or Lingala speak- 
ers, together with other upriver peoples. 

Most of the Congo River basin and part of the lands stretching 
south to the Kasai and Sankuru rivers are inhabited by a large num- 
ber of groups categorized under the name of a man from whom 
they claim descent, Mongo. Among most Mongo groups, the au- 
tonomous unit is the village, the core of which is a dominant lin- 
eage whose chief is also the chief of client lineages. Only among 
the Ntomba and some groups (the Lia, the Sengele, the Mpama, 
and perhaps others) in the southwestern subset of Mongo are hi- 
erarchical systems headed by a sacred chief and divided into 
provinces. A claim to common descent did not lead to a sense of 
common identity, at least not until Roman Catholic missionaries 
encouraged such a development. 

Bantu Speakers of the Eastern Forest and Plain 

To the south of the Central Sudanic- speaking groups and to some 
degree mixed in with them live a number of Bantu-speaking groups. 
While generally forest-dwelling, some groups have sited themselves 
in the more open plain leading to the eastern highlands, and a few 
have established themselves in the Ruwenzori Mountains. They 
have been grouped together primarily because they and their Cen- 
tral Sudanic-speaking neighbors share some significant cultural and 
organizational features and may be clearly distinguished from the 
neighboring highland Bantu speakers. 

Here again, the village in which a localized lineage dwells is the 
significant political unit rather than any overarching descent group. 
Links between villages are provided by religious associations and 



83 



Zaire: A Country Study 

initiation rites. Clan names are shared with adjacent Bantu-speaking 
groups as well as with some Central Sudanic- speaking communi- 
ties. Lineage alliances found in some parts of the area also some- 
times cross linguistic lines. 

Farther south along both sides of the Lualaba River and extend- 
ing east along its tributary, the Ulindi, another congeries of varied 
Bantu-speaking groups may be found. All but the Lengola and 
Metoko share closely related languages. Frequently, in this area 
of close intermingling, communities are known to have adopted 
the language and much of the culture of a neighboring, unrelated 
group. For example, groups of Lega origin, according to anthro- 
pologist Daniel Biebuyck, have adopted the culture of other entities 
and vice versa. Among most of these communities, hierarchically 
graded religious and political associations have served to tie together 
systems in which patrilineal lineages provide the bases. 

Despite the absence of a centralized state among the Lega and 
despite the permeability of the borders between them and their 
neighbors, the Lega have a strong sense of their own historical and 
cultural unity. That sense was reinforced during the mid-1960s re- 
bellions in eastern Zaire; rebel groups led by intrusive ethnic groups 
killed a number of Lega and thereby turned most of the others into 
supporters of the national army that fought and eventually defeat- 
ed the rebels (see Rural Insurgencies: The " Second Independence," 
ch. 1; The Congolese National Army, ch. 5). 

Bantu Speakers of the Eastern Highlands 

From the northern end of Lake Tanganyika to Lake Edward 
are a number of groups that share cultural and political features 
among themselves and with the interlacustrine Bantu-speaking peo- 
ples of Rwanda, Burundi, southwestern Uganda, and northwestern 
Tanzania. Most live at an altitude of 1,400 meters or more with 
a handful sited in the lowlands. Whereas all are cultivators, those 
in the highlands proper also raise cattle, primarily for milk and 
milk products; the few lowland groups that are unable to raise cat- 
tle have turned, like their forest neighbors, to hunting and fishing. 

The highland Bantu speakers have known, possibly as early as 
the fourteenth century, the presence of centralized states ruled by 
members of specific descent groups thought to have come from the 
interlacustrine states to the northeast. Traditionally, only one of 
their number, the Furiiru, were organized into a single, relatively 
small state. More often there were several states, for example, 
among the Shi, that despite their small size carried the heavy ap- 
paratus of royal family, court officials, and hierarchy of chiefs. 

A degree of ethnic consciousness overriding membership in specific 



84 



The Society and Its Environment 



states developed during the late 1950s and early 1960s. The clearest 
example of the situational character of this consciousness came in 
1964 when Shi irregulars joined the national army in opposing a 
rebel group passing through their territory because the rebels were 
perceived as outsiders led by Kusu. 

Peoples of the Savannas: Southeastern Zaire 

In eastern Shaba, stretching from the border with Tanzania and 
Zambia roughly to the Lualaba River, Vansina has distinguished 
three sets of communities: the Bemba cluster, the Hemba cluster, 
and the Haut-Katanga cluster encompassing peoples of Haut-Shaba 
Subregion (formerly Haut-Katanga). Settlement patterns are ge- 
ographically fragmented so that representatives of one cluster live 
cheek by jowl with representatives of another or constitute an en- 
clave in another group's territory. 

The area has a long history of conquest and conflict. Most of 
the peoples of Haut-Shaba were subjects of the Kazembe King- 
dom of Luapula, an offshoot of the Lunda Empire whose center 
was farther west. The Kaonde, the south westernmost people in the 
Haut-Katanga cluster, living in present-day Lualaba Subregion 
(of Shaba Region), were ruled by still another Lunda king. After 
the middle of the nineteenth century, a group of long-distance 
traders, the Nyamwezi of central Tanzania, established the Yeke 
Kingdom, which lasted for thirty years. The introduction of new 
cultural elements by the Yeke and their trading activities both east 
and west had longer-range effects than the establishment of their 
political rule itself. 

All of these kingdoms came to an end before the beginning of 
the twentieth century, leaving their people with polities of much 
smaller scale. The political pattern that preceded the institution 
of kingship and outlasted it was based on chiefs of the earth, basi- 
cally ritual offices essential for maintaining fertility, and, occasion- 
ally, political chiefs. 

Peoples of the Savannas: Lunda Region 

Most of the inhabitants of western Shaba between the Lubilash 
and Kasai rivers and extending east to the town of Kolwezi are 
speakers of Lunda or closely related languages. Their distribution 
extends beyond this area to Angola, Zambia, southwestern Kasai- 
Occidental, and southeastern Bandundu. The vast scale of their 
distribution is the legacy of the Lunda Empire (see fig. 2; fig. 3). 

Vansina has distinguished the northern Lunda from the southern 
Lunda and related peoples, in part on linguistic grounds, in part 
on the basis of differences in modes of inheritance and descent-group 



85 



Zaire: A Country Study 

formation. The southern Lunda proper, the Chokwe (also seen as 
Cokwe), the Ndembu, and others are matrilineal; the northern Lun- 
da (also called the Ruund) are marked by bilateral descent. Some 
contemporary conflicts between these groups, notably between Lun- 
da and Chokwe, have their roots in the period of the breakup of 
the Lunda Empire in the late nineteenth century. Chokwe raiders 
from the periphery of the empire grew powerful enough to inter- 
vene in Lunda kingship succession disputes and briefly to seize the 
Lunda capital. Although the Chokwe were eventually ousted and 
their expansion halted, they succeeded in establishing themselves 
as competitors to Lunda power. The contemporary echoes of that 
competition have expressed themselves in the reluctance of Chokwe 
to support Lunda-led political action. 

Peoples of the Southern Uplands: Kasai-Shaba 

Extending across much of the southern savannas east of the mid- 
dle reaches of the Kasai River are the Tshiluba- and Kiluba- 
speaking peoples. (Kiluba is the language of the Luba-Katanga as 
distinct from Tshiluba, the language spoken by the Luba-Kasai.) 
Vansina distinguishes three clusters: the Luba-Katanga — com- 
prising the Luba-Katanga proper, the Kaniok, the Kalundwe, and 
the Lomotwa; the Luba-Kasai — comprising the Luba-Kasai proper, 
the Lulua, the Luntu, the Binji, the Mputu, and the North Kete; 
and the Songye — comprising the Songye proper and the Bangu- 
Bangu. Closely related to the Luba-Katanga and living to their 
east are the Hemba, separately distinguished chiefly because, un- 
like the others, they are matrilineal. 

All of these peoples appear to have shared a tradition of chief- 
tainship, but it was among the Luba-Katanga that more complex 
centralized states emerged as early as the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries. Elsewhere, the people and territory over which a chief 
ruled were much more restricted, and even among the Luba- 
Katanga, local chiefs had a substantial degree of autonomy. 

Peoples of the Lower Kasai and Its Tributaries 

This heterogeneous group of peoples distributed north and south 
of the lower Kasai River, its tributaries, and the lower Congo River 
as far as Kinshasa all speak Bantu languages more closely related 
to each other than to those of adjacent peoples. Many of these 
groups, particularly those at the periphery, have been influenced 
by adjacent peoples — the Mongo in the north and peoples of the 
Kwango River in the southwest. 

Vansina has distinguished several clusters, each including the 
group giving its name to the cluster and others. The Tio cluster 



86 



Zebra, common in the 
savanna regions 
of central and 
southern Zaire 
Courtesy Zaire National 
Tourism Office 



A square-shaped, thatched- 
roof hut, typical of the 
Kasai- Oriental Region, provides 
shelter against the heavy rains. 



Zaire: A Country Study 

includes the core peoples of the Tio Kingdom and several others, 
some of them never incorporated into the kingdom. The Boma- 
Sakata cluster includes the Nku and several smaller groups. The 
Yans-Mbun cluster includes a number of smaller entities. The Kuba 
cluster includes the Leele, the Njembe, and a number of groups 
governed by a ruling group called the Bushong, together called Kuba. 

The Tio Kingdom was established along both sides of the Congo 
River north and south of Stanley Pool (now Pool de Malebo) at 
least as early as the fifteenth century and influenced the develop- 
ment of smaller kingdoms and chiefdoms along the lower Kasai 
thereafter. At the eastern end of the region, the kingdom of the 
Kuba, already in existence but not well developed, was reorganized 
in the mid-seventeenth century and exercised considerable influence 
in the region west of the Tshiluba-speaking peoples. Between the 
Tio in the west and the Kuba, most of the peoples in the region 
were organized into small kingdoms or chieftainships that extended 
beyond the level of the village or local community. The only im- 
portant exception was the Leele. There were Leele chiefdoms, but 
the chiefs had no real significance, and the villages were essentially 
autonomous and often in conflict. 

Local communities were governed by local chiefs in almost all 
cases. There were superior chiefs nearly everywhere and, in three 
cases at least, kings, but their powers were often limited. In the 
cases of kingdoms, one task of the superior chief was to collect 
tribute. 

The Tio Kingdom was large but decentralized. One of the seg- 
ments in what is now Zaire was essentially autonomous, paying 
tribute to the king irregularly. The other was more closely con- 
trolled, and in certain legal cases, appeals to the king from the judg- 
ments of the local chief were possible. The Kuba Kingdom was 
much more tightly organized. In Vansina's view, this was perhaps 
the most complex state organization in Zaire, with the exception 
of the Lunda Empire. 

Peoples Between the Kwango and the Kasai 

Four clusters have been distinguished among the mixture of peo- 
ples in this area. The Yaka cluster includes, among others, the Suku. 
The Mbala cluster also includes several groups and is perhaps the 
most fragmented of the lot. The Pende cluster includes the Kwese; 
the Lunda cluster includes the Soonde and the Chokwe. The Lunda, 
closely related to the peoples of western Shaba, are included here 
by Vansina because they are separated from their core area and 
have had a longtime relationship with the other peoples in the area. 

Mixture and mutual influence have characterized these peoples, 



88 



The Society and Its Environment 



often in less than peaceful ways. In general, Lunda expansion led 
to the formation of Lunda-ruled states, a process that continued 
through the first half of the nineteenth century. The Chokwe, who 
became such a powerful presence in the core Lunda area in western 
Shaba in the second half of the nineteenth century, also drove north 
here in the same period, fragmenting local groups but also incor- 
porating many of them. They were stopped only in 1885 by a coa- 
lition of Mbun, Njembe, and Pende, the first two being peoples 
of the lower Kasai. 

Except for the members of the Lunda cluster, most of the peo- 
ples in the area originally spoke a dialect of Kikongo or a language 
related to it. Over a period beginning in the seventeenth century, 
a good deal of movement was set in train by the expansion of the 
Lunda Empire. The result was the establishment of Lunda-influ- 
enced political patterns among Kongo peoples in the area. 

The Kongo Peoples 

The Kongo have long occupied all of Bas-Zaire Region. Most 
but not all of these peoples, together with substantial numbers in 
Angola and smaller numbers in Congo, were originally inhabitants 
of the kingdom of the Kongo encountered by the Portuguese in 
the late fifteenth century. For all practical purposes, that kingdom 
had disintegrated into a number of small chiefdoms by the early 
seventeenth century. The end of the kingdom's political power did 
not preclude the continuing spread of Kongo influence, however, 
and some groups may have become Kongo in culture later. 

Given the size of the population and the territorial range of the 
Kongo, much dialectical variation in their language has developed, 
to the point that some dialects are barely mutually intelligible. There 
are similar variations in other aspects of culture. From the seven- 
teenth century until the arrival of the Belgians, there were shifting 
combinations of smaller chiefdoms into larger entities under the 
domination of one or another chief, the power of a dominant chief 
often reflecting his easier access to or more effective exploitation 
of the slave and ivory trade of the period. The hierarchies thus es- 
tablished were usually ephemeral. In the end, the effective units 
were the clans, their larger constituent units called by anthropolo- 
gist Wyatt MacGaffey houses (the units controlling land), and lin- 
eages, rather shallow units. All of these units were based on 
matrilineal descent. Although each unit had a head, authority was 
shared with persons both inside and outside the unit in a complex 
fashion. 

Because of their early contact with Europeans, the Kongo were 
among the groups early and heavily influenced by Roman Catholic 



89 



Zaire: A Country Study 

and Protestant missionaries and by the schools established by them. 
The Roman Catholics placed particular emphasis on the traditions 
of the Kongo as they understood them and in turn communicated 
these reconstructed traditions to their students. The complex in- 
teraction of myth, competition, and the ambition of some leaders 
of Kongo origin as the prospect of independence loomed made the 
Kongo the largest single group to define themselves in ethnic terms 
for political purposes in the late 1950s and one of the few to de- 
velop an articulate ethnic ideology (see The Rise of Militant Eth- 
nicity: Abako, ch. 1). 

The Significance of Ethnic Identification 

Ethnic identity may best be understood as a construct useful to 
both groups and individuals. It may be built around group mem- 
bers' perceptions of shared descent, religion, language, origins, or 
other cultural features. What motivates members to create and 
maintain a common identity, however, is not shared culture but 
shared interests. Once created, ethnic groups have persisted not 
because of cultural conservatism but because their members share 
some common economic and political interests, thus creating an 
interest group capable of competing with other groups in the con- 
tinuing struggle for power. 

The construction and destruction of ethnic identities has been 
an ongoing process. The name Ngala, or Bangala, for example, was 
used by early colonial authorities to describe an ethnic group that 
they imagined existed and lived upriver from the capital and spoke 
Lingala. The name Ngala figured prominently on early maps. The 
fact that Lingala was a lingua franca and that no group speaking 
Lingala as a mother tongue existed did not prevent colonial authori- 
ties from ascribing group characteristics to the fictional entity; they 
gave Ngala further substance by contrasting Ngala characteristics 
with those of downriver peoples such as the Kongo. In the pre- 
independence era, some of the upriver Africans briefly adopted the 
identity of Bangala; they found it useful as a rallying point in creat- 
ing a political party. Unfortunately, the party failed to win signifi- 
cant electoral support. Without the prospect of winning political 
and economic spoils, the Bangala identity was perceived as use- 
less and was quickly discarded. 

Other ethnic group identities have proven more enduring. Zaire's 
two largest ethnic groups, the Kongo and the Luba, have been wide- 
ly mistrusted by many other Zairians as excessively arrogant, am- 
bitious, and inclined to nepotism. Here again, however, traits 
considered to be innate to the group are in fact ascribed, products 
of specific historical conditions. Both groups were early adapters 



90 



The Society and Its Environment 



to the influences of the West. Their numerical preponderance in 
Zaire's postcolonial business, church, educational, and governmen- 
tal hierarchies is a product of their history of early schooling and 
early acquisition of the skills of literacy rather than of any timeless 
expression of innate characteristics of ambition and arrogance. 
Groups on the borders of Kongo and Luba influence have some- 
times affirmed their common identity with their larger neighbor 
or denied it, depending on the historical advantages or disadvan- 
tages to be gained. 

The significance and divisiveness of ethnic identities were high- 
lighted during the struggle for political power at the time of in- 
dependence and in the period preceding it. The politically ambitious 
seized on ethnic identity as the most practical basis for organizing 
political parties, and a nation fragmented along ethnic lines was 
the result. In Kasai Province (now Kasai-Occidental Region and 
Kasai-Oriental Region), ethnic conflict broke out between the Lulua 
and the Luba-Kasai. In Katanga Province (now Shaba Region), 
tension had long existed between the Lunda and others (such as 
the Tabwa from eastern Katanga), who consider themselves 
"authentic Katangans," and Luba-Kasai immigrants, whose 
material success the Lunda resented. When Katanga seceded in 
1960, its Lunda president, Moise Tshombe, briefly attempted to 
expatriate the Luba-Kasai from Katanga back to Kasai Province; 
the net result was to exacerbate hostility between the two groups. 

When Mobutu came to power in 1965, his first concern was the 
reestablishment of public order; ethnicity was widely perceived as 
having contributed to intra-Zairian conflicts, so Mobutu began a 
concerted campaign against its expression both in political parties 
and in government. The several hundred existing political parties, 
most of them organized along ethnic or regional lines, were banned. 
They were replaced with one national party, Mobutu's Popular 
Revolutionary Movement (Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution — 
MPR). Ethnic associations and appeals to ethnic unity were pro- 
scribed. Within government, administrative centralization led to 
a reduction in the number of provinces and other administrative 
units and the abrogation of the autonomy of such units. The staff- 
ing of government ministries and of high-level posts was consciously 
balanced to ensure ethnic diversity. Also, the constant rotation of 
both civilian and military heads of regional and subregional units 
prevented anyone from building an ethnic following in his or her 
home region. 

Despite these measures, Mobutu's government has been widely 
perceived as having if not an ethnic, then a regional Equateurian 
bias. Equateur Region is sometimes knowingly referred to as 



91 



Zaire: A Country Study 

"Bethlehem" or "The Promised Land" by non-Equateurians. One 
major factor in this perception is the fact that Equateurians have 
profited from Zaire's equivalent of an educational affirmative-action 
program. Education is perceived as the key to social mobility, and 
the government's establishment of a regional quota system for 
university admissions (allotting set numbers of entry places by 
region) has effectively disadvantaged secondary students graduat- 
ing from regions with numerous schools, such as Bandundu or Bas- 
Zaire, relative to those with fewer schools, notably Equateur and 
Haut-Zai're. Students from regions rich in schools have long been 
angered by the fact that lesser-qualified graduates are occupying 
university seats solely because they come from the north. In addi- 
tion, many key posts in the security network generally have been 
staffed by Equateurians. 

Ethnic identity has remained a potent force, and ethnic tensions 
have festered, exacerbated by the country's economic and social de- 
terioration. Events in Shaba and Nord-Kivu in the early 1990s amply 
demonstrate this renewed tendency toward ethnic violence. Some 
groups have come to feel threatened by others they perceive as more 
successful. And, in a climate of economic collapse and increasingly 
fierce competition for scarce resources, they have taken action to 
rid themselves of the offending groups, witness the "authentic Katan- 
gans forcing Luba-Kasai out of Shaba and the resentment of in- 
digenous peoples in Nord-Kivu of the numerous Banyarwanda. 
Many observers also believe, however, that the Mobutu regime has 
deliberately encouraged this ethnic tension in order to foster anar- 
chy and undermine mass political mobilization against the regime 
(see Subsequent Political Developments, 1990-93, ch. 4). 

Nevertheless, despite the persistence of ethnic tensions demon- 
strated by interethnic violence in the early 1990s, from the individual 
Zairian's standpoint, ethnicity is still but one source of identity 
among many, one that may or may not be expressed depending 
upon the advantages to be gained or lost. Class identity, for ex- 
ample, may well be more important than ethnic identity to a mem- 
ber of the politico-commercial elite in determining how he or she 
reacts to a given situation. Religious identity might be more sig- 
nificant than class or ethnic identity to clergy. And patron-client 
ties throughout the society may undercut or strengthen religious, 
ethnic, or class identities. Few contemporary analysts would at- 
tempt to predict either an individual or a group's probable course 
of action based on ethnic factors alone. 

Indigenous Social Systems 

In most cases, the boundaries of indigenous societies, defined as 



92 



Men offering to sell a cayman, Equateur Region 
Women on their way to the market, Equateur Region 



93 



Zaire: A Country Study 

politically autonomous units, were narrower than ethnic bound- 
aries established on the basis of linguistic and cultural similarity. 
A community was often just a cluster of villages or hamlets, and 
even that cluster might consist of descent groups, each of which 
was in some ways autonomous or potentially so (that is, it might 
move out and establish itself elsewhere). This autonomy was by 
no means absolute, however. Lineages, and sometimes villages, 
were exogamous and therefore relied on other groups for spouses, 
which in turn led to connections of political relevance between lin- 
eages. In addition, marital and other cross-cutting ties, such as trade 
ties or secret societies, sometimes cut across ethnic boundaries, par- 
ticularly at the territorial periphery of the group. 

The environmental range inhabited by Zairian communities and 
their varied origins made for substantial differences of detail in their 
patterns of subsistence and modes of sociopolitical organization. 
Nevertheless, the characteristic way in which most groups came 
to the places where they finally settled was conducive to a good 
deal of interpenetration of communities with different traditions 
and the transfer of aspects of culture from one community to 
another. Typically, a people entered a region not as a wave in- 
undating or driving out its earlier inhabitants but as small bands fil- 
tering in, sometimes conquering, sometimes pushing out, and 
sometimes peacefully absorbing the communities already there. In 
a number of cases, these processes were still continuing in the ear- 
ly 1990s. 

Communities sharing language and culture were often thinly scat- 
tered in a given area. The widespread practice of shifting cultiva- 
tion meant that each village required a good deal of land, much 
of which was not under cultivation at any time. If the population 
of a village or related hamlets grew substantially, some segment 
of it, usually defined as a lineage, would leave to establish itself 
elsewhere. The establishment of colonial rule eventually put an end 
to such movements, however. The Belgians insisted that villages 
be combined and stabilized, in part to make administrative con- 
trol easier, in part so that cash cropping could be encouraged. 

With very few exceptions, indigenous Zairian communities had 
chiefs of some kind. There was, however, a good deal of variation 
in the scale of the entity under a single head and therefore in the 
extent to which any chiefdom was marked by a hierarchy of chiefs. 
There were also considerable differences in the secular authority 
of chiefs at any level. 

Chieftainship was linked in principle, and often in fact, to the 
system of unilineal (patrilineal or matrilineal) descent groups that 
provided the basic sociopolitical framework of most Zairian groups. 



94 



The Society and Its Environment 



The politically significant descent groups were often those local- 
ized in a single village or a cluster of related villages. 

Another feature of precolonial Zairian societies was the existence 
of some form of slavery, usually as a result of warfare. The precise 
social and economic position of slaves varied from society to socie- 
ty. Rarely, if ever, was it exactly like the chattel slavery charac- 
teristic of much of the New World. In traditional Zairian societies, 
slaves had some rights and could improve their position to some 
extent. Nevertheless, slaves, and often their descendants, were in 
a marginal position. 

Of the varied sociopolitical patterns characteristic of indigenous 
Zairian communities, only some elements, altered and adapted dur- 
ing the colonial era and since independence, remain significant in 
the lives of Zairians generally and those in rural areas particular- 
ly. Broadly, the persisting units are the local communities, often 
changed by the aggregation of smaller units into larger ones; the 
descent groups, which bear a variable relationship to local com- 
munities; and the networks of kin connections in which each in- 
dividual is involved. 

In general, the range of fairly important kin is wider than that 
in the West and has not appreciably narrowed, even in modern- 
day urban society, in part because many urban Zairians maintain 
ties with the rural areas from which they come, in part because 
kin ties provide ways of coping with some of the difficulties of ur- 
ban life. In some cases, obligations to kin become burdensome in 
an urban context, particularly to those who have had some degree 
of success and are expected to help new arrivals. Kin may be more 
trustworthy than others, however, and for the ambitious person 
they may provide a nucleus of dependents and followers necessary 
to further success. 

In a number of the more complex chiefdoms, aspects of the hi- 
erarchy have survived. Some traditional chiefs still wield consider- 
able influence. Many do not, however. Moreover, disputes over 
succession were not uncommon in the precolonial era and have 
persisted into the modern period so that at any time a group may 
be divided among factions supporting specific claimants to the 
chiefdom. 

With very few exceptions, indigenous Zairian communities dis- 
tinguished their members on some scale of worthiness based on 
age and sex, and such distinctions persist. In general, other things 
being equal, age requires respect, although seniority does not neces- 
sarily confer access to the office of highest status in the descent group 
or local community. Again in general, males have higher status than 



95 



Zaire: A Country Study 

females, despite the presence in many communities of matrilineal 
descent groups and matrilineally based succession and inheritance. 

Zairian Social Classes 

In the years since independence in 1960, Zaire has become an 
increasingly stratified and polarized society. One way of under- 
standing how this process has occurred and what the social profile 
of the country has become is by distinguishing among the various 
classes that have evolved. Zaire specialist Michael G. Schatzberg's 
notion of class is a useful tool in conceptualizing these changes. 
He argues against a rigid conception of class that identifies any 
single individual as a member of an exclusive category such as the 
proletariat or the bourgeoisie. He argues instead that class identi- 
ty is situationally based; an individual may be a member of one 
class in one interactional situation and a member of another in a 
different situation. Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, adopt- 
ing this more fluid concept of class, and building on previous models 
of Zairian stratification elaborated by Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, 
Jean Rymenam, and others, have distinguished the following so- 
cial classes. 

The External Estate 

Non- African expatriate numbers fell from 110,000 before in- 
dependence to a figure fluctuating between 40,000 and 60,000 there- 
after, but foreigners remained a significant elite social force in Zaire. 
Belgian colonial officials, missionaries, and businessmen predomi- 
nated in the preindependence era. Belgian colonial officials and 
security personnel left during the crisis at the start of the Katan- 
gan secession in 1960, and their positions were quickly Africanized. 
But Belgian employees of private companies left more gradually. 
Although they still constitute the majority of resident aliens in Zaire, 
if refugees are excluded, Belgian traders and settlers have been sup- 
planted or joined over time by Greek, Levantine, Portuguese, 
Italian, and Indo-Pakistani family-based mercantile networks. West 
Africans constitute another elite expatriate group. 

These family-based transnational businesses generally began in 
trade and moved on to acquire farms, mills, and small factories. 
In addition, trade manipulation (including smuggling, rigged in- 
voices, and illicit currency transactions) is an important source of 
windfall profits, indulged in by Zairians and foreigners alike. 
Despite the expulsion of West African traders in 1971 and the tem- 
porary expropriation of Mediterranean and Asian businesses in 
1973 and 1974, many family-owned transnational businesses have 



96 



The Society and Its Environment 



remained. In 1980, for example, fully half of Kisangani's locally 
owned businesses were in the hands of resident Greeks and Asians. 

Most significant as a reference group for Zairian elites are the 
several thousand foreign personnel of various nationalities who serve 
in the foreign-aid missions, public-sector agencies, and the educa- 
tion system. They are much more socially fragmented than their 
colonial-era predecessors, in that Belgians, French, Americans, and 
Japanese have created separate social milieus, each with their own 
schools, clubs, and religious institutions. Yet their common cos- 
mopolitan life- style, frequent travel, automobiles, and expensive 
household consumer goods effectively define Zairian elites' stan- 
dards and aspirations for the "good life." 

Western missionaries are a case apart. Although diminished in 
number and influence, they continue to work toward the institu- 
tionalization of African churches. Their progressive Africanization 
of church hierarchies, modest consumption standards relative to 
other expatriates, willingness to work in rural areas, and, most im- 
portant, their provision of high-quality health care and education 
have earned them a high status throughout much of the country. 

The Politico-Commercial Class 

This class has ruled Zaire since independence. Two key features 
of this "national bourgeoisie," as Nzongola calls it, have been its 
dependence upon the state for its social status and its use of politi- 
cal power to amass economic power. By looking at the shifting popu- 
lar terms of reference for the group over time, its salient features 
can be sketched. 

The origins of this class lie in the colonial-era group called the 
evolues (sing., evolue — see Glossary). The evolues were drawn from 
the ranks of colonial clerks, teachers, and nurses. They sought recog- 
nition as a group set apart from the African masses, one which 
embraced and emulated European patterns of culture and behavior. 
Whereas evolues were intermediaries between the Belgians and 
the Congolese masses, not all intermediaries were evolues. Clergy, 
noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and chiefs were intermedi- 
aries who did not have evolue status. Clergy in particular had a dis- 
tinctive status, being the only Africans in colonial society who were 
considered on a plane of approximate social equality with Eu- 
ropeans. 

With the growth of nationalism in the late 1950s, the term evolue 
was gradually displaced and rejected in favor of the new status term, 
intellectuel (intellectual). An intellectuel was generally someone who 
had some secondary education and a white-collar job. This class 
was well positioned to take advantage of the flight of Belgian civil 



97 



Zaire: A Country Study 

servants and army officers following independence in 1960. 
Although there was only a modest difference between the income 
opportunities of colonial-era evolues and other Congolese, the op- 
portunities available to the new elite were substantial. Clerks and 
NCOs moved up into the vacated positions above them, and Con- 
golese who shot up into the senior executive ranks of the civil ser- 
vice or into national and provincial ministerial offices enjoyed huge 
increases in income. In the nation's first cabinet, nineteen of the 
twenty- three ministers were former clerks. 

This new elite quickly invested in those commercial sectors where 
the state's regulatory position could be converted into competitive 
advantage, including the acquisition of urban land titles, supply- 
ing the state, constructing rental housing, and selling licenses for 
the right to import goods. In addition, corruption served as a source 
of capital for the new politico-commercial class; by 1971 theft of 
state funds was estimated by one analyst at 60 percent of the na- 
tional budget. 

The new class profited spectacularly from the government's 1973 
Zairianization (see Glossary) decree in which all foreign-owned plan- 
tations and many commercial firms were turned over to nationals 
(see Zairianization, Radicalization, and Retrocession, ch. 1; Zair- 
ianization, ch. 3). The term used to describe a politically connect- 
ed individual who was given ownership of a foreign business was 
acquereur (literally, acquirer). First used as an administrative term, 
acquereur rapidly became transformed in public usage to a synonym 
for a member of the ruling circle; it further degenerated into an 
epithet shouted out by children whenever a Mercedes drove by. 
In Young's words, "In the metamorphosis from evolue to acquereur, 
social respect was transformed into class conflict." 

Because few members of the politico-commercial class own 
productive resources unrelated to political influence or protection, 
they remain dependent and insecure. Turnover in the upper echelon 
of the regime is rapid, so economic security for its members has 
been precarious. This elite has consequently preferred either to in- 
vest in short-term, high-return enterprises like the import-export 
trade, urban property, or taxis, or to stash its funds abroad for 
safekeeping. 

The New Commercial Class 

In addition to the economically predatory politico-commercial 
class, a new economic class has been developing. This class is un- 
connected to the political authorities, is relatively uneducated, and 
is not made up of acquereurs. It has grown in regional centers such 
as Kisangani, far from the capital, where the state presence and 



98 



The Society and Its Environment 



state provision of public services are weakest. Amassing capital 
through trade and other successful commercial activities, this class 
has became strong enough in some areas to replace the state as 
a provider of infrastructure, such as airstrips, electrical generators, 
and road maintenance. 

Other High-Status Groups 

Ranking military officers, Zairian university staff, and clergy 
all enjoy high social status in Zaire but have developed quite differ- 
ent profiles. Officers have received rewards from the president for 
their loyalty and have been given wide leeway to develop lucrative 
outside businesses. They are, however, in much the same position 
as members of the politico-commercial class in that they are fre- 
quently promoted and demoted at the president's whim and have 
little security of tenure. Staff at the main Kinshasa campus of the 
National University of Zaire (Universite Nationale du Zaire — 
UNAZA) have tended to be absorbed into the politico-commercial 
class; this is particularly the case with those faculty in fields such 
as economics, commerce, and law. They have served as appoin- 
tees in high government posts or have found lucrative consultancy 
opportunities. Kinshasa campus staff not in these fields and univer- 
sity staff outside the capital have had an increasingly marginal- 
ized economic position but have nevertheless retained considerable 
social prestige. In general, the clergy have retained much of the 
status and security they enjoyed before independence. For exam- 
ple, in the transition from single-party rule beginning in 1990, Mon- 
signor Laurent Monsengwo Pasinya, archbishop of Kisangani, 
played a major role, reflecting the continuing prestige of the Ro- 
man Catholic clergy. 

The Subbourgeoisie 

Underneath the politico-commercial class and the other elite 
groups, yet above the working class, is the subbourgeoisie. This 
group includes the nation's teachers and clerks, military NCOs and 
junior officers, and low-level bureaucrats or local government offi- 
cials. Although the early members of the politico-commercial class 
came from the subbourgeoisie, the waves of university graduates 
that filled the upper echelons of government from 1965 onward 
effectively blocked this class from any hope of upward mobility. 
Totally dependent on the state, yet marked by a deteriorating in- 
come and status, this was a highly disgruntled group in the early 
1990s. 

The subbourgeoisie provides a clear example of what Schatz- 
berg means by situational class membership. Relative to those above 



99 



Zaire: A Country Study 

them in the class hierarchy, teachers, clerks, NCOs and chiefs have 
felt "out of the loop," without power or influence. Their percep- 
tions of powerlessness are well justified. With the exception of some 
university-educated secondary school teachers, who might be posted 
outside their home areas, chances of geographical or professional 
mobility are nil. While totally dependent on the state as a source 
of livelihood, their salaries have fallen woefully behind inflation. 
They frequently wait months to receive their salaries and, even 
then, their superiors might appropriate much of what is disbursed. 

Nonetheless, from the perspective of those people below them, 
namely workers, peasants, and Zairians in the informal sector, these 
salaried members of the subbourgeoisie are part of the privileged, 
exploiting class. Many low-level state functionaries require bribes 
before exercising their services. Teachers may demand money to 
pass a student, government clerks may request a bribe in order 
to get funds disbursed or a certificate or license delivered. And state 
security personnel may demand a donation in order to let travel- 
ers pass an impromptu roadblock or escape an infraction of the 
law, whether real or imagined. Even for those state employees who 
retain a sense of professionalism, the need to feed their families 
when salaries go unpaid has proved a powerful inducement to abuse 
of official position. As a consequence, a member of the subbour- 
geoisie may be viewed as a member of the victimized lower class 
or of the victimizing upper class, depending upon the onlooker. 

Historically, the position of the subbourgeoisie has been most 
precarious in times of trouble. During the 1964 rural insurgen- 
cies, for example, the subbourgeoisie lacked the ability of elite per- 
sonnel to flee and consequently bore the brunt of popular anger 
against the establishment; tens of thousands of teachers, clerks, and 
low-level government personnel were killed in many rebel-held 
areas. Fear of such popular anger, together with the habits and 
mindsets of their professional roles, have kept the subbourgeoisie 
generally compliant in their role as, in Young's words, "the in- 
dispensable capillaries of the power system." 

The Working Class 

This class includes employees of public and parastatal (see Glos- 
sary) entities, large private companies, small companies, rural plan- 
tations, and lumbering enterprises. The public-sector employees 
have been the least content, principally because many are not cov- 
ered by civil service status and have known repeated layoffs, de- 
lays in pay, and insecure work conditions. Turnover in the work 
force of large corporations, however, including the large parasta- 
tal General Quarries and Mines (Generate des Carrieres et des 



100 



The Society and Its Environment 



Mines — Gecamines), has tended to be low. Consistendy paid sal- 
aries, company stores, and company medical services have been 
key elements in retaining the long-term loyalty of such employees. 
Turnover also appears to be rather low in rural enterprises, where 
isolation has resulted in localized recruitment patterns and little 
contact with other workers. 

Workers have shown a sense of class consciousness in launching 
episodic strikes beginning as early as 1941 , when at least sixty were 
killed at Elisabethville (now Lubumbashi). Unions, however, have 
been generally weak, and the postcolonial state has generally con- 
trolled similar episodes by coupling the offer of limited concessions 
with the jailing or intimidation of strike leaders. Whereas workers 
have shared a clearly articulated sense of who "they" are — namely, 
acquereurs, politicians, abacost (see Glossary) wearers, Mercedes own- 
ers, and regime courtiers — "we" has been a less clear-cut category 
and has tended to be defined by place of work, city, and ethnicity. 
Still, the general consciousness of inequality and of social polari- 
zation has remained acute; fueling it has been the dramatic decline 
in workers' incomes (see Gross Domestic Product, ch. 3). 

The Informal Sector 

This category has grown substantially in the years since indepen- 
dence, particularly in the cities. It consists of people who lack regular 
wage employment and who engage in a wide variety of economic 
activities. Typical occupations include tailoring, shoe repairs, hous- 
ing construction, taxi and bus services, soft-drink vending, masonry 
work, petty retailing, artisanal crafts, prostitution, and petty crimi- 
nality. In border cities, the latter category includes smugglers, who 
have sometimes grown wealthy from their illicit activity. Partici- 
pation may be transitional or permanent. School leavers have been 
typical transitional members as they may engage in such activities 
on a part-time subsistence basis while searching for permanent em- 
ployment. Older persons, women, and individuals lacking educa- 
tional qualifications for wage employment have tended to remain 
in this sector permanently. Although poverty grips most people in 
this sector, individuals have occasionally prospered. More impor- 
tantly, the size, ingenuity, and redistributive capacity of this group 
have served as buffers to individual hardship during periods of eco- 
nomic calamity. 

Peasants 

The peasantry is the class that has probably lost the most since 
independence. Although the Belgian colonial state laid an oner- 
ous burden of labor and taxation on its rural subjects, it did provide 



101 



Zaire: A Country Study 

some medical and educational services and built a substantial trans- 
portation network. All of these services have deteriorated. Resour- 
ces, whether they are budget appropriations, consumer goods, 
gasoline, or medicines, have been targeted first to the urban popu- 
lation, with only the remainder going to the hinterland. Rural 
government hospitals and dispensaries have continued to exist, but 
have rarely had medical supplies. Rural schools have increased in 
quantity but, outside of selected schools run by church networks, 
have greatly decreased in quality. And the road network has so 
deteriorated that in many areas crops cannot be transported to mar- 
ket and have been left to rot at collection depots. 

The decrease in state services has not meant a corresponding 
decrease in state exactions, however. State economic policies have 
kept the price of foodstuffs and cash crops alike at low levels, dis- 
advantaging rural producers and favoring urban populations and 
middlemen or state marketing organs. Production quotas for 
peasants have continued to be enforced, including those for export 
crops such as cotton. Coercion is applied not only in the form of 
hectarage quotas for specified crops but also through direct taxa- 
tion. Each adult household head must pay a tax, and, prior to 1990 
at least, party dues were levied on top of that. Census-takers pass- 
ing through a village charged fees both for adding names to the 
roster in case of births and for deleting names from the roster in 
case of deaths. 

Fines have been another form of taxation on rural producers. 
Fines may be levied for failure to perform unpaid labor for state 
projects, for digging an improper latrine in contravention of sani- 
tary regulations, or for failing to plant the required hectarage. On 
top of these charges are the many illegal extortions imposed by 
government agents. Local police, army units, or party youth groups 
have long set up impromptu roadblocks where identity cards, offi- 
cial party cards, or other documents can be demanded, declared 
out of order, and retrieved only after payment of a "fine." Or a 
market-bound villager's bundle of game meat might be declared 
to belong to an endangered species protected by law, justifying con- 
fiscation on the spot. Young has speculated that "as much as 50 
percent of real and potential village income is extracted by the state 
or its representatives." 

Polarization and Prospects for Conflict 

Given the polarization of Zairian society since 1960 into an 
upper class dominated by the external estate and the politico- 
commercial elite and a lower-class group of subbourgeoisie, work- 
ers, members of the informal sector, and peasants, open conflict 



102 



Women 
and children, 
Equateur Region 




103 



Zaire: A Country Study 

would seem inevitable. At least three major reasons why this has 
not occurred may be cited. 

One is the power of the myth of educational mobility (see Edu- 
cation, this ch.). A link between education and upward mobility 
is widely believed to exist, which has given parents hope that 
however bad their own current conditions, through education their 
children might advance and prosper. Parents have made painful 
financial sacrifices in order to get their children into and through 
secondary school. 

The myth obscures the fact that schools vary widely in qual- 
ity and that only some urban and church-run schools offer the qual- 
ity of instruction needed to pass the national state secondary school 
examinations. In addition, many parents in the politico-commer- 
cial class send their children abroad to be educated in Europe and 
elsewhere, giving their offspring an advantage unavailable to the 
children of other classes. Nevertheless, despite the progressive 
closure of avenues of advancement through education, the myth 
of its availability has been a significant factor in dampening social 
unrest. 

A second factor is the availability of outside force to back the 
state in case of rebellion or invasion. The external estate depends 
on the government as a guarantor of the order needed to conduct 
its economic activities and to protect its luxurious lifestyle; thus, 
it has tacitly backed the status quo. The state in turn depends on 
the external estate in order to operate the mining industry; that 
industry has long furnished it with the bulk of its revenues. Both 
the external estate and the government are closely linked with a 
group of Western states, most importantly Belgium, France, and 
the United States. Whenever the external estate or key productive 
installations, such as Zaire's copper or cobalt mines, were threat- 
ened, foreign powers intervened militarily. The knowledge that their 
rulers might rely on outside military aid has had a restraining ef- 
fect on those in the lower classes who might otherwise have con- 
templated active opposition to the state. 

A final factor in the failure of the people to revolt in response 
to their pauperization is their own strength in creating alternatives 
to the formal market economy. The informal sector has shown 
remarkable resilience and has provided a means of subsistence where 
the formal economy has failed. The weakness of the state in its at- 
tempts to regulate or control these parallel markets has, paradoxi- 
cally, helped to ensure their survival. For people who would starve 
if limited in their activity to the formal market, the parallel mar- 
kets of the informal sector offer a chance for survival. 



104 



The Society and Its Environment 



Strategies of Survival 

Zairians have not revolted in the face of their progressive pauperi- 
zation. Instead, faced with a steady decline in income and a rise 
in exactions from authorities on their declining income base, they 
have responded in three ways: by adapting, by resisting, and by 
fleeing. These strategies cut across class distinctions, although the 
specific actions taken might be shaped by class. 

One key to understanding popular adaptive strategies and their 
underlying ideologies may be found in the terms of reference and 
address, idioms, and phrases used in everyday life. Paralleling the 
official ideologies of authenticity (see Glossary) and Mobutism (see 
Glossary) have been those methods created by the Zairian people 
in their efforts to cope with an economy in decline. Phrases heard 
in daily conversation embody the strategies used to negotiate an 
increasingly difficult economic climate. 

Coping and Hustling 

A simple translation of the French term se debrouiller (verb; noun 
form, debrouillardise) might be "to fend for oneself," or "to cope," 
but that literal translation would need to be elaborated with the 
connotations of hustle, know-how, and the ability to get by or to 
get what you want. It may consist of knowing how to get a ride 
on one of the rare commercial trucks that still ply the deteriorat- 
ing roads of the interior and that furnish what is often the only 
passenger service available. It may involve knowing which official 
to bribe in order to get one's salary released or knowing which kin- 
ship connection to tap in order to get a sought-after secondary school 
slot opened for one's child or cousin after enrollment is formally 
closed. Or debrouillardise may be demonstrated by the ability to lo- 
cate on the black market drugs needed by a hospitalized family 
member or by paying a hospital or dispensary nurse to "acquire' ' 
the needed medications from institutional stocks. The term may 
also be adapted to refer to the entire unofficial economy. 

The popular admonition that "you need to know how to 
cope/hustle' ' (ilfaut savoir comment se debrouiller) implicitly contradicts 
official party and state slogans such as "servir, oui, se servir, non" 
(serve yes, serve oneself, no). The popular phrase embodies an 
ideology of aggressive individualism that contradicts the state- 
promoted ideology of selfless public service. 

Theft and Bribery 

The widely used Lingala phrase, yiba moke, meaning "steal just 
a little," did not originate in popular conversation but in the text 



105 



Zaire: A Country Study 

of a speech by President Mobutu in 1977. He was speaking out 
against runaway corruption and advised his countrymen that they 
should "steal just a little" or, perhaps, "steal wisely" and that 
they should invest the proceeds inside the country rather than stow- 
ing it abroad. Intended as a moderating counsel, Mobutu's words 
have come to epitomize the scale of corruption under his rule, cor- 
ruption so commonplace as to command public presidential acquies- 
cence so long as its practice remained "moderate." Some analysts, 
notably David Gould, have identified this massive corruption as 
the essential grease that has served to lubricate the machinery of 
state and without which it might cease to function. 

Corruption is extremely widespread. A survey of government 
personnel in Lubumbashi in 1982 documented the variety of means 
by which state employees supplemented their irregular and inade- 
quate salaries. These means included embezzlement (including 
direct payroll theft, often through the padding of payrolls with fic- 
titious names), payoffs, forgeries of official signatures and seals, 
sale of false documents of certification, illegal taxation, second jobs, 
and foodstuff production and sale. Other analysts have added to 
the above false bills and profit-margin cheating on the allowed rate 
of profit for business; import, export, and excise stamp fraud; sale 
of merchandise quotas; postal and judicial fraud; and extortion at 
military barricades. 

Bribery, too, is commonplace. A rich vocabulary for bribes is 
one index of its ubiquity. Anthropologist Janet MacGaffey has cited 
as examples in Lingala, madesuya bana (beans for the children) and 
tia ngai mbeli (stab me); in Swahili, kuposa koo (refresh the throat) 
and kulowanish a ndebu (moisten the beard); and in French, com- 
prendre, s' arranger, and cooper er (to understand, to come to terms, 
and to cooperate), which may be used by a speaker to indicate that 
a bribe is appropriate. Sometimes a gesture may be used, such as 
stroking under the chin, to signal that a bribe is expected. Although 
analysts debate whether the term bribery is an appropriate charac- 
terization of these exchanges, the scale of the phenomenon and the 
bottom-to-top direction of the flow of resources has not been con- 
tested. 

The sense that public and commercial coffers are prizes to be 
won may be found in conversational phrases and in popular mu- 
sic. Adults knowingly speak of the avantages de la caisse (the ad- 
vantages of the cashbox) in discussing a chiefs economic position. 
Children in the early and mid-1970s would frequently shout out 
to passing expatriates a phrase from a popular song mondele, donnez- 
moi la caisse (white man, give me the cashbox), showing not only 
an appreciation of the continuing economic power of the first estate 



106 



The Society and Its Environment 



but also the sense of treasury as trophy. This sense extends to the 
upper reaches of society; university students in Kisangani would 
at times exonerate those responsible for thefts of public funds with 
the phrase s'il y a Vanarchie, profitez-en, (if there's anarchy, profit 
from it). 

Patron-Client Relations 

Patron is a term of address that means, crudely, "boss" or "pa- 
tron." Patron-client relations are marked by unequal status, 
reciprocity, and personal contact, and their use is common through- 
out Zaire. Individuals may circumvent the power of state officials 
by locating someone in the bureaucracy to whom they are related 
by ties of ethnicity, locality, kinship, religious affiliation, or class. 
In appealing to such ties in order to get a permit issued, a court 
case resolved, or a child admitted to school, for example, bonds 
are forged that may be used by the patron or the client in future 
matters. Such bonds may undercut or reinforce other bonds of class, 
regional, or ethnic solidarity, depending on the situation. 

Such bonds and the need for them subvert official ideology as 
well as official structures and procedures. Under the state and party 
ideology of authenticity, all citizens were equal and the appropri- 
ate term of address among all Zairians was citoyen (fern., citoyenne), 
or citizen. The term was mandated for public use in order to do 
away with the perceived hierarchical distinctions of monsieur and 
madame. Not only does use of the term patron undercut this aim by 
creating new hierarchies, but Zairians often reversed the egalitar- 
ian intent of the term citoyen itself in their use of it. The term was 
often reserved for addressing members of new and old elites, the 
politico-commercial class, and the external estate; a foreigner might 
find himself or herself addressed as citoyen, while a Zairian worker 
or farmer might not. 

Resistance 

Under Mobutu, resistance through public or institutional chan- 
nels of expression generally has met with state repression and/or 
co-optation. Political resisters are often bought off with the offer 
of high-salaried posts. In the past if this failed, leaders might be 
imprisoned or sentenced to internal exile in their home villages. 

Strikes by workers have occurred intermittently but have not been 
effective tools for social or economic change. Typical is the 1980 
secondary school teachers' strike against low pay and overcrowd- 
ed classrooms in Kisangani. Strikers were threatened with dismis- 
sal, and strike leaders were repeatedly summoned to appear in the 
offices of the secret police. Threats against strike leaders' lives were 



107 



Zaire: A Country Study 

made, and the strike was eventually broken. When an institution's 
personnel have gone on strike or had the temerity to hold public 
protest marches, as university students have done periodically since 
the late 1960s, the state has responded with force. 

The hopelessness of public protest has given rise to alternative 
forms of resistance. Farmers' resistance to compulsory cotton cul- 
tivation quotas has been well documented. Faced with low producer 
prices and dishonest state marketing boards, farmers sabotaged 
cotton production by diverting fertilizer intended for cotton produc- 
tion to their own food crops, by failing to space plants appropri- 
ately, and by refusing to replant their fields as instructed. Farmers 
then redirected their energies to the cultivation of more profitable 
food crops such as corn, cassava, and peanuts. No more cotton 
hectarage was planted than was required to escape fines and im- 
prisonment. 

A similar form of resistance has been practiced in the area of 
palm oil production. Low wages for palm oil plantation workers 
and low prices for palm nuts purchased from petty producers result- 
ed in workers deserting plantations in areas such as Bunia, near 
Lake Albert. Their preferred course of action was to abandon com- 
mercial crop production in order to concentrate on producing food 
crops. 

Resistance has also taken other forms. Illicit mining of gold in 
the Kivu regions and Haut-Zaire occurs on both an individual and 
group basis. Mukdrya Vwakyanakazi has documented the forma- 
tion of villages of illicit gold miners in Kivu, villages that have their 
own authority structure independent of the government. In Haut- 
Zaire, people engaged in illicit mining activities protect themselves 
and their operations with private militias against government sol- 
diers and officials, or, elsewhere, local officials are paid off for 
protection against interference. Similar arrangements have been 
reported for illicit diamond mining. 

Smuggling across Zaire's porous borders is another means of 
resisting pauperization. A large-scale illicit trade flourishes in all 
commodities that can be sold for foreign currencies, among them 
gold, coffee, ivory, diamonds, cobalt, tea, cotton, and palm oil. 

Finally, resistance is expressed linguistically, in the labels used 
to deflate state institutions and ideologies and to create an alterna- 
tive folk consciousness. In this vein, the national army's proud slo- 
gan of being toujours en avant (always out front) is transformed into 
toujour s en arriere (always behind). The national airline, called Air 
Zaire, has become known as "Air Peut-etre" (Air Maybe) and 
the national highway authority, the Office des Routes, is called 
in popular parlance the Office des Trous (Department of Holes). 



108 



The Society and Its Environment 



Such resistance began long before the economic crises of the late 
1980s and early 1990s. When Mobutu officially changed the names 
of the nation, the Congo River (name change not recognized by 
the United States), and the national currency to Zaire, and referred 
to them as Les Trois Z — Notre Pays, Notre Fleuve, Notre Monnaie (The 
Three Zs — Our Country, Our River, Our Money) in 1967, the 
radio trottoir (literally, sidewalk radio; meaning public grapevine) 
quickly recharacterized the president's program as Les Trois M — 
Mwasi, Moyibi, Masanga (The Three Ms — Women, Thieves, Booze). 
Or when students in Bandundu were required in the name of the 
state doctrine of authenticity to replace their European first names 
with African ones in 1971 , first names such as Mambo Ve (Doesn't 
Matter) suddenly appeared on teachers' class rosters. 

Flight 

Another strategy for survival is flight, which for the politico- 
commercial class might mean sending family and fortune abroad 
when conditions appear threatening. For undercompensated workers, 
flight might mean movement from a low- wage job in plantation 
agriculture to self-employment elsewhere as an independent farmer, 
miner, or petty merchant. For undercompensated farmers, it might 
mean migration to the cities; part of the impetus behind urban 
migration is the heavier levies on people in rural areas (where they 
are within the government's reach) than on the urban population. 
And for some groups, flight into deep forest and the establishment 
of villages entirely independent of the state has been a solution. 

The Status of Women 

Women in Zaire in the 1990s have not attained a position of 
full equality with men. Although the Mobutu regime has paid lip 
service to the important role of women in society and although wom- 
en enjoy some legal rights (e.g., the right to own property and the 
right to participate in the economic and political sectors), custom 
and legal constraints still limit their opportunities. 

The inferiority of women was embedded in the indigenous so- 
cial system and reemphasized in the colonial era. The colonial-era 
status of African women in urban areas was low. Adult women 
were legitimate urban dwellers if they were wives, widows, or elder- 
ly. Otherwise they were presumed to be femmes libres (free women) 
and were taxed as income-earning prostitutes, whether they were 
or not. From 1939 to 1943, over 30 percent of adult Congolese 
women in Stanleyville (now Kisangani) were so registered. The 
taxes they paid constituted the second largest source of tax revenue 
for Stanleyville. 



109 



Zaire: A Country Study 



Opportunities for wage labor jobs and professional positions re- 
mained rare even after independence. For example, in Kisangani 
there were no women in law, medicine, or government in 1979, 
nineteen years after independence. Moreover, educational oppor- 
tunities for girls remained constricted compared with those for boys. 

By the 1990s, women had made strides in the professional world, 
and a growing number of women now work in the professions, 
government service, the military, and the universities. But they 
remain underrepresented in the formal work force, especially in 
higher-level jobs, and generally earn less than their male counter- 
parts in the same jobs. 

In addition, certain laws clearly state that women are legally sub- 
servient to men. A married woman must have her husband's per- 
mission to open a bank account, accept a job, obtain a commercial 
license, or rent or sell real estate. Article 45 of the civil code speci- 
fies that the husband has rights to his wife's goods, even if their 
marriage contract states that each spouse separately owns his or 
her own goods. 

Adapting to this situation, urban women have exploited com- 
mercial opportunities in the informal economy, outside of men's 
control. They generally conduct business without bank accounts, 
without accounting records, and without reporting all of their com- 
merce. Anthropologist Janet MacGaffey's study of enterprises in 
Kisangani showed that 28 percent of the city's large business owners 
not dependent on political connections were women; these women 
specialized in long-distance distribution and retail and semi- 
wholesale trade. About 21 percent of the retail stores in the com- 
mercial and administrative zone of the city belonged to women, 
and women dominated the market trade. 

Rural women find fewer such strategies available. Saddled with 
the bulk of agricultural work, firewood gathering, water hauling, 
and child care, they have generally seen an increase in their labor 
burdens as the economy has deteriorated. In Zaire's eastern high- 
lands, conditions have grown particularly severe. The state-promot- 
ed expansion of cash-crop hectarage for export, particularly of coffee 
and quinine, has reduced the amount and quality of land availa- 
ble for peasant household food-crop production. Plantations owned 
by the politico-commercial and new commercial elites have increas- 
ingly expanded onto communal lands, displacing existing food crops 
with cash crops. And within peasant households, men's control of 
the allocation of household land for export and food crops has led to 
greater use of land for export crops and the diminution of women's 
access to land and food crops. 

Even when male producers turn to cultivating food crops, the 



110 



The Society and Its Environment 



household does not necessarily profit nutritionally. Food needed 
for household consumption is frequently sold for cash, cash need- 
ed to pay for daily necessities, clothes, school fees, taxes, and so 
on. Higher-priced and nutritionally superior food crops such as 
sorghum are frequently sold by producers who eat only their cheap- 
er, less nutritious food crops such as cassava. Widespread malnutri- 
tion among children has resulted. 

Among groups where women have more power, the situation 
is less severe. Among the Lemba, for example, women not only 
have more say in determining what is grown but also in what is 
consumed. In a country where the most widespread pattern is for 
the men to be served the best food first, with the remainder going 
to women and children, Lemba women traditionally set aside choice 
food items and sauces for their own and their children's consump- 
tion before feeding the men their food. Their nutritional status and 
that of their children is correspondingly better. 

Rural women have arguably borne the brunt of state exactions. 
In some cases, women have banded together to resist the rising 
tolls and taxes imposed on them. Political scientist Katharine New- 
bury studied a group of Tembo women growers of cassava and 
peanuts west of Lac Kivu who successfully protested against the 
imposition of excessive collectivity taxes and market taxes levied 
on them when they went to market. The local chief was hostile. 
But a sympathetic local Catholic church, which provided a forum 
for meetings and assistance in letter writing, was helpful, as was 
the ethnic homogeneity of the group. Although they could not 
nominate a woman for election to the local council, they did suc- 
ceed in voting for males friendly to their position. The newly elected 
councillors hastened to suspend the taxes and the tolls. 

Not all women's organizations have been equally successful. In 
Kisangani the Association of Women Merchants (Association des 
Femmes Commercantes — Afco) failed to advance the interests of 
the assembled women merchants. The group instead turned into 
a vehicle for class interests, namely those of the middle-class presi- 
dent. MacGaffey clearly saw the case as one of the triumph of class 
solidarity over gender solidarity. 

A continuing challenge for women has been the limited integra- 
tion of women's experience and perspectives into the development 
initiatives of Western development agencies. As Brooke Schoepf 
has documented, little effort has been made to create agricultural 
extension networks for women, who have continued to contribute 
the overwhelming bulk of agricultural labor. In addition, project 
production goals rarely have taken into account the effect of the 
withdrawal of women's time from current food production and 



111 



Zaire: A Country Study 

household work to meet the goals of the new programs. Develop- 
ment in such a context often has meant a step backward rather 
than a step forward from the perspective of the women being ' 'de- 
veloped." 

Religion 

The majority of Zairians belong to one Christian church or 
another. Although statistics are imprecise, roughly 46 to 48 per- 
cent are Roman Catholics; 24 to 28 percent, Protestants; and as 
many as 16.5 percent may belong to the indigenous Kimbanguist 
Church. Islam counts only a small number of adherents in Zaire, 
perhaps 1 percent of the population, principally clustered in the 
former Maniema Subregion of Kivu (now Maniema Region) and 
in pockets in eastern Zaire from Kisangani south to Shaba. Most 
of the remaining population practices traditional African religions. 

A clear delineation of religious affiliation into these membership 
categories can give a misleading picture of Zairian reality. The num- 
ber of persons who can be categorized as belonging exclusively to 
one group or another is limited. Overlapping affiliations are more 
common. As with class identity or with ethnic identity, an individual 
Zairian' s religious identity may be situational. Different spiritual 
traditions, agents, and communities may be sought out for as- 
sistance, depending on the situation at hand. For example, Chris- 
tian students in Christian schools may employ sorcery with the 
objective of improving their individual exam scores or of helping 
their school's soccer team win in competition against their oppo- 
nents. Sophisticated urbanites, faced with disease in a family mem- 
ber, may patronize indigenous healers and diviners. And Zairians 
practicing traditional African religions may also go to both estab- 
lished Christian clergy and breakaway Christian sects in search of 
spiritual assistance. In the search for spiritual resources, Zairians 
have frequently displayed a marked openness and pragmatism. 

The Roman Catholic Church 

The impact of the Roman Catholic Church in Zaire is difficult 
to overestimate. Schatzberg has called it "Zaire's only truly na- 
tional institution apart from the state." Besides involving over 40 
percent of the population in its religious services, its schools have 
educated over 60 percent of the nation's primary school students 
and more than 40 percent of its secondary students. The church 
owns and manages an extensive network of hospitals, schools, and 
clinics, as well as many diocesan economic enterprises, including 
farms, ranches, stores, and artisans' shops. 

The church's penetration of the country at large is a product 



112 



High-school students, 
Bas-Zaire Region 



Parents with a newborn on the 
way to have the baby baptized, 
Bandundu Region 



Zaire: A Country Study 

of the colonial era (see The Apparatus of Control, ch. 1). The Bel- 
gian colonial state authorized and subsidized the predominantly 
Belgian Roman Catholic missions to establish schools and hospi- 
tals throughout the colony; the church's function from the perspec- 
tive of the state was to accomplish Belgium's "civilizing mission" 
by creating a healthy, literate, and disciplined work force, one that 
was obedient to the governing authorities. From the perspective 
of the church, evangelization was the primary goal, and the num- 
ber of converts baptized was the measure of its success. Although 
different in emphasis, church and state goals were sufficiently com- 
plementary that the state and church were perceived by the popu- 
lation as sharing the same purpose. As Joseph Cardinal Malula, 
who was for many years the head of the church in Zaire, put it, 
"For our people, the Church was the State, and the State was the 
Church." When independence came in 1960, the bill for church 
collaboration came due; Roman Catholic personnel were the fre- 
quent subjects of attacks by angry Congolese throughout the coun- 
try, while Protestant missionaries and Kimbanguist personnel were, 
outside of Bas-Zaire Region, largely spared. 

The church's reversal of its role in relation to the state since in- 
dependence has been striking. Formerly a reliable ally, it has in- 
creasingly become the state's most severe institutional critic (see 
Interest Groups, ch. 4). Overt conflict first erupted in 1971 when 
the state, as part of its efforts to centralize and extend its authori- 
ty, nationalized the country's three universities, including the 
Catholic church's Lovanium University outside Kinshasa. State 
attempts to implant sections of the official party's youth movement, 
the Youth of the Popular Revolutionary Movement (Jeunesse du 
Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution — JMPR), in Catholic semi- 
naries were strongly resisted. The conflict intensified in 1972 when, 
as part of the authenticity campaign, all Zairians were ordered to 
drop their Christian baptismal names and adopt African ones. 
Cardinal Malula protested the decision and told his bishops to ig- 
nore it. The regime retaliated by forcing the cardinal into exile for 
three months and by seizing his residence and converting it into 
JMPR headquarters. In addition, the state banned all religious pub- 
lications and youth groups. 

Following a brief thaw in 1973 and early 1974, during which 
the cardinal was permitted to return from exile, relations between 
church and state continued to deteriorate. The state declared that 
Christmas would no longer be a Zairian holiday, banned religious 
instruction from the schools, and ordered crucifixes and pictures 
of the pope removed from schools, hospitals, and public buildings; 
the removed items were replaced by pictures of President Mobutu. 



114 



The Society and Its Environment 



The president was characterized by the regime as a new messiah, 
and the state took over direct control of the nation's schools. Courses 
in Mobutism supplanted courses in religious instruction. Students 
in the former church schools found themselves participating in daily 
rallies led by JMPR members, during which they were obliged to 
chant "Mobutu awa, Mobutu kuna, Mobutu partout" (Mobutu here, 
Mobutu there, Mobutu everywhere). 

The tables turned in late 1975 as the effects of Zairianization 
and the fall in copper prices resulted in a progressively worsening 
economy. As living standards fell, more and more state officials 
exploited their positions to steal from the citizenry. Roman Catholic 
clergy issued public denunciations of these exactions. Increasing- 
ly pointed pastoral letters denouncing state corruption were pub- 
lished by all of Zaire's bishops in 1977 and 1978. 

Meanwhile, although privately furious at such criticism, Mobutu 
was preoccupied with the deteriorating economy and the invasions 
of Shaba Region (see External Threats to Regime Stability, ch. 
1; Shaba I, ch. 5; Shaba II, ch. 5). In addition, the state's lack 
of managerial skills and resources had rendered its takeover of the 
education system a disaster. Faced with these realities, the presi- 
dent asked religious institutions to resume responsibility for church 
schools, which, by 1976, they had done. Courses on religion were 
once again integrated into the curriculum. 

Tensions remained high throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s. 
The bishops' episcopal letter of June 1981, for example, castigat- 
ed the regime for corruption, brutality, mismanagement, and lack 
of respect for human dignity. An angry Mobutu retaliated by warn- 
ing the church hierarchy to stay out of politics; he also stationed 
JMPR militants in all places of worship to monitor priestly homi- 
lies. C ©incidentally, attacks and attempted attacks were launched 
during the following months by unknown parties against several 
highly placed Catholic clerics; Cardinal Malula's home, for exam- 
ple, was attacked and his night watchman killed. The cardinal ad- 
vised Zairians before the 1984 presidential elections to consult their 
consciences before casting their ballots; his act was denounced by 
the government as religious zealotry. 

Tensions would have been still greater but for divisions with- 
in the church and for the ambiguity of the church's role relative 
to the state. Conflict within the church exists between the lower 
clergy, who are in day-to-day contact with the population, and the 
higher clergy; the former argued for a more radical critique of 
the regime, while the latter prevailed in arguing for a more limit- 
ed, moral criticism. Many bishops wished to protect the church's 



115 



Zaire: A Country Study 

institutional position and to avoid the retaliation that a more mili- 
tant attack on the state could well provoke. 

Too sharp a structural critique could also expose vulnerabilities 
in the church's position. High church officials enjoyed many of 
the economic and social privileges of other prominent Zairians, 
privileges that could easily be called into question. In addition, the 
church continued to depend on grants from foreign sources; as of 
1976, none of Zaire's forty-seven dioceses was financially self- 
sufficient, a situation of dependency that appeared litde changed 
by the early 1990s. The dependence of the largely Africanized 
church leadership on substantial numbers of expatriate priests, 
nuns, and brothers at lower and middle staff levels was another 
weakness. Finally, while church officials generally sided with the 
populace against the government in labor disputes, tax revolts, and 
individual cases of injustice, they sometimes made common cause 
with the regime; in its management role in Catholic schools, for 
example, the church found itself siding with the government against 
striking underpaid teachers in the early 1980s. 

Protestant Churches 

Protestant missionaries have been active since 1878 when the 
first Protestant mission was founded among the Kongo. Early re- 
lations with the state were not warm. During the existence of the 
Congo Free State (1885-1908), some Protestant missionaries wit- 
nessed and publicized state and charter company abuses against 
the population during rubber- and ivory- gathering operations. That 
evidence helped lead to the international outcry that forced King 
Leopold II to cede control of the Congo Free State to the Belgian 
state (see The Leopoldian Legacy, ch. 1). Situated outside the 
governing colonial trinity of state, Roman Catholic Church, and 
companies, Protestant missions did not enjoy the same degree of 
official confidence as that accorded their Catholic counterparts. State 
subsidies for hospitals and schools, for example, were (with two 
individual exceptions) reserved exclusively for Catholic institutions 
until after World War II. 

The colonial state divided up the colony into spiritual franchises, 
giving each approved mission group its own territory. At indepen- 
dence in 1960, some forty-six Protestant missionary groups were 
at work, the majority of them North American, British, or Scan- 
dinavian in origin. The missions established a committee to main- 
tain contact and minimize competition among them. This body 
evolved into a union called the Church of Christ in the Congo, 
now the Church of Christ in Zaire. The Church of Christ devel- 
oped rules that permitted members of one evangelical congregation 



116 



The Society and Its Environment 



to move to and be accepted by another. It also established institu- 
tions that served common needs, such as bookstores and mission- 
ary guest houses. 

Since independence, church leadership and control have been 
widely and successfully Africanized, though not without conflict. 
Most mission property has been transferred to autonomous Zair- 
ian churches, and many foreign missionaries now work directly 
under the supervision of a Zairian-run church. The new indigenous 
leadership has succeeded in expanding its churches in Africa's larg- 
est francophone Protestant community. 

Protestant churches are valued, as are their Catholic counter- 
parts, not only for the medical and educational services they pro- 
vide, but also for serving as islands of integrity in a sea of corruption. 
Explicit recognition of this role came in 1983 when Mobutu sent 
emissaries to Europe and the United States to encourage increased 
involvement by foreign mission boards in Zairian institution- 
building; a conference in Kinshasa with local and international 
Protestant officials followed. Not only was a renewed church in- 
volvement sought with struggling institutions, such as the formerly 
Protestant university in Kisangani (nationalized in 1971), but 
churches were asked if they would be willing to station representa- 
tives within the major government ministries in order to discourage 
and/or report acts of corruption by state officials. Sensing the threat 
of co-optation, the Protestants respectfully declined. 

State solicitation of Protestant action was logical. The state sought 
a counterweight to its critics in the powerful Roman Catholic 
Church. Protestant churches, and particularly the Church of Christ 
leadership, have been consistentiy supportive of Mobutu, making 
them an attractive potential partner. And the Church of Christ served 
the state in areas where state-church interests coincided. Both church 
and state looked askance at the formation of new uncontrolled reli- 
gious movements and splinter groups. The government's require- 
ment that religious groups register with the state and post a Z 100,000 
(for value of the zaire — see Glossary) deposit in a bank in order to 
be legally recognized helped limit their development; so too did the 
lingering effects of the colonial franchise system. When, for example, 
a charismatic preacher of the officially recognized but noncharisma- 
tic Church of Christ of the Ubangi (Eglise du Christ de l'Oubangi) 
broke away in 1988 to ally his own congregation with a charismatic 
but officially recognized church community in distant Kivu, the 
Church of Christ in Zaire stepped in to adjudicate. The governing 
body prevented the Kivu church from accepting the rebellious 
preacher and his congregation, leaving him with no outside allies 
or resources and effectively localizing his potential impact. 



117 



Zaire: A Country Study 

The Kimbanguist Church 

The Kimbanguist Church, an indigenous Zairian religion, 
emerged from the charismatic ministry of Simon Kimbangu in the 
early 1920s. Kimbangu was already a member of the English Baptist 
Mission Church when he reportedly first received his visions and 
divine call to preach the word and heal the sick. Touring the low- 
er Congo, he gained a large following drawn both from members 
of Protestant churches and adherents of indigenous religious prac- 
tice. He preached a doctrine that was in many ways more strict 
than that of the Protestantism from which it evolved. Healing by 
the laying on of hands; strict observance of the law of Moses; the 
destruction of fetishes; the repudiation of sorcery, magic, charms, 
and witches; and the prohibition of polygyny were all part of his 
original message. 

Unfortunately, the extent of his success caused increasing alarm 
among both church and state authorities. Numerous preachers and 
sages appeared, many of them professing to be his followers. Some 
of these preachers and possibly some of Kimbangu 's own disciples 
introduced anti-European elements in their teachings. And Euro- 
pean interests were affected when African personnel abandoned 
their posts for long periods in order to follow Kimbangu and par- 
ticipate in his services. 

In June 1921, the government judged the movement out of con- 
trol, banned the sect, exiled members to remote rural areas, and 
arrested Kimbangu, only to have the prophet "miraculously" es- 
cape; the escape further amplified his popular mystique. In Sep- 
tember he voluntarily surrendered to the authorities and was 
sentenced to death for hostility against the state; the sentence was 
later commuted to life imprisonment, and Kimbangu died in pris- 
on in 1950. His movement, however, did not die with him. It 
flourished and spread "in exile" in the form of clandestine meet- 
ings, often held in remote areas by widely scattered groups of con- 
gregants. In 1959, on the eve of independence, the state despaired 
of stamping out Kimbanguism and afforded it legal recognition. 

The legalized church, known as the Church of Jesus Christ on 
Earth by the Prophet Simon Kimbangu (Eglise de Jesus-Christ sur 
Terre par le Prophete Simon Kimbangu — EJCSK), has since suc- 
ceeded in becoming one of the only three Christian groups recog- 
nized by the state, the other two being the Roman Catholic Church 
and the Church of Christ in Zaire. The Kimbanguist Church has 
been a member of the World Council of Churches since 1969. Es- 
timates of its membership vary depending on the source. The church 
claims 5 million members; yet its own internal figures indicate no 



118 



The Society and Its Environment 



more than 300,000 practicing members. Individual congregations 
are scattered throughout much of the country, but the greatest con- 
centrations have always been in Bas-Zaire; some villages there have 
long been totally Kimbanguist. 

Since being legalized, the Kimbanguists have bent over back- 
ward to curry favor with the state. The church's head, Simon Kim- 
bangu's son, regularly exchanges public praise with Mobutu and 
has become one of the state's main ideological supports. Structur- 
ally, the church organization has been changed to parallel the ad- 
ministrative division of the state into regions, subregions, zones, 
and collectivities. The Kimbanguist Church deliberately rotates its 
officials outside their areas of origin in order to depoliticize eth- 
nicity and centralize power, a policy taken directly from the state. 
An insistence on absolute obedience to the leader and a ban on 
doctrinal disputes also are shared by both institutions. In many 
ways, the Kimbanguist Church and the Roman Catholic Church 
have exchanged places in their relationship with the state; the former 
outlaw has become a close ally and the former ally an outspoken 
critic. 

Other African Christian Movements 

Africanized variants of traditional Christianity can be found 
throughout the continent. In spite of state prohibitions, new 
churches outside the three officially recognized in Zaire have sprung 
up and, so long as they remain small and nonthreatening, have 
usually been left alone by authorities. Some have been founded 
by figures known as prophets, individuals who respond to situa- 
tions of popular dissatisfaction with existing spiritual agents and 
organizations by creating new religious movements. New move- 
ments often recombine familiar elements with new ones, a synthe- 
sis effected sometimes with exclusively indigenous elements and 
sometimes with a mixture of Christian and indigenous elements. 

Jamaa 

The Jamaa movement (jamaa means family in Kiswahili), like 
other Christian sects in Africa, has taken root under the umbrella 
of an existing church, in this case the Roman Catholic one. Jamaa 
is actually a European- African hybrid in that it was initially founded 
by a Flemish Franciscan priest, Placide Tempels, in 1953. Tem- 
pels helped to form small groups of African Catholics who met regu- 
larly with one another and with Tempels and his associates. 
Drawing from both African roots and Franciscan tradition, the 
movement emphasizes the importance of an emotional encounter 
with God and fellow believers and strives to draw out in group 



119 



Zaire: A Country Study 

meetings the "vital force" Tempels believed to be characteristic 
of Bantu belief and practice. 

Although accepted by the Roman Catholic Church (members 
continue to participate in parish activities and do not withdraw from 
the institutional church), the church hierarchy has periodically ques- 
tioned the degree to which Jamaa deviates from Catholic belief and 
practice. The church has never denounced the Jamaa movement, 
but the hierarchy has grown steadily more wary of it. 

Kitawala 

A much more radical product of the synthesis of African and 
Christian elements is the Kitawala movement, which appeared in 
Katanga Province (now Shaba Region) during the 1920s. Born of 
the black American missionary activity in South Africa of the Watch 
Tower Bible and Tract Society (Jehovah's Witnesses), the move- 
ment converted miners who then spread the movement northward 
from their South African base into the Katangan copper belt. 

Watch Tower missionaries preached racial equality, equal pay 
for equal work, the imminent arrival of God's kingdom, and the 
impending struggle for the restitution of Africa to Africans. 
Although anticolonial in ideology, the movement had no concrete 
strategy of revolution, which, however, did not prevent the state 
from cracking down on it. As with Kimbanguism, the state attempt- 
ed to repress Kitawala by relegating its members to isolated rural 
regions. Ironically, this strategy once again simply served to speed 
the spread of the movement as exiled adherents converted their 
rural neighbors. 

Over time the movement became more Africanized and more 
radical, slowly transforming itself from a branch of the worldwide 
Watch Tower Church into what has been termed a form of peasant 
political consciousness. Theological messages varied from place to 
place, but a common core of beliefs included the struggle against 
sorcery, the purification of society, and the existence of a black 
God. Kitawala denounced all forms of authority as the work of Sa- 
tan, including taxes, forced labor, and most other coercive elements 
of colonial rule. The movement's anticolonial message was so strong 
that the worldwide Watch Tower movement formally renounced it. 

Colonial bannings failed to eradicate the movement, however. 
And the independent state that succeeded colonial authority, black 
African though it be, has been no more successful in converting 
the Kitawalists from their apolitical, antiauthoritarian stance. 
Kitawalists continue to resist saluting the flag, participating in party- 
mandated public works (Salongo), and paying taxes. At times they 
have resisted state pressure violently, as in Shaba in 1979 when 



120 



The Society and Its Environment 



the appearance of army units in their midst provoked an attack 
by Kitawalists on the state's administrative offices and the killing 
of two soldiers. The state retaliated with a vicious repression. More 
frequently, Kitawalists withdraw when state pressure becomes ex- 
cessive. Entire communities have moved into deep forest in areas 
such as Equateur Region in order to escape any contact with civil 
authorities. 

Traditional African Religions 

The wide variety of African indigenous beliefs and practices 
makes generalizations difficult, but some commonalities may 
nonetheless be noted. In general, Zairians believe themselves to 
be subject to a number of unseen agents and forces. Most indige- 
nous communities recognize a higher being, and many attribute 
to him the role of creator; otherwise, he has few specific charac- 
teristics beyond that of ultimate cause. 

Far more significant are ancestors, who are believed to continue 
to play a part in community life long after their death. In general, 
the living are required to speak respectfully of ancestors and to ob- 
serve certain rites of respect so that the dead will look favorably 
on their descendants' activities. Africans do not engage in ances- 
tor " worship"; rather, the living address and relate to their de- 
ceased elders in much the same way that they relate to their living 
ones. Often the terms of address and the gifts given to placate a 
dead elder are identical to those accorded a living one. 

Nature spirits live in particular places, such as rivers, rocks, trees, 
or pools, or in natural forces such as wind and lightning. A typical 
practice involving a nature spirit in much of northern Zaire is the 
commonplace tossing of a red item (palm nut, cloth, matches, etc.) 
in a river before crossing it, particularly in places where the water 
is rough or turbulent. Thus placated, the spirit will refrain from 
stirring up the waters or overturning the boat. 

Nature spirits play a minor role in negotiating everyday life com- 
pared with that played by witches and sorcerers. Witches are in- 
dividuals who possess an internal organ giving them extraordinary 
power, generally malevolent power. The organ and its powers are 
hereditary. Witches can bring death and illness to crops, animals, 
and people, and their actions can be voluntary or involuntary. A 
witch might dream an angry dream about a friend or relative, for 
example, and awake to find that person struck ill or dead by the 
agency of that dream. Sorcerers are the possessors of nonhered- 
itary powers that can be bought or acquired. A sorcerer might be 
consulted and paid to provide a medicine or object that strengthens 



121 



Zaire: A Country Study 

the client in the hunt (or, in contemporary life, in taking an exam) 
or that brings misfortune on an enemy. 

In the event of illness, or of crop failure, or of misfortune in some 
other sphere of life, the stricken party may consult a diviner in order 
to identify the agent responsible for his or her affliction. The diviner 
is a specialist skilled in identifying the social tensions present in 
the community of the afflicted, and, for a fee, will identify the agent 
responsible for the individual's misfortune. By obtaining details 
of the afflicted person's life and social situation, the diviner will 
diagnose the misfortune by citing the agency of angry ancestors, 
nature spirits, sorcerers, or witches. Different ethnic groups add 
or subtract from the set of agents of affliction, but these are the 
most common. Once a diagnosis has been made, the diviner will 
then prescribe the appropriate cure. Diviners' powers are benefi- 
cent and their role highly valued. 

From an outsider's perspective, the most striking aspect of in- 
digenous belief and practice is its determinism; accidents are vir- 
tually unheard of, and there is always a cause behind any 
misfortune. In many indigenous societies, for example, a death is 
always followed by an inquest at which the cause of death and the 
identity of the killer are determined. Measures are then taken 
against the alleged miscreant, even when someone dies of disease 
in bed at an advanced age. 

Education 

Statistically, education would appear to be one of the healthiest 
institutions in contemporary Zaire. Though precise numbers vary 
among sources, the overall growth trend has been unmistakable. 
The number of illiterates over fifteen years of age, both absolute 
and as a percentage of population, has continued to decrease, from 
68.7 percent in 1962 to 38.8 percent in 1985. By 1992 the rate of 
illiteracy was estimated at just 28 percent (16 percent for males 
over age fifteen and 39 percent for females). Numbers of schools, 
teachers, and pupils have grown (see table 8, Appendix). According 
to UN estimates, however, enrollment ratios (the percentage of the 
school- age population enrolled in school) remain relatively low — 79 
percent for primary school in 1990 (89 percent for males and 67 
percent for females), up from 70 percent in 1965; and 23 percent 
for secondary school (16 percent for females). Moreover, only 56 
percent of primary school-aged children reach the fourth grade. 

In higher education, the nation boasts three universities, a net- 
work of teacher training, technical, and agricultural institutes; and 
several university- affiliated research institutes — this in a country 
that began its independent existence in 1960 with a total of thirty 



122 



The Society and Its Environment 



Congolese university graduates among its population of more than 
16 million. 

Quantitative growth, unfortunately, has served to mask a per- 
vasive and accelerating decline in quality at all levels. The causes 
of this decline may be found in shifting and inconsistent state poli- 
cies, in church-state conflicts, in problems within the schools, and 
in the economic impoverishment suffered by the country as a whole. 

Despite the deficiencies of the education system, most Zairians 
share a faith in the value of education and a belief that their chil- 
dren might have, through schooling, a better future. This hope 
has been cited as one of the major factors behind the citizenry's 
disinclination to political activism in the face of a pervasive and 
continuing decline in living standards. Some analysts, however, 
have noted a progressive narrowing of access to the education sys- 
tem. For example, Schatzberg has argued that the perceived open- 
ness of the system to all children is a myth. Access to education 
has increasingly been denied to those who are not part of the state 
bureaucracy and its class. 

Policy Changes 

The state's initial goal was to rectify the severe imbalance be- 
tween primary schooling, where the colonial state had excelled, and 
secondary and university schooling, where it had done almost noth- 
ing. At independence the nation had one of the highest literacy 
rates on the continent and fully 70 percent of the primary school- 
age population enrolled in school. (However, over 70 percent of 
these schools offered only two grades, and dropout rates were among 
the highest in colonial Africa.) At the secondary level, however, 
the enrollment total of 28,951 students was a mere 2 percent of 
the primary school enrollment. The colonial bias toward creation 
of a minimally educated populace was clear. 

The new government responded by rapidly expanding educa- 
tion at all levels, with special emphasis on increasing the number 
of postprimary institutions. Whereas the state established some 
primary and secondary schools under its own direction, it gener- 
ally preferred to continue the existing pattern of subsidizing Catholic 
missions to carry out state educational goals. (Protestant and Kim- 
ban guist schools were also subsidized; the former had received few 
funds under the colonial state, and the latter had received none.) 
The general pattern was for the state to set curriculum, to pay staff 
salaries, and to provide some educational materials. Recruitment 
of teachers and staff and management of the schools themselves 
were left to the churches. 



123 



Zaire: A Country Study 

Primary schools taught grades one through six, and secondary 
schools were responsible for grades seven though twelve. Second- 
ary schools were subdivided into the cycle d' orientation (junior high) 
and cycle long (senior high). Diplomas were awarded not for simply 
finishing classes with passing grades, but for passing a rigorous 
nationwide examination administered by the state, the examen d'etat. 

By the mid-1980s, higher education had expanded into more than 
twenty postsecondary institutions providing university-level edu- 
cation. The four campuses of the National University of Zaire 
(Universite Nationale du Zaire — UNAZA) led the six that grant 
university degrees. UNAZA consists of the University of Kinsha- 
sa (Universite de Kinshasa; originally Lovanium University, the 
Catholic university, founded in 1954), the University of Kisanga- 
ni (Universite de Kisangani; originally the Free University of the 
Congo, or Universite Libre du Congo — ULC, the Protestant 
university, founded in 1963), the University of Lubumbashi 
(Universite de Lubumbashi, formerly the state-run Universite 
Offlcielle du Congo — UOC, founded in 1964), and the Universi- 
ty of Kananga (Universite de Kananga, created in 1985). The two 
teacher-training centers, the National Teaching Institute-Kinshasa 
(Institut Pedagogique National-Kinshasa) and the National Teach- 
ing Institute-Bukavu (Institut Pedagogique National — Bukavu) also 
award university-level degrees. These institutions offer undergradu- 
ate programs lasting four to five years leading to a license (the rough 
equivalent of a B.A. or B.S. degree). The other institutions offer 
a three-year course of study leading to a graduat diploma (the rough 
equivalent of an A. A. degree). 

With Mobutu's accession to power, the drive to nationalize and 
centralize Zairian institutions, including the education system, even- 
tually eclipsed all other educational policy issues. Universities, all 
privately run, were the first target. Students there had repeatedly 
displayed their independence, resisting Mobutu's attempt at es- 
tablishing on-campus chapters of his party's youth organization, 
the JMPR, as well as striking and demonstrating against particu- 
lar state policies. Student opposition was neutralized for a long time 
by the army's shooting of a large number of demonstrators in 1969, 
by closing the universities, and by drafting the entire student body 
into the army for one year. 

The autonomy of the universities themselves was formally end- 
ed in August 1971 by their nationalization and reorganization as 
three separate campuses under one body, UNAZA. Administra- 
tion was centralized in Kinshasa. The takeover of the universities 
and implantation of JMPR chapters on each campus have not 



124 



The Society and Its Environment 



succeeded in permanently stilling dissent. Periodic closings of cam- 
puses are decreed by the state when student activism appears 
threatening. When such measures fail to work, force is used. In 
May 1990, troops of the Special Presidential Division (Division 
Speciale Presidentielle — DSP) flew by night from Kinshasa to Lu- 
bumbashi, where they surrounded student dormitories and beat, 
robbed, and killed up to 100 unarmed students before returning 
under cover of darkness to the capital (see Subsequent Political De- 
velopments, 1990-93; Opposition since 1990, ch. 4). 

Primary and secondary schools (mosdy church-owned and church- 
operated) were nationalized in their turn in 1974. While officially 
intended to implement the state ideology of authenticity, the ac- 
tion was also motivated by the desire to wrest control of the schools 
from the powerful Roman Catholic Church (see Religion, this ch.). 
Several years later, the government, faced with other more press- 
ing crises, reversed course and formally asked the churches to re- 
sume their former role in school administration. The churches 
accepted. Staffs and faculties were quickly rebuilt, but the damage 
done to many schools' physical facilities while under state manage- 
ment, including the stripping of desks, chairs, books, doors, and 
windows, was so extensive that some schools were permanently 
abandoned. 

Institutional Problems 

The quality and status of teachers have long been problems. A 
1976 World Bank (see Glossary) report notes that students who 
complete teacher training prefer to use the credential to seek posi- 
tions outside their profession. Teachers' salaries are insufficient 
to live on and are paid irregularly. Popular music reflects the declin- 
ing esteem in which teachers are held, referring to them as "two 
shirts," two shirts being all the clothes a teacher can afford. 

Schools are often seriously understaffed. One government re- 
sponse has been to require university students to teach as recom- 
pense for the cost of their state- subsidized schooling. Unfortunately, 
large numbers of these teachers-by-decree regularly fail to report 
to their assigned institutions. 

When teachers have organized to protest their salaries and work- 
ing conditions, they have met with repression. Demoralized and 
underpaid, many teachers resorted to corruption to make ends meet, 
accepting and sometimes demanding gifts from their students as 
the price of advancement from one year to the next. A 1988 poll 
published in the periodical Zaire- Afrique showed that fully 80 per- 
cent of the teachers polled approved of students giving gifts to 
teachers. There was no significant difference in responses between 



125 



Zaire: A Country Study 

educators teaching in religious schools and educators teaching in 
secular ones. Such systemic corruption has systemic causes; in ef- 
fect, the state's unwillingness and inability to pay teachers a living 
wage has forced educators to seek income elsewhere in order to 
survive, whether by moonlighting or through less honorable means. 

Students face considerable difficulties within the system. Edu- 
cation is not free, and school fees represent a significant percen- 
tage of household budgets; often schooling is cut short for lack of 
funds. Boys are routinely given priority over girls in household al- 
locations of school fees. Students in rural areas can be required 
to provide free labor for their schools and teachers, repairing class- 
rooms and teachers' homes, or working for a period each day in 
a teacher's garden. Gifts are frequently required for academic ad- 
vancement. Female students often face sexual demands from 
teachers and staff at the postprimary levels. And successful stu- 
dents, namely those who succeed in passing the state exams at the 
end of secondary school studies, face the hurdle of a regional " af- 
firmative action admissions policy" for university entry, one that 
favors applicants from historically underrepresented areas at the 
expense of those from historically better-schooled regions. Jn fact, 
the regional quota system also has created tension and dissatisfac- 
tion within regions. Disadvantaged groups regard the quotas as 
giving those who are ahead in education an unfair proportion of 
the region's slots at the university. 

In the early 1990s, the state-run education system, like all state- 
funded social services, had deteriorated further. Most state-run 
schools are reported to have been closed. Nevertheless, at least some 
children (whose parents could find the means) continue to seek and 
find education through private schools at all levels (including several 
private universities reported to exist or be in the making in 1992) 
that have sprung up to fill the gap — another manifestation of Zaire's 
informal economic and social systems. The elite continue to send 
their children abroad to be educated, primarily in Western Europe. 

Health and Medical Services 

Zairian health statistics are similar to those of other countries 
in Central Africa. Life expectancy at birth in 1992 was estimated 
at fifty-two years for males and fifty-six years for females. While 
unimpressive by United States standards, the statistics on life ex- 
pectancy have improved markedly, a real achievement given the 
challenges to public health the country faces. 

Incidence of Disease 

Infectious and parasitic diseases are a major health threat, 



126 




Operating room at a Gecamines hospital in Lubumbashi 

Courtesy Gecamines 

accounting for at least 50 percent of all deaths in Zaire. (The United 
States rate, by comparison, is 1.5 percent.) Malaria, trypanosomi- 
asis (sleeping sickness), onchocerciasis (river blindness), and 
schistosomiasis are all endemic. Malaria, long a significant cause 
of illness and death, is increasingly menacing because of its grow- 
ing resistance to antimalarial drugs. Cases of trypanosomiasis are 
increasing, primarily because of a reduction in the number of mo- 
bile teams engaged in controlling the spread of the vector, the tsetse 
fly. Diseases such as measles, diarrheal diseases, tetanus, diphtheria, 
pertussis, poliomyelitis, tuberculosis, and leprosy are preventable 
or curable given available technology; unfortunately, only 30 to 
40 percent of the population has access to such technology and ser- 
vices. The UN has estimated the immunization rate in the early 
1990s to be only 38 percent for measles and 35 percent for diphthe- 
ria, pertussis, and tetanus. In addition, a majority of the popula- 
tion is infected with intestinal worms, including ascaris, hookworms, 
and ankylostomes; the effect of these parasites is to further weaken 
a population already suffering from widespread malnutrition. 

The disease burden has fallen particularly heavily on children 
under the age of five. They constitute roughly 20 percent of the 
population and account for 80 percent of all deaths. Malaria is the 
primary killer among infants, while measles, malaria, and diarrheal 



127 



Zaire: A Country Study 

diseases are responsible for the bulk of deaths of children under five. 

Acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) and other sex- 
ually transmitted diseases have been spreading rapidly. As of 1990, 
the number of reported cases in Zaire totaled 1 1 ,732, a 60 percent 
increase over 1989. In urban areas, the AIDS epidemic is the most 
threatening public-health problem facing the nation. Seropositivi- 
ty statistics (the proportion of a population whose blood serum tests 
positive for the AIDS virus) in Kinshasa for the general popula- 
tion in 1987 were 6 to 8 percent; among prostitutes the figure was 
as high as 30 percent. The scanty data from rural areas show a 
lower incidence, but the samples are too small to be statistically 
significant. 

AIDS is regarded as a potentially even greater public-health haz- 
ard in the face of the virtual collapse of the state-run health care 
system. By most accounts, in 1993 the majority of blood banks had 
been closed, and blood screenings were rare. 

AIDS transmission in Zaire occurs primarily through sexual, 
mostly heterosexual, intercourse (80 percent); infected blood trans- 
fusions and contaminated skin-piercing instruments account for 
15 percent of cases, and transmission from infected mothers to their 
offspring for 5 percent. The significance of heterosexual intercourse 
in the spread of the disease is documented in the ratio of afflicted 
men to afflicted women; in Zaire it is 1:1.4, while in the United 
States it is 13:1. 

Initial public reaction to the early warnings sounded by the med- 
ical authorities tended to be skeptical. In a play on the French acro- 
nym for AIDS, SID A {syndrome immunite deficient acquis), Kinshasa 
street slang labeled the new disease the "syndrome invente pour 
decourager les amoureux," or, crudely translated, "syndrome invent- 
ed to discourage lovers. " But as increasing numbers of well-known 
musicians and other public figures have contracted the disease and 
died, public attitudes have grown more sober. Public health authori- 
ties have attempted to promote safe-sex education in their health 
education programs. In addition, the United States Agency for In- 
ternational Development (AID) funded AIDS research programs 
and health education programs through Project SIDA, and the 
government used a US$500,000 grant from the World Health Or- 
ganization, together with money from other international agen- 
cies, to establish a national AIDS control program. Thus far, 
however, success in slowing the spread of the epidemic remains 
elusive, and rates of prophylactic use remain low. 

Health Care System 

In a regional context, the health care system established to meet 



128 



The Society and Its Environment 



these challenges appears impressive, at least on paper, although 
the UN estimates that only 50 percent of the population had ac- 
cess to health care in the early 1990s (see table 9, Appendix). The 
ratio of physicians to population in the early 1990s was claimed 
to be approximately one per 14,000, markedly higher than in neigh- 
boring countries such as Rwanda (one to 35,000) or Burundi (one 
to 45,000), for example. The ratio of nurses to population was es- 
timated as approximately one to 1,900, spectacularly higher than 
the sub-Saharan African average of one to 45,000. Average popu- 
lation per hospital bed was approximately 700, a better rate than 
neighboring Burundi's 850, for example. 

In theory, the nation is divided into health zones, each covering 
a population of 100,000 to 150,000 and containing on average one 
referral hospital, between one and three reference health centers, 
and fifteen to twenty-five standard health centers. Each standard 
health center is staffed with at least one certified nurse and pro- 
vides basic preventive and simple curative services to the five to 
ten villages in its area. Serious medical cases are referred upward 
to the health zone's reference health centers and referral hospital. 

The health care system is considerably less impressive in prac- 
tice, however. The relatively high physician- and paramedic-to- 
population ratio masks the fact that the quality of medical education 
has seriously deteriorated. Moreover, salaries of medical person- 
nel are too low to permit staff the luxury of full-time attention to 
their professional duties. Virtually all people employed in the public 
sector must seek outside income in order to survive. It is not un- 
common for state hospital nurses, for example, to demand private 
payment from a hospitalized patient or the patient's family before 
changing a dressing, or before administering a medication pre- 
scribed by the patient's physician. In fact, according to Janet Mac- 
Gaffey, doctors, nurses, and other medical personnel routinely 
require payment of a personal fee before they will care for a pa- 
tient. Even emergency cases are not admitted to a hospital until 
payment has been made. 

The large number of health centers and health zones cited in 
statistics is similarly misleading. Many government health centers 
are dysfunctional, completely lacking in medications or in basic 
medical equipment and personnel. In the early 1990s, the public 
health system had deteriorated further as a result of civil and politi- 
cal unrest and severe economic disruptions. Indeed, the govern- 
ment's health services have in essence collapsed. What health care 
Zairians find comes more often from private sources. The elite con- 
tinue to seek quality health care abroad. 



129 



Zaire: A Country Study 

Religious organizations, notably the Roman Catholic, Protes- 
tant, and Kimbanguist churches, and international relief organi- 
zations provide the bulk of health care in Zaire, particularly in rural 
areas, as happened in the preindependence era as well. The Catholic 
medical service network is the largest and involves primary responsi- 
bility for some ninety health zones. The Protestant network partici- 
pates in the development of fifty health zones; as the implementing 
agent of an AID-supported rural health project, it plans to develop 
fifty more health zones over a seven-year period. Kimbanguist med- 
ical work centers on the rehabilitation of two urban hospitals and 
on management of 1 80 health centers scattered all over the coun- 
try. Private enterprises also manage large health care facilities where 
they provide high-quality care. The large parastatal General Quar- 
ries and Mines (Generate des Carrieres et des Mines — Gecamines), 
for example, owns seven hospitals and six clinics with about 2,264 
beds. 

Sanitation and Nutrition 

According to UN estimates, only 14 percent of the population 
has access to safe water (52 percent urban and 20 percent rural). 
Potable water is provided to approximately half the population in 
urban areas through private connections or through public stand- 
pipes. The remaining 50 percent get their water from wells and 
surface water of varying quality. Roughly 30 percent of the urban 
population has access to a sewerage system, 10 percent use septic 
tanks, and 60 percent use latrines. There is no garbage collection 
system. In rural areas, water quality varies widely. Only about 10 
percent of the rural population has access to communal standpipes. 
About 20 percent of the population uses pit latrines. 

Malnutrition is widespread in Zaire. Measures of children's stan- 
dard weight-for-age show at least 25 percent of the country's chil- 
dren to be undernourished. Protein-calorie malnutrition and anemia 
are widespread. Iodine-deficiency disorders resulting in the growth 
of goiters and in cretinism are commonly seen in Equateur and 
in Haut-Zaire. 

The major cause of malnutrition is poverty. Gross domestic 
product (GDP — see Glossary) per capita has been decreasing in 
the 1980s and early 1990s, and Zaire's per capita GDP places Zaire 
among the poorest and least-developed countries in the world. Local 
markets are reported to have abundant supplies of food, but most 
of the population cannot afford to buy it. For example, average 
earnings in the capital of Kinshasa are not enough to buy the mini- 
mum basket of essential foods. Deficiencies in food production and 
diet are additional causes of malnutrition. Food and Agriculture 



130 



The Society and Its Environment 



Organization of the United Nations (FAO) statistics show nation- 
al average calorie production per inhabitant as less than the mini- 
mum daily consumption requirements. The balance is made up 
by importing food. Dependency on cassava as a staple further de- 
grades the diet. Cassava contains few nutrients, and the cyanide 
it contains is not always properly leached out in the process of food 
preparation. 

Family Planning 

Family planning began late and was accepted slowly in Zaire. 
In 1972 the Mobutu regime officially expressed interest in limit- 
ing births to "desirable" ones and thus promoted family planning 
for reasons of health and as a human right. In 1973 a presidential 
decree created an official clearinghouse committee for family- 
planning information. It was not until 1978, however, that the state 
established a nongovernment organization dedicated to family plan- 
ning, namely, the Zairian Association for Family Well-Being (As- 
sociation Zairoise pour le Bien-Etre Familial — AZBEF). It was 
formed in order to acquire technical and financial aid from the In- 
ternational Planned Parenthood Federation. Evaluation teams sent 
in 1981 were unable to evaluate the impact of the early programs 
because of the lack of data and the small numbers of acceptors. 

Not until the launching of an AID-funded program in 1982 — the 
Project for Planned Birth Services (Projet des Services des Nais- 
sances Desirables — PSND) — did family-planning efforts begin in 
earnest. Problems in coordinating PSND efforts with AZBEF led 
to the establishment of three systems working in parallel, PSND, 
AZBEF, and Rural Health (Sante Rurale — Sanru), a rural family 
health care project with a family-planning component. 

PSND statistics have been the most complete. PSND selected 
fourteen urban areas with a target population of about 800,000 
women and aimed to increase contraceptive use from 1 percent 
to 12 percent by 1986. Early returns were disappointing, with only 
1.6 percent usage reported by a mid-term evaluation mission in 
1985. Later trends were more encouraging, including a 1984-87 
quadrupling of family- planning acceptors (see table 10, Appendix). 

In rural areas, AZBEF family-planning units and Sanru have 
been active, although the numbers of personnel are insufficient to 
reach the bulk of the population. To supplement their efforts, AID 
has funded efforts to make contraceptives available through 
community-based distribution projects. A Tulane University pro- 
gram distributed birth-control pills, condoms, and contraceptive 
foams in Bas-Zaire in a pilot project; the effort demonstrated that 
such distribution is less effective than making supplies available 



131 



Zaire: A Country Study 

in health facilities. Companies such as Gecamines that operate 
health care facilities receive aid from PSND to promote family plan- 
ning among company workers and their families. Most significant 
are commercial marketing projects. Forty pharmacies in three zones 
of Kinshasa spread information on contraceptive methods and 
products and sell attractively packaged and well-priced contracep- 
tives, which are quite popular. Recent efforts in social marketing 
organized by Family Health International have had promising 
results in their test areas, although the collapse of the economy in 
the early 1990s has compromised any precise evaluation of their 
overall effectiveness. 

Barriers to acceptance of family planning remain, however. As 
long as child mortality remains high, both men and women will 
continue to value large families. Demand for family-planning ser- 
vices remains low. In fact, the availability of such services has been 
almost unknown by the community, even in the immediate neigh- 
borhood of family-planning units. Although occasional radio, tel- 
evision, and press programs have been generated, and T-shirts, 
posters, and brochures bearing family-planning messages have been 
distributed, follow-up has been lacking and evaluation of family- 
planning informational campaigns has not been done. Given the 
relative lack of success in promoting family planning and birth con- 
trol, Zaire faces a continued high rate of population growth, which 
will exacerbate deteriorating social and economic conditions. 

* * * 

Periodicals provide the best source of current social and cultur- 
al information on Zaire, although many of the best are either in 
French or unavailable in many libraries. Still, the curious reader 
can find many good and widely available books on Zaire in En- 
glish. Crawford Young and Thomas Turner's The Rise and Decline 
oftheZairian State provides a good overview of the country's institu- 
tional history and development since independence. The extraor- 
dinary scope of state corruption is painstakingly documented as 
it pertains to Equateur Region by Michael G. Schatzberg in Poli- 
tics and Class in Zaire and in The Dialectics of Oppression in Zaire; David 
J. Gould's Bureaucratic Corruption and Underdevelopment in the Third 
World: The Case of Zaire does the same on a national scale. 

Zairians' strategies of adaptation to their ongoing impoverish- 
ment have been well documented in several more recent works. 
Edited anthologies such as Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja's The Crisis 
in Zaire: Myths and Realities and Janet MacGaffey's The Real Economy 
of Zaire both contain accounts of the dynamic informal economy 



132 



The Society and Its Environment 



and the varying survival strategies used by different ethnic groups, 
classes, regions, and genders. The literature on women's roles in 
adaptation is particularly well developed in books such as Jane L. 
Parpart and Kathleen A. Staudt's Women and the State in Africa. Ar- 
ticles by Catharine Newbury and Brooke G. Schoepf in this volume 
as well as in the volume edited by Janet MacGaffey provide in- 
sights into the ways African women have confronted state oppres- 
sion by forming local alliances and by creatively exploiting the 
potential of the informal economy. 

Students of Zairian ethnography interested in an overview would 
do well to start with Jan Vansina's recent Paths in the Rainforests; 
its bibliography contains references to more specialized studies and 
ethnic groups that the reader could subsequently consult. People 
interested in Zairian religions would profit from reading any of 
Wyatt MacGaffey 's several books on the Kongo people, the most 
recent of which are Religion and Society in Central Africa and Astonish- 
ment and Power. 

Finally, for those interested in health care, the complexities of 
its provision are detailed in The Social Basis of Health and Healing 
in Africa, edited by Steven Feierman and John M. Janzen. The 
volume includes discussions of indigenous concepts of disease and 
modes of diagnosis and therapy, elements not always considered 
in public health delivery planning. (For further information and 
complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



133 



Chapter 3. The Economy 



Traditional wooden mask 



Independent zaire has never lived up to its enormous 

economic potential. The political turmoil that followed indepen- 
dence from Belgium in 1960 irrevocably disrupted the economy. 
Even after political and civil order was restored by Mobutu Sese 
Seko in the mid-1960s, efforts at economic revival consistently fell 
short. Indeed, the government's misguided and overambitious 
economic policies, first of Zairianization and nationalization of 
foreign-owned enterprises and then of large-scale industrialization, 
undertaken on the basis of the country's mineral wealth and at the 
expense of the agricultural sector, brought economic disaster in 
their wake. The regime resorted to heavy foreign borrowing to fund 
economic development and grandiose industrial projects. When 
the prices of commodities (especially copper), on which Zaire was 
heavily dependent, dropped drastically in the mid-1970s, export 
earnings and government revenues dropped sharply, and Zaire 
faced a grave economic and financial crisis. Thereafter, the coun- 
try, urged on by Western donors and by the World Bank (see Glos- 
sary) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF — see Glossary), 
attempted a series of economic reforms and structural adjustments. 
But ultimately all efforts at reform or significant change were un- 
dercut by the patrimonialism (see Glossary) and rampant corrup- 
tion that characterized the regime. 

In the early 1990s, as the regime of President Mobutu appeared 
on the verge of collapse, the economic situation was desperate. The 
country remained heavily indebted and impoverished, despite its 
vast mineral wealth and early economic promise . A large propor- 
tion of its population lived outside of the formal economy, eking 
out a marginal existence through subsistence agriculture and in- 
formal trade or barter. The standard of living for most of the popu- 
lation was low and continued to decline as inflation skyrocketed. 

By most accounts, the export-oriented Zairian economy has been 
in a free-fall for a number of years, suffering the effects of monu- 
mental, institutional corruption, neglect, and mismanagement. But 
the economic crisis was worsened by the rampant looting and riot- 
ing by unpaid troops in late 1991 and again in early 1993, which 
in turn led to the mass exodus of the foreign technicians who had 
kept the economy going — in particular copper production and the 
maintenance of economic infrastructure. 

By the end of 1992 and throughout 1993, Zaire's economy was 
described as being in ruins, the formal economy having virtually 



137 



Zaire: A Country Study 

ceased to function. The banking system had in essence collapsed 
because of the rampant hyperinflation and drastic fall in the value 
of the currency. Most banks were closed; those that were open had 
no reserves, so only cash transactions were possible. Shoppers 
reportedly circulated in Kinshasa with sackfuls of virtually useless 
paper currency. The central bank, which had in the past served 
as Mobutu's personal piggy bank, was for all practical purposes 
bankrupt. The tax collection system was defunct, and few if any 
customs revenues were collected. Most foreign aid had been cut 
off, and copper production, long the mainstay of the economy and 
the main source of government revenues, had dropped off signifi- 
cantly. The government was able to pay its bills only by printing 
new currency. But even that avenue was being closed off as foreign 
printing companies rebelled at printing money without being paid. 

The effects of the economic chaos on Zairian society were enor- 
mous. Unemployment and poverty were widespread. According 
to press reports, the public- service sector was no longer operational. 
The economic infrastructure had virtually broken down as well. 
The telephone, electric power, and transportation systems were all 
a shambles. By some estimates, as little as 10 percent of the road 
network in existence at independence was still functioning. Road 
and rail links between major cities were being overgrown by the 
jungle. 

Background and Overview of the Economy 

Early Economic Activity 

In the precolonial era, economic activity in most communities in 
Zaire was largely subsistence in nature, characterized by a varying 
combination of shifting cultivation, hunting, fishing, and collecting. 
The agricultural technology of most groups was comparatively sim- 
ple. Livestock was limited to chickens and sometimes a few goats 
or sheep. In most communities — particularly those in and on the 
fringes of the forest — the men valued hunting far above agricul- 
ture and devoted not only time but much ritual activity to it. This 
pattern was consistent with the division of labor: at best men played 
a small part in cultivation, usually that of cutting and burning forest 
or bush before planting. The high esteem of hunting persisted even 
where the declining availability of game made it economically less 
important. 

Along the Congo River and its many tributaries, thriving river- 
ine economies developed. The men of some groups devoted them- 
selves wholly to fishing and the women to pottery, exchanging these 
items for food and other goods produced by their neighbors. These 



138 



The Economy 



fishermen were also active traders along the navigable waters. 

Other groups devoted themselves entirely to hunting and col- 
lecting. Occasionally these groups lived in villages with settled 
agricultural communities. More often they lived in physically sepa- 
rated hamlets but in symbiosis with specific cultivating communi- 
ties, exchanging the products of the hunt for bananas and other 
crops. 

Various groups in precolonial Zaire also played a substantial role 
in the trade of such commodities as ivory, rubber, copper, and 
slaves. To meet the demand for such goods, sustained caravan trade 
involving Arab and mixed Arab- African traders occurred through- 
out the interior of Central Africa, including territory in what is 
now Zaire. Although never great traders themselves, the Lunda 
apparently profited handsomely from controlling and supervising 
the caravan trade of others. And both the Kazembe Kingdom and 
later the Luba Empire prospered as a result of their control of the 
ivory trade (see Early Historical Perspectives, ch. 1). 

From Colonial Times to Independence 

After the 1884-85 Conference of Berlin gave undisputed 
sovereignty of the region of modern Zaire to Leopold II, king of 
Belgium, the first order of business was to structure the area's econ- 
omy to suit Belgian needs. The goal was to make an economically 
viable and self-sustaining entity out of the Congo Free State, as 
Zaire was then known (see The Colonial State, ch. 1). In 1908 the 
Belgian parliament voted to remove the region from direct control 
of the king, make it a colony, and rename it the Belgian Congo. 
The Belgian government wanted to avoid subsidizing the adminis- 
tration of the new colony while at the same time reaping whatever 
profits might eventually be generated by the country. Therefore, 
the colony itself was to be responsible for financing its administra- 
tion and security. 

Although exploitation of the country's mineral and agricultural 
wealth was substantial during the colonial period, economic de- 
velopment bore little direct relationship to the needs of the in- 
digenous population. The production of cash crops for export was 
stressed at the expense of the production of food crops. Moreover, 
monetary benefits accrued almost entirely to non-Congolese, the 
foreign shareholders of the industrial and agricultural companies 
that constituted the modern sector, and the colonial state, which 
had holdings in many of the companies. 

The colonial government's major aim was to encourage foreign 
investment in the Belgian Congo to develop agricultural commodi- 
ties for export, to exploit the country's mineral resources for the 



139 



Zaire: A Country Study 

same purpose, and to establish a transportation infrastructure to 
facilitate the export of goods. The colonial state concerned itself 
very little with such basic social needs as health care or education, 
which were provided by religious missions and to some extent by 
the large concessionaire companies. Policies designed to promote 
state economic objectives emphasized measures to ensure adequate 
supplies of labor at low wages. Among such measures were the use 
of forced recruitment and restrictions on the establishment of for- 
eign commercial trading activities, which would have encouraged 
the farm population to produce surpluses for sale rather than take 
low-paying work on plantations and in mines. Colonial authori- 
ties obtained through coercion the indigenous labor necessary to 
perform public works and private investment projects. A decree 
of 1917, for example, required African peasants to devote sixty days 
a year to agricultural work, and mandated penal sanctions for dis- 
obedience. 

By offering exceedingly generous terms, the Belgian government 
induced major foreign financial groups to invest in its colony. The 
colonial state itself laid claim to a significant share in the owner- 
ship of corporations in the extractive and transportation sectors. 
In 1906 the General Holding Company of Belgium (Societe Gene- 
rale de Belgique — SGB), a powerful Belgian trust, formed the 
Upper Katanga Mining Union (Union Miniere du Haut-Katanga — 
UMHK), the International Forest and Mining Company (Societe 
Internationale Forestiere et Miniere — Forminiere), and the Bas- 
Congo to Katanga Railroad Company (Compagnie du Chemin 
de Fer du Bas-Congo au Katanga — BCK). A majority shareholder 
in the UMHK and Forminere, the colonial state could potentially 
have run both companies. State capitalism did not extend to ac- 
tive involvement in company affairs, however; the colonial adminis- 
tration merely collected its dividends. 

SGB was given mineral rights to already-prospected ore deposits 
in Katanga Province (now Shaba Region) and a ninety-nine-year 
monopoly on any mineral deposits it could identify within a six- 
year period on a tract of 140 million hectares. BCK was given 
mineral rights to 2 1 million hectares in the area along the two main 
rail lines from Matadi to Leopoldville (now Kinshasa) and from 
Port Francqui (now Ilebo) to the mining centers in Katanga and 
also was permitted to run the railroad with indigenous labor provid- 
ed by the colonial state. By the 1920s, the rich mineral base was 
being exploited, and SGB had consolidated its control over the three 
companies that dominated the colony's economy. 

After World War II, government recognition of growing social 
discontent among the African population led to support for wage 



140 



The Economy 



increases and to promoting the development of an indigenous mid- 
dle class. Import-substitution (see Glossary) industries were estab- 
lished to meet the growing demand for consumer goods. The 
colonial administration encouraged corporations and missions to 
expand social services and to construct hospitals and educational 
facilities for the Congolese. These reforms, however, were largely 
unsuccessful; at independence the economy was still primarily 
export-led, that is, geared toward the export of raw materials, and 
expatriates held most of the managerial and technical positions. 

Post independence 

The political turmoil that followed independence from Belgium 
in 1960 resulted in the collapse of civil administration and severe 
economic dislocations (see The Crisis of Decolonization, ch. 1). 
The rapid departure of Belgian administrators and technicians left 
government and industry in the hands of low-level cadres. Vital 
transportation facilities and trade services were disrupted. Export 
earnings declined. After political and civil order were restored fol- 
lowing the rise to power of President Mobutu in 1965, the govern- 
ment of the Congo (as the country was then known) soon launched 
a comprehensive and ambitious attempt to achieve economic in- 
dependence through nationalization. The largest expropriation was 
that of the Belgian-owned mining company, UMHK, and its trans- 
formation into General Quarries and Mines (Generate des Car- 
rieres et des Mines — Gecamines). After much wrangling with 
Belgian industrialists and the government, Zaire and Gecamines 
agreed to a reimbursement plan, which included a percentage of 
revenues of the new company to be paid to the former owners. 

The government also promoted a series of development programs 
designed to transform a primarily agrarian economy into a regional 
industrial power. Zaire's enormous mineral wealth of copper, 
cobalt, gold, and diamonds was intended to serve as the engine 
for this transformation. The ultimate goal was ostensibly to move 
the economy to a stage of development comparable with that of 
the Western industrial powers. The new Congolese government 
thus expected to realize the early colonial aspirations for the coun- 
try to be the breadbasket and principal industrial power of Africa. 

This strategy of industrialization was to be financed through 
external lending and was based on projections of increases in min- 
eral prices, production, and sales. Justified by the doctrine of eco- 
nomic nationalism, grandiose and ill-conceived projects based on 
copper and energy development and financed on terms unfavora- 
ble to Zaire were undertaken. In 1967 the IMF concluded an agree- 
ment with the Congo for monetary and economic reform. The 



141 



Zaire: A Country Study 

currency was devalued to control inflation, and the Congolese franc 
was replaced by the zaire (for the value of the zaire — see Glossary). 
Within two years, the reform program, combined with political 
tranquility, a rise in the price of copper, and increased exports, 
had led to a stable currency and an increase in foreign-exchange 
reserves. Zaire (as the nation was called from 1971) rode high on 
the commodity price boom of the early 1970s along with other 
primary commodity-producing countries. 

In retrospect, it appears that the economic and financial poli- 
cies of this period were the result of a desire both to transform Zaire 
into an industrial power and to maintain in power, as well as enrich, 
what was to become the country's ruling political and economic 
elite. As several observers have noted, Mobutu's authoritarian 
paternalism gave rise to rampant corruption incompatible with eco- 
nomic diversification and development. Regardless of the motives 
for the economic decisions of the late 1960s and early 1970s, eco- 
nomic decline set in as grace periods expired on the enormous debt 
that the government had incurred from foreign governments, as 
well as international lending agencies, to finance its ambitious in- 
dustrial development projects and as the neglect of transport and 
agriculture began to take its toll. 

The cost of living rose rapidly, while new foreign borrowing 
raised the nation's external debt from US$763 million at the end 
of 1972 to US$3 billion by 1974. In November 1973, Mobutu an- 
nounced measures to place all businesses in the hands of Zairians. 

Zairianization 

Economic nationalism was a common theme throughout post- 
independence Africa, frequently manifesting itself in the expulsion 
of foreign merchants and/or expropriation of foreign assets. For 
Zaire, economic autonomy and political independence were seen 
as dependent on each other. Zairianization, the expropriation plan 
announced in November 1973, represented both a combination 
of the nationalistic impulse for economic independence and per- 
sonal aggrandizement for President Mobutu, who practiced a form 
of patrimonialism. Zairianization created a vast pool of goods and 
money for personal distribution to loyal family members and the 
political class composed mainly of government and army officials. 
It was the final and clearest demonstration that political power was 
the primary means of acquiring wealth. The entrepreneurial risk 
and initiative in building up business enterprises required to de- 
velop an infrastructure for economic development were thus not 
characteristic of the Zairian elite that came to dominate the coun- 
try 's economy. 



142 



Open-pit mining of copper and cobalt at the Gecamines 
Musonoi Mine near Kolwezi 
Steam shovel loading copper and cobalt ore to be processed 

at Musonoi Mine 
Courtesy Gecamines 



143 



Zaire: A Country Study 

Mobutu's announcement on November 30, 1973, before the Na- 
tional Legislative Council, the country's parliament, of his inten- 
tion to seize and redistribute the nation's foreign businesses was 
a demonstration of his total rule over the country. The wisdom, 
timeliness, or practicality of the nationalization measures were not 
discussed, much less debated. There seems to have been no prior 
consultation with anyone, including the political elite. 

Expropriated property consisted of commercial buildings, light 
industry, and agricultural holdings including a vast network of plan- 
tations, much of which was acquired by the president and held in 
partnership with Belgian interests. Administratively, expropriation 
was managed by various government ministries. Most recipients 
were ministers, members of the party's political bureau, and top 
army officers. Smaller properties were allocated to local notables. 
The term used to describe someone who benefited from the distri- 
bution of the spoils was aquereur, or acquirer. 

In practical terms, Zairianization represented a financial wind- 
fall for the country's political elite, which was to be allocated busi- 
nesses, and which brushed aside any economic risks involved in 
such a takeover. On the level of rhetoric, on the other hand, Mobutu 
spoke of Zairianization as promoting radical economic national- 
ism, and helping the lot of the country's masses. Zairianization 
was to promote rural development by creating a landed gentry to 
induce greater investment in the countryside. Thus, the ruling elite 
transformed a mythology of state autonomy and economic sov- 
ereignty into a tool for its own enrichment. 

Ultimately, Zairianization resulted in asset stripping, liquida- 
tion of inventory, and capital flight. In some instances, single en- 
terprises were allocated to more than one individual. Integrated 
agro- industrial enterprises were broken up. Many of the new owners 
had neither the expertise nor the interest to manage and to main- 
tain their newly acquired holdings. Many were unable to obtain 
credit and had no commercial experience. Their first impulse was 
frequently to dispose of liquid assets as quickly as possible and then 
to abandon the properties and enterprises to ruin. Throughout 1974 
this lack of interest and expertise led to a devastating dislocation 
of the commercial infrastructure. The adverse effects were espe- 
cially evident in small businesses where the new owners often sim- 
ply sold the goods and then left. Shortages of food and consumer 
goods became common countrywide. 

The final blow to Mobutu's development strategy was the col- 
lapse in the price of copper in 1974. The price paid for copper in 
world markets dropped from US$0.64 per kilogram to US$0.24 per 
kilogram between 1974 and 1975. Zaire's trade balance deteriorated 



144 



The Economy 



further when its bill for imported oil reached US$200 million, or 
20 percent of its foreign-exchange earnings. The continued sharp 
fall in commodity prices brought export receipts and government 
revenues down with a crash and produced a decline in the overall 
standard of living. 

After only twelve months, Zairianization was acknowledged to 
be a failure, and enterprises that had been given to Zairians were 
nationalized. The economy continued to slide, however, and in 
December 1974, under a plan called retrocession (see Glossary), 
former owners were invited to return to Zaire and reclaim a propor- 
tion of their businesses. In practice, the requirement that Zairians 
retain a sizable stake in such businesses was largely ignored for 
those expatriates who did return. 

Economic Decline 

By early 1976, Zaire was in a grave economic and financial cri- 
sis and faced international bankruptcy. Mobutu and the unproduc- 
tive political elite sought relief from the eleven members of the Paris 
Club (see Glossary), the World Bank, and the IMF as debt arrears 
mounted rapidly. However, the thorough implementation of 
changes and reforms required by the World Bank, the IMF, and 
other Western donors was perceived as a threat to the very basis 
of the elite's power — access to and free use of the nation's resources. 
If the president were to execute effectively the reforms his foreign 
partners demanded, the heart of his authority: complete personal 
discretion and the fiscal privileges and corruption that bound the 
system together, would be undermined. As a result, Mobutu and 
the political elite used their control of government institutions to 
sabotage economic change by manipulating their donors' economic 
interests against one another and by exploiting foreign anxieties 
about the instability that might result from a collapse of the regime. 

The members of the Paris Club fitfully coordinated efforts to 
persuade Zaire to service debts, control expenditures, diminish cor- 
ruption, and implement hard economic decisions. They attempt- 
ed to draw up joint plans of action, but they sometimes worked 
at cross purposes as their national interests did not always coin- 
cide. Lack of coordination among the different donors and mul- 
tilateral institutions was also a problem. Foreign contractors were 
often not entirely supportive of reform since many of them actual- 
ly benefited from the economic chaos and the opportunities for per- 
sonal enrichment. Pressure for reform from the West fluctuated 
as governments changed hands. Mobutu took skillful advantage 
of these differences and lapses in attention; the inability of Western 
governments to sustain effective coordination presented Mobutu 



145 



Zaire: A Country Study 

and those close to him with opportunities to deflect the pressure 
to reform. 

Between 1975 and 1983, Zaire experienced a relendess economic 
decline. Significant economic and financial imbalances including 
high inflation and a decline in per capita income gripped the country 
and turned Zaire into a beggar in the international marketplace. 
The nationalization measures of 1974, while short-lived, destroyed 
commercial distribution networks and undermined private- sector 
confidence. 

From 1975 to 1978, the gross domestic product (GDP — see Glos- 
sary) dropped 3.5 percent annually. Annual inflation rates aver- 
aged 75 percent. In 1980 and 1981, the price of copper recovered 
briefly but then dropped again the following year. Prior to 1975, 
Zaire had shipped almost half of its Shaba Region copper exports 
to the Angolan Atlantic seaport of Lobito via the Benguela Rail- 
way. The closure of this rail line in 1975 because of the Angolan 
civil war forced Zaire to export a large share of its mineral exports 
via the more costly and politically embarrassing South African 
route. 

The period from the early 1970s to the early 1980s was also 
marked by excessive government regulation of the economy. The 
central government imposed price controls on food, fuel, and other 
items, regulated interest rates, and overvalued the zaire. The coun- 
try sustained chronic budget deficits, and the infrastructure was 
allowed to deteriorate further into dilapidation. 

In the early 1980s, the IMF appointed Erwin Blumenthal, of 
the central bank of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Ger- 
many), to monitor and advise Zaire's central bank, the Bank of 
Zaire. Blumenthal cut off credit and foreign-exchange facilities to 
firms of key members of the political elite, which led to conflict 
with President Mobutu. Blumenthal 's efforts to impose budgetary 
control over the president and others were delayed and circum- 
vented. 

The Zairian political elite thus blocked efforts by international 
lenders to control the country's financial practices. The IMF sup- 
ported Zaire with four stabilization programs between 1976 and 
1983, and there were as many Paris Club reschedulings and five 
currency devaluations. These efforts were aimed at cutting cor- 
ruption, rationalizing expenditures, increasing tax revenues, limit- 
ing imports, boosting production in all sectors, improving the 
transportation infrastructure, eliminating debt-service arrears, mak- 
ing principal payments on schedule, and improving economic plan- 
ning and financial management. But the custom for Zaire quickly 
became to make the first drawing and then to drift away from the 



146 



The Economy 



economic reform performance criteria. The 1981 program of spe- 
cial drawing rights (SDRs — see Glossary) 912 million was blocked 
in September of that year after disbursement of only SDR 1 75 mil- 
lion because of Zaire's failure to meet performance criteria, main- 
ly budgetary deficit limits. The fate of other programs during this 
period was similar. In 1983, however, Zaire finally agreed on 
another economic reform plan. 

The 1983 Reforms 

Devaluation of the currency was the centerpiece of the 1983 re- 
form. An initial 80 percent devaluation and subsequent adjustments 
in the value of the currency reduced substantially black-market ac- 
tivity, which had mushroomed when the currency was way over- 
valued at the official rate. The central bank and commercial banks 
began to meet weekly to fix a rate for the zaire on the basis of re- 
cent transactions among themselves. The supply of foreign exchange 
at the official rate increased markedly, and traders were readily 
able to purchase foreign exchange from commercial banks for the 
import of most necessities. Nonetheless, restrictive monetary and 
fiscal policies made it difficult for many firms to muster the deposit 
in local currency that the commercial banks required to open a letter 
of credit. 

The government's 1983 attempts at economic liberalization were 
the first serious reform efforts since the economic crisis began in 
1974. The government reduced its role in the decision making of 
state-owned industries and in the economy as a whole. Most prices 
were decontrolled except for petroleum products, public utilities, 
and transportation. Deficit and government expenditure reduction 
efforts were undertaken. The trade regime was liberalized, cus- 
toms duties (a significant source of government income) revised, 
and external debt payments regularized. 

Results were positive, and exporting enterprises were more free 
from government intervention than at any time since the seizure 
of UMHK in 1967. Where government chose to maintain its owner- 
ship of a company for strategic reasons, important decisions on 
production, investment, and marketing were increasingly taken by 
the company rather than by the government itself. Interest rates 
were deregulated, and controls on producer and retail prices were 
largely dismantled, though firms remained subject to a subsequent 
review by Zairian authorities to ensure compliance with legal profit 
margin limits. 

In late 1983, after Zaire had undergone a year of fiscal discipline, 
the IMF approved a support plan of SDR1 14.5 million and an ad- 
ditional fifteen-month standby loan amount of SDR228 million, 



147 



Zaire: A Country Study 

both repayable over five years. This plan was accompanied by Paris 
Club multilateral debt rescheduling, the fifth rescheduling of Zaire's 
external debt in a period of eight years. Under the agreement, loans 
totaling US$1.2 billion for 1983-84 were rescheduled. These ac- 
tions ensured a marginally positive net transfer of resources to Zaire 
between 1983 and 1986. Although immediately after the devalua- 
tion inflation doubled, debt arrears continued to build, and GDP 
rose by only 1.3 percent, by 1984 inflation had dropped to 52 per- 
cent and GDP grew by 1.3 percent. 

The 1983 reforms began to unravel in 1986. Export earnings 
in 1986 were indeed far below expectations because of extremely 
low copper and cobalt prices. The government raised civil servant 
salaries despite stagnant budget receipts. Over half of the budget 
was paid to foreign and domestic creditors. Frustrated by the slow 
pace of recovery, the government reestablished some controls and 
discontinued some reforms. Deficit spending rose dramatically, in- 
flation accelerated, and the zaire began a rapid depreciation. Gains 
from the reform effort had been largely eroded by late 1986. 

Much of the opposition to the reform plan was voiced by mem- 
bers of the political elite and organs of the sole legal political party, 
the Popular Revolutionary Movement (Mouvement Populaire de 
la Revolution — MPR). Their complaints were voiced under the 
guise of economic nationalism in opposition to the "economic im- 
perialism" of the donors. They especially vilified the IMF. Their 
actual opposition to the 1 983 reform may have stemmed less from 
national pride than from the fact that the previously untouchable 
political elite was being made to pay taxes and duties and was be- 
ing denied the economic privileges and access to resources for per- 
sonal enrichment to which members had grown accustomed. 
Economic reform and liberalization were incompatible with patri- 
monial economics because they restrained the government from 
determining who should profit from the nation's natural wealth 
and domestic markets. 

The 1987 Plan 

In May 1987, Zaire negotiated another economic reform pro- 
gram with the IMF, the World Bank, and its bilateral partners. 
Along with the usual fiscal and monetary restrictions, Zaire agreed 
to revise its investment code to streamline the incentive framework 
and to revamp the tariff structure. Mobutu also backed away from 
a threat to reinstitute the fixed exchange rate and agreed to sharp 
increases in fuel prices and taxes. The IMF in turn allowed a 20 
percent public-sector wage increase as opposed to the 40 percent 
increase the government had originally sought. 



148 



The Economy 



This program, like past efforts, was subsequently supported by 
Paris Club rescheduling. The IMF agreed to a twelve-month stand- 
by credit of SDR116.4 million. The World Bank initiated a 
US$165-million loan in June 1987 to assist with structural adjust- 
ment and balance of payments. The loan was to support improve- 
ments in the management of public enterprises and public 
administration, agriculture, and transportation, and to provide sup- 
port for the private sector. Disbursements were to occur in two 
drawings conditional on meeting performance criteria. 

The Paris Club rescheduled US$884 million due between May 
1987 and May 1988 over fifteen years with six years' grace. Monthly 
debt payments were expected to drop from US$15 million to US$7 
million. This agreement was exceptional because the Paris Club 
usually set ten-year ceilings on repayment delays. Private lenders 
agreed to lower repayments from US$3.5 million a month to US$3 
million. A Belgian bank provided a bridge loan of SDR 100 mil- 
lion to clear Zaire's arrears to the IMF. 

Soon after the 1987 program was under way, excessive deficit 
spending prevented Zaire from meeting the program's targets, and 
further credits were withheld by both the World Bank and the IMF. 
Continued excessive government spending through 1988 led to a 
decline in foreign reserves, and the black market again became ac- 
tive. In 1988 the zaire depreciated dramatically against both the 
United States dollar and the Belgian franc. The budget deficit went 
from 3 percent of gross national product (GNP — see Glossary) in 
1986 to 12 percent in 1988. The growth in GDP from 1987 to 1989 
averaged 2.5 percent a year, well below population growth, resulting 
in a decline in per capita income. 

The 1989 Reform 

In January 1989, the government once more took steps to es- 
tablish economic stability. A structural adjustment program, in- 
cluding the commitment to contain budget deficits, narrowed the 
gap between the official and black-market exchange rate to 10 per- 
cent by April 1989. In May 1989, a letter of intent was signed with 
the IMF for a standby loan of SDR115 million, SDR90 million 
of which came from the structural adjustment facility approved in 
May 1987 but blocked after the first drawing. A net capital out- 
flow was expected in the first year. However, the program fore- 
saw a net inflow of resources from multilateral and bilateral donors 
and creditors over the life of the agreement. The World Bank 
released the second drawing of the US$165 million loan for essential 
imports, which had been approved in June 1987 but blocked pend- 
ing agreement with the IMF. Important loans for the transportation 



149 



Zaire: A Country Study 

and mining sectors were sanctioned while proposed energy sector 
and social adjustment credits were considered. This latest IMF pro- 
gram emphasized, as usual, a reduction in government budget 
deficits, the restructuring and improvement of public-sector man- 
agement, further elimination of distortions in trade policies, im- 
provement in the climate for the growth of the private sector, and 
improvement in the transportation sector. 

The significance of this IMF agreement, as with past agreements, 
was the favorable impact it was expected to have on all the lenders 
involved. In June 1989, the Paris Club met to reschedule outstand- 
ing Zairian debt. Lenders were presented with three options: a 
twenty-five-year rescheduling; cancellation of 33 percent of ser- 
vice due over the period under consideration and repayment of 
all maturities with repayment of the balance at market interest rates 
over fourteen years with six years' grace; or rescheduling of all 
maturities involved at an interest rate 3.5 percent lower than the 
prevailing level over fourteen years with eight years' grace. 

Despite the country's reform efforts, the pace of economic ac- 
tivity had not accelerated sufficiently in 1 989 to boost living stan- 
dards, which had fallen each year for more than a decade. The 
standard of living showed no noticeable improvement for the typi- 
cal Zairian. Major new investment, foreign or domestic, remained 
elusive. Nonetheless, agricultural production rose in some areas, 
although Zaire was still importing substantial quantities of food. 
In addition, some new light industrial production appeared in Kin- 
shasa, the national capital, including manufacturing of plastics, 
matches, and batteries, and light electronic assembly. Liberaliza- 
tion in the diamond market meant that official diamond exports 
and receipts rose substantially. 

Inefficient and corruptiy managed parastatal (see Glossary) com- 
panies had contributed to Zaire's troubled economic history and 
were a severe strain on the budget. As part of the 1989 reform, 
the government announced that it was taking steps to reduce the 
role of the public sector in the economy and to increase the effi- 
ciency of parastatals, and it produced a list of seventeen compa- 
nies intended for partial or full privatization. The government's 
broad objective was to raise private investment funds and to make 
the private sector more responsible for productive activities, with 
the exception of essential public services such as utilities and other 
strategic activities. In agriculture, a program of divestiture led to 
the privatization of several state-owned companies, such as Coton- 
Zaire and Agrifor, a forestry firm. 

The adoption in 1 989 of a liberalized pricing policy and the re- 
moval of foreign-exchange restrictions eased conditions for importers 



150 



The Economy 



and entrepreneurs, which in turn led to an increase in the range 
and availability of a variety of consumer goods in the Kinshasa 
market. Most of these goods, however, were expensive imported 
food items, clothing, and other merchandise unaffordable to all ex- 
cept expatriates and the local rich. Liberalized pricing policies also 
meant a more adequate supply in a wider market of fuel products. 

By the end of 1989, however, it was apparent that these latest 
reforms were unsuccessful in promoting sustained economic ex- 
pansion. Indeed, Zairians experienced a massive drop in per cap- 
ita income, as inflation rose and the GDP growth rate fell. The 
inflation rate for 1989 was 104 percent, a significant increase over 
the 83 percent rate recorded the previous year. GDP growth for 
1989 was registered as - 1.3 percent. 

Economic indicators for 1990 were even more dismal. IMF 
credits had expired, and large public-expenditure deficits were 
expected in response to pay increases for government workers. The 
final figures for 1990 showed a GDP decline of 2.6 percent, a 90 
percent rate of inflation in consumer prices, and further devalua- 
tion of the zaire against Western currencies. 

By 1992 and continuing into 1993, most sectors of the economy 
were in a state of advanced decay. Hyperinflation was a perma- 
nent fixture. The country's currency continued to depreciate to 
new lows against the dollar (Z110 million = US$1 by December 
1993), causing a demonetization of the economy and a breakdown 
of the banking system, as well as severely damaging Zaire's inter- 
national competitiveness. Poverty and unemployment were wide- 
spread. 

Role of Government 
Parastatals 

Until the economic reforms begun under IMF tutelage in 1983, 
the government controlled economic policy by heavy participation 
in and ownership of enterprises, particularly those in the mining 
sector. Gecamines, the giant mining company, was a wholly 
government-owned company. These parastatals, until the reforms 
of 1983, were characteristically inefficient, largely because of their 
use by government elites as sources of private enrichment. One 
of the most notorious offenders was the mineral marketing agen- 
cy, the Zairian Commerce Company (Societe Zairoise de Com- 
mercialisation des Minerals — Sozacom). Prior to its dissolution 
in 1984, Sozacom was under constant government pressure to 
surrender its export receipts to the treasury rather than to Geca- 
mines for reinvestment, and it also had a reputation for diverting 



151 



Zaire: A Country Study 

a percentage of its receipts to members of the Zairian elite. 

The emergence in 1972 of the parastatal state marketing offices 
to monopolize the purchase of major crops, including coffee and 
cotton, was another example of corrupt government involvement 
in the economy. These monopolies were typically inefficient, sub- 
ject to corruption, and provided only small returns for the farmer. 
Of the eleven state marketing offices created from 1971 to 1974, 
only one, the Zairian Coffee Board, continued to operate in the 
early 1990s. 

Although by the early 1990s the government still owned or held 
a majority interest in many enterprises, including the national rail- 
road and airlines, major mining and petroleum companies, and 
utilities, in theory the private sector was expected to lead econom- 
ic growth. World Bank and IMF lending has been predicated on 
privatization and reform of state enterprises, allowing them to be 
run by competent managers free of political pressure from the cen- 
tral government. But reform appears unlikely under the Mobutu 
regime. 

Patrimonial Politics and Corruption 

Mobutu's efforts to centralize state power in his hands in order 
to penetrate all aspects of society have been analyzed by Thomas 
Callaghy, who has demonstrated that in the economic realm these 
efforts met with catastrophic results. When Mobutu came to pow- 
er, Zaire began major state expansion and consolidation. Key to 
this process was the notion of economic sovereignty. Furthermore, 
Mobutu sought to bring economic activity within his tight control 
and was especially concerned with mining activity in the secession- 
ist Katanga and Kasai (present-day Kasai-Oriental and Kasai- 
Occidental) regions. Some have speculated that insecurity about 
Katangan separatism in part led Mobutu to construct the coun- 
try's primary source of electricity, the Inga I and Inga II hydro- 
electric plants, west of Kinshasa, in order to increase the capital's 
control over Katanga. Mobutu sought to reverse the traditional 
dominance of the mining region over the rest of the nation. The 
nationalization of the Belgian-owned UMHK in 1967 and its trans- 
formation into the Zairian-owned parastatal Gecamines, for ex- 
ample, was both a political and an economic act, deliberately and 
carefully planned. Its primary objective was the consolidation of 
presidential authority and spending ability. To finance state goals, 
Mobutu had to acquire major new financial resources for develop- 
ment projects and for slush money. 

The government became increasingly preoccupied throughout 
the 1970s with raising revenue to finance grandiose projects. The 



152 




The Inga dams barrage, Zaire's largest source of electricity, on the lower 

Congo River near Matadi 
Courtesy Agence Zaire Presse 



practice of patrimonialism gave free rein to the enrichment of the 
president and his associates in government and other spheres. Ac- 
cording to Callaghy, ' 'the revenue needs of the state intersected 
the need of the regime to finance its patrimonial processes of pow- 
er maintenance and the ambition of the emergent political class 
for a swift accumulation of wealth." 

These needs and ambitions led to a continuing financial crisis. 
Government administration developed weak, inefficient, and in- 
famously corrupt financial structures; the revenue collection sys- 
tem, in particular, was little more than an open invitation for 
personal enrichment by favored administrators. Mobutu, as the 
patron of patrons, demonstrated a voracious desire for more revenue 
to spend as he saw fit. Much of this spending was untraceable, ac- 
cording to foreign technocrats brought in to salvage the economy 
as its crisis deepened. The expense of this quest for power and glory, 
and the costs of defense, grandiose projects, and a lavish life-style 
as well as the corruption and largesse inherent in a patriarchal 
patrimonial regime also brought the Zairian state to the point of 
collapse in the late 1970s. 

In Zaire, corruption appeared to be the norm, not just an occa- 
sional or problematic exception. Access to high office was controlled 



153 



Zaire: A Country Study 

by the president (see The Presidency; The National Executive 
Council, ch. 4). Because no one could be sure of remaining in office 
for very long, the incentive was to profit as quickly and as much 
as possible. Access to high office was the only hope of the Zairian 
elite or would-be-elite to attain, or maintain, a decent standard 
of living. The system guaranteed that top functionaries would serve 
the president, the ultimate source of their livelihood, rather than 
the nation. But corruption in Zaire was economically dysfunctional. 
Corruption did not serve to grease the wheels of the economic 
machine by creating jobs or other forms of expansion. Unfortunately 
for millions of Zairians as well as for frustrated foreign donors, the 
system was incapable of promoting sustained development. 
Nonetheless, to the extent that this system had enriched the presi- 
dent and kept him in firm control of a disparate society, it had 
worked well, and Mobutu appeared unlikely to abandon it, even 
under the heavy internal and external pressures he faced in the 
early 1990s. 

Investment Projects 

The early 1970s saw a rash of poorly conceived industrial de- 
velopment projects, which were launched without sensible and com- 
prehensive economic planning and institutional support. Moreover, 
Zaire displayed a penchant for massive industrial and energy 
projects, neglecting the rural sector and transportation, both of 
which were in dire need of an infusion of resources. For example, 
an Italian consulting firm sold the idea of a steel-producing facili- 
ty in Bas-Zaire Region to Mobutu as an import-substitution scheme. 
The consulting firm that developed the plant at Maluku was a sub- 
sidiary of the contracting company. The project, begun in 1972 
and completed in 1975, cost the Zairian government US$250 mil- 
lion. There were no foreign equity investors. Because there was 
no serious planning to develop iron-ore deposits, the mill operat- 
ed on costly imported scraps at 10 percent of capacity until it ceased 
operations in 1980. 

The massive Inga I and Inga II hydroelectric facilities also created 
a severe drain on Zairian resources. The project was initially sched- 
uled for completion in 1978 but was not finished until 1982. The 
load forecast used to justify the project was based on overly op- 
timistic expectations of copper price rises, mining expansion, and 
rapid expansion of the economy generally. Its cost was estimated 
at US$2 billion in 1983 prices, financed by the United States Export- 
Import Bank and the governments of Italy and Sweden. But cost 
overruns and underestimated management costs for foreign 
managers turned cheap power into expensive electricity as Zaire 



154 



The Economy 



struggled under the heavy debt burden incurred to build and main- 
tain the project. In 1990 Inga II generated only 14 percent of its 
total capacity. A planned free-trade zone and a Swiss aluminum 
refinery near the dam had also failed to materialize. 

The Zairo-Italian Society Refinery (Societe Zairo-Italienne de 
Raffinage — Sozir) oil refinery, in Moanda on the Atlantic coast, 
was another costly operation built by an Italian firm. It was con- 
structed in 1967 before offshore crude oil production began. The 
refinery was designed to refine a lighter crude than was eventually 
produced from Zaire's coastal wells. Refining Zaire's production 
would result in too much heavy fuel and not enough lighter prod- 
ucts. It was therefore more economical to export Zairian crude oil 
and to import most refined products and all the crude petroleum 
to be processed at the Sozir plant. The refinery ran at 10 percent 
of capacity until September 1984 when it was closed. Subsequently, 
in 1986 small shipments of Nigerian crude were refined, but the 
refinery remained essentially idle. 

Structure and Dynamics of the Economy 
Gross Domestic Product 

Zairian and other official statistics on the composition and growth 
of GDP should be taken as approximations at best, in particular 
given the chaotic nature of the economy and society in the early 
1990s. Nevertheless, some basic trends can be observed. The Zair- 
ian economy grew slowly throughout most of the 1980s (except for 
1982) but declined sharply beginning in 1989. Real GDP growth 
in 1980 was registered as 2.4 percent. The rate increased to 2.9 
percent in 1981, but dropped sharply to -3.0 percent in 1982, 
a year of decline in the price of copper. Thereafter, it increased 
once again and sustained positive real growth rates of 1.3 percent 
in 1983, 2.7 percent in 1984, 2.5 percent in 1985, 2.7 percent in 
1986 and 1987, and 0.5 percent in 1988. In 1989, however, the 
growth rate fell to 1 . 3 percent and continued its decline with nega- 
tive growth rates of - 2.6 percent in 1990, - 7.3 percent in 1991, 
and -8.0 percent in 1992. 

Zaire's poor economic performance has had a severe impact on 
the populace's standard of living. Even in years of modest GDP 
growth, economic growth was outpaced by the nation's very high 
population growth rate, which has been estimated at over 3 per- 
cent per year. As a result, per capita GDP has often fallen, or ris- 
en only slightly, even in years of improved economic performance. 
In terms of per capita GDP, mineral-rich Zaire found itself among 
the poorest African nations. 



155 



Zaire: A Country Study 

Nevertheless, although living conditions and purchasing power 
for the average peasant and city dweller are indeed meager, and 
for many people desperately low, official estimates of per capita 
income indicate a much lower standard of living than has actually 
been the case, especially prior to 1992. Many Zairians eke out a 
living through subsistence agriculture and barter and informal trade 
in a range of goods and services that show up nowhere in official 
government or donor country statistics. This energetic informal 
economy is often described by the apocryphal article fifteen of the 
first postindependence constitution, "fend for yourself" (see The 
Informal Economy, this ch.). 

The sectoral composition of GDP has changed substantially since 
independence because of a drop in the real value of mineral produc- 
tion and because of the chronic weakness of other sectors, such as 
transportation and manufacturing, which the government has 
neglected. According to estimates by the government's Ministry 
of National Economy and Industry, agriculture accounted for 22 
percent of GDP in 1970, industry for 8 percent, mining and metal- 
lurgy for 22 percent, and services for 48 percent. By contrast with 
the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, where agriculture lost ground to 
other sectors, Zairian agriculture's share of GDP had risen to 32 
percent by the late 1980s, with industry dropping to about 2 per- 
cent, mining and metallurgy rising to 24 percent (but then drop- 
ping to 17 percent by 1990), and services and other sectors falling 
to about 42 percent. The increased contribution of agriculture to 
the GDP despite the fall in agricultural output in staples and cash 
crops is a vivid indication of the overall weakness of the economy. 
The increased importance of the mining and metallurgy sector was 
caused principally by the success of the legalization of the artisanal 
(panning) diamond market in 1983 and a substantial increase in 
cobalt production. The surprisingly large service sector is gener- 
ally attributed to a bloated and grossly inefficient public sector and 
the fact that people receiving government pensions were included 
in this figure. 

In a regional division of GDP, it is not surprising that Shaba 
accounted for 30 percent of the nation's total and Kinshasa for 
another 20 percent. The remainder was divided fairly evenly among 
the other regions. 

The Informal Economy 

In Zaire, as in many developing nations, a great deal of eco- 
nomic activity takes place outside of the official economy. Such 
activity, variously termed the informal, parallel, underground, un- 
recorded, or second economy, is in many cases so extensive that 



156 



Women selling food 
at a Kinshasa market 
Courtesy Sandy Beach 



Central Market, 
Kinshasa 
Courtesy Zaire 
National Tourism Office 



Zaire: A Country Study 

it should not be regarded as marginal or supplemental, but, rather, 
as the way such economies really work. In her study of the second 
economy (her preferred terminology) in Zaire, anthropologist Janet 
MacGaffey concludes that smuggling and other unofficial activi- 
ties constitute the real economy of Zaire. Second-economy activi- 
ties are fully institutionalized and in most respects more rational 
and predictable than official trade and production activities. The 
second economy provides access to goods and services unavailable 
in the official economy and compensates for the deficiencies of the 
official system in infrastructure and services, such as construction, 
transportation, distribution networks, and provision of capital. 

The magnitude of the informal economy far exceeds official eco- 
nomic activity. In the early 1990s, Zaire's informal economy was 
estimated to be three times the size of the official GDP. In Zaire, 
as elsewhere, the size of the informal economy reflects the increas- 
ing inability of the official system to serve the needs of the populace. 
The informal economy has grown dramatically as economic and 
social conditions have deteriorated and as purchasing power has 
dropped. Citizens have increasingly been forced to turn to infor- 
mal economic activity to survive. 

The informal economy in Zaire includes a wide array of eco- 
nomic activities, similar only in that all are unmeasured, unrecord- 
ed, and, to varying degrees, illegal in that they are unlicensed and 
designed to avoid government control and taxation. They range 
from small-scale street vending to the production of illicit goods, 
to open and relatively large-scale trading and manufacturing en- 
terprises, to cross-border smuggling, to barter arrangements such 
as rural-urban exchanges of food for manufactured goods, to vari- 
ous schemes intended to avoid the payment of taxes on legal produc- 
tion (e.g., concealing legal production and falsifying invoices). 

Despite its significance, however, MacGaffey concludes that 
Zaire's bustling second economy is a mixed blessing. A cost-benefit 
analysis of the second economy provides a varied picture. On the 
plus side, the informal economy in Zaire has enabled the bulk of 
the populace to get by and occasionally to prosper. Profits from 
such activities have been invested in community services and in 
some instances in official economic activity, thus contributing to 
national prosperity. In the social realm, the informal economy has 
empowered women and various segments of the population not able 
to participate in the formal economy (see The Informal Sector; 
Polarization and Prospects for Conflict; Strategies of Survival; The 
Status of Women, ch. 2). 

Nevertheless, there are also negative aspects to the second econ- 
omy. Drawbacks include the inherent unfairness and unevenness 



158 



The Economy 



of both access to the resources needed to participate in the second 
economy and the distribution of benefits from such participation. 
Those already rich and powerful and the employed tend to benefit 
far more than the unemployed, the urban poor, or rural producers. 
There are also negative effects on the official economy in that the 
state is deprived of both revenue and foreign exchange (for exam- 
ple, smuggling out food crops because of price controls in Zaire 
forces Zaire to use scarce foreign exchange to buy imported food), 
and labor shortages may also result from the proliferation of un- 
official economic activity. 

On balance, although the second economy is dynamic and con- 
tributes to the well-being of most of the Zairian populace, long- 
term economic development and national prosperity depend on 
reforming and energizing the formal economy, transferring to it 
the dynamism of the second economy. The prospects for such a 
radical transformation, however, appear bleak so long as the 
Mobutu regime remains entrenched in power. 

Currency 

In 1967 the Congolese franc was replaced by the zaire, a non- 
convertible unit with a value of US$.50 to the zaire. This exchange 
rate held good until March 1976 when the zaire was revalued to 
Zl.l to the SDR. A succession of devaluations in 1978, 1979, 1980, 
and 1981 temporarily gave the zaire a realistic value, but, because 
the fixed link with the SDR was retained, the black market quick- 
ly took over again as the principal market for exchange. A few 
exporters, notably Gecamines and other government-owned com- 
panies as well as the offshore oil consortium, normally observed 
the official exchange rate, a policy that inevitably had an adverse 
impact on their cash flow because the local currency they were paid 
was considerably less than the real value of their foreign-exchange 
earnings. 

The overvaluation of the zaire led to consistent shortages of hard 
currency at the official rate, making it difficult for local industries 
to import necessary inputs and spare parts. This limitation and 
restrictions on repatriating profits by overseas investors gave rise 
to a black market where the zaire sold at a fraction of its official 
value. For example, the parallel rate stood at five times the official 
rate in September 1983. 

The parallel rate was the principal currency vehicle for business. 
Recorded diamond exports dropped sharply as smuggling offered 
a considerably higher profit margin than operating officially. Dia- 
monds were sold at one point by nondiamond-producing Burundi. 
Coffee exporters were required to present their export documents 



159 



Zaire: A Country Study 

to official channels in order to register their allocated percentage 
of Zaire's international coffee organization quota. However, it was 
common practice to ask bankers to deliver foreign-currency receipts 
to another customer, who would then pay the exporter zaires at 
the parallel rate minus a commission. Some exporters simply smug- 
gled coffee to neighboring countries. Access to limited and grossly 
undervalued foreign exchange depended on political and family 
connections. In this way, many members of the Zairian elite gained 
easy access to hard currency, as opposed to those Zairians and 
foreigners engaged in more entrepreneurial pursuits. 

Throughout the early 1990s, the Zairian government accelerat- 
ed its attempts to acquire hard currency and to control foreign- 
exchange transactions. In October 1993, the regime required all 
Zairian exports to be paid for in advance in foreign currency. In 
addition, all incoming foreign exchange had to be "sold" to the 
central bank for domestic currency within forty-eight hours of 
receipt. 

In terms of the United States dollar, the zaire has registered 
a dramatic decline in value since 1985, when Z50 equaled US$1, 
and 1986, when Z60 equaled US$1. The average annual value 
of the zaire per US$1 was registered as Z112 in 1987, Z187 in 
1988, Z381 in 1989, and Z719 in 1990. The zaire was devalued 
in August 1991 in order to match the official exchange rate with the 
black-market rate, resulting in a new official rate of US$1 = Z 15, 300. 
But in 1992 the rate plummeted to US$1 = Zl 14,291 and continued 
to deteriorate. The official rate was Zl, 990, 000 = US$1 by De- 
cember 1992 (the average annual rate for 1992 was Z645,549 = 
US$1). 

In January 1993, the regime attempted to introduce a new Z5 
million note. But opposition forces denounced the move as infla- 
tionary and encouraged merchants to refuse to accept the note. When 
many of them did so, soldiers who had been paid in the notes went 
on a rampage, and extensive rioting and looting occurred. By March 
1993, the exchange rate was Z2, 529, 000 = US$1 . 

In October 1993, the regime again attempted to resolve its chronic 
liquidity crisis by announcing the introduction of a new zaire (nou- 
veau zaire — NZ), each supposed to be worth 3 million of the old 
zaire and set at an official rate of three new zaires to the United 
States dollar; the old currency was to be withdrawn from circula- 
tion. The change had not been implemented by the end of 1993. 
The result of the announcement alone has, however, been a dras- 
tic plunge in the exchange rate in the black market and another 
surge in prices. The zaire traded against the United States dollar 
at a seemingly ridiculous rate of 8 million to one in October 1993; 



160 



The Economy 



by December the rate was a patently absurd Z110 million to the 
dollar and still rising. Once again some rioting and looting occurred 
when opposition forces promoted a boycott of the new currency. 

Inflation 

Zaire often financed its large budget deficits by borrowing from 
the domestic banking sector. This process in turn led to excessive 
growth in the money supply and rapid inflation. The black mar- 
ket, persistent government overspending, and a lack of control of 
the money supply led to high rates of inflation, rising to 77 per- 
cent in 1983 according to the central bank. A key objective of the 
stabilization program of 1983 was to control the growth of the money 
supply and inflation by gradually instituting measures designed to 
restrict credit expansion. During the 1983-86 period, these mea- 
sures resulted in a sharp decrease in domestic liquidity and a low- 
er inflation rate — 52 percent in 1984, 24 percent in 1985, and 47 
percent in 1986. Commercial bank deposit rates increased. Pres- 
sure on the exchange rate diminished. 

In 1987 and 1988, however, after the 1983 plan unraveled, the 
rate of inflation soared to 90 percent and 83 percent, respectively, 
as the money supply exploded. The zaire dropped dramatically 
against the dollar and against the pound sterling. In January 1989, 
the government tried again to contain the budget deficit and to 
limit monetary financing of the deficit. By April 1989, domestic 
liquidity had declined, real interest rates were positive, and infla- 
tion was briefly lowered. As was the case with previous reforms, 
however, the economic gains from this plan were short-lived, and 
the inflation rate for 1989 rose to 104 percent. In 1990 inflation 
was conservatively reported by the IMF to have dropped to 81 per- 
cent. (Other sources reported a 296 percent rate in 1990.) But the 
rate rose dramatically to 2,154 percent in 1991 (3,524 percent ac- 
cording to other sources). By 1992 and continuing throughout 1993, 
the economy had deteriorated to such an extent that, although no 
reliable figures had been produced by the government, inflation was 
wildly estimated at rates ranging between 3,500 and 23,000 percent. 
Some sources cited an average rate of 4,129.2 percent in 1992. 

In late 1993, analysts noted that the rate of inflation, although 
still very high and rising, had not accelerated as much as expected 
despite the drastic decline in the value of the zaire. They attribut- 
ed this situation to the severe reduction in imports and the virtual 
demonetization of the economy. Some believed that the average 
annual inflation rate for 1993 would prove to be in the neighbor- 
hood of 275 percent rather than the 7,000 percent to 10,000 per- 
cent originally predicted. 



161 



Zaire: A Country Study 
Budget 

The government has regularly overspent since independence, 
largely because of enormous and costly development projects. 
Financial administration has been marked by poor budgetary con- 
trol, accompanied by widespread mismanagement and corruption. 
Money for the ambitious plans to make Zaire a regional industrial 
power was provided by foreign governments and commercial banks, 
anxious to channel the country's enormous potential petrodollar 
surpluses into assets. 

The budget was drafted by the financial ministries and promul- 
gated by the National Legislative Council. Accountability was lack- 
ing, however, and much of Zaire's government spending was 
untraceable until reform efforts began in the mid-1980s. World 
Bank and IMF technical experts who tried to audit Zairian govern- 
ment expenditures were only partially successful. Budgets in the 
early 1980s distributed 50 percent of outlays to political institu- 
tions and government, 23 percent to the military, 3 percent to 
health, and 3 percent to education. Agriculture was not a high 
budgetary priority. 

The budget for fiscal year (FY — see Glossary) 1987, drafted under 
IMF tutelage, estimated revenues at Z 100 billion. Current revenue 
accounted for Z82.3 billion, and counterpart funds (contributions 
from external sources) accounted for Z17.7 billion. The main 
sources of current revenue were: customs and duties, Z28.3 bil- 
lion; direct and indirect taxes, Z25.9 billion; Gecamines, Z15.3 
billion; and oil revenue, Z7 billion. 

Expenditures for FY 1987 were Z106 billion. Of that amount, 
Z88.3 billion went to current expenditures, with costs broken down 
into administration, Z26.5 billion; external debt service, Z26.5 bil- 
lion; personnel, Z16.8 billion; capital, Z13.2 billion; and internal 
debt service, Z5.3 billion. The defense ministry was the largest item 
under administrative costs, receiving Z5.2 billion or 50 percent of 
all ministry expenses. The IMF permitted Zaire to run a Z6 bil- 
lion deficit in FY 1987. The investment budget stood at Z 13. 2 bil- 
lion, compared with planned investment expenditures of Z167 
billion in the 1986-90 period. 

The public finance deficit widened to over Z60 billion in FY 1988, 
when revenue stood at Z134.4 billion and expenditures at Z195.1 
billion. First-quarter revenues in FY 1989 exceeded expenditures 
by 9.5 percent, creating a small budget surplus. But the situation 
greatly deteriorated in FY 1990 when consistent and credible eco- 
nomic policy was made impossible by a prolonged political crisis, 
resulting in several revisions of the fiscal year's draft budget (see 



162 



The Economy 



Political Reform in the 1990s, ch. 4). The initial draft budget 
providing for expenditures of Z584,300 million and revenue of 
Z554,300 million was revised after the government admitted that 
the economy was uncontrollable because of a fall in export revenues 
resulting from weak commodity prices, and a hyperinflation rate 
of an estimated 1,300 percent (other figures for the country's in- 
flation rate were vastly higher). Following devaluation of the zaire, 
the revised budget approved in July 1991 estimated expenditures 
at Z4, 600, 000 million, with revenues projected at Z3, 600, 000 mil- 
lion. The budget deficit for FY 1992 was Z703,632 million, more 
than ten times higher than planned; the FY 1993 deficit was project- 
ed to total almost Z 1,098 billion. 

All reports indicate that the government is bankrupt. The tax 
collection system is defunct, few if any customs revenues are col- 
lected, and foreign aid (other than humanitarian assistance) has 
been virtually cut off. Copper production, formerly a major source 
of government revenue, has dropped off significantly; however, 
many sources believe that the Mobutu regime continues to obtain 
funds from the diamond trade (both legal and illicit). To pay its 
bills, the government has had new currency printed abroad, first 
in Germany and then in Britain, and flown in but increasingly has 
had difficulty even paying these printing bills. In late 1993, Zaire 
was reported to be deeply in debt to the British and German firms 
that printed Zairian money for the Mobutu regime. 

Debt 

The external debt quintupled between 1967 and 1973. Massive 
and rash spending and borrowing when revenues were high, ram- 
pant corruption and fiscal mismanagement, and lack of understand- 
ing and concern about the rapidly deteriorating economic situation 
by Mobutu, the political elite, and foreign lenders characterized 
the period. The debt stood at US$1.5 billion in 1973. Debt-service 
payments jumped 353 percent between 1967 and 1973, or in ab- 
solute terms to US$81 million. By 1976 the external debt was more 
than a third of total expenditure and 12 percent of GDP. In 1977 
debt service amounted to 43 percent of export earnings and 49 per- 
cent of total revenues. 

At the end of 1988, Zaire's debt was estimated at US$7 billion 
(excluding what was owed to the IMF). Unlike many other debtor 
nations, most of Zaire's debt was owed to bilateral government 
creditors; multilateral institutions accounted for only 14 percent 
and commercial banks for only 6 percent. Mobutu and his govern- 
ment regularly pointed to this fact when seeking debt forgiveness 
or other relief. Without debt rescheduling, Zaire would have had 



163 



Zaire: A Country Study 

a 50 percent to 60 percent debt-service ratio. However, debt 
reschedulings reduced debt- service payments, resulting in an ac- 
tual debt-service ratio of between 12 percent and 19 percent. This 
ratio fell to 7.3 percent in 1988 because Zaire stopped most debt- 
service payments to bilateral creditors in May and accumulated 
substantial arrears. Zaire's debt was again rescheduled in June 
1989. Altogether, there had been sixteen multilateral debt reschedul- 
ings since 1975, more than for any other African nation. Zaire regu- 
larly threatened to suspend debt-service payments but invariably 
resumed payments in the context of renewed reform efforts and 
rescheduling. 

The local currency cost of external debt-service payments in- 
creased substantially with the depreciation of the zaire. Payments 
of external debt service amounted to 1 1 percent of total govern- 
ment expenditures in 1988 and were thought likely to account for 
23 percent of government expenditures in 1989. 

In 1989 foreign debt was US$9.2 billion. Zaire's total foreign 
debt in 1990 amounted to US$10.1 billion, with the external debt- 
service ratio at 15.4 percent. By the year's end, all of Zaire's main 
bilateral and multilateral lending partners had frozen their finan- 
cial aid programs as Zaire's political and economic situation de- 
teriorated and specifically as a direct result of the killing of student 
demonstrators at the University of Lubumbashi in May 1990. (The 
World Bank did, however, continue to make disbursements to Zaire 
so long as Zaire kept up debt- service payments.) In 1991 Zaire's 
external debt stood at US$10.7 billion, including US$9.1 billion 
in long-term public debt. In 1992 Zaire virtually ended all pay- 
ments on its foreign debt, paying only US$79 million of the more 
than US$3.4 billion due. 

In February 1992, the IMF issued a Declaration of Noncooper- 
ation with Zaire, signaling that Zaire's arrears had made it ineligible 
for further borrowing. In July 1993, the World Bank froze all dis- 
bursements to Zaire because of arrears on debt- service payments 
to the bank. (Previously Zaire had kept up with debt-service pay- 
ments to the World Bank, which had as a result not cut off finan- 
cial flows to Zaire.) Moreover, it appears that so long as President 
Mobutu remains in power, the country's lending partners are un- 
likely to agree to reschedule or cancel its debts, as analysts argue 
that debt cancellation will encourage bad economic practices from 
the past. 

Banking 

The banking system in Zaire has traditionally been underdeve- 
loped and largely confined to urban areas. Zaire's banking system 



164 



The Economy 



consists of a central bank, called the Bank of Zaire (Banque du 
Zaire), and seventeen commercial banks, including development 
or investment institutions. In addition to the traditional functions 
of a central bank — issuing currency, establishing monetary policy, 
and acting as cashier for the national government — the Bank of 
Zaire also has the power to control all financial institutions in Zaire 
and to administer the country's gold and foreign monetary reserves. 

The Bank of Zaire experienced difficulties in the early 1990s be- 
cause of the country's dire economic situation. Mobutu's govern- 
ment had survived primarily by printing new money abroad to pay 
its loyal troops but became deeply indebted to German and Brit- 
ish printing firms. 

Of the seventeen commercial banks, only one, the People's Bank, 
is publicly owned. The other sixteen commercial banks are mostly 
subsidiaries of Western banks, the largest being the Zairian Com- 
mercial Bank, which is associated with a Belgian industrial con- 
glomerate. The two most important investment organizations are 
the Development Finance Company (Societe Financiere de Devel- 
oppement — Sofide) and the National Savings and Real Estate Fund 
(Caisse Nationale d'Epargne et de Credit Immobilier — CNECI). 
Sofide is a joint stock company, financed by the government, the 
World Bank, and the private sector, and is responsible for lending 
money to create or modernize industry in Zaire. CNECI promotes 
savings from the private sector and grants loans to individuals for 
housing or mortgages. 

As of 1993, the banking system has virtually collapsed. The cen- 
tral bank is bankrupt, and most other banks have closed. Despite 
the demise of the official banking system, however, many bank- 
ing services are available through the informal sector. Visitors to 
Zaire have reported that Zairian women "bankers" operating in 
the informal economy have ample supplies of foreign currencies 
for exchange. 

Labor 

Employment statistics are considered extremely unreliable be- 
cause the national agency responsible for their collection, the Na- 
tional Institute for Social Security, has limited resources. The latest 
available published figures from 1984 showed 1 . 1 million employed 
in the official economy out of an employable population of about 
15 million. A breakdown of the persons employed had almost 
800,000 workers in the private sector and the remaining 300,000 
employed in public administration. Teaching was the largest sin- 
gle component in the public sector with 200,000 employees, and 



165 



Zaire: A Country Study 



the mining conglomerate Gecamines was the largest single corporate 
employer with a work force of roughly 37,000. 

Skilled industrial labor was in short supply, and often workers 
had to be trained by individual companies. Salaries were general- 
ly low, but employers were required to provide a variety of benefits, 
including medical care, family allowances, transportation, and 
sometimes housing and subsidized food. Termination of an em- 
ployee was a difficult procedure. 

Incomplete statistics make detailed analysis of employment pat- 
terns difficult, but several generalizations can nevertheless be made. 
A large part of the population stands outside the formal economy 
and ekes out a living by subsistence farming, informal trade or bar- 
ter, or smuggling and other illicit activities. Women are severely 
underrepresented in the formal economy; by some estimates, only 
4 percent of formal-sector employees are women. As a result, they 
have recourse in large numbers to the informal economy. 

Although the population rose from 16.2 million in 1960 to 34 
million in 1989 and to 39.1 million by 1992, total formal-sector 
employment remained about the same in the early 1990s as at in- 
dependence; increases in the labor force were probably absorbed 
by an increase in the number of subsistence farmers. A lack of new 
jobs in urban areas would imply high urban unemployment for 
the growing populations of the cities (Kinshasa alone added 2 mil- 
lion inhabitants from 1960 to 1984). One estimate placed unem- 
ployment in the mid-1980s at 40 percent for Kinshasa and as high 
as 80 percent for other cities. Only mining towns had unemploy- 
ment at lower figures. 

The government encouraged foreign employers to minimize the 
number of expatriate employees. As an investment matured, the 
number of foreign workers was expected to diminish. The govern- 
ment controlled foreign labor through a tax on expatriate salaries 
and issuance of work and residence permits. 

The National Union of Zairian Workers (Union Nationale des 
Travailleurs Za'irois — UNTZA), the country's only official trade 
union until mid- 1 990 when independent trade unions were legal- 
ized, was in reality a branch of the MPR (see Interest Groups, 
ch. 4). UNTZA employed 1,000 full-time staff members and 
claimed to represent all Zairian workers. Disputes were settled by 
a government order that labor and management agree to settle- 
ments that were usually compromises between their respective de- 
mands. Union militancy was rare. UNTZA rarely, if ever, called 
strikes. Any work disruptions that occurred were outside the con- 
text of the union. 



166 



The Economy 



Mobutu's April 1990 announcement that the country would make 
a transition to a pluralistic, multiparty political system ended 
UNTZA's role as the nation's sole trade union, although it re- 
mained the most influential union in the early 1990s. Subsequent- 
ly, some twelve trade unions sprang up, all officially recognized 
by the government, representing various political constituencies, 
political parties, and industrial sectors. To protest low wages, trade 
union pluralism led to more frequent strikes as well as other demon- 
strations against the government. By 1992, for example, the pub- 
lic-service system had virtually ceased to function. Most public 
employees, including hospital workers and teachers, were on strike 
to protest lack of payment by the bankrupt government. 

Agriculture 

Throughout the 1980s, nearly 65 percent of the work force was 
engaged in subsistence and commercial agriculture, and the sec- 
tor accounted for approximately 32 percent of GDP. Because of 
the various economic distortions since independence, such as ex- 
change controls, price controls, overvaluation of the currency, and 
the smuggling out of cash crops such as coffee, agriculture's con- 
tribution to the economy was usually undervalued in official reports. 

Zaire has the potential to be a net exporter of agricultural 
produce, but, as in other economic sectors, the country has never 
lived up to its potential. Indeed, as of the 1990s, Zaire was not 
even self-sufficient in food production. The agricultural sector has 
suffered as a result of the dislocations from Zairianization, an in- 
adequate infrastructure for the transport of agricultural produce 
and an inadequate banking system, both of which have also af- 
fected other sectors of the economy, and inattention from the ur- 
ban elite, resulting in few rural ventures and limited funds for 
investment. 

Small-scale subsistence farmers primarily grow four staple food 
crops — rice, corn, cassava, and plantains — together on small scat- 
tered plots. Women generally handle food production, transport 
to market, and sale. Traditional slash-and-burn clearing methods 
are used, and the only capital inputs are hand-held tools and seed 
raised on the farms. Land clearing is labor intensive and thus has 
limited the areas under cultivation. 

The average growth rate of the food supply in Zaire fell from 
4. 1 percent a year in the late 1960s to 1 .8 percent in the 1970s com- 
pared with an estimated population growth rate of about 2 per- 
cent in the 1960s and approximately 3 percent in the 1970s and 
1980s. Rural areas continue to provide much of the food for ur- 
ban areas, but food imports have been increasingly important for 



167 



Zaire: A Country Study 

the swelling urban population, with considerable illicit traffic cross- 
ing the borders, such as corn brought in from Zambia and Tanza- 
nia. By many accounts, Kinshasa subsists mainly on imported food: 
wheat, corn, flour, and canned and dried fish. 

There is much disparity between official and unofficial estimates 
of food imports. In 1985, for example, official estimates placed food 
imports at 157,000 tons, while unofficial figures were estimated 
at 393,000 tons. In 1986 Zaire imported 170,000 tons of wheat and 
64,000 tons of flour, up from 156,000 tons and 31,000 tons, respec- 
tively, the preceding year. The 1987 bill for imported wheat was 
estimated at US$33 million in July 1987 prices. Wheat and flour 
imports were estimated to total 220,000 tons in 1990. 

Zaire's agricultural potential is greatly underutilized. By some 
estimates, as little as 1 percent of the land is under cultivation. Com- 
pounding the problem, government expenditures on the sector are 
inadequate, amounting to only 1 percent to 2 percent of govern- 
ment outlays, most of which goes to government administration. 

Under the colonial administration, coercion was frequendy used 
to keep production up. Nonetheless, extension services and sup- 
plies for small farmers were far superior to the postindependence 
government's ability or efforts. Agricultural buying offices have 
frequently been sources of corruption and are unable to provide 
small shareholders with adequate fuel, spare parts, buying stations, 
or bonuses-in-kind, such as the salt or sugar that were sometimes 
provided by the colonial administration. The poor transportation 
network is one major obstacle to increased production. Small farm- 
ers raise crops primarily for their own subsistence because of the 
difficulty of transporting goods to market. Middlemen who pro- 
vide transport can reap huge profits. 

In the 1950s, many agribusiness enterprises, or corporate plan- 
tations, were established, especially in the Bas-Zaire and Kivu 
regions. There was livestock raising and food processing, and cot- 
ton, wood, and rubber were produced and used in local manufac- 
turing. However, full vertical integration in such areas as cotton 
production and textile manufacturing did not materialize. 

The 1973 policy of Zairianization resulted in agricultural stag- 
nation, as many enterprises were stripped of their assets or aban- 
doned. In addition, price fixing, a colonial legacy used to hold down 
prices in order to restrain urban wages, led to some profit in the 
import sector but discouraged production of food crops. Adjust- 
ments in producer prices under the stabilization plans were limit- 
ed; the government felt that higher food prices would cut incomes 
in the urban areas. Donors advised the government to direct scarce 
resources to maintenance of the existing road system, development 



168 



Car ferry crossing the Kasai River in Bandundu Region 
Cassava truck on a dirt road in Bandundu Region 



169 



Zaire: A Country Study 

of a delivery system for tools and seeds, and provision of credit. 
They also noted that long-term investment in infrastructure de- 
velopment, technological research, and institution building were 
needed. But the Zairian government failed to act on this advice, 
and the stagnation of agriculture, which dated back to 1959, thus 
continued. In 1993 some observers predicted an impending agricul- 
tural crisis as a result of the failure to plant crops in areas such 
as Nord-Kivu in which ethnic violence had occurred. 

National Land Law System 

A national system of land law exists in Zaire. However, it is based 
on a legal dichotomy, and its system of land registration is report- 
ed to be highly ineffective and insecure. The Zairian land law sys- 
tem was established by national legislation and is based legally and 
in practice on the legacy of Belgian colonialism as well as the Zairian 
customary system of land tenure. The European principle of in- 
dividual ownership of land was unknown in Zaire's indigenous sys- 
tem. Instead, historically, land was the property of a lineage or 
descent group (see Glossary). In this system, a "land chief" exer- 
cised authority over land allocation in a village, and cultivators held 
usufruct rights to the land, which was farmed through shifting cul- 
tivation. 

This indigenous system was transformed by the colonial legacy 
of the Congo Free State (1885-1908) and the Belgian Congo 
(1908-60), during which the land law system was established to 
favor the exploitation of the country's natural resources by the Bel- 
gian authorities. "Vacant lands" were decreed to belong to the 
state, with the lands "occupied by the native population, under 
the authority of their chiefs' ' continuing to be governed by the cus- 
tomary laws and customs of the lineage groups. However, the no- 
tion of "vacant land" was never clearly defined, and in practice 
land that lay fallow was considered "vacant," even though it was 
meant to be used eventually by indigenous cultivators. Moreover, 
the state completely ignored hunting and gathering rights, which 
were well-defined and governed by customary law. 

Another element in this system favoring the colonial authorities 
was the introduction of land registration, with any lands coming 
under the state's domain ceasing to be governed by customary law 
and thus eligible to be granted by the state to individuals and en- 
terprises. It was estimated that by 1944, Europeans controlled ap- 
proximately 12 million hectares of land, out of a total land area 
of 234 hectares in the Belgian Congo. 

The colonial period's land law system remained in force follow- 
ing independence in 1960, at which time four broad categories of 



170 



The Economy 



land-holding existed: state-owned lands, lands owned by individuals 
and companies, concessions, and lands occupied by indigenous 
populations covered by customary law. The newly independent state 
now had to resolve inherent conflicts, in particular the status of 
preindependence lands controlled by foreign interests as well as 
lands controlled by Congolese under customary law, and the ap- 
plicability of the land registration system in determining the rights 
of nationals. 

The Bakajika Law, enacted in June 1966, was the first in a se- 
ries of laws designed to ensure government control of the land and 
its riches. It gave ownership of all wealth above and below the 
ground to the state, thus ensuring that the government could claim 
all public mineral rights. On December 31, 1971, the enactment 
of a constitutional amendment and promulgation of a law empow- 
ered the state to repossess all rights to the land. In July 1973, the 
General Property Law was enacted to organize the country's new 
land law system. With the enactment of the 1971 and 1973 laws, 
all lands now belonged to the state, with individual land rights de- 
rived from either concessions by the state or indigenous customary 
law. The new laws did not abrogate preexisting customary land 
rights, but they left unclear the future concessionary status of these 
lands. 

Another problem confronting practical application of these ear- 
ly 1970s laws is the fact that very little privately owned land is 
registered in Zaire, causing tenure to be precarious. Lack of clear 
title prevents land from being offered as collateral for a loan and 
discourages individual farmers from making the capital investment 
in land improvement needed to raise output. The situation is ex- 
acerbated both by the limited government resources available to 
embark on a large-scale land registration and the practice by con- 
cessionaires of bribing local officials to postpone indefinitely in- 
vestigations of further development activities on the concession. 
Political interference has also obstructed the resolution of land dis- 
putes. The theft of documents and files relating to land disputes 
is another common practice. The irresolution of these problems 
has led to an increase in the number of land disputes in Zaire. 

Crops 

The major food crops are cassava, corn, rice, plantains, and, 
to a lesser extent, bananas, beans, and peanuts. Millet, sorghum, 
yams, potatoes, and various fruits are also significant (see table 
11, Appendix). The food most universally eaten is cassava (also 
known as manioc), annual production of which was estimated at 
18.2 million tons in 1991 . Cassava is grown throughout the country 



171 



Zaire: A Country Study 



under all climatic conditions; not only do the tuber and its products 
form a major element of the diet, but the leaves are also eaten as 
a vegetable. 

Corn, like cassava, is grown nationwide, but its principal cul- 
ture is centered in the south. In much of Shaba Region, corn is 
the preferred staple; cassava is eaten chiefly during periods of corn 
shortage. Rice is grown mainly in the humid climate of the Congo 
River basin, particularly along the Congo in Equateur Region and 
also near Kisangani in Haut-Zaire Region. Plantains and bananas 
are cultivated throughout the country but are of special importance 
in the northeast and east, particularly in the former Kivu Region, 
where in some places they are planted on about half the land devoted 
to agriculture and form the principal staple. 

Millet and sorghum are grown exclusively in the savanna areas 
and are important only in the relatively dry far northern and 
southeastern parts of the country. A considerable part of the sor- 
ghum and millet harvests is used for making beer, a profitable ac- 
tivity for Zairian women in particular. 

Yams and potatoes are cultivated principally in the forest zones 
of central Zaire, where they occasionally constitute the main sta- 
ple. Peanuts are grown outside the central forest zones, and, be- 
fore the turmoil of the 1960s, peanut oil was a significant export 
crop. 

The principal cash crops have traditionally been coffee, palm 
oil and palm kernel oil, sugar, cocoa, rubber, and tea. All are grown 
on large plantations. Cotton and tobacco are produced mainly on 
smallholdings. 

Coffee has long been Zaire's most important agricultural cash 
crop. Coffee is grown by both smallholders and large plantations. 
However, plantation owners reap proportionately much larger 
profits. Moreover, large exporter firms often buy coffee at low prices 
from small farmers. Then the exporters and the state, through the 
official Zairian Coffee Board, reap large profits when world prices 
are high, such as in 1986 when the International Coffee Organi- 
zation suspended export quotas in the wake of the 1986 Brazilian 
freeze and failed harvest. 

To circumvent state controls, low prices, and quotas, many 
producers have engaged in illicit trade. By some accounts, as much 
as 30 percent to 60 percent of the coffee crop has traditionally been 
smuggled out of the country each year since independence — a ten- 
dency increased by the economic crisis of the early 1990s. 

Two varieties of coffee are grown: robusta, used primarily in the 
manufacture of instant coffee, and arabica, exported in bean form. 
Cultivation of robusta is widespread and accounts for approximately 



172 



Cassava plants at a government showcase farm 

90 percent of the coffee grown; arabica requires the cooler tem- 
peratures of highland areas. In 1988 an estimated 99,000 tons of 
coffee were produced. In 1989 approximately 107,000 tons of coffee 
were produced, and the 1990 crop was 120,000 tons. But the coffee 
crop was reported to be threatened by the fungal disease, tracheomy- 
cose, and production is estimated to have dropped to 102,000 tons 
in 1991. In the early 1990s, coffee production and exports also 
suffered because of the shortage of fertilizers, credit for farmers, 
and low world prices. 

In August 1993, Zaire and other African coffee producers joined 
the Association of Coffee Producing Countries (ACPC), formed by 
Latin American producers in July 1993. The association aimed to 
force a rise in coffee prices by withholding a portion of production 
from export. World coffee prices did rise in the last quarter of 1993. 

Prior to independence, Zaire was the second largest producer 
of palm oil in Africa, producing as much as 400,000 tons annual- 
ly. Production dropped during the 1960s as civil disturbances 
damaged palm plantations and farmers switched to the more lucra- 
tive coffee. Plantations also deteriorated as the decline in the price 
of palm oil reduced profitability. In 1988 and 1989, Zaire produced 
178,000 tons annually. Subsequent production figures were un- 
available in 1993. 

Information on tea, cocoa, and rubber is meager. Tea is grown in 
the highland areas of northeastern Zaire. Although the government 



173 



Zaire: A Country Study 

has made various attempts to increase its cultivation, annual produc- 
tion of tea in the late 1980s (about 3,000 tons) was less than two- 
thirds of the amount grown in 1978. The increased use of synthetic 
rubber also led to a decline in rubber cultivation; annual tonnage 
for the late 1980s, between 17,000 and 24,000 tons, was less than 
half the amount for 1978. In 1990 and in 1991, production was 
estimated at only 10,000 tons. Cocoa is grown in the more humid 
areas of Bas-Zaire and Equateur regions. Cocoa production levels 
remained fairly constant through the 1970s and early 1980s, but 
generally declined in the late 1980s and early 1990s, from 6,000 
tons in 1988 to 4,000 tons in 1991. 

The colonial state relied on coercion — fines and prison — to force 
peasants to invest the labor-intensive energy needed for cotton 
production. The imposed system of export crop production still 
existed in the early 1990s, and fines were levied for noncompli- 
ance. In 1952 some 102,000 tons were produced; 180,000 tons were 
produced in 1959. Since that time, cotton growing has diminished 
steadily as farmers, where possible, have chosen to grow the more 
lucrative cash crop, coffee. Only 26,000 tons of cotton were 
produced each year from 1988 to 1991 . By 1992 production report- 
edly had dropped to 11,000 tons. 

Cotton output has been affected by farmers' difficulties with 
credit, supplies of seeds and insecticides, and the lack of agricul- 
tural extension programs. Cotton imports, which grew as local 
production fell in the early 1990s, have also discouraged local 
production. Zaire imports large quantities of used Western cloth- 
ing and foreign-made traditional African textiles. Nearly 7,500 tons 
of cotton were imported from the United States for spinning in 1986. 

Forestry 

Zaire is the most heavily forested country in Africa, with a forest 
cover extending over 122 million hectares. The country has an es- 
timated 6 percent of the world's forestland. Only a small portion 
of Zaire's forest area, however, had been exploited commercially 
by the early 1990s, primarily because of the lack of transportation 
infrastructure, particularly in the interior of the country. 

There are three main areas of economic interest: the Mayombe 
Forest in western Bas-Zaire covering 240,000 hectares, an area 
north of the Congo River in Equateur Region covering 21 million 
hectares, and the tropical rain forests in northern Bandundu Region 
with 101 million hectares. Bas-Zaire, close to Kinshasa and the 
country's ports, has been the site of the heaviest logging in the coun- 
try. Much of the Mayombe Forest was seriously depleted by log- 
ging operations in the 1960s, and some logging restrictions are now 



174 



The Economy 



in force there. The forests in Equateur Region have been partially 
degraded because of slash- and-burn farming techniques. The hard- 
wood central basin forests in Bandundu Region remain relatively 
untouched, although some encroachment from itinerant slash- 
and-burn agriculture has begun to affect the northern and southern 
borders. 

In effect, all forestiands are owned by the Zairian state, which 
has granted long-term (usually twenty-five-year) logging conces- 
sions over huge areas to multinational companies. In the early 
1990s, timber concessions had already been granted for 37 per- 
cent of Zaire's exploitable forest area. Eleven foreign-based com- 
panies or joint ventures accounted for 90 percent of the country's 
logging operations. One German subsidiary alone accounted for 
40 percent of logging in Zaire. 

On average, 500,000 cubic meters of timber traditionally were 
extracted annually, but figures were lower in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. In 1988 about 416,500 cubic meters of logs were ex- 
tracted; production rose to 419,000 cubic meters in 1989 and to 
465,000 cubic meters in 1990 but dropped to 391 ,000 cubic meters 
in 1991. Sawn wood production was much lower, at 131,000 cu- 
bic meters in 1989, dropping to 117,000 cubic meters in 1990, and 
105,000 cubic meters in 1991. Zairian production is extremely 
modest when compared with that of major international producers. 

In the early 1990s, planning was underway for major increases 
in logging production — up to 5 million cubic meters by the year 
2020. Production increases would be accompanied by promotion 
of Zairian wood products in overseas markets, particularly in Eu- 
rope, the United States, and Japan. There were also plans to in- 
crease timber exports to East Africa, currently at a low level. Such 
an increase would depend, however, on the construction of a road 
network in the interior of the country. 

Over the years, attempts have been made to increase growth, 
diversity, and development in the forestry sector, but to no avail. 
Zaire's timber, like most African timber, continues to be export- 
ed primarily in its cheapest raw material form — as raw logs rather 
than sawn wood. Moreover, production of other products such as 
veneer and plywood remains quite limited. As with other areas of 
agricultural development, ecologically sound and profitable growth 
in forestry depends on dramatic improvements in transportation 
and both private and public management capabilities, neither of 
which appears likely in the foreseeable future (see Environmental 
Trends, ch. 2). 



175 



Zaire: A Country Study 

Fishing and Livestock 

Zaire has only a small coastline, but fish are abundant in all of 
Zaire's lakes and rivers with the exception of Lac Kivu. Neverthe- 
less, although fish is an important source of protein in the diet, 
the amounts harvested are below demand and are considered to 
be well below the potential; imports, mosdy of salted fish, are re- 
quired to meet demand. Imports, primarily from South Africa and 
Zimbabwe, normally total about 100,000 tons per year. Marine 
fishing is under the control of a government organization that oper- 
ates a small fleet of fishing boats off the mouth of the Congo River. 
The marine catch, however, is only slightly more than 1 percent 
of the country's total and is used almost entirely by urban centers 
in Bas-Zaire and by Kinshasa. Zaire's total fish catch was 162,000 
tons in 1988, about 166,000 tons in 1989, and 162,000 tons in 1990. 
Of these totals, only 2,000 tons were from the Atlantic each year; 
the remainder came from inland waters. Actual annual produc- 
tion compares very unfavorably with estimated production poten- 
tial of 330,000 tons per year. 

Most of the traditional livestock herding is found in the higher 
eastern sections of the country, where the tsetse fly, which trans- 
mits sleeping sickness, is less of a problem. Commercial herds also 
are raised in the highland areas of Shaba and Kasai-Occidental 
regions. Estimates in 1991 showed 1.6 million head of cattle, 
910,000 head of sheep, more than 3 million goats, and 830,000 
pigs. There were an estimated 19 million chickens in 1987. Sheep 
and goats are raised by villagers in all parts of the country. Sheep, 
of a small domestic variety that produces little wool, are raised for 
their meat and skins; goats are kept for milk and meat. Hogs are 
generally raised near urban centers. Most villages have flocks of 
chickens and ducks, and, in the mid-1970s, the government es- 
tablished a model farm outside Kinshasa to supply large quanti- 
ties of eggs and fowl to the capital. Yet as of the early 1990s, Zaire 
was still not self-sufficient in animal products and imported sizea- 
ble quantities of meat and dairy items — in particular those for which 
the elite had acquired a taste. 

Mining 

Mining has been the cornerstone of Zaire's wealth since colonial 
times. In the late 1980s, Zaire was the world's largest producer of 
cobalt, second or third largest producer of industrial diamonds, and 
fifth largest producer of copper. Mining, mineral processing, and 
petroleum extraction accounted for 17 percent of the GDP in 1990 
(down from 24 percent in 1987), and mineral exports, principally 



176 



The Economy 



copper, cobalt, diamonds, and gold, provided nearly 75 percent 
of all export earnings. The mining industry, primarily the giant 
Gecamines, also provided a significant percentage of ordinary 
government revenues, although the company failed to reinvest 
profits, resulting in worn-out equipment. In addition, to enrich 
itself the presidency repeatedly diverted the firm's funds. Through- 
out the early 1990s, the deterioration of Gecamines was both a sym- 
bol and a result of the country's economic chaos. Most skilled 
expatriates working for the company fled following military loot- 
ing in 1991 and further unrest in 1992. Since then Gecamines' s 
facilities have been systematically gutted, and the company is now 
bankrupt. 

Mining is centered in the southeastern and eastern parts of the 
country with the exception of petroleum, which is found in the far 
west in Bas-Zaire Region, and diamonds, mined in Kasai-Oriental 
and Kasai-Occidental regions (see fig. 10). Shaba Region has the 
greatest concentration of minerals, with copper, cobalt, and zinc 
mined in a narrow crescent known as the copper-cobalt zone, 
stretching roughly from Kolwezi to Lubumbashi. Shaba Region 
also contains most of Zaire's known deposits of coal and manganese. 
A broad belt in eastern Zaire from northern Shaba to eastern Haut- 
Zaire Region contains deposits of tin and gold with lesser amounts 
of tungsten-bearing wolframite, niobium, and tantalum. 

Copper and Zinc 

Zaire has traditionally been the world's fifth largest copper 
producer after Chile, the United States, Canada, and Zambia, ac- 
counting for about 8 percent of world copper production. Most 
copper (90 percent) is mined by the giant parastatal Gecamines 
in Shaba Region. Shaba's ores are rich in copper — from 4 percent 
to 6 percent, or twice the Zambian average concentration. Some 
mines produce ore with copper content as high as 15 percent. In 
comparison, United States producers have been working ores with 
less than 1 percent copper. Mining officials estimated in the late 
1980s that known reserves would last for another forty years at a 
production rate of approximately 500,000 tons annually, about 6 
percent of world production. 

Copper production began to fall in 1988, however. Competi- 
tion from substitute materials as well as from lower-cost copper 
producers elsewhere in the world (such as Chile), strikes, and tech- 
nical problems, including a cave-in in September 1990, all con- 
tributed to the downturn. In the early 1990s, copper mining, 
although once the mainstay of the economy, had virtually collapsed 
following years of neglect by Gecamines and as a result of the 



177 



Zaire: A Country Study 




CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 



ANGOLA^ / 



"ft- Sp" Kinshasa 



Tshikapa 9 



MUtniic 
Ocean 



- International boundary 
National capital 
Populated place 
D Tin zone 



C 

\///A Copper-cobalt zone 
<&> Gold Diamonds 
Zinc □ Manganese 
H Petroleum 
1p0 200 Kilo meters 
100 200 Miles 




Figure 10. Mineral Resources, 1993 



prevailing economic chaos. Actual production of copper ore was 
465,000 tons in 1988, declining to 440,600 tons in 1989, then 
355,500 tons in 1990. Production was 291,500 tons in 1991, and 
146,000 tons in 1992. Estimates for 1993 indicated a very low 
production figure of 80,000 tons. 

About 80 percent of Zaire's copper has traditionally been sold 
to Western Europe. A substantial share of the country's produc- 
tion is shipped to Belgium for final processing by a subsidiary of 
the General Holding Company of Belgium (Societe Generate de 
Belgique — SGB). 

Another copper-mining company, Industrial and Mining De- 
velopment Company (Societe de Developpement Industriel et 
Minier de Zaire — Sodimiza) was founded in 1969 and was owned 



178 



The Economy 



briefly by Japanese interests before being taken over by the Zair- 
ian government. The Canadian firm Philip Barrat Kaiser held a 
management contract until April 1987 when the government decid- 
ed to merge Sodimiza with Gecamines. Sodimiza had produced 
between 6 percent and 10 percent of Zaire's annual copper output. 

Zinc is produced as a byproduct of copper from a single mine 
near Lubumbashi. Copper output from this mine has steadily 
decreased. Because zinc reserves there are substantial, the mine 
is expected to produce primarily zinc by the mid-1990s. Zinc 
production totaled 64,000 tons in 1985 but had fallen to 38,200 
tons by 1990. Production in 1992 was estimated to be only 18,350 
tons. 

Cobalt 

Zaire has traditionally been the world's largest producer and ex- 
porter of cobalt, accounting for about half of all production. Cobalt 
production in Zaire is entirely a byproduct of copper mining by 
Gecamines. The company produced 9,429 tons of cobalt in 1989 
and 10,033 tons in 1990, but production fell to 8,800 tons in 1991 
and to 6,600 tons in 1992. Production in 1993 was projected to 
fall to about 3,500 tons. World cobalt prices are extremely vola- 
tile, and true to form they fluctuated dramatically in the 1980s and 
early 1990s. The market price rose temporarily in early 1992, but 
because of its reduced production, Zaire was not able to capitalize 
on this favorable situation. 

Manganese 

Manganese is found at two locations in western Shaba Region, 
but only one, near Kisenge, has been exploited. The government- 
owned Kisenge Mining Company ceased production of manganese 
shortly after the Benguela Railway to the Angolan port of Lobito 
was closed in 1975. Sporadic sales since 1975 have been from huge 
stockpiles accrued before the railroad closed. Production in 1968 
amounted to over 300,000 tons. Foreign businesses, usually backed 
by supplier credits and requiring substantial down payments, 
offered a number of proposals to restart manganese production, 
including building a battery factory. Nothing had come of these 
plans by the early 1990s, although there was hope for renewed 
production once the Benguela Railway reopened. 

Tin and Related Minerals 

Deposits of cassiterite, the chief source of tin, are found in a broad 
zone extending from northern Shaba Region through Sud-Kivu and 
Nord-Kivu to Haut-Zaire Region. Associated with the cassiterite 



179 



Zaire: A Country Study 

are commercially exploitable amounts of ores of tungsten, niobi- 
um, and tantalum. The Kivu Mining and Industrial Company (So- 
ciete Miniere et Industrielle du Kivu — Sominki) has responsibility 
for tin mining in Nord-Kivu and Sud-Kivu regions, and the Zaire 
Tin Company (Compagnie Za'iretain — Zairetain) carries out open- 
pit operations in Shaba Region. In 1993 there were reports that 
Sominki had ceased production of tin ore. 

Known deposits are large. In the mid- 1940s, Zaire was the 
world's second largest producer after Bolivia, but thereafter produc- 
tion decreased steadily. Mining of cassiterite (and associated ores) 
continued to slacken through the early 1990s because of weak prices 
and expensive and time-consuming transport from the remote lo- 
cations where it is mined. Production was estimated at 1,943 tons 
in 1988, dropping to 1,642 tons in 1989, and 1,600 tons in 1990. 

Gold 

Gold is found in minable quantities in various locations in eastern 
Zaire. Three companies have been involved in gold production: 
the Kilo-Moto Gold Mine Board (Office des Mines d'Or de Kilo- 
Moto — Okimo), which has the main gold mine, Sominki, and Geca- 
mines. In addition, artisanal gold mining, legalized in 1983, has 
long been substantial. Official gold receipts dropped in the early 
1990s because of smuggling and looting from industrial produc- 
tion sites, as well as extensive smuggling of artisanal production 
into neighboring countries. The Okimo and Sominki mines are 
located in isolated areas, where smuggling and looting are rela- 
tively easy and transport and resupply difficult. Artisanal producers 
have consistently chosen to smuggle out their production rather 
than accept the lower prices paid by the official purchasing coun- 
ters (comptoirs) . 

Together the Okimo and Sominki mines accounted for nearly 
half of official gold exports, or about 900 kilograms out of the more 
than 2,000 kilograms that were officially exported in 1988. Of the 
1988 total, Okimo produced about 260 kilograms of gold; Sominki 
produced approximately 625 kilograms; and individual artisanal 
producers accounted for 1,212 kilograms (Gecamines's production 
was negligible). In 1988 Okimo awarded contracts worth US$14 
million to a Brazilian firm and the United States subsidiary of a 
British firm for rehabilitation of two potentially highly productive 
mines. These contracts were expected to result in increased out- 
put in the 1990s, but in fact production continued to drop as the 
economy deteriorated. Production was estimated at only 225 kilo- 
grams in 1990. 



180 



The Economy 



Diamonds 

In 1992 Zaire was the world's third largest producer of indus- 
trial diamonds after Australia, which became the largest producer 
in 1986, and Botswana, which surpassed Zaire in 1992 because 
of Zaire's reduced production. In 1984 and 1985, Zaire account- 
ed for nearly 30 percent of world production, dropping to about 
26 percent in 1986 as new Australian mine production came on 
stream. Diamond production occurs in the Kasai-Occidental and 
Kasai-Oriental regions, mosdy around the regional capital of Kasai- 
Oriental, Mbuji-Mayi, near Tshikapa, and in Lodja, about 300 
kilometers north of Mbuji-Mayi. In 1993 there were also reports 
that diamond deposits had been discovered in Equateur Region, 
in Haut-Zaire Region, and in southern Bandundu Region along 
the Angolan border. Diamond ore in Zaire yields about 6 carats 
per cubic meter. Although Zaire mines both gem quality and in- 
dustrial diamonds, 90 percent of production is of industrial quality. 

Bakwanga Mining Company (Societe Miniere de Bakwanga — 
Miba), the state-owned mining concession in Kasai-Oriental Re- 
gion, produces much of the country's total export in diamonds, 
from alluvial deposits near Mbuji-Mayi and from kimberlite 
deposits. The Miba concession covers 62,000 square kilometers. 
Miba's production is marketed by a subsidiary of the South Afri- 
can company DeBeers, with whom the government has negotiat- 
ed a guaranteed price per carat. Thousands of individuals also mine 
for gold, many of them illegally mining the huge Miba concession, 
whose perimeters are difficult to patrol. 

Because of their value on the international market, diamonds 
have long been smuggled extensively in Zaire. Diamond smuggling 
spread quickly in the early 1960s. By the late 1970s, the amount 
of diamonds smuggled was believed to equal nearly 70 percent of 
official production (5.5 million carats smuggled; official produc- 
tion was almost 8.1 million carats). Smuggling decreased follow- 
ing the legalization of artisanal diamond mining in 1983 and the 
establishment of official, licensed purchasing counters to buy and 
market artisanal production; official production increased cor- 
respondingly. But by 1987 there were already indications that smug- 
gling was once again on the increase, and it soared in the troubled 
early 1990s. 

In the first eleven months of 1991, Miba exported an estimated 
9.6 million carats. The artisanal purchasing counters accounted 
for an additional 7.2 million carats. Actual output was much higher 
than the official combined total of 16.8 million carats, as a result 



181 



Zaire: A Country Study 

of extensive large-scale smuggling. Reportedly, many of the smug- 
gled diamonds originate from the artisanal counters, aided by high- 
level government collusion. 

The figures for 1991 diamond exports were lower than the 18 
million carats produced in 1990 because of the country's chaotic 
situation, including factors such as looting and flight out of the coun- 
try by diamond traders. Zairian diamond production in 1992 was 
estimated at just 15 million carats. Despite its decline, the diamond 
industry remains vital to the Zairian economy — and to the Mobutu 
regime — because it is widely regarded as the country's last remain- 
ing source of hard currency. A large portion of Miba's official 
revenues — US$46.3 million in 1991 — are believed to go directly 
to Mobutu's coffers. Moreover, diamond dealers pay Zaire's cen- 
tral bank 1.5 percent of their official total exports, estimated at 
US$185 million in 1991. Illicit trade in the 1990s was estimated 
to be as much as twice the officially recorded transactions, but it 
was not known how much Mobutu profited from the unregistered 
diamond trade. 

Industry 

The manufacturing sector accounted for an estimated 1 percent 
of GDP in 1987, and 1.7 percent in 1988, down from 9 percent 
in 1981. The sector is concentrated in Kinshasa and the mining 
area of Shaba Region and consists largely of consumer goods, such 
as food processing, textile manufacturing, beer, cigarettes, metal- 
working and woodworking, and vehicle assembly. Manufacturing 
as a whole is hindered by many problems, including chronic mis- 
management, lack of foreign exchange as well as long-term invest- 
ment capital (especially the reluctance of foreigners to invest because 
of past nationalization schemes), a lack of spare parts, an inade- 
quate transportation system, limited access to international markets, 
and a small domestic market that largely consists of consumers with 
little expendable income. Liberalization of economic policies in the 
late 1980s, however, resulted in an increase in production in some 
fields, most notably textiles, plastics, tobacco, and breweries. 

The policy of import substitution begun between 1969 and 1972 
was largely abandoned during the 1980s. The two most important 
enterprises established under the import-substitution policy were 
a General Motors vehicle assembly plant and a Continental Grains 
wheat mill, which was dependent on imported wheat. Goodyear 
also built a US$16 million tire plant in 1972. Promised rubber plan- 
tation investments never materialized. 

By 1987 both General Motors and Goodyear had sold their en- 
terprises to local businessmen, who were rumored to be backed 



182 



Room where copper is electrolyzed at the Gecamines Luilu refinery near Kolwezi 
Flow racks for the electrolyzed copper, Gecamines Shituru refinery near Likasi 

Courtesy Gecamines 



183 



Zaire: A Country Study 

by high government officials. General Motors and Goodyear had 
had chronic difficulties competing with cheap imports, which were 
frequently smuggled into the country or brought in exempt from 
import duties. Additionally, the proportion of raw materials im- 
ported for manufacturing was high. Moreover, companies suffered 
tremendous production difficulties when the foreign-exchange crisis 
of the mid-1970s hit. 

Throughout the 1980s, most Zairian factories operated at just 
30 percent of installed capacity. By most accounts, manufacturing 
in the formal economy had virtually ceased by 1992 in the wake 
of general economic chaos and several waves of military-led loot- 
ing and rioting in Kinshasa. Factories, stripped bare, were forced 
to close, leaving thousands in the capital out of work. Shops and 
restaurants also closed. 

Traditionally, numerous Zairian entrepreneurs have operated 
small- (three to four employees) and medium-sized businesses in 
the informal sector in Kinshasa. Such activities have continued, 
producing a wide range of products — e.g., furniture, clothes, crafts, 
food, and even vehicle chassis. Most such enterprises are unlicensed, 
but they fill a critical need in supplying the populace with other- 
wise unavailable or unaffordable goods. 

Energy 

The government has a broad involvement in the energy sector. 
It holds part ownership in all energy enterprises, including the Na- 
tional Electric Company (Societe Nationale d'Electricite — Snel), 
it sets price controls, and it reviews all investments in the sector. 
The Ministry of National Economy and Industry had authority 
over pricing for electricity and oil products but eventually lifted 
price controls in 1983. The government also holds minority shares 
in the fuel-product distribution companies: Mobil, Fina, and Shell. 

Exploitation of major resources at times has been poorly adapt- 
ed to meeting the country's overall energy needs. The government 
has tended to concentrate primarily on petroleum resources and 
electric power and to neglect the potential of the country's abun- 
dant biomass. The lack of sector- wide planning and coordination, 
a weak energy infrastructure, ill-defined pricing policies, and in- 
stitutional deficiencies have constrained efficient development and 
utilization of energy resources. 

Various government energy entities execute their duties in iso- 
lation, and responsibility is divided among the numerous and 
diverse agencies, with none having access to information required 
to define sector policies or the capacity to implement them. This 
decentralization and the absence of an effective coordinating agent 



184 




Gecamines Lubumbashi copper smelter 
Concentrators for copper and cobalt at Gecamines Kamoto mills near Kolwezi 

Courtesy Gecamines 



185 



Zaire: A Country Study 

have hindered the formulation of a cohesive sector strategy. In 
response to this disorder, a National Energy Commission within 
the Department of Land Management, Mines, and Energy was 
created in 1985. The French provided and funded an adviser to 
the commission, but its effectiveness remained in doubt. 

Petroleum and Other Fuels 

In 1956 exploration began of the Atlantic coastal basin, the most 
accessible of Zaire's petroleum reserves. Offshore oil production 
began in 1975, while onshore production started in 1979. Chevron- 
Gulf led a consortium controlling offshore production, while a Bel- 
gian concern had the onshore concession. In June 1992, the Zairian 
government seized the assets of United States and European oil 
companies operating in Zaire in order to relieve fuel shortages. The 
Zairian government, avoiding use of the word nationalization, 
promised compensation and insisted that the measure was tem- 
porary. 

Until the late 1980s, Zaire's petroleum reserves were small by 
world standards but larger than those of many countries in sub- 
Saharan Africa. In the early 1990s, oil reserves were estimated at 
140 million barrels. It seems likely that these reserves will be ex- 
hausted unless continuing exploration near the borders with Uganda 
and Tanzania is successful. 

Because domestic production is a heavy crude best suited for fuel 
oil, all of it is exported for refining. Production was 10.7 million 
barrels in 1988, down from previous years, 9.9 million barrels in 
1989, some 10.9 million barrels in 1990, and 9.9 million barrels 
in 1991. Gas-injection techniques are used in the oldest onshore 
fields to increase petroleum production. 

Petroleum consumption since the late 1970s has remained fairly 
constant; limited availability of foreign exchange is the main con- 
straint on increased purchases. Indeed, as reserves of foreign ex- 
change began to dwindle in the 1990s, Zaire suffered an acute 
gasoline shortage. Shortages also were due to riots and looting. In 
addition, Zaire's poor road and rail network restricts supply to out- 
lying areas (see Transportation and Telecommunications, this ch.). 
In June 1985, PetroZaire, the national petroleum company, lost 
its import monopoly for fuel and other finished petroleum products, 
and at the same time the government removed price controls. Sup- 
ply and distribution improved gradually. 

Zaire imports all of the petroleum that it refines because its sole 
refinery, located in Moanda on the Atlantic coast, is not designed 
to handle the heavy crude produced domestically. The government 
has been unable to secure financial backing to overhaul the plant 



186 



The Economy 



so that it can refine heavy Zairian crude. As a result, the refinery 
is forced to operate solely on small quantities of crude oil import- 
ed from Nigeria. The refinery has an installed capacity of 750,000 
tons per year, but in 1986 processed under 90,000 tons. 

Domestic coal sources are all of low grade. Located in central 
and northeast Shaba Region, coal is used entirely by a cement plant 
at Kalemie. Production was estimated at 123,000 tons in 1988; it 
increased to 125,000 tons in 1989 and 126,000 tons in 1990. Higher 
grade coal and coke needed for the metallurgical industry are im- 
ported. 

Fuelwood and charcoal are by far the most heavily consumed 
energy sources in Zaire, used primarily for household cooking. But 
there is no organized supply of fuelwood in urban areas, and popu- 
lation growth in urban areas, such as Kinshasa, has contributed 
to deforestation. The price of charcoal has risen because it has to 
be trucked in to urban centers from ever greater distances. The 
steady price increases have constrained growth in small-scale in- 
dustries that use wood, such as fish smoking, and have put pres- 
sure on household budgets. Moreover, the use of wood exceeds 
regrowth of forests, and reforestation efforts have been slow. 

Electricity 

Electricity production is concentrated in Bas-Zaire and Shaba 
regions, and about 95 percent of all electricity is sold in Kinshasa 
and Shaba. An estimated 73 percent of Snel's sales are made in 
Shaba, 57 percent of the total to the mining parastatal Gecamines. 
In early 1992, Snel experienced considerable losses following the 
destruction and looting in the country. It also lacked spare parts. 
By late 1992, the electrical system was nearing breakdown. 

Home consumption of electricity and public lighting account for 
only a small percentage of electricity produced; most electricity con- 
sumption is closely tied to the copper market. Demand stagnated 
during the slump from 1974 through 1979, recovered slightly in 
1980, and then dropped again in 1982 and 1983 before recovering 
and reaching a record high of 5,455 gigawatt-hours in 1986. De- 
mand again declined in the early 1990s. 

Zaire has tremendous hydroelectric potential (estimated at 
100,000 megawatts), accounting for half of the hydroelectric poten- 
tial of the entire African continent. Installed capacity was estimat- 
ed at 2,486 megawatts in 1987. Hydropower, in fact, accounts for 
95 percent of all electricity produced in the country, the rest com- 
ing from small thermal units. 

The largest hydroelectric site is on the lower part of the Congo 
River, forty kilometers upstream from its mouth, where the river 



187 



Zaire: A Country Study 

drops 300 meters to sea level. One hundred meters of this drop 
is located in a twelve-kilometer stretch at the site of the Inga dams 
barrage. Sketchy colonial plans to tap this source of power were 
postponed because of the political uncertainty at the end of the 
colonial period and the dearth of customers for the immense quan- 
tities of electric power to be produced. 

Inga I, a dam and generating facility built on this site in 1972, 
has a generating capacity of 300 megawatts. The adjacent Inga 
II dam has a generating capacity of 1 ,000 megawatts. In 1986 the 
two produced 3,100 gigawatt-hours of electricity. 

The high-voltage transmission line from the dams to the Shaba 
mining region was the longest direct current line in the world at 
the time of its construction. It stretches 1,725 kilometers from the 
Inga I and Inga II dams in Bas-Zaire to Kolwezi, the northern- 
most mining center in the Shaba copper-cobalt mining area. The 
project was chosen over competing ideas for power delivery to Sha- 
ba, including the construction of a new dam in Shaba itself. The 
high- voltage transmission line was intended to transmit about 1 ,200 
megawatts of power to Shaba. However, it is grossly underutilized, 
with installed capacity at only about 560 megawatts and actual trans- 
mission to Shaba at about 200 megawatts. By late 1992, observers 
feared that the vital Inga- Shaba power line could not long remain 
operational. Its upkeep has been problematic since the departure 
in late 1991, following widespread rioting and looting, of the for- 
eign technicians and mechanics (mostly Belgians and Italians) who 
provided most of its maintenance. 

In the late 1980s, the Zairian state again demonstrated its fasci- 
nation with hydroelectric schemes. A small hydroelectric power sta- 
tion was opened at Mobayi-Mbongo near Mobutu's birthplace in 
a remote section of Equateur Region near the border with the Cen- 
tral African Republic. 

In July 1992, Zaire and Egypt reached agreement on the con- 
struction of a high-tension electric line from the Inga dams to Egypt, 
to transmit 600 megawatts of electricity to Egypt. Observers be- 
lieve this plan is unlikely to be realized, however. The Inga power 
stations do supply some power to neighboring Congo, and the 
potential certainly exists for Zaire to export electricity to other neigh- 
bors should its economic situation ever be normalized. 

Transportation and Telecommunications 

Zaire's severely dilapidated transportation infrastructure is 
perhaps the major constraint on the country's economic develop- 
ment. The country's large size and the physical limitations imposed 
by its topography are major factors in the underdevelopment of 



188 



The Economy 



the transportation system, but poor management by inefficient 
parastatals and corruption are primarily responsible for the sec- 
tor's daunting deficiencies. During colonial times, the transporta- 
tion system was well developed to transport food products from 
Kivu and minerals from Shaba (then Katanga Province) to the At- 
lantic Coast for export. The transportation infrastructure has been 
neglected since independence, however. 

Roads traditionally played a secondary role in the Zairian trans- 
portation network, behind railroads and waterways. A network of 
approximately 145,000 kilometers of roads exists in Zaire, although 
the country's vast interior is virtually devoid of roads (see fig. 11). 
Only 2,500 kilometers are paved, originally including the 350- 
kilometer Kinshasa-Matadi link, which is nearly thirty years old 
and was not built for the heavy loads it carries. By 1992 there were 
reports that only about forty kilometers of the Kinshasa-Matadi 
road were still paved. The road from Kikwit to Kinshasa and the 
links among the mineral centers of Lubumbashi, Kolwezi, and Lika- 
si in Shaba also are paved. In the early 1990s, the entire road net- 
work had slipped into a state of serious disrepair; a journey of 150 
kilometers could take up to twenty-four hours. 

The situation has obvious implications for the movement of both 
passengers and in particular freight, 80 percent of which report- 
edly moved by private road transport in 1988. This vital service 
is, however, in jeopardy in the early 1990s. Trucks, spare parts, 
and fuel are in short supply, and the condition of most roads (es- 
pecially secondary and rural roads) ranges from appalling to un- 
usable. Local residents and entrepreneurs, religious groups, and 
some large companies have attempted to maintain some roads but 
with limited success nationwide. 

Official passenger transport services in Kinshasa are also inade- 
quate, but unofficial, mostly unlicensed suppliers have been able 
to fill much of the gap. Deploying an armada of pickup trucks, 
covered trucks, and taxibuses, they provide half the city's public 
transportation, offering better service at a lower cost to the city's 
workers and residents. 

Zaire has 5, 138 kilometers of railroad in three discontinuous lines. 
A 366-kilometer standard- gauge (1.067 meter) line links Kinsha- 
sa with Zaire's main port of Matadi. Over 1,100 kilometers of 
narrow-gauge (1 meter and 0.6 meter) rail connect towns in north- 
east Zaire. The bulk of the system, however, consists of a network 
of standard-gauge lines in southeast Zaire used primarily to ex- 
port minerals. International connections exist with Angola's Ben- 
guela Railway (not operating in the early 1990s), with the Zambian 



189 



Zaire: A Country Study 



I CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 

\ 

CAMEROON V - • 

v 




( CONGO } ^andaka 



tABON ( 



V ANGOLA / [Bandundu 

-/ ~. ^Kinshasa r- ^ eb0 

\^^Kananga 

- mm) , \ 

Soma ^ Vsk X 

ANGOLA ^ 



Ocean 



N 

k 



International boundary 

® National capital 
• Populated place 

Road 

1 11 1 Railroad 

International airport 
Major port 

100 200 Kilometers 



100 200 Miles 



' ',; ^^-P^rlukasi ; 
\ .. >w ■ • • Kolwezi *\ I/O 
} <- Lubumbashh W 

ZAMBIA \ j 

: Boundary representation 
| ool necessarily authoritative 



Figure 11. Transportation System, 1993 



and South African rail systems, and with Tanzania's rail lines via 
a ferry across Lake Tanganyika. 

The Zairian National Railroad Company (Societe Nationale de 
Chemins de Fer Zairois — SNCZ) is headquartered in Lubumbashi, 
the regional capital of Shaba. Since 1974 SNCZ has been a state- 
owned company, responsible for the operation and maintenance 
of the rail line between Lubumbashi and Ilebo on the Kasai River. 
The National Transport Board of Zaire (Office National des Trans- 
ports au Zaire — Onatra) manages the Matadi-Kinshasa line as well 
as transport on the Congo River. 

The railroads, too, are in desperate need of repair. Train trans- 
port is slow, cumbersome, and unreliable. Little attention has been 
paid the railroads since independence. The railroads are suffering 



190 



The Economy 



from a lack of working locomotives and rolling stock as well as de- 
teriorating railbeds. In the late 1980s, SNCZ undertook a US$75 
million rehabilitation effort financed by the World Bank, the Afri- 
can Development Bank, and the governments of Belgium, France, 
and West Germany. By 1989 the project was at the half-way point 
in terms of committed funding. It sought to refurbish 263 kilo- 
meters of the Kinshasa-Matadi and Lubumbashi-Ilebo links. Track 
beds were rebuilt and new rail and cross ties installed. The plan 
called for the overhaul of twenty diesel locomotives and thirty-eight 
electric locomotives as well as for the purchase of new rolling stock 
and material to manufacture rail cars locally. Most of the project 
had been set for completion in the early 1990s, but little if any 
progress was expected in light of the prevailing economic chaos. 

The rail and river transportation network between the copper- 
mining region of Shaba and the country's principal port of Mata- 
di is called the National Route (Voie Nationale). This network is 
Zaire's lifeline, a 2,665-kilometer combination of railroad between 
Lubumbashi and Ilebo, river transport from Ilebo to Kinshasa, 
and rail once again between Kinshasa and the port of Matadi. (Be- 
cause of rapids below Kinshasa, the river is not navigable between 
Kinshasa and Matadi.) It is the only route between the mining 
region and the ocean entirely within Zaire. This route became even 
more crucial after the 1,400-kilometer Benguela Railway linking 
Shaba to the sea via the Angolan port of Lobito was closed in 1975 
because of the Angolan civil war. (In 1991 plans were underway 
to reopen this rail line following an agreement between Portugal 
and Belgium, but no further progress had been made by 1993.) 
Zaire once sent almost half of its exports via the Benguela Rail- 
way. Mineral shipments traveling via the National Route to Matadi 
can take as long as two months and average about forty- five days. 
Moreover, because the load on the route is limited, Zaire has been 
forced to rely heavily on South African rail lines for between 33 
percent and 40 percent of its mineral exports. 

Inland waterways have traditionally been an important mode 
of internal transportation, but in the early 1990s, river transport 
was limited because the marking of navigable channels had been 
neglected, and barges were both old and in short supply. 

The Congo River is the most significant of the country's rivers, 
and both passenger and freight ships ply the navigable section be- 
tween Kinshasa and Kisangani. In late 1993, however, there were 
reports that riverboats had ceased operating between Kisangani 
and Kinshasa because of lack of fuel and spare parts. 

Ports are limited because Zaire, nearly landlocked, has only a 
tiny coastline of just forty kilometers. Matadi on the lower Congo 



191 



Zaire: A Country Study 

River is Zaire's principal port and handles 90 percent of the coun- 
try's nonmineral exports. Efficient cargo and passenger transpor- 
tation at the Atlantic port of Boma, at Matadi, and between Ilebo 
on the Kasai River and Kinshasa are constrained by lack of equip- 
ment, the need for better charting and maintenance along the two 
rivers, and the fact that Matadi is a relatively shallow port and thus 
not accessible by large vessels. Donor countries have attempted to 
improve service at the ports of Kinshasa and Matadi, and a new 
deep-water port at Banana on the Atlantic also was at one time 
under consideration but has been abandoned given the economic 
situation prevailing in the early 1990s. 

The cut-off of aid to Zaire and the deterioration of the economy 
in the early 1990s have halted economic development efforts, and 
shipping, like other forms of transport, is in serious disarray. Ac- 
cording to one report, Zaire's maritime company has been forced 
to sell off all its boats. 

Large distances between urban centers and a lack of modern 
ground transportation make air transport of particular importance, 
although domestic air services deteriorated substantially in the 1980s 
and 1990s. The number of airlines serving Zaire had increased sig- 
nificantly in the 1980s, and included the formation of at least two 
private Zairian airlines that competed with the state-owned national 
carrier, Air Zaire. Both the number of destinations served within 
Zaire and the international links grew substantially in the wake 
of liberalization measures begun in 1983. Several European carri- 
ers as well as Air Zaire and a private airline, Scibe Airlift, linked 
Kinshasa to places in Europe and the rest of Africa. But by 1992 
most foreign airlines no longer landed at Kinshasa's airport, which 
was badly damaged by looting in late 1991 . (Some flights resumed 
in late 1992.) People wishing to enter Zaire by air often land in 
Brazzaville in Congo and take a ferry across the Congo River to 
Zaire. 

Air Zaire has been under the management of the French airline, 
Air Transport Union (Union de Transports Aeriens — UTA) since 
the fall of 1986, but became virtually bankrupt as a result of the 
country's economic crisis in the 1990s. Air Zaire once operated 
four jets, but one was repossessed by Belgium and another by Is- 
rael for nonpayment of debts. Mobutu reportedly commandeered 
the other two to bring in newly printed bank notes from the printer 
in Germany. 

The Postal and Telecommunications Board provides overseas 
telephone and domestic and overseas mail service. In 1984 the coun- 
try had only 30,300 telephones, almost all of them in the capital. 
A new satellite ground station was installed at Matadi in 1985, which 



192 



Ferry 
on the 
Congo River, 
Equateur Region 



Marechal Mobutu 
Bridge over 
the Congo River 
near Matadi 
Courtesy Agence 
Zaire Press e 



1 



4 







193 



Zaire: A Country Study 

greatly improved the quality of international calls. Calling Brus- 
sels from Kinshasa, in fact, was reportedly far easier than making 
a connection to a city in the interior. An American company, in 
partnership with local business interests, established a cellular tele- 
phone system for Kinshasa in June 1991. In 1990 there were re- 
ported to be 32,000 telephones in Zaire, but by 1992 the telephone 
system as a whole was reported to be dysfunctional. 

Broadcast facilities increased throughout the 1980s, and residents 
of most larger towns can now receive radio and television program- 
ming. Fourteen cities have television stations. There were an esti- 
mated 40,000 television sets and 3.7 million radio receivers in Zaire 
in 1990. The capital has one medium-wave amplitude-modulation 
(AM) radio station and one frequency-modulation (FM) station 
with programming in French; there are two other AM and two 
FM stations in other cities. Five shortwave stations transmit 
programming in French, Kiswahili, Lingala, and several other lan- 
guages to listeners in more remote areas. All radio stations are 
government owned and part of the Voice of Zaire (Voix du Zaire) 
network. 

The state of telecommunications in the early 1990s was report- 
ed to be deplorable. The only reliable national radio network is 
said to be that of the Roman Catholic Church. 

Foreign Economic Relations 
Trade and Balance of Payments 

Total exports for 1991 were estimated at US$1 .5 billion (see ta- 
ble 12, Appendix). Six products — copper, cobalt, crude petrole- 
um, diamonds, coffee, and gold generally accounted for over 
three-fourths of export earnings (see table 13, Appendix). Total 
imports in 1991 were estimated at nearly US$1.2 billion, with the 
largest single import, US$362 million, being goods for Gecamines 
(see table 14, Appendix). Luxury goods for expatriates and the 
Zairian elite also constitute a substantial portion of imports. 

The trade balance was positive throughout the late 1980s, but 
by 1991 had dropped sharply because of decreases in world mar- 
ket prices for many of Zaire's commodity exports (copper, coffee, 
diamonds, crude oil, and cobalt), drops in production, and rises 
in import prices. The current account balance (which includes goods 
and services) was consistently negative, however, because of the 
massive increase in external debt- servicing requirements. Trade 
surpluses were more than swallowed up by outflows on the ser- 
vices account. Inflows on services could not make up the deficit, 
resulting in a negative current account balance and, generally, in 



194 



Spanish fishing boat at Zaire's main port of Matadi on the Congo River 

Courtesy Agence Zaire Presse 
Shallow -draft dugout on Lac Tumba, Equateur Region 



195 



Zaire: A Country Study 

a negative overall balance of payments as well because net capital 
transfers were also insufficient to cover the deficit. Ironically, Zaire's 
current account showed great improvement (by more than 75 per- 
cent) in 1992, largely because of a dramatic 52 percent decline in 
imports, which outweighed the 35 percent drop in exports. 

Belgium, the United States, and other West European countries 
are the destinations of most of Zaire's exports (see table 15, Ap- 
pendix). However, since 1989 South Africa has also been an in- 
creasingly important trading partner. Zaire reportedly exchanges 
coffee, wood, and minerals for South African food, agricultural 
machinery, and spare parts. Official figures on trade with South 
Africa are sketchy, but there is an abundance of South African food 
products available in Kinshasa, including large quantities of fresh 
produce. 

The economic problems confronting developing countries that 
rely predominantly on extractive product exports have been well 
documented. In Zaire agricultural exports declined steadily from 
nearly half the value of all exports in 1958 to 11.6 percent in 1986. 
Coffee was the primary agricultural export commodity, contributing 
7 percent of export revenues in 1988, while cotton was no longer 
being exported in the early 1990s but was produced mainly for 
domestic consumption. Copper and cobalt alone accounted for near- 
ly half of all export earnings in 1987 and 1988. Three of the four 
largest companies in Zaire (Gecamines, Gulf, and Miba) accounted 
for 70 percent of export earnings and were mineral or petroleum 
companies. Mineral prices fluctuated dramatically throughout the 
decade. Even for cobalt, where Zaire and Zambia had a near mo- 
nopoly, the two countries had difficulty maintaining a price floor. 

Theft, looting, and smuggling also are widespread in the Zairi- 
an economy. Cross-border smuggling and unlicensed trade have 
been widespread since independence but have expanded marked- 
ly in the troubled 1990s. Although both activities deprive the govern- 
ment of revenues, they do provide consumers with goods that are 
otherwise unavailable or unattainable because of the lack of for- 
eign exchange and hard currency needed for official imports. 
Traders smuggle out primary products such as gold, diamonds, 
cobalt, coffee, and ivory in order to barter for or obtain the hard 
currency to purchase consumer goods such as vehicles, spare parts, 
fuel, electrical appliances, construction materials, pharmaceuticals, 
and foodstuffs. 

Foreign Aid 

In 1990 Zaire received an estimated US$711.1 million in de- 
velopment assistance. This sum represented a decline from US$805 



196 



The Economy 



million in foreign aid from bilateral donors in 1987. France, Ger- 
many, and Italy accounted for much of the foreign aid in 1990, 
with France (US$180 million) replacing Belgium as Zaire's primary 
development partner. Belgium's importance to Zaire as a source 
of aid and trade declined in the late 1980s and early 1990s, as rela- 
tions between the two countries broke down over the issue of human 
rights abuses in Zaire. As Zaire's economic situation deteriorated 
in the early 1990s, foreign donors and creditors provided assistance 
primarily in the form of food aid. Most other bilateral and multi- 
lateral aid was terminated in 1990-91 and is unlikely to resume 
until Mobutu leaves the scene and democratization takes hold in 
Zaire. However, China reportedly has become more active in Zaire 
since the cutoff of aid from the West. More than 1,000 Chinese 
technicians are reported to be working in Zaire on agricultural and 
forestry projects. 

In late 1992, in an attempt to tackle Zaire's economic crisis and 
court foreign donors, the government of Prime Minister Etienne 
Tshisekedi wa Mulumba announced its commitment to economic 
liberalization (including privatization of some parastatals) and 
stabilization. To that end, it initiated several measures, such as 
the imposition of import quotas and tightened controls of the money 
supply. In addition, the administration declared its intention of 
curbing government spending, controlling inflation, and ending 
corruption, in particular illegal disbursements and the arbitrary 
allocation of credit. International organizations and various foreign 
governments expressed interest in resuming aid but remained cau- 
tious, unconvinced that a credible stabilization program was possi- 
ble in Zaire. Belgium and France provided additional humanitarian 
assistance, but continued to insist that a full resumption of aid de- 
pends on democratic change in Zaire (in particular, concrete evi- 
dence that the prime minister's government actually controls 
finances and the military) and an IMF-World Bank sponsorship 
of the government's economic program. 

Foreign Investment 

In the early 1970s, direct foreign investment ranged from US$50 
million to US$100 million annually before dropping with the on- 
set of Zairianization. To entice foreign investors to return to Zaire 
after the economic decline brought on by nationalization, in 1981 
the government created a free-trade zone in Bas-Zaire under the 
direct authority of the president. Zaire hoped to attract power- 
intensive export-oriented industries with the offer of relatively in- 
expensive power and tax incentives. But although there had been 



197 



Zaire: A Country Study 

many proposals to establish industries in the free-trade zone, at 
the end of the 1980s there had been no firm commitments. 

Zaire and the United States signed a bilateral investment treaty 
in 1984. The treaty was, in part, aimed at supporting Zaire's eco- 
nomic reform efforts. The treaty proved to be more symbolic than 
practical. Little new United States private investment ensued, 
despite promotion by the Overseas Private Investment Corpora- 
tion (OPIC), which led a small investment mission to Zaire in 1986. 
Zaire also had bilateral investment agreements with France, Bel- 
gium, Switzerland, West Germany, Canada, Denmark, and the 
Netherlands. Most foreign investment, albeit a significantly smaller 
share than at independence, was still Belgian. 

The new investment code promulgated in April 1986 was an im- 
portant step toward restoring investor confidence and mobilizing 
foreign capital. It incorporated various existing tax benefits and 
introduced new ones. Further advantages were offered to inves- 
tors depending on the location of the enterprise, number of jobs 
generated, type of activity, training and promotion of local staff, 
export orientation, and value added to local resources. Most of the 
benefits were available for five years, but some ranged from one 
to ten years and even longer for mining ventures, which were also 
exempted from taxes on reinvested profits. Repatriation of profits 
and earnings was guaranteed for foreign investors. Despite the 
code's enticements, Zaire experienced only a marginal increase in 
foreign direct investment. Moreover, not all projects approved un- 
der the investment code were actually started. 

Despite increasing incentives, foreign investment was slow and 
fitful. The transportation system was still in a state of gross dis- 
repair, although rehabilitation efforts had been under way for some 
time. Communication was also difficult, and the population's pur- 
chasing power remained low. In addition to the daunting physical 
and logistical difficulties of doing business in Zaire, new investors, 
especially nontraditional ones such as United States business in- 
terests, were discouraged by Zaire's reputation for unbridled cor- 
ruption. It was thought in many circles that these irregularities were 
among the reasons that the United States business community had 
largely ceded Zaire to Belgium and other European countries as 
their sphere of economic influence. 

Prospects for Growth 

Zaire's ability to achieve long-term economic development and 
growth depends in large measure on the willingness of the govern- 
ment to resolve decisively the conflict between authoritarian 
patrimonialism and democracy. Patrimonialism has led inexorably 



198 



The Economy 



to widespread corruption, economic mismanagement and miscal- 
culation, and chronic borrowing. 

Resolution of this conflict is considered vital to removing Zaire's 
primary economic constraints: a heavy external debt burden, which 
has grown as a result of repeated reschedulings at market interest 
rates; dependence on primary commodity exports — copper, coffee, 
cobalt, and diamonds — that have poor market price prospects and 
are in any case subject to severe price fluctuations; an outdated 
and deteriorating transportation and communication infrastruc- 
ture; and a badly neglected rural sector. In order to resolve its 
chronic economic problems and move toward sustained growth, 
Zaire would need to generate confidence in its institutions and to 
mobilize and invest substantial additional resources, both domes- 
tic and foreign. Observers increasingly believe that such changes 
will not be possible so long as the Mobutu regime remains in power. 
Thus, political change is the key to economic development. 

The writings of Thomas M. Callaghy, Thomas E. Turner, and 
Crawford Young continue to provide the most insightful analyses 
of the Zairian state. For analysis focused more directly on the econ- 
omy, see David Gould's Bureaucratic Corruption and Underdevelopment 
in the Third World: The Case of Zaire; Zaire: The Political Economy of 
Underdevelopment, edited by Guy Gran; and Gregory Kronsten's Zaire 
to the 1990s: Will Retrenchment Work?. Janet MacGaffey's The Real 
Economy of Zaire provides an insightful analysis of Zaire's vibrant 
unofficial economy. The Economist Intelligence Unit's quarterly 
Country Report: Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi and annual Country Profile: 
Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi are the best sources for current economic 
and political trends and up-to-date statistical information. The an- 
nual Africa South of the Sahara also provides information on current 
economic developments in Zaire, as well as a statistical survey. 

Data on various sectors of the economy are provided in special- 
ized publications such as the United States Department of the In- 
terior, Bureau of Mines, Mineral Perspectives: Zaire; Jean-Claude 
Willame's L 'Epopee dTnga; and the International Petroleum Encyclope- 
dia. (For further information and complete citations, see Bib- 
liography.) 



199 



Chapter 4. Government and Politics 



Celebrants below a billboard of the flaming torch in the national flag, 
20th of May Stadium, Kinshasa 



SINCE 1965, JOSEPH-DESIRE MOBUTU, or Mobutu Sese 
Seko as he has called himself since 1971, has thoroughly dominat- 
ed the political life of Zaire, a fact reflected in the tide that he award- 
ed himself, "Father of the Nation." Mobutu presides over a political 
system that has the formal trappings of a republic but is in reality 
the personal fiefdom of the president, who uses the national trea- 
sury as his personal checkbook and disburses both rewards and 
punishments at will. Corruption, nepotism, and cronyism, as well 
as maladministration and inefficiency, are pervasive and widespread 
in the Zairian political system. 

From 1967 until 1990, the primary instrument of Mobutu's con- 
trol of the government was the country's sole legal political party, 
the Popular Revolutionary Movement (Mouvement Populaire de 
la Revolution — MPR), a Mobutu creation. In theory, the party 
was a separate entity intended to parallel the state apparatus and 
to guide and control it. But in reality the party had virtually no 
independent existence from the state, so the state and party were 
effectively fused. 

On April 24, 1990, Mobutu radically transformed the political en- 
vironment by announcing the establishment of a competitive multi- 
party system. But his move, generally regarded as a calculated 
attempt to quell domestic and international pressures for change 
rather than a sincere commitment to reform, unleashed volatile 
forces that threatened to topple the regime, although Mobutu did 
everything in his power to retain his hold on the government. In- 
dependent political parties were permitted to register, with the 
Union for Democracy and Social Progress (Union pour la Demo- 
cratic et le Progres Social — UDPS) emerging as the main opposi- 
tion party. 

In mid- 1991 Mobutu finally convened a long-promised nation- 
al conference, ostensibly designed to oversee the drafting of a new 
constitution and to manage the transition to a democratic, multi- 
party political system. But inevitably conflicts arose between a con- 
ference determined to assert its sovereign powers and a president 
equally determined not to cede control of the government, and the 
conference was very much an on-again-off-again institution through- 
out 1991 and most of 1992. 

In August 1992, the conference passed a Transitional Act to serve 
as a provisional constitution. The Transitional Act established a 
parliamentary system with a figurehead president, a High Coun- 
cil of the Republic (Haut Conseil de la Republique — HCR) to serve 



203 



Zaire: A Country Study 

as a provisional legislature; and a first state commissioner (prime 
minister) to serve as head of government. Under the terms of the 
Transitional Act, Etienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba, head of the 
UDPS, was duly elected to head the transitional government. But 
the new administration, although recognized by the United States 
and other Western powers, has never been able to govern because 
of Mobutu's continued control of key military and security forces, 
which he has used to obstruct the functioning of the transitional 
government, to intimidate the opposition, to incite ethnic violence, 
and to promote instability throughout the country. In early 1993, 
Mobutu went further in repudiating the authority of the transi- 
tional government by appointing a rival administration under a 
different prime minister, Faustin Birindwa. Since that time, a po- 
litical stalemate has prevailed in Zaire, with two parallel govern- 
ments vying for international acceptance and political control over 
a country in crisis, its economy and social system in total disarray. 

Postindependence Political Development 

Establishment of a Personalistic Regime 

After the bedlam of the First Republic, 1960-65, the preceding 
colonial regime seemed to offer an alternative model of order and 
discipline (see the First Republic, 1960-65, ch. 1). Thus, as he 
moved to depoliticize the legislative and administrative structures 
of the First Republic, Mobutu consciously restored structures of 
the colonial era. Mobutu and his associates attempted to establish 
a nation based solely on the colonial state, but without the coloni- 
al trinity, which also included the Roman Catholic Church and 
colonial companies (see The Apparatus of Control, ch. 1). In es- 
sence, Mobutu attempted to develop a political religion to replace 
the imported Christian faith, and a single party, the MPR, was 
to be the "church" of that religion. 

Mobutu and his associates consolidated their control of the coun- 
try 's security apparatus by eliminating professionally autonomous 
military units, gradually suppressing rival ethnic and regional seces- 
sionist rebellions, establishing an effective state security agency, 
and maintaining linkages with external backers, who provided ex- 
tensive training and equipment. To achieve greater national in- 
dependence, Mobuto's regime diversified relations with external 
patrons (France, China, Israel, the United States, Belgium, and 
the conservative Arab states) and expropriated colonial enterprises. 
The Congo (Zaire was formally called the Republic of the Congo 
from independence to August 1, 1964, when it became the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, which name was used until 



204 



Government and Politics 



October 27, 1971.) solicited a multitude of new links to Western 
multinational corporations and banks. The revenue needs of the 
state were to be met by sharp increases in fiscal impositions on the 
colonial corporate structure, which had been very lightly taxed, 
by perpetuation of the taxes imposed on the peasant majority, and 
by drawing in major new resources from abroad through loans, 
aid, and investments as well as by mortgaging the country's rich 
natural resource base. 

What began as a collegial alliance of the Binza Group (a group 
of Mobutu supporters named for the prosperous suburb where its 
members lived); the top military command; some former supporters 
of Patrice Lumumba, who was the Congo's first prime minister; 
and young, often radical university graduates, gradually became 
an assemblage of courtiers doing the bidding of the presidential 
monarch (see The Second Republic, 1965-90: The Rebirth of Bula 
Matari, ch. 1). Mobutu carried out this transformation by suborn- 
ing former colleagues and adversaries, thereby sapping the autono- 
mous power bases of influential First Republic officials. Systematic 
rotation of high office was practiced, and a pool of vacant posi- 
tions was sustained through the continuous pensioning of former 
collaborators into lucrative business opportunities. Access to high 
rank in all state agencies depended upon presidential favor. The 
sanction for not cooperating in this new elite was exile or imprison- 
ment on trumped up or real charges of corruption, nepotism, or 
subversion. 

The term presidential monarch became increasingly appropriate as 
applied to Mobutu. Mobutu's retinue was reported to consist of 
some 600 courtiers, and members of his family were treated as 
royalty. His son, Mobutu Nyiwa, was trained to succeed him, oc- 
cupying a series of ministerial posts. President Mobutu increas- 
ingly spent more and more time at the several palaces he had built 
in his ancestral village, Gbadolite, which was transformed into a 
modern town, endowed with an international airport, satellite tele- 
vision antennas, street lights, and other amenities that most Con- 
golese centers lacked. The president often met with his cabinet at 
Gbadolite, and he received foreign dignitaries there. 

In 1973, espousing what Mobutu claimed to be Zairian nation- 
alism, the regime embarked on a quest for economic and cultural 
emancipation in a sweeping program known as Zairianization (see 
Glossary). In the economic sphere, however, Zairianization resulted 
in an ill-advised and costly nationalization and confiscation pro- 
gram, highlighted by the personal aggrandizement of President 
Mobutu's ruling political and commercial class. Zairianization also 
advocated cultural pride and autonomy and aimed at rejecting and 



205 



Zaire: A Country Study 

eliminating foreign cultural influences. Christian names of indi- 
viduals and colonial place-names were dropped in favor of "au- 
thentic" Zairian names (see Zairianization, Radicalization, and 
Retrocession, ch. 1; Zairianization, ch. 3). 

By 1974 the official ideology had metamorphosed into Mobutism 
(see Glossary), in which the acts and sayings of the leader were 
glorified. The state was personalized, and state and party were fused 
together. But Mobutism soon degenerated into a parody of Mao- 
ism. To "Founder-President" were added ever more extravagant 
praise-names: "Guide of the Revolution," "Helmsman" (bor- 
rowed from Mao Zedong), "Mulopwe" (emperor, or even god- 
king), and finally "Messiah." Important places in the president's 
political career were designated as pilgrimage sites. At this point, 
the ideology of the regime had become so overblown that many 
Zairians and most foreign observers found it impossible to take seri- 
ously. But as Zaire specialist Michael G. Schatzberg points out, 
the paternalistic strand of Mobutu's ideology corresponds to a "deep- 
ly rooted ideological and symbolic moral matrix undergirding both 
Zairian state and society." As he explains, "legitimate governance, 
in Zaire and in much of Africa, is based on the tacit normative 
idea that government stands in the same relationship to its citizens 
that a father does to his children. " Yet this same moral matrix also 
provides the basis for opposition. When African political leaders 
violate the implied cultural norms and underlying premises of po- 
litical "fatherhood," "legitimacy erodes, tensions mount, and in- 
stability, repression, or both, ensue." 

A number of the themes in the Mobutist ideology — the yearn- 
ing for cultural and economic autonomy and for strong, paternalistic 
leadership — resonated with deeply held opinions on the part of 
Zairians, among both the elite and the people in general. At the 
same time, however, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that this 
ideology served to justify the domination of the political system 
by a self-serving ruling class that lived off the profits to be extract- 
ed from Zaire's interface with the world economy. 

The Party-State as a System of Rule 

The initial orientation of the Mobutu regime was antipolitical 
and antiparty. The announcement of the November 25, 1965, coup 
began by contrasting the performance of the armed services, al- 
leged to be "satisfactory," with the "complete failure" of the previ- 
ous political leaders, who had "shut themselves up in a sterile 
struggle to gain power without any consideration for the well-being 
of the citizens of this country." Although the proclamation made 
no explicit mention of political parties, there were signs of danger 



206 



Government and Politics 



for the existing parties in the message Mobutu sent to the joint 
session of the legislature on the afternoon after the coup. The mes- 
sage reiterated that the new government (whose members represent- 
ed areas of the country, not parties) would serve for only five years, 
and that a regime d } exception (in essence a state of emergency) would 
be imposed throughout the country. Political activities by parties 
were suspended. The parties themselves were not dissolved, 
however, and several of them issued communiques in support of 
the coup. 

One reason for taking no action against the political parties during 
the early weeks of the regime was that Mobutu still needed their 
support. The first government after the coup, headed by Colonel 
Leonard Mulamba as prime minister, relied to a considerable ex- 
tent upon the politicians of the 1960-65 era. But that reliance was 
nowhere acknowledged in Mobutu's public pronouncements. On 
the contrary, his continuing verbal assaults on the politicians 
presaged his attempts both to reduce their participation in his 
government and to create a personal instrument of power. 

Mobutu claimed to depoliticize the nation by abolishing con- 
ventional political parties but then formed his own sole party, the 
MPR. Unlike the sweeping measures of later years, instituted 
almost overnight on the basis of little apparent preparation, the 
creation of the MPR was an incremental process, occurring over 
a period of about sixteen months. The first step was the creation 
of the Corps of Volunteers of the Republic (Corps des Volontaires 
de la Republique— CVR). 

The Mobutu coup had taken place in the context of intense ac- 
tivity on the part of the political "youth movements" in the capi- 
tal. Two days earlier, the League of Young Vigilantes (Ligue des 
Jeunes Vigilants) had organized a militant demonstration of 200 
people at the Belgian embassy in Kinshasa. According to its stat- 
utes, the purpose of the league was "to fight resolutely and firmly 
against the forces which destroy national consciousness and the sense 
of responsibility, to assure the education and the encadrement of the 
people in order to build a truly free Congo, rid of the fear of im- 
perialism, of the exploitation of man by man, [and] of obscuran- 
tism, [and] oriented toward the route of progress of the popular 
masses." The CVR, and later the MPR, would echo the diffuse 
radicalism of this pronouncement. Mobutu seems to have viewed 
such groups both as a threat to be harnessed and as potentially valu- 
able allies in the struggle against the old politicians. 

The formation of the CVR was announced to the public on Janu- 
ary 9, 1966. A serious attempt was made to co-opt the leadership 
of the General Union of Congolese Students (Union Generale des 



207 



Zaire: A Country Study 

Etudiants Congolais — UGEC), the most articulate and radical of 
the youth organizations. Both UGEC president N'Kanza Dolomin- 
gu and former UGEC secretary for international affairs Kaman- 
da wa Kamanda figured on the initial list of CVR leaders, but both 
declined to participate. Subsequent events suggest that either the 
ideological gap was too great to be bridged, as in the case of 
N'Kanza, who was imprisoned, or that such elements had to be 
co-opted on the highest level, e.g., in the case of Kamanda, who 
was named secretary general of the presidency in December 1966, 
after the prime ministership had been abolished in October and 
Mobutu became head of government (see The Presidency, this ch.). 

The CVR established branches throughout the capital and in 
at least some of the provinces. At its first national seminar (in Kin- 
shasa in December 1966), the group declared its ideology to be ''na- 
tionalism." "Economic independence" and "nationalization of the 
education system" were set as major objectives. 

The CVR referred to itself as a vanguard movement rather than 
a party, and its contradictory statements regarding parties doubt- 
less reflected the fact that Mobutu's own opinion on the subject 
was evolving. In fact, Mobutu faced a dilemma. The term politi- 
cian had become virtually synonymous with thief or traitor. At the 
same time, particular parties and politicians retained substantial 
credit with their respective constituencies. The May 1967 Manifesto 
of N'Sele, charter of the MPR, affirmed that the government ad- 
ministration would have to be reorganized and new personnel 
brought in. It would have to be "detribalized" and "depoliticized." 
Little was said as to how this would be accomplished. Administra- 
tive personnel were upgraded, but no major reorganization took 
place. Rather than being "depoliticized," the administration was 
merged with the MPR. 

At first the MPR was given a separate structure on all levels be- 
low that of the president. Then, following a series of disputes be- 
tween government and party officials on the same level, e.g., 
regional commissioner and regional president of the MPR, the du- 
ality was eliminated. At the beginning of 1972, the regional com- 
missioner became head of the MPR on the regional level, the 
collectivity chief, head of the party in the local collectivity, and so on. 

Under such a system, "politics" (competition for rewards and 
for control over distribution of rewards) still existed, but in the hands 
of the administrators. There were party committees at each level 
of the administrative structure. In a typical rural zone, the MPR 
committee comprised the zone commissioner and his two assistant 
commissioners, the director of the Youth of the Popular Revo- 
lutionary Movement (Jeunesse du Mouvement Populaire de la 



208 



View of Kinshasa, 
with Pool de Malebo 
on the Congo River 
in the background 
Courtesy Zaire 
National Tourism Office 



Modern buildings on the 
outskirts of Kinshasa 
Courtesy Zaire 
National Tourism Office 



Zaire: A Country Study 

Revolution — JMPR), the commander of the gendarmerie, the 
secretary of the National Union of Zairian Workers (Union Na- 
tionale des Travailleurs Zairois — UNTZA), and the chiefs of the 
collectivities that made up the zone. 

Paradoxically, the fact that the party was everywhere undermined 
its significance; everyone was included in it (all Zairians were con- 
sidered to be members by birth; the MPR was regarded as the "na- 
tion politically organized"). The only distinguishable MPR 
institutions were the Political Bureau and (later) the Central Com- 
mittee and the JMPR, or party youth wing. 

Suffrage was universal and compulsory at age eighteen, but the 
system offered no real political choice. All electoral choice or com- 
petition supposedly took place within the MPR. All presidential 
elections (1970, 1977, and 1984) were essentially plebiscites, with 
Mobutu as the only candidate. 

Parliament was restored in 1970, but it had a very limited ability 
to influence the policy-making process. Nor were individual mem- 
bers of parliament able to play a linkage role between their constit- 
uents and the center to any significant extent. Under the system 
instituted in 1970, the population was asked to approve a single 
list of candidates for people's commissioners, or members of the 
legislature. The single-party list was put to the electorate, which 
had no choice but to vote yes or no (by casting a green or red ballot). 

In 1977, under pressure from the United States, the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund (IMF — see Glossary), and other outside 
forces, Mobutu began to pay lip service to the notion of democra- 
cy for Zaire. Multiple candidacies were permitted, but within the 
MPR framework. The result was that the National Legislative 
Council served as a lightning rod for the population's resentment 
of its treatment by the regime. In 1982, for example, 310 mem- 
bers of parliament (one per 100,000 persons) were elected from 
among 1,409 candidates presented by the MPR. But only sixty 
out of 310 members were reelected. 

The move toward multipartyism and democratization initiated 
in 1990 did, indeed, result in the formation and, ultimately, legal 
recognition of numerous political parties and coalitions (see Polit- 
ical Reform in the 1990s; Opposition since 1990, this ch.). The 
logical consequence would be free multiparty elections, and ini- 
tially hopes ran high for a transition leading up to the presidential 
and legislative elections due in early December 1991. But those 
elections did not take place, and Mobutu made very clear his in- 
tention to stay in power beyond his constitutional mandate. Thus, 
in the early 1990s, free electoral choice remained an unfulfilled 
dream in Zaire. 



210 



Government and Politics 



Political Reform in the 1990s 
Proclamation of the Third Republic 

On April 24, 1990, President Mobutu Sese Seko announced to 
the citizens of Zaire that the country was entering a new era. Hence- 
forth, that date would rank as a milestone, along with June 30, 
1960 (independence day) and November 24, 1965 (inauguration 
of the Second Republic). The new era was to be one of multiparty 
government, replacing the single-party system that had been in place 
for twenty- three years. 

This major reform, which would usher in the Third Republic, 
was presented as the product of Mobutu's personal initiative. In 
an exercise in direct democracy or "popular consultation, ' ' he had 
gone to the people and sought their views on the functioning of 
political institutions. Mobutu claimed that 5,310 of the 6,128 
memoranda received, or 87 percent, proposed retaining the single- 
party status of the MPR, with some administrative and organiza- 
tional changes, such as reductions in the number and size of party 
agencies and the recruitment of new staff. Only 13 percent of 
respondents called for a multiparty system. But, he said, after much 
reflection he had decided to go beyond the wishes expressed by the 
majority of the Zairian people. Thus, he had opted to experiment 
with political pluralism, establishing a system of three political par- 
ties, including the MPR. Each citizen would be free to adhere to 
the political formation of his choice. Mobutu cautioned, however, 
that the new multiparty system would have to avoid the errors of 
the past, namely allowing multiparty ism to become synonymous 
with multitribalism. 

Mobutu claimed that the Zairian people had demanded that he 
continue to preside over the destiny of the country in a broad sense. 
He would serve as chief of state and as such would ostensibly be 
above both the political parties and government organs, function- 
ing as the final arbiter or last resort. Because he would be above 
the parties, Mobutu indicated that he was resigning that very day 
as head of the MPR, permitting that party to choose for itself a 
new leader to carry out the changes necessary to its new role. 
(Nevertheless, following his 1990 resignation, Mobutu accepted 
the leadership of the MPR once again on April 21, 1991.) 

All these changes would require a transitional period of twelve 
months. According to Mobutu, the deliberative bodies, from the 
national legislature down to the collectivity councils, had been 
judged satisfactory by respondents and would remain in place un- 
til the next elections. However, the National Executive Council 
(also called the Council of Ministers), or cabinet, was considered 



211 



Zaire: A Country Study 

to have resigned. A caretaker prime minister would be named, and 
this person would put together a transition team. 

When Mobutu announced the transition to the Third Repub- 
lic, he also dealt with several superficial but highly charged aspects 
of the aftermath of authenticity (see Glossary). Zaire's political 
vocabulary would be changed, and Zairians would be free to return 
to the more universal forms of address. Moreover, while the aba- 
cost (see Glossary) would remain the national dress and his per- 
sonal choice, Zairians would be free to choose to wear a suit and 
tie. The ambiguities of the measures of 1990 were illustrated by 
the fact that members of the transitional government, sworn in two 
weeks later, all were dressed in the abacost or its feminine equivalent. 

The whole exercise — the three-month "popular consultation" 
and the speech that summarized the results — was vintage Mobutu. 
In a masterful ploy, he cut the ground from beneath the feet of 
those opposition groups — the UDPS at home as well as some of 
the groups operating from exile — whose demands centered on po- 
litical reform. He exempted himself and the directly elected deliber- 
ative bodies from the condemnation expressed by the people via 
their memoranda. He placed the burden for dealing with Zaire's 
enormous social and economic problems on the back of the new 
cabinet, which he would not head. At no time did he assume respon- 
sibility for the country's problems, nor did he acknowledge that 
his great initiative was really largely a reaction to external events 
and pressures. He made no mention of the fact that democratiza- 
tion has been a major demand of Western creditors, and that many 
other African states either had opted for multiparty systems or ap- 
peared to be about to do so, partly in response to the same inter- 
national pressures. 

Mobutu's apparent jettisoning of the party-state, ushering in the 
Third Republic, was a surprise move, the implications and im- 
plementation of which were far from clear. It remained to be seen 
how much Mobutu's personalistic regime would really change. In 
fact, within ten days Mobutu was already backpedaling. 

Subsequent Political Developments, 1990-93 

In a press conference following his April 24, 1990, speech to the 
country's assembled politicians, Mobutu suggested that the three 
authorized political parties might consist of the long-banned UDPS 
as well as two wings of the MPR, which he labeled "moderates" 
and "hard-liners." Nevertheless, despite Mobutu's attempt to con- 
strict the political space he appeared to open up, his speech set off 
the inevitable multiplication of efforts to publicize existing organi- 
zations and to found new ones. The best-structured opposition 



212 



Government and Politics 



movement, the UDPS, was the first to react. But on April 29, a 
demonstration by supporters of its most popular leader, Etienne 
Tshisekedi, released from house arrest on the day of Mobutu's 
speech, was violently suppressed. The UDPS claimed five people 
were killed, although the government denied this. Tshisekedi wound 
up in the hospital, early in May, after being attacked at his home 
by men apparently belonging to a government security service. 

Joseph Ileo Nsongo Amba (formerly known as Joseph Ileo), in 
1960 a political adversary of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and 
since 1967 a frequent member of the MPR Political Bureau and 
Central Committee, responded to Mobutu's announcement of the 
multiparty system by founding the Democratic and Social Chris- 
tian Party (Parti Democrate et Social Chretien — PDSC). On April 
29, Christophe Gbenye, a leader of the 1965 rural rebellions, 
announced that he had filed a request for recognition of the Con- 
golese National Movement-Lumumba (Mouvement National 
Congolais-Lumumba — MNC-Lumumba) . 

Then on May 3, 1990, Mobutu made another speech. Political 
parties other than the MPR did not legally exist, he told the legis- 
lature, and were not yet authorized to hold marches or public 
meetings. (Thus, the UDPS meeting had been illegal.) Mobutu's 
twenty-three-minute speech was designed to overcome what he 
called ' ' ambiguities and misunderstandings" following his an- 
nouncement ten days earlier of an end to the political monopoly 
of the MPR. Until the authorities decided which three political par- 
ties were to be authorized — and Mobutu did not indicate when the 
choice would be made — politicians could meet privately to discuss 
organizational questions. 

Most observers believed that Mobutu's espousal of political re- 
form was in part an attempt to appease domestic calls for change, 
in the wake of events elsewhere in Africa and in Eastern Europe. 
The fall of Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceau§escu, with whom 
Mobutu identified, apparently made an impact on Mobutu. In ad- 
dition, Mobutu undoubtedly felt it wise at least to appear to bow 
to Western pressure for political reform. It soon became evident, 
however, that Mobutu had unleashed volatile forces that he could 
contain only with difficulty, if at all, in the long run. Indeed, 
Mobutu proceeded to embark on a checkered course of half-hearted 
moves toward democratization, interspersed with attempts to un- 
dercut real reform and periodically interrupted by brutal crack- 
downs on dissent. 

One of the most notorious of the crackdowns occurred in May 
1990, when security forces were widely believed to have deliberately 



213 



Zaire: A Country Study 

massacred numerous protesting students at the University of Lu- 
bumbashi. The government claimed that only one student was 
killed, but international human rights groups and other credible 
observers estimated the death toll to be between thirty and 100. 
The incident and Mobutu's refusal to allow an international inquiry 
into it ultimately resulted in the suspension of aid by Belgium, the 
European Community (EC), Canada, and the United States. 

Faced with strong international censure and growing opposition 
demands for a national conference to write a new constitution, or- 
ganize new elections, and lead a transition to a democratic form 
of government, Mobutu did lift the ceiling on the number of polit- 
ical parties in October 1990, and legislation passed in December 
1 990 finally opened the door for the formal registration of political 
parties. He also declared that all registered parties would have ac- 
cess to the media. 

By the spring of 1 99 1 , numerous political parties existed legal- 
ly, and the regime announced that some fifty-eight had accepted 
invitations to an upcoming constitutional conference, the date of 
which had not been set, despite the rapid approach of December 
4, 1991 , the date on which Mobutu's constitutional mandate would 
expire. Among the parties refusing to cooperate with Mobutu were 
the principal opposition groups, namely, the UDPS, which demand- 
ed Mobutu's resignation; Ileo's PDSC; and the Union of Feder- 
alists and Independent Republicans (Union des Federalistes et des 
Republicains Independants — UFERI) led by Jean Nguza Karl-i- 
Bond. 

At the same time, Mobutu asked the prime minister of the first 
transitional government, Lunda Bululu, to resign in March 1991 
and appointed a new prime minister, Professor Mulumba Lukoji. 
Most ministerial appointees were from Kasai-Oriental, Kasai- 
Occidental, and Shaba regions in an obvious attempt to undercut 
support for the UDPS and UFERI, respectively, which drew their 
strongest support from those regions. Further undermining pub- 
lic confidence in Mobutu's commitment to reform were a brutal 
March 1991 attack on peaceful Christian demonstrators in Kin- 
shasa, in which, according to human rights groups, thirty-five peo- 
ple were killed and dozens wounded; and an April attempt by police 
to break up a political meeting in Mbuji-Mayi. Over forty individu- 
als were believed to have been killed and nearly thirty seriously 
wounded in the ensuing ransacking and looting by protesters. 

The long-awaited national conference on political reform, ulti- 
mately known as the Sovereign National Conference (Conference 
Nationale Souveraine — CNS), finally convened in August 1991. 
It encompassed over 2,800 political, religious, and civic leaders, 



214 



Government and Politics 



representing some 225 political groups, whose declared goal was 
to draft a new constitution as a prelude to new elections. The con- 
ference was suspended by Mobutu on August 1 5 after opposition 
groups boycotted it on August 13, claiming that the government 
was overrepresented at the conference, had infiltrated opposition 
delegations (it was also alleged that the government had distribut- 
ed money to some opposition delegates to sway their votes), and 
was preventing certain groups from attending the conference. The 
conference was further delayed because of the September 23-24 
mutiny by some 3,000 paratroopers in Kinshasa, who were pro- 
testing low wages and lack of pay. The demonstration soon turned 
into a violent rampage, with hundreds of civilians joining the sold- 
iers in looting businesses and homes. Other cities and southern Sha- 
ba Region also experienced disturbances. France and Belgium sent 
several hundred troops to restore order and protect foreign nationals 
in Kinshasa, and the United States supplied transport airplanes. 
But the evacuation of some 10,000 foreign residents and the virtu- 
al abandonment of numerous foreign-run businesses had a major 
impact on the economy. Indeed, according to most observers the 
economy virtually came to a standstill. 

The political aftermath of the rampage was an agreement on Sep- 
tember 29, 1991, by Mobutu and the opposition to form a transi- 
tional coalition government and a promise by Mobutu to reconvene 
the conference. Under the accord, UDPS leader Tshisekedi was 
named by Mobutu as prime minister in early October 1991, and 
Mobutu agreed that the cabinet would contain five Mobutu loyalists 
and six opposition leaders. However, Tshisekedi was fired after 
only one week in office in a dispute over the apportionment of 
ministerial portfolios. After the major opposition coalition, the 
Sacred Union (Union Sacree), refused to choose a new prime 
minister, Mobutu named Bernardin Mungul-Diaka, a leader of 
a small opposition party, prime minister. Tshisekedi' s firing spurred 
violent demonstrations and riots, including attacks on one of Mobu- 
tu's villas in Kinshasa and on the new prime minister's home. Fol- 
lowing the unrest, France joined other Western nations that had 
already cut off economic aid to Zaire. In addition, civil servants 
resumed a long-standing strike that had been lifted in the wake 
of what had appeared to be positive political developments. 

In late November 1991, Mobutu formed another transitional 
government, this time under Nguza. Nguza was a Tshisekedi rival 
in the Sacred Union, which he subsequently left, after other mem- 
bers termed his nomination a "betrayal." Now out of the Sacred 
Union, UFERI, headed by Nguza, organized another political coa- 
lition within the CNS, the Alliance of Patriotic Forces. This alliance 



215 



Zaire: A Country Study 

of some thirty parties espoused a commitment to political change 
but rejected what it termed "extremist" stands. 

The new government under Nguza included ten ministers from 
the opposition, although not from the Sacred Union's UDPS and 
PDSC , which boycotted the new government and called for a gen- 
eral strike against it. The progovernment MPR, which had not 
participated in the two previous transitional governments, was in- 
cluded, and in fact pro-Mobutu forces controlled eight posts, in- 
cluding the "reserved" domains of defense, interior and security, 
and external relations. 

The long-term future of the CNS remained uncertain, and 
prospects for its success were dim so long as Mobutu clung to power. 
In any case, while the CNS was mired down in regime-opposition 
conflict, Mobutu's mandate quietly expired on December 4, 1991, 
and he made it clear that he would stay in power until new elec- 
tions were held, although no firm date for such elections had been 
announced. 

The CNS had reconvened on November 15, 1991, with a ple- 
nary session. However, disagreements over procedures for appoint- 
ing a new prime minister delayed its formal resumption until 
December 11. At its session on December 12, Monsignor Laurent 
Monsengwo Pasinya, archbishop of Kisangani and president of the 
Episcopal Conference of Zaire, was elected president of the CNS. 
Monsengwo' s election and his support by all of the opposition par- 
ties was a blow for Mobutu's camp, whose candidate for the con- 
ference's presidency was soundly defeated. In another blow to the 
Mobutu forces, the conference also elected Ileo, a leading mem- 
ber of the Sacred Union (and leader of the PDSC), as its vice 
president. 

Following government attempts to pack the conference with 
Mobutu loyalists and to limit its powers, Prime Minister Nguza 
called for a suspension of the CNS on January 6, 1992, but it recon- 
vened on January 14 to decide on issues of geopolitical represen- 
tation. At the same time, pro-Mobutu delegates at the conference 
suspended their participation, charging that Tshisekedi's supporters 
from Kasai were overrepresented. On January 19, the government 
once again suspended the conference, with the prime minister stat- 
ing that the conference proceedings were ' 'likely to create a politi- 
cal crisis in the country. " The suspension of the CNS was criticized 
by the international community. 

Following a declaration by the Sacred Union that it would em- 
bark on a "concrete, logical action program" if the conference were 
not resumed by April 2, as well as pressure by Belgium, France, 
and the United States, the government announced on March 28 



216 



Government and Politics 



that the conference would meet on April 6. When it met, a majority 
of the more than 2,800 delegates voted to declare that the confer- 
ence had sovereign powers not only to draw up a new constitution 
but also to legislate for a multiparty system. This represented a 
direct challenge to President Mobutu, who responded that "some 
decisions made (by the conference) constitute an act of attempting 
to go beyond bounds." When conference delegates voted on May 
6 for an act empowering them to make constitutionally binding 
decisions, Mobutu reacted by characterizing the step a "civilian 
coup d'etat." To Mobutu the conference's role was limited to devis- 
ing a draft constitution. 

In August 1992, the CNS passed a Transitional Act to serve as 
a provisional constitution and, under its terms, created a transi- 
tional government to govern for two years. According to the Tran- 
sitional Act, the government would consist of four institutions: a 
figurehead president "who reigns but does not govern" as head 
of state; a High Council of the Republic (Haut Conseil de la 
Republique — HCR) to serve as a provisional legislature and to over- 
see new elections; a first state commissioner (prime minister) elected 
by the CNS as head of government with full executive powers; and 
an independent judiciary encompassing the courts of law. At the 
same time, Mobutu and the CNS agreed to abide by the princi- 
ples established in the Comprehensive Political Agreement (Com- 
promis Politique Global). The Comprehensive Political Agreement 
includes ten principles, the most significant being that no institu- 
tion or organ of the transition should use its constitutional powers 
to prevent any other institution from functioning. In essence, all 
parties agreed to share power and to abide by the constitutional 
provisions embodied in the Transitional Act. In January 1993, the 
official status of the Transitional Act was strengthened further when 
the Supreme Court of Justice, acting as the Constitutional Court, 
declared the Transitional Act to be the country's only binding con- 
stitution. 

As part of its August 1992 deliberations, the CNS, symbolizing 
its desire for change from the Mobutu regime, also proposed that 
Zaire resume its old name, the Republic of the Congo, and rein- 
stitute the former national flag and anthem. Under pressure from 
Mobutu, however, the conference backed down, announcing that 
the country would keep its name, flag, and anthem until the pro- 
posed changes could be submitted to the electorate in a referendum. 

Tshisekedi was duly elected transitional first state commission- 
er by the CNS on August 15, 1992. On August 30, he appointed 
a transitional government of "national union" including various op- 
ponents of Mobutu — but no Mobutu supporters. On December 6, 



217 



Zaire: A Country Study 

1992, the CNS dissolved itself and was succeeded by the 453-mem- 
ber HCR, to be headed by CNS head Archbishop Monsengwo. 
As the supreme interim legislative authority, the HCR was autho- 
rized to formulate and adopt a new constitution and to organize 
legislative and presidential elections. But Mobutu refused to accept 
the authority of the HCR or the legitimacy of any constitution it 
might formulate. Instead, in October 1992, he had reconvened the 
former legislature, which had been abolished, and entrusted it with 
drafting a rival new constitution more to his liking. 

The transitional government has never been able to govern ef- 
fectively because of its inability to limit Mobutu's powers except 
on paper. Mobutu clearly violated the terms of both the Transi- 
tional Act and the Comprehensive Political Agreement, impeding 
the work of the other institutions from the very start. Using troops 
loyal to him, Mobutu seized control of state radio and television 
facilities, denied HCR members and cabinet ministers access to 
their government offices, and took control of the central bank. 
Moreover, Mobutu pursued a deliberate strategy of promoting 
anarchy and inciting ethnic violence in order to discredit the 
prodemocracy movement and undermine the ability of the populace 
to organize against him. 

Mobutu and Tshisekedi have been at loggerheads since Tshiseke- 
di's election as transitional prime minister. But the situation de- 
teriorated further in 1993. In mid-January 1993, the HCR declared 
Mobutu to be guilty of treason because of his mismanagement of 
state affairs and threatened to impeach him unless he recognized 
the legitimacy of the transitional government. Opposition forces 
organized a general strike to force the president's resignation. In 
the ensuing disturbances, five people were killed and many others 
injured. Then, later that month, Mobutu insisted on introducing 
a new currency note of Z5 million (for value of the zaire — see Glos- 
sary), which Tshisekedi denounced as inflationary and urged mer- 
chants to reject. When many did so, troops who had been paid 
in the currency went on a rampage of looting and violence during 
which sixty-five people were killed, including the French ambas- 
sador to Zaire. 

In the aftermath of the violence, Mobutu attempted to reassert 
his political authority by convening a special "conclave" of politi- 
cal forces in early March 1993 to chart the nation's future, includ- 
ing devising a new constitution. The HCR and the Sacred Union 
declined to participate in any such deliberations, which clearly were 
intended to undermine the existing transitional government. 
Mobutu also "dismissed" the Tshisekedi government, although 
according to the Transitional Act he did not have the power to do 



218 



Government and Politics 



so. At his urging, the conclave then named Faustin Birindwa as 
prime minister of a so-called government of national salvation. 

Since that time, Zaire has had two parallel, rival governments 
vying for domestic and international acceptance. The Birindwa 
government has not received international recognition, although 
delegations sent by that government have been accepted by sever- 
al United Nations (UN) specialized agencies. But the Tshisekedi 
government, although legal and recognized internationally, lacks 
the power or resources to govern. The result of this situation is 
government stalemate, which has worked to Mobutu's advantage. 
Mobutu has continued to use his control of key military units to ob- 
struct the functioning of the transitional government, to intimidate 
critical opposition leaders and newspapers, to promote anarchy and 
chaos, and to incite ethnic violence. Tshisekedi 's frustration with 
the impotence of his own government in the face of the country's 
economic and social deterioration became so great that he requested 
UN intervention to restore order. In July 1993, the secretary general 
of the UN appointed a special envoy to Zaire, but no further in- 
ternational action had been taken by the end of the year. 

Mobutu's ability to obstruct the democratization process has also 
been aided by the divisiveness of his opposition. The Sacred Union 
has had its defectors, including six former members who joined 
the Birindwa government and were immediately expelled from the 
Sacred Union. Tshisekedi 's UDPS also has its differences with other 
parties in the coalition, such as Ileo's PDSC and the Unified Lu- 
mumbist Party led by Antoine Gizenga. Moreover, Tshisekedi has 
increasingly been under fire even within the transitional govern- 
ment and his own party for being too authoritarian. But Tshisekedi 
remains very popular, particularly in Kinshasa, with people who 
see him as the only opposition politician who has consistently op- 
posed Mobutu. 

At international urging, negotiations aimed at resolving Zaire's 
political stalemate continued throughout 1993 between represen- 
tatives of the Mobutu-appointed conclave and the Sacred Union. 
Mobutu critics believed that he was merely using the negotiations 
to attempt to regain credibility in the eyes of the West. Neverthe- 
less, some progress was made. In October 1993, the two sides 
reportedly reached agreement on a transitional constitution, a joint 
transitional parliament, and an electoral schedule (presidential and 
legislative elections to be held in December 1994). No details were 
available on the transitional constitution, but it is believed to 
represent a compromise between the approaches favored by the 
two sides. (Mobutu supporters favored a presidential or semi- 
presidential system while the opposition favored a parliamentary 



219 



Zaire: A Country Study 

system.) The mere fact that agreement was reached on some previ- 
ously thorny issues was interpreted as a positive sign. But most 
observers regarded any implementation of the agreement as high- 
ly problematic. First and foremost, no agreement could be reached 
on a prime minister acceptable to both sides, and neither Tshisekedi 
nor Birindwa was prepared to resign. Moreover, Mobutu himself 
remained a major stumbling block. The opposition refused to ac- 
cept his continuation in a position of authority, and he clearly still 
had no intention of stepping down. Thus, at the end of 1993, Zaire's 
political impasse was still far from resolution. 

Structure of Government 

Under Mobutu, the government of Zaire has generally been 
described as a republic with strong presidential authority. Indeed, 
on paper at least Zaire possesses most of the conventional organs 
of a modern republic: separate executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches. However, mere enumeration of the organs of govern- 
ment conveys little about how they function. It is more useful to 
conceive of Zaire under Mobutu as being governed according to 
a system that has been variously described as patrimonialism (see 
Glossary) or as a presidential monarchy, in which the president 
exercises near-absolute power. 

Zaire's constitutional situation has been murky since Mobutu's 
proclamation of the Third Republic and ostensible authorization 
of a multiparty system in 1990. The 1974 constitution (amended 
in 1978) is the last permanent constitution. The Mobutu-appointed 
government of national salvation headed by Birindwa was based 
on that constitution. Opposition forces, however, looked to the 
Transitional Act, which was passed by the CNS as a provisional 
constitution in August 1992 and subsequently upheld by the 
Supreme Court as the country's only legitimate constitution. The 
transitional government headed by Tshisekedi was elected by the 
CNS on the basis of that document, which, broadly, established 
a parliamentary system with a figurehead president. 

Throughout 1992 and 1993, both camps continued to formu- 
late rival draft constitutions. In October 1993, agreement report- 
edly was reached on a new constitution acceptable to both sides, 
but no details were available, and the agreement has not been im- 
plemented. At year's end, the constitutional standoff persisted, but 
because Mobutu controlled the state's treasury and military ap- 
paratus, the old political system clearly prevailed. 

The Presidency 

Mobutu deserves the label presidential monarch not simply because 



220 




Official presidential residence, Kinshasa 
Courtesy Zaire National Tourism Office 



of style, such as his use of the capitalized, plural pronoun We, but 
also because under Mobutu the Zairian state has been dominated 
by the institution of the presidency, which controls a huge share 
of public expenditure. The "reforms" announced in 1990, accord- 
ing to which the president would be "above politics," only rein- 
forced the long-term trend toward an ever more powerful executive 
office of the president. 

It should be stressed that the overdevelopment of the presiden- 
cy occurred entirely under Mobutu. The Fundamental Law (Loi 
Fondamentale), or provisional constitution, of 1960 was based on 
the Belgian constitution. Power was vested in the parliament. Like 
a European constitutional monarch, the president had very limit- 
ed powers, although his role in a constitutional crisis could be sub- 
stantial. The 1964 constitution — known as the Constitution of 
Luluabourg (Luluabourg is now Kananga) — provided for an ex- 
ecutive presidency that coexisted with cabinet government, under 
the prime minister. When Mobutu seized power in 1965, he ini- 
tially continued this arrangement, serving as president while Colonel 
Leonard Mulamba was prime minister, heading a nonparty cabi- 
net, formally called the National Executive Council. 

The first step in building a more powerful presidency came in 
October 1966, when Mobutu dismissed the popular Mulamba. 



221 



Zaire: A Country Study 

Rather than name a new prime minister, he absorbed the func- 
tions of that position into those of the president. 

The constitution of 1967 formalized the primacy of the presiden- 
cy. Under its provisions, the role of the ministers was simply to 
execute the decisions and policies of the president. During 1977-79 
and again in the late 1980s, Mobutu named prime ministers, but 
they were little more than vice chairmen of the cabinet, outranked 
by the president, who was also a member. 

At the same time, Mobutu was increasing the capabilities of the 
office of the president. In November 1966, he created the General 
Secretariat of the Presidency. The secretariat comprised three gener- 
al directorates {directions generates): economic, commercial, and cul- 
tural affairs; juridical and administrative affairs; and mines and 
energy. Some of the leading political figures of the Second Republic 
first emerged as members of the secretariat. 

In October 1967, this small secretariat was transformed into the 
Bureau of the Presidency of the Republic and given responsibility 
for "a permanent mission of studies and of conceptualization, of 
technical coordination and of liaison between the public institu- 
tions and their organs." It comprised a director and four ' 'col- 
leges of counsellors," the fourth one being charged with ' 'social 
and cultural problems." The new body, composed entirely of 
university graduates, gave Mobutu a higher level of expertise than 
that available through the cabinet. Perhaps more importantly, it 
gave him a means of co-opting young men, often of radical views, 
who might otherwise have found their careers blocked by the "old" 
independence-era politicians. Playing off these two groups against 
one another proved an effective divide-and-rule tactic. 

The capabilities of the presidency were further enhanced by the 
creation of military services directly attached to the presidency. The 
maison militaire, or personal military staff of the president, and the 
Special Presidential Brigade — later, Special Presidential Division 
(Division Speciale Presidentielle — DSP) — were loyal to the presi- 
dent, even more so than the armed forces in general. 

The next major change in the position of the president came with 
the 1974 constitution, drafted by the presidency and approved by 
the MPR Political Bureau and the rubber-stamp legislature, for- 
mally known as the National Legislative Council, by acclamation. 
According to Article 28 of this constitution, Zaire was to have "a 
single institution, the MPR, incarnated by its President." Article 
30 provided that the "President of the MPR is ex officio Presi- 
dent of the Republic, and holds the plenitude of power to exer- 
cise. He presides over the Political Bureau, the Council of Ministers, 
the Legislature, and the Judicial Council." The president was to 



222 



Government and Politics 



be elected by direct popular vote to a seven-year term and could 
serve an unlimited number of terms. 

The Transitional Act of August 1992 created a parliamentary 
system. Mobutu, as president, was to remain head of state but was 
intended to serve as a figurehead with ceremonial rather than real 
executive powers. Mobutu refused to accept the validity of the new 
document, however, and continued to wield power as before, us- 
ing control of the military, media, central bank, and state enter- 
prises to his advantage. It remains to be seen what the role of the 
president will be in the new transitional constitution on which both 
pro-Mobutu and anti-Mobutu forces reportedly agreed in late 1993. 
It seems clear, however, that Mobutu would never voluntarily step 
aside and allow himself to be shunted off to a strictly ceremonial role. 

The National Executive Council 

In Mobutu's Zaire, there is a parliament and a Council of 
Ministers, or cabinet, also known as the National Executive Coun- 
cil, but any formal resemblance to Western parliamentary democra- 
cy is misleading. Zaire's National Executive Council is responsible 
not to the parliament but rather to the president. According to the 
constitution of 1967, the president, as chief of the executive branch, 
named and revoked the ministers and determined their respective 
powers. The ministers were responsible only to the president. In 
their departments, they did not carry out their own policy, but 
rather the program established and the decisions taken by the presi- 
dent of the republic. The constitution of 1974, which established 
the MPR as ''the sole institution" of the republic, left the role of 
the National Executive Council essentially unchanged. It gave the 
president of the MPR the right to name and dismiss the members 
of the National Executive Council as well as to fix the council's 
program of action and supervise policy implementation. Mobu- 
tu's control of the cabinet was so firm that in 1980 he had abolished 
ministerial interpellations by establishing the Central Committee 
as the new decision-making body within the MPR, which action 
also weakened the country's parliament. 

Nevertheless, the post of minister, and particularly that of prime 
minister, remained important despite the changes made in the cabi- 
net's constitutional makeup. In part, the notion of ministers re- 
tained prestige from the European model, and ministerial posts 
were eagerly sought for that reason. Moreover, ministerial posts 
were major rewards for service to the patrimonial ruler, as well 
as providing the incumbent with opportunities for self-enrichment. 
Zaire's disastrous economic and social situation resulted in part 



223 



Zaire: A Country Study 

from this system, which guaranteed that top functionaries served 
the president rather than the nation. 

The cabinet was subjected to frequent reshuffles, opening up 
some posts and assuring that those clients kept on were fully aware 
that they could go the next time. In a typical cabinet, all regions 
of the country were represented, although Mobutu's home region 
of Equateur was overrepresented. Often a political exile was 
"recuperated" and given a ministerial post. Few military person- 
nel served as ministers. Mobutu personally retained control of the 
defense portfolio, and usually veterans' affairs as well, until the 
formation of the transitional government in May 1990. The presi- 
dent's control of the National Executive Council and his attempt 
to use it to appease and undercut the opposition were clearly evi- 
dent in the formation of a succession of transitional and coalition 
governments following the May 1990 announcement of political 
pluralism. 

Since March 1993, Zaire has had two cabinets. One is headed 
by Tshisekedi, elected by the CNS under the terms of the Transi- 
tional Act. This transitional government, the so-called government 
of national union, was reconfigured and broadened in September 
1993; it consists of Tshisekedi as first state commissioner, or prime 
minister, and thirty-two state commissioners heading the various 
government ministries. The rival, Mobutu-appointed government, 
the so-called government of national salvation, is headed by Bi- 
rindwa as prime minister, with three deputy prime ministers, and 
twenty-five other ministers. The United States government (and 
other Western powers) have not recognized the Birindwa govern- 
ment. Yet the Tshisekedi government cannot truly govern because 
of the ability of Mobutu to obstruct its operations, including us- 
ing troops to prevent the prime minister and his cabinet ministers 
from occupying government offices. Tshisekedi has been forced 
to operate from his home. 

The Legislature 

The Zairian government has, since independence, included a 
legislative branch of government, but its powers have been steadi- 
ly eroded by the presidency. The Fundamental Law, in effect from 
1960 to 1964, created a bicameral legislature, which had substan- 
tial powers in that it both elected the president, who served as head 
of state, and chose the prime minister and cabinet ministers. But 
the document did not adequately define the division of power be- 
tween the executive and legislative branches and thus contributed 
significandy to the breakdown of public order shortly after indepen- 
dence. The 1964 constitution retained the bicameral parliament 



224 



Government and Politics 



and gave it both legislative responsibilities and the power to ap- 
prove the president's appointment or dismissal of the prime 
minister. But after Mobutu's coup in 1965, the president increas- 
ingly assumed legislative powers. The 1967 constitution replaced 
the bicameral parliament with the unicameral National Assembly, 
which had little formal or real power because of the power given 
the president to rule by executive order, which carried the force 
of law. 

According to the provisions of the 1974 constitution, the Na- 
tional Legislative Council (Conseil National Legislatif — CNL; the 
new name for the former National Assembly, adopted in July 1972) 
remained one of the five organs of government. But it was sub- 
ordinate to the party, the supreme institution of the state; the 
president, who was automatically president of all five organs of 
government; and the president's appointed ministers. The consti- 
tution provided for only limited legislative powers, in that mem- 
bers of the CNL, elected to five-year terms, had the right to initiate 
laws "concurrently" with the president. 

In reality, the CNL operated within very narrow boundaries. 
Real legislative power was wielded by the Central Committee of 
the MPR, while the CNL was relegated to the subordinate posi- 
tion of approving party initiatives. The CNL did, however, serve 
as a lightning rod for the population's resentment of its treatment 
by the regime, particularly after 1977, when multiple candidatures 
for legislative seats were allowed for the first time (although all still 
ran under the banner of the MPR). In the September 1982 legis- 
lative elections, for example, only sixty out of 310 members of 
parliament were reelected. 

The high point of legislative independence had come earlier, in 
the late 1970s. Early in 1977, the CNL had rejected the budget 
submitted to it by the president and denounced excessive presiden- 
tial spending. Moreover, the new CNL elected that year used ques- 
tioning of ministers as a mechanism for raising policy issues. 

In 1979 a group of deputies from Kasai-Oriental defied presiden- 
tial pressure and affixed their signatures to a report charging that 
the army had been responsible for the massacre of approximately 
300 diamond miners at Katekalay in Kasai-Oriental. In Novem- 
ber 1980, these dissident deputies, who became known as the Thir- 
teen (their actual number fluctuated from episode to episode), 
published a fifty-one-page open letter to President Mobutu, provid- 
ing a comprehensive critique of Mobutu's autocracy. The Thir- 
teen were careful to include in their number parliamentarians from 
various regions, to forestall the charge of tribalism. Writing in le- 
gal brief style, the authors of the letter dissociated themselves from 



225 



Zaire: A Country Study 

any advocacy of violence, invoking the constitution itself as pro- 
tection for the expression of their views. Following their forma- 
tion in 1982 of a second party, the UDPS, the Thirteen were 
imprisoned, then released under amnesty in May 1983, with several 
later placed under house arrest or exiled. Despite the formation 
of such opposition groups, the banishment of some members was 
a constant reminder to other deputies that no organized opposi- 
tion would be tolerated by Mobutu, however peaceful their methods 
or aims. 

The Transitional Act passed in August 1992 created the HCR 
to serve as a legislature, as well as to amend and adopt a new con- 
stitution and oversee new legislative and presidential elections. In 
December 1992, the CNS dissolved itself and was succeeded by 
the HCR under the terms of the Transitional Act. The 453 -member 
HCR, headed by Archbishop Mongsengwo, was, however, never 
accepted as valid by Mobutu. To prove his point, in October 1992 
he reconvened the old legislature, or CNL, which had been dis- 
solved by the CNS. Mobutu established the CNL as a rival to the 
HCR and charged the former with formulating a new draft con- 
stitution. 

The political agreement on a new transitional constitution report- 
edly reached by pro-Mobutu and anti-Mobutu forces in October 
1993 created a new 780-member legislature, to which the govern- 
ment will be responsible. Encompassing both the HCR and the 
CNL, the new body is to be called the High Council of the Republic 
(Haut Conseil de la Republique — HCR)-Parliament of the Tran- 
sition (Parlement de la Transition — PT), or HCR-PT. At the end 
of 1993, however, no action had been taken to implement the 
agreement. 

The Judiciary and the Courts 

The judicial system is organized hierarchically, in accordance 
with the country's administrative and political structure. At the 
apex is the Supreme Court of Justice in Kinshasa. Under it, in 
descending order, are three courts of appeal in Kinshasa, Lubum- 
bashi, and Kisangani, whose jurisdiction includes several regions 
each; a regional tribunal in each of the ten regions and Kinshasa; 
and numerous urban and rural subregional tribunals (courts of the 
peace) with original jurisdiction over most offenses. In a formal 
sense, the judicial system seems to resemble its European model, 
but in fact non-Western customary law and other forms of local 
practice have been added to the colonial heritage. 

Mobutu inherited the Belgian colonial judicial system, with only 
a few modifications dating from the First Republic. The findings 



226 



Government and Politics 



at each judicial level were subject to review at the next higher level. 
But because the administration recognized the authority of Afri- 
can customary law at the lowest level, a dual legal system devel- 
oped, one applying customary law for almost all Congolese, the 
other applying written law for Europeans. In 1958, two years 
before independence, a decree attempted to reform the legal sys- 
tem, removing the distinctions in the treatment of Europeans and 
Africans. 

After independence the mass departure of Belgian magistrates 
meant that the judicial system almost ceased to function above the 
level of the territory (zone, in present-day nomenclature). The 
United Nations sponsored a program of recruitment under which 
magistrates were engaged from Greece, Haiti, Egypt, Syria, and 
Lebanon. These foreign judges slowly were replaced by locals. A 
1973 decree specified that all magistrates were obligated to hold 
a licence (undergraduate degree) or doctorate in law. All magistrates 
typically began their careers in government administration and 
served provisionally for a year, after which they might be appointed 
to a court by the president. 

Under the Fundamental Law as well as under the 1964 and 1967 
constitutions, judicial power was theoretically independent of the 
executive and legislative powers, although judges were appointed 
by the president. Magistrates were supposed to remain totally aloof 
from all political activity. 

However, the independent judiciary became an anomaly once 
the MPR had been declared the supreme institution of the nation. 
The constitution of 1974 eliminated the inconsistency. The Coun- 
cil of the Judiciary, comprising all courts and tribunals, was made 
one of five organs of government. Mobutu was its president. Al- 
though in theory magistrates were to remain independent and free 
in the execution of their judicial powers, they were obligated to 
be active party members and to interpret the law in the spirit of 
the party. As with other government officials, the degree of their 
devotion to the party was continually monitored. Thus, the MPR 
became the source of all legality. The president of the republic could 
not interpret the law, but justice was carried out in his name and 
under his authority. 

The Mobutu regime claimed that the 1974 reforms were consis- 
tent with the principle of administrative justice as it had been prac- 
ticed under the Colonial Charter, where the law was stated and 
executed in the name of the king, and also with the African tradi- 
tional concept of a chief who is also a judge. The latter assertion 
is an example of a tendency, very common in Mobutu's Zaire, 
to justify current practice by sweeping statements regarding African 



227 



Zaire: A Country Study 

tradition. In fact, in many precolonial societies of Zaire, elders who 
were not political chiefs heard disputes and decided the outcome. 

The result of this reform was the politicization of the judiciary. 
Nevertheless, despite this limitation to their authority, and their 
theoretical integration into the MPR, many magistrates continued 
to defend the concept of their autonomy. As Michael Schatzberg 
has put it, they inhabited ''a pocket of resistance internal to the 
state." 

The 1990 reforms were intended to reinstate the judiciary's con- 
stitutional independence. Moreover, the Transitional Act of Au- 
gust 1992 made the courts of law one of the four independent 
institutions of government. The Supreme Court gave evidence of 
this independence when in January 1993, in its capacity as the na- 
tion's Constitutional Court, it declared the Transitional Act to be 
Zaire's only binding constitution. Nevertheless, the judicial sys- 
tem as a whole has not been revamped because of Mobutu's con- 
tinued ability to obstruct the implementation of the Transitional 
Act and the functioning of the transitional government. In addi- 
tion, there were reports in 1992 and 1993 that Mobutu had used 
loyal military forces to intimidate the judiciary, along with oppo- 
sition leaders and the media. 

Legal dualism persisted at the local level. Early in the Mobutu 
years, the Ordinance of July 10, 1968, had supposedly erased the 
last traces of racial discrimination, had incorporated 4 'custom" into 
the national law, and put an end to the dichotomy of judicial insti- 
tutions. Moreover, under the 1968 ordinance, customary courts 
were to be replaced by courts of the peace, meaning that profes- 
sional magistrates would replace local notables as judges. 

Legislation in 1978 provided that there should be one or more 
courts of the peace in each zone, urban or rural. But even in the 
early 1990s, many areas of Zaire did not have a local court, ap- 
parently because of the inability of the government to recruit peo- 
ple with legal training who were willing to work in the countryside, 
far from urban amenities. Much of the population remained at the 
mercy of customary justice, as administered by the chiefs and their 
courts. 

Local Government 

Internally, Zaire is a unitary state, whose power is projected 
downward to the local level. In such a centralized system, local 
government enjoys little autonomy. 

The local government of Mobutu's Zaire, like the colonial ad- 
ministration that served as its model, has as its major function the 
control of the population: counting the people, controlling their 



228 



Government and Politics 



movements, issuing identity cards, and taxing them to pay for the 
operations of the local administrative units that carry out these tasks. 
Although the labels attached to the administrative units and to the 
administrators who hold them have changed, the structures them- 
selves are very similar. In many ways, the texture of the relation- 
ship between the citizen and the state apparatus resembles that of 
the Belgian era. 

At the same time, there are great differences between the Mobutu 
administration and its colonial predecessor in the related areas of 
efficiency and honesty. Few would dispute the effectiveness or probi- 
ty of the colonial administration, within its own terms of reference. 
By contrast, the Mobutu administration is widely regarded as cor- 
rupt and inefficient. Indeed, political scientist Michael Schatzberg 
has shown that the administration has long constituted a powerful 
mechanism for pumping resources out of the impoverished rural 
population. 

The territorial administration was the crucial armature of the 
colonial state. A thorough penetration of the subject society was 
basic to the colonial project, and the loss of control in some terri- 
tories in 1959 was a mortal blow to colonial self-confidence. 

Territorial control was no less central to the policy calculus of 
the independent state that became Zaire. The loss of effective 
provincial administration, and the fragmentation of administra- 
tive authority through a multiplicity of factionalized provincial juris- 
dictions and local rebellions, were defining characteristics of the 
First Republic. During the 1964-65 rebellions, the vestiges of state 
power even remotely responsive to Kinshasa were eliminated over 
large areas of the republic. Reestablishing the authority of the state, 
by restoring the ascendancy of its central territorial administra- 
tion, was a first priority for the Mobutu regime. 

Initially, it appeared that this goal was being met. The unified 
hierarchical grid of the centralized state was restored, at least in 
form. But new self-destructive tendencies became apparent by the 
1970s; the credibility of the state was at issue as its inability to per- 
form basic services became manifest, and corruption pervaded its 
apparatus. 

Under the Belgians, the entire colony was divided into nesting 
subdivisions. Each province was divided into districts and each dis- 
trict into territories, all units on a given level being juridically 
equivalent. There were about 125 territories and twenty-five dis- 
tricts; totals varied as a result of the frequent redrawing of bound- 
aries in a vain attempt to obtain the perfect match between 
administration and society. The province, the district, and the ter- 
ritory all were headed by Belgians. The territory was the most 



229 



Zaire: A Country Study 

crucial echelon, as it represented the point at which the European 
administration exercised its control upon African intermediaries, 
the so-called chiefs. 

The local colonial administration functioned without substan- 
tial oversight or control from outside bodies. There were consul- 
tative provincial councils appointed by the government, but until 
the last few years of the colonial era they represented only Euro- 
pean interests (see The Colonial State, ch. 1). At the very end of 
the colonial period, elected communal councils in urban areas and 
appointed rural councils were authorized. The former continued 
to function in the major cities until the end of the 1960s (the last 
elected organs from the First Republic to survive). Rural councils 
never really took shape. 

In the First Republic, the province was a political unit, with an 
elected assembly and ministers theoretically responsible to the as- 
sembly. However, such elected bodies were never created at the 
working level where the state had its interface with the intermedi- 
aries it had created, the chiefs. 

The symmetry and formalism of the Belgian system, its density 
(almost unparalleled in Africa), and its relative freedom from legis- 
lative oversight, all were powerful influences on contemporary 
Zaire. The Second Republic attempted not only to reconstitute this 
system, but to extend its application to the cities and to the local 
level in the countryside. 

In February 1966, three months after his seizure of power, 
Mobutu signalled his intention to bring the provinces to heel by 
reunification and depoliticization. By the end of the year, the 
twenty-one so-called provincettes had been reduced to eight provinces 
(renamed regions in 1972), plus the capital, Kinshasa, meaning 
that colonial provincial boundaries had been almost completely re- 
stored. The exceptions were the division of the former Kasai 
Province into Kasai-Oriental and Kasai-Occidental and the divi- 
sion of the former Leopoldville Province into Bas-Zaire and Ban- 
dundu (see fig. 4). The provinces, once quasi-federal political units 
with their own governments, were reduced to administrative sub- 
divisions of the unitary state. Their chief officers were named by 
the president, they were rotated frequendy, and they generally were 
assigned outside their home areas. 

The heads of the various administrative subdivisions all had es- 
sentially the same role — representing the central state. The similar- 
ity in role was symbolized by the adoption of uniform terminology: 
the regions, subregions, zones, and collectivities (as the colonial 
provinces, districts, and territories were known from 1972 on) all 
were headed by commissioners (commissaires). However, the weight 



230 



Government and Politics 



of the colonial legacy was reflected in a decision in 1982 to revive 
the prestigious title of gouverneur (governor), in place of regional 
commissioner (commissaire de region). 

Although the governors clearly were dependent upon the presi- 
dent, problems of control did not disappear. At first the governors 
were kept on a short leash by the simple expedient of shifting them 
very often. Despite the frequent changes, some governors briefly 
succeeded in building up personal political machines. To prevent 
this process, and generally to keep an eye on the regional adminis- 
tration, Mobutu added a parallel control organ of state inspectors. 
The state inspectorate seems not to have served its purpose; it was 
abolished in 1971 . By the late 1970s, Mobutu also had abandoned 
the practice of constant reshuffling; instead, governors were named 
to three-year terms. 

Although in theory the Mobutist state was highly centralized, 
in practice local administrators enjoyed a degree of autonomy. They 
were charged with implementing within their regions the decisions 
taken by the president, and an administrative memorandum stipu- 
lated that the word "decisions," which appears in the constitu- 
tion, must be understood in a very broad sense. Mobutu frequently 
made such decisions, and governors often had nothing more to go 
on than a radio broadcast, telephonic instructions, or a vaguely 
worded telegram. Thus, they had considerable discretion as to how 
decisions should be implemented. There were risks at the same time; 
if their interpretations were subsequently to incur presidential dis- 
pleasure, they could lose their jobs. 

Since 1977 the Mobutu regime supposedly has been committed 
to a policy of decentralization, beginning with urban areas. In fact, 
there seem to be two contradictory tendencies: toward decentrali- 
zation and democratization, under pressure from external aid 
donors, and toward tighter administrative controls. Also in 1977, 
a plan was announced for sweeping reorganization of rural areas, 
so that no zone would contain more than 200,000 people and no 
subregion would comprise more than three zones. New subregions 
were created in parts of Bas-Zaire, Equateur, Kasai-Oriental, and 
Shaba. But full implementation of this plan would have meant a 
huge expense, and it was never completed. 

Reorganization moves reflected both the administrative ration- 
ale and political considerations, particularly in Mobutu's home 
region of Equateur. Mobutu's transformation of his home village 
of Gbadolite into a city, and the development of the small town 
of Gemena, also in northwest Equateur, into an important center 
as a result of his activities and those of his relatives and associates, 
led to the creation of new subregions around them. Had greater 



231 



Zaire: A Country Study 



importance been attached to "administrative rationality," then sure- 
ly the reorganization of Equateur Region would have been com- 
pleted. Indeed, plans had been prepared for all the remaining 
"unorganized" regions and portions thereof, but the deteriorat- 
ing politico-economic situation led to their indefinite postponement. 

This wave of reform affected only the number and scope of the 
administrative units, not their relationship to the center. Not un- 
til 1984, when Mobutu accepted suggestions from external aid 
donors that he carry out political "liberalization," were the regions 
given legislative assemblies and a degree of politico- administrative 
autonomy. 

In May 1988, Mobutu proposed improving the functioning of 
the regional structures and redrawing their boundaries, so as "to 
bring the administrator closer to the administered." The experi- 
ment was to begin with the division of Kivu Region into three new 
regions, Nord-Kivu, Sud-Kivu, and Maniema; the reorganization 
was not implemented immediately, but seemed to be in effect by 
the early 1990s. Zaire thus was divided into ten regions plus the 
city of Kinshasa. 

Political Dynamics 
Managing the Military 

Mobutu's regime emerged from a coup but is not a military re- 
gime because it has never given priority to the interests of the mili- 
tary. Since 1965 Mobutu has continued to manage the armed forces 
by the same methods he used, as chief of staff, to rebuild them 
after 1960, i.e. , by tying individual units and officers to him. Rather 
than a traditional pyramidal organization, the Zairian security forces 
resemble a wheel with Mobutu at the hub. Time and again, when 
existing units have proven to be unreliable, he has created new 
units trained by foreigners (see Armed Forces Missions and Or- 
ganization, ch. 5). 

In addition, Mobutu has been careful both to keep the military 
under his personal control and to minimize military participation 
in the civilian government. He has usually been the only military 
man in the cabinet, filling the role of minister of defense and veter- 
ans' affairs. 

The reforms announced in April 1990 ostensibly included 
depoliticization of the armed forces, presumably to include elimi- 
nation of the official MPR presence within the military, which had 
annoyed many of the officers. But in a broader sense, of course, 
the military services remain political in that they are under the con- 
trol of President Mobutu. As one part of that control, Mobutu's 



232 



Government and Politics 



cronies and relatives head key military units. 

Nevertheless, despite the military's role as the backbone of the 
regime, it is also a potential Achilles' heel. Military coup attempts 
were reported in 1975, 1978, and 1984. For several years, there 
were no further reports of coup attempts. Then in August 1987, 
the Voice of Zaire (La Voix du Zaire) announced that a large cache 
of arms and ammunition brought illegally into the country had been 
discovered in a military camp in Kinshasa. Each of the alleged coup 
attempts was followed by a major purge of high military officers. 
These purges, as well as Mobutu's general organizational policy, 
made it clear that political reliability would be given higher priori- 
ty than military effectiveness. 

The events of September 1991, in which unpaid paratroopers 
mutinied and engaged in a frenzy of looting throughout Kinshasa 
cast into doubt the morale and loyalty of the military. Such doubts 
were reinforced by the periodic bouts of looting that occurred 
throughout 1992 and 1993, as well as an exchange of fire between 
paratroopers and the Civil Guard in June 1992, prompting fears 
that many armed forces elements were beyond any control. 

Nevertheless, Mobutu has shrewdly retained the loyalty of his 
most important military units, the DSP in particular. In the early 
1990s, the beleaguered Mobutu reportedly continued to receive 
bags of newly printed currency flown in from abroad, which he 
disbursed to key military personnel. 

Opposition to the Regime prior to 1990 

As the Zairian political scientist Ilunga Kabongo has observed, 
the origin of the Mobutu regime, together with subsequent foreign 
aid, had the effect of generating 4 'a myth of the foreign element 
in Zairian politics." Whereas foreign, and especially American, 
scholars have tended to underplay foreign influence as secondary 
to local forces in shaping Zairian events, "it is overemphasized 
by many a Zairian scholar, the political elite as well as the com- 
moners, to a point where most Zairians think that any change 
in their condition will have to come from outside decisive influ- 
ence." This interpretation explained the futility felt by Zairian 
opposition groups, whose activities consisted mainly of lobbying 
Western powers in order to persuade the latter to remove Mobutu. 
One could extend Ilunga' s argument to cover groups that relied 
on violence to overthrow Mobutu, most of which have depended 
on foreign support. The People's Revolutionary Party (Parti Revolu- 
tionnaire du Peuple — PRP) may be an exception to this rule. Cer- 
tainly the aura of foreign influence, or foreign protection, as well as 
lobbying by international human rights organizations, conditioned 



233 



Zaire: A Country Study 

the eventual emergence of successful opposition movements, notably 
the UDPS, which was able to survive within Zaire and to demon- 
strate that, like the government, it too had support from the Unit- 
ed States. 

Armed Opposition 

The best-known of the groups committed to armed struggle prob- 
ably is the Front for the National Liberation of the Congo (Front 
pour la Liberation Nationale du Congo — FLNC), whose armed 
forces invaded Zaire's Shaba Region in 1977 and 1978, from bases 
in Angola (see Shaba I; Shaba II, ch. 5). The FLNC was led by 
Nathaniel Mbumba, a former police officer. On the basis of its 
activities on Zairian soil and its declarations, the FLNC had no 
discernible program other than to overthrow Mobutu. Despite 
recruiting largely from Lunda and other ethnic communities of 
southwestern Shaba Region, there was no sign of Shaba separatism 
in its pronouncements or actions. The FLNC continued to exist 
in the early 1990s, but it had expelled Mbumba in 1987; neither 
the party nor its one-time leader played a major role in the transi- 
tional period after May 1990. 

Some observers noted the FLNC's failure to coordinate its ac- 
tivities with the other major armed opposition group, the PRP. 
Headed by Laurent Kabila, a leader of the Lumumbist insurrec- 
tion of 1964-65, the PRP maintained a "liberated zone" in the 
Fizi area of southeastern Kivu (in present-day Sud-Kivu). This 
zone had been out of government control since 1964. PRP forces 
in the area apparently existed in symbiosis with the government 
forces sent to exterminate them. Assignment to that theater of oper- 
ations reportedly was popular with Zairian military officers, who 
profited from smuggling gold, ivory, and other commodities out 
of the PRP zone. 

In contrast to the FLNC , the PRP had a well-defined program 
for social revolution. According to one publication, it foresaw 
regrouping peasants in cites agricoles, which would be organized as 
agricultural cooperatives, and equipped with a dispensary, mater- 
nity clinic, nursery school, playing fields, movie theater, market, 
and branch of the savings bank. It was unclear how this socialist 
paradise in rural Zaire would be financed. 

The PRP was briefly in the headlines in 1975, when its guerril- 
las kidnapped four foreigners (three American, one Dutch) at a 
Tanzanian wildlife research station. In 1984 and again in 1985, 
the PRP captured the town of Moba (eastern Shaba, on Lake Tan- 
ganyika) before being expelled each time by the Zairian army. The 
government claimed that 1,500 PRP fighters surrendered in 1986, 



234 



Government and Politics 



but in the early 1990s, the PRP apparently held its small pocket 
of rural territory. 

Another Lumumbist group, the Congolese Liberation Party (Par- 
ti de Liberation Congolaise — PLC), attacked small army and police 
posts and government transport around Beni, between Lake Ed- 
ward and Lake Albert, Kisangani, and Kwilu in 1987. At the end 
of the 1980s, the PLC apparendy still had a small guerrilla force 
in the Ruwenzori Mountains, along the Ugandan border. Aban- 
doned by their leader, Marandura Kibingo, some of the PLC fight- 
ers reportedly were hiding their guns and descending to western 
Uganda to grow food. In the meantime, Marandura was said to 
be living in Dar es Salaam on money supplied by Libya to the PLC . 

The Congolese National Movement-Lumumba (Mouvement 
National Congolais-Lumumba — MNC -Lumumba) was involved 
over the years in small-scale, low-visibility border incursions from 
the east, which did not pose a serious threat to regime stability. 
In 1984, however, the MNC -Lumumba claimed responsibility for 
bomb blasts at the Voice of Zaire and the central post office in Kin- 
shasa, in which one person was killed. Zaire placed the blame for 
the incidents on Libya, but the Belgian government expelled MNC- 
Lumumba secretary general Francois-Emery Lumumba Tolenga 
(son of Patrice Lumumba), saying it "would not permit acts of 
terrorism to be organized from Belgian territory. ' ' The 1984 blasts 
remained isolated incidents of urban terrorism. 

In the turbulent mid-1990s, a revival of armed opposition ap- 
peared possible. In Luanda, Angola, a group calling itself the 
Congolese National Army (Armee Nationale Congolaise — ANC) 
announced its intention of beginning an armed struggle in Zaire. 
The ANC presented itself as the military wing of the "radical op- 
position," and said that its main objective was "to restore legitimacy 
and democracy" to the "ex-Zaire" or "future Democratic Republic 
of the Congo." It claimed that it had fighters based in Uganda, 
Tanzania, Zambia, and Angola. 

Fragmented Exile Movements 

For the most part, groups in exile, including the Lumumbists, 
remained fragmented and unable to pose much of a threat to 
Mobutu. Their weakness is exemplified by the meeting held in Swit- 
zerland in 1987. Thirteen Zairian opposition movements took part 
and agreed to establish a government in exile, the sole aim of which 
was "to overthrow the Zairian dictator by any means." But no 
sooner had the composition of the government in exile been an- 
nounced than the supposed "president of the Constituent Assem- 
bly" denied his participation and appealed to exiles "to return to 



235 



Zaire: A Country Study 

the country to take part in the immense task of national recon- 
struction." 

An earlier attempt to unite the exiled opposition was the Coun- 
cil for the Liberation of the Congo (CLC), set up by former Lu- 
mumbist politician Bernardin Mungul-Diaka. Mungul-Diaka had 
been a minister under Mobutu, then fled the country in 1980, and 
surfaced in Brussels as head of the CLC. This council supposedly 
brought together five organizations, including the FLNC, the PRP, 
and the Progressive Congolese Students, all of which identified the 
country by its former name, rejecting "Zaire" as a creation of 
Mobutu. It was clear that the FLNC and PRP existed; it was less 
clear that the CLC would be able to coordinate their activities, or 
indeed to survive the return of Mungul-Diaka from exile. Equally 
ephemeral were the Congolese Front for the Restoration of De- 
mocracy, created in 1982 by Nguza Karl-i-Bond, and the Afri- 
can Socialist Force (Force Socialiste Africaine — FSA), formed by 
Cleophas Kamitatu in 1977. Such opposition groups competed with 
one another for aid from foreign supporters and were vulnerable 
to the co-optation of their leaders by Mobutu. They were impor- 
tant in that they managed to publicize abuses of the Mobutu re- 
gime but posed little threat to its endurance. 

The UDPS 

Alone among pre- 1990 Zairian opposition groups, the UDPS 
began as a dissident faction within the legislature. In November 
1980, thirteen members of parliament signed an "open letter to 
the president of the republic," a ten-point document cataloging 
corruption and abuse of power in the regime, and calling for legali- 
zation of a second political party. The thirteen signatories were 
arrested and stripped of their parliamentary seats. 

In July 1982, some of the Thirteen — as the ex-deputies were 
known; but the exact number involved was unclear — were sen- 
tenced to fifteen years in prison for aggravated treason. In 1983 
Mobutu lifted the prison sentences of six members of the group, 
but banished them to their home villages. The Thirteen became 
an opposition party in 1982 or merged with an existing clandes- 
tine party, under the rubric of the UDPS. Frederic Kibassa Mali- 
ba, a former minister under Mobutu, was the party's first head. 

The UDPS stood out among opposition groups as being distincdy 
moderate. The party identified itself as "the Party of Peace and 
Justice for all" and committed itself to achieving democracy in Zaire 
through nonviolent means. It aimed at establishing a multiparty 
political system with free elections, freedom of the press and as- 
sociation, and a free-market economy. 



236 



Government and Politics 



The UDPS suffered from several handicaps. It was seen as a 
party dominated by Luba-Kasai. In fact, of the original thirteen 
deputies who signed the open letter in November 1980, about half 
were from the Luba or related groups from Kasai-Oriental or Kasai- 
Occidental, while others represented other regions of the southern 
half of the country. The most prominent members, including 
Tshisekedi, were Luba-Kasai. When the UDPS emerged as a party, 
new members were brought in from other regions. Nonetheless, 
the government had some success in painting the UDPS as an ethnic 
movement. 

A second handicap, which contributed to frequent incoherence 
in the message of the UDPS, was the split between leaders in the 
country and in exile. This division was at the same time a strength 
of the UDPS. Its survival, when so many other opposition groups 
disappeared, was linked to its double status as a group within and 
outside Zaire. Particularly helpful was the willingness of Tshisekedi 
and others to attempt to work within the country. Also important 
was the early success of the UDPS in attracting the support of several 
United States congressmen. 

On June 24, 1987, Mobutu announced that the last leaders of 
the UDPS had rejoined the MPR. ' 'Apart from a few dozen noisy 
supporters, prudently based outside the country — notably in Brus- 
sels and Paris — and true militants isolated in Kinshasa — the UDPS 
had no impact in this too vast country of Zaire," the Paris weekly 
Jeune Afrique commented. It was too soon to write off the UDPS, 
however. Tshisekedi explained that permission had been granted 
to allow the group to continue as a "tendency" within the MPR. 
In January 1988, he attempted to address a public meeting in Kin- 
shasa. Police beat and arrested hundreds of participants, includ- 
ing Tshisekedi himself. 

In February 1989, when thousands of students took to the streets 
of Kinshasa to protest IMF-inspired austerity measures, includ- 
ing a hike in tuition fees, and inadequate and expensive transpor- 
tation, security forces arrested Tshisekedi 's wife, apparently to 
pressure the UDPS leader into confessing that he had instigated 
the demonstrations. In the meantime, Mobutu, perhaps attempt- 
ing to subvert the opposition, named former UDPS president Kibas- 
sa to the low- ranking post of minister of sports. 

Opposition since 1990 

As noted previously, Mobutu's April 1990 announcement of po- 
litical pluralism emphasized that three political parties would be 
permitted. Soon thereafter, however, he opted instead for "integral 
multipartyism," apparently seeing more scope for his habitual 



237 



Zaire: A Country Study 



divide-and-rule tactics than in a three-party arrangement. Numer- 
ous parties formed and ultimately received legal recognition in 1990, 
but most were small and not major contenders in elections. By late 
1991 , the number of registered political parties was placed at 230. 

The major opposition parties are the UDPS, led by Tshisekedi; 
the PDSC, led by Ileo; and UFERI, led by Nguza. Other notewor- 
thy opposition political parties are the Common National Front 
(Front Commun National or Front Commun des Nationalistes — 
FCN) of Kamanda wa Kamanda; the African Socialist Party (Parti 
Socialiste Africain — PSA), led by Jibi Ngoyi; the Unified Lumum- 
bist Party, led by Antoine Gizenga; and the Rally of Liberal 
Democrats (Rassemblement des Democrats Liberaux — RDL), led 
by Mwamba Mulanda and generally allied with UFERI. 

By late 1991, several opposition parties had formed a coalition, 
the Sacred Union (Union Sacree). Among the participants, in ad- 
dition to UFERI, were the UDPS and the PDSC, which led the 
so-called radical wing of the coalition, as well as the Lumumbist 
Unified Party. The radical wing refused to participate in the new- 
ly formed government of Nguza. Nguza and UFERI then left the 
Sacred Union and organized another political coalition within the 
CNS, the Alliance of Patriotic Forces, encompassing some thirty 
opposition parties, ten civic associations, and various individuals 
united in opposition to the Mobutu regime, but rejecting "ex- 
tremist" stands. Adolphe Kishwe-Maya, president of a UFERI 
faction, headed the Alliance's coordination bureau. Pro-Mobutu 
forces, led by the MPR, which reportedly changed its name to 
Popular Movement for the Revival (Mouvement Populaire pour 
le Renouveau), worked together in the United Democratic Forces 
(Forces Democratiques Unies — FDU) coalition. 

In June 1993, six defectors from the Sacred Union, claiming that 
the Sacred Union had become too extremist, formed their own coa- 
lition, which they called the Restored Sacred Union (Union Sacree 
Renovee). The six had joined the Birindwa government, and as 
such could no longer be regarded as ardent opponents of the 
Mobutu regime, so their role in the anti-Mobutu, prodemocracy 
movement is suspect. The same can be said of Nguza' s UFERI 
and Alliance of Patriotic Forces, given Nguza' s position as first 
deputy prime minister in charge of defense in the Birindwa govern- 
ment. In fact, some observers see Nguza' s acceptance of the 
ministerial post as evidence that he has been co-opted by Mobutu. 

In early September 1993, Tshisekedi formed another coalition 
to organize opposition to a Mobutu plan for a constitutional referen- 
dum to be held in October 1993 and followed by elections in De- 
cember. The new group is called the Democratic Forces of the 



238 



Animateurs, cheerleaders for the MPR, after a rally in Equateur Region 

Congo-Kinshasa (Forces Democratiques de Congo-Kinshasa). 
Its relationship to the Sacred Union is unclear, but presumably 
close. 

The Sacred Union, still the principal component of the anti- 
Mobutu campaign, reportedly has been beset by divisiveness. In 
addition, Tshisekedi has been criticized both within the transitional 
government and within the UDPS for being too authoritarian and 
failing to hold a party conference. Such disunity within the oppo- 
sition has continued to undermine its effectiveness and to play to 
Mobutu's advantage in the early 1990s. 

Interest Groups 

Political scientists frequently characterize Zaire and other Afri- 
can states as "corporatist," manifesting a system in which interest 
groups are officially sanctioned and noncompetitive. Although cor- 
poratism has not been a dominant theme in official Zairian dis- 
course, it is present, notably in the oft-repeated phrase, "toutes 
les forces vives" (all the vital forces). When a new policy is to be 
launched, "toutes les forces vives" of the nation or of the region, 
as appropriate, are called together — representatives of the employ- 
ers, employees, churches, and other pertinent groups. 

In 1991, as Zaire initiated a national conference on the model 
of those held in Benin, Congo, and other French-speaking African 



239 



Zaire: A Country Study 

states, a new expression arose to refer to interest groups: civil so- 
ciety (la societe civile), a sociological expression that originated in 
the writings of nineteenth-century German philosopher Georg Wil- 
helm Friedrich Hegel. 

Organized Labor 

The case for corporatism was strongest in the area of labor rela- 
tions until 1991 , when independent trade union organizations were 
officially recognized. The political pluralism of the First Republic 
had given labor unions freedom to maneuver among the various 
interest groups and parties. Trade unions performed an opposi- 
tion role but were by no means united over what that role ought 
to be. Some were reformist, others more radical. 

In 1967 the Mobutu government forced the unification of the 
country's fractious trade unions into a single organization, the Na- 
tional Union of Zairian Workers (Union Nationale des Travailleurs 
Zai'rois — UNTZA). Then the government brought UNTZA un- 
der its control, making clear that UNTZA was to be an instru- 
ment of support for the regime. Officially UNTZA was a specialized 
branch of the MPR, carrying out some syndicalist functions, such 
as negotiating contracts with various firms, but operating under 
the supervision of the MPR secretariat. 

Resolutions of the 1978 UNTZA congress reveal a balance be- 
tween political concerns and purely syndicalist ones. There was 
a motion of support for Mobutu. By contrast, several specific reso- 
lutions dealt with the interests of workers, such as control of con- 
sumer prices, equitable distribution of revenues and goods, and 
representation of workers on the administrative councils of public 
enterprises. It is revealing, however, that all the resolutions were 
drafted in the MPR secretariat in the expectation that they would 
be adopted by UNTZA without significant debate. 

Having a captive trade union federation did not spare the regime 
from labor strikes. What it meant was that any strike was a "wild- 
cat" strike and had no official leaders with whom to negotiate. 

The clearest evidence that structural conflicts between the trade 
unions and the regime were being papered over came early in 1990, 
when Mobutu called for a national dialogue. Memoranda prepared 
by various groups were not supposed to be released to the public, 
but Jeune Afrique claimed to have learned that the Kinshasa office 
of UNTZA was the author of a memo calling for the resignation 
of Mobutu. 

Following Mobutu's April 24, 1990, announcement of the end 
of the one-party state, UNTZA lost its monopoly position and with 
it the right to the "check-off or withholding of union dues at 



240 



Government and Politics 



source. UNTZA remains the strongest trade union federation but 
has to contend with eleven other officially recognized unions, some 
of which represent Christian, liberal, or social democratic tenden- 
cies while others have grouped employees in particular trades or 
sectors. In the new, competitive environment— amid a deteriorating 
socioeconomic situation — strikes are even more common. Indeed, 
teachers, medical personnel, and other public- service personnel are 
frequently on strike because of low or nonexistent pay, and the lack 
of public services resulting from the strikes has further contributed 
to the deterioration of the economy and society. 

Religious Groups 

The Roman Catholic Church 

Until the inauguration of multipartyism in 1990, the most per- 
sistent and most effective opposition to the Mobutu regime came 
from the Roman Catholic Church. Mobutu's ambitions for state 
expansion necessarily implied conflict with organized religion, and 
the main adversary of the expansionist regime was the Roman 
Catholic Church, which claims 46 to 48 percent of the population 
as active members. The Catholic network of schools, clinics, and 
other social services was as large as that of the state, and more ef- 
ficiently run. The role of the church thus was pervasive, and its 
moral authority made it an uncomfortable competitor for the com- 
prehensive allegiance that Mobutu sought. 

Initially, the church had welcomed the new regime and supported 
the consolidation of its authority. The founding of the MPR led 
to the first tensions, and in 1969 a conference of bishops privately 
noted "dictatorial tendencies" in the regime. The following year, 
Joseph Cardinal Malula, the head of the church in Zaire, publicly 
expressed fears regarding the regime's intentions during a mass 
celebrating the tenth anniversary of independence. 

In 1971 the regime struck at the symbol of the Catholic educa- 
tion system, absorbing Lovanium University (along with the Prot- 
estants' fledgling university) into the new National University of 
Zaire. Even more offensive to the church was the announcement 
that branches of the JMPR (party youth organization) had to be 
established in the seminaries. After weeks of tension and closure 
of the seminaries, in April 1972 the bishops accepted JMPR cells 
on the condition that their party links pass through the church hi- 
erarchy. 

Another battle took place over the concept of authenticity, which 
the Catholic hierarchy began to see as a threat to Christianity. The 



241 



Zaire: A Country Study 

regime's stress on "mental decolonization" and "cultural disalien- 
ation" could be read as a veiled attack on Christianity as an im- 
port from the West, as could the appeal to the values of traditional 
African culture as an alternative to indiscriminate Westernization. 

Authenticity also included the banning of Christian names, a 
measure that particularly offended the church. The Zairian bishops 
briefly resisted the measure, then acquiesced. The church's oppo- 
sition earned Cardinal Malula attacks as a "renegade of the revo- 
lution"; he was evicted from the residence the regime had built 
for him and forced to leave the country for three months. 

Late in 1972, the regime banned all religious publications and 
dissolved church- sponsored youth movements. Indoctrination of 
Zairian youth should be an exclusive function of the party, it was 
argued. The zenith of this campaign came at the end of 1974 when 
the religious school network was nationalized, public celebration 
of Christmas was banned, and the display of religious artifacts was 
limited to the interior of churches. 

Soon thereafter, the regime began to concede tacitly that it had 
gone too far. The school networks eventually were returned to 
church management when the state proved unable to operate them 
effectively. 

By 1976, the Catholic church had reemerged as the strongest 
critic of the existing sociopolitical order. Following the abandon- 
ment of the education "reforms" and of Zairianization of the econ- 
omy, and the fiasco of intervention in Angola, a mood of profound 
demoralization settled over the country, and the church expressed 
the prevailing mood in a pastoral letter. Outraged, Mobutu sum- 
moned the Catholic bishops and demanded that they disavow the 
letter; they flatly refused. 

Since that time, church- state relations have been on a see- saw. 
Mobutu welcomed the visits of Pope John Paul II, in May 1980 
and August 1985, perhaps because they lent a reflected glory to 
his regime. But at other times, relations have been very bad in- 
deed. In 1982, for example, Le Monde reported that Cardinal Mal- 
ula and three bishops had been subjected to violent intimidation 
by the authorities. 

The death of Cardinal Malula in 1989 removed the most promi- 
nent opponent of Mobutism. But when Mobutu called for a na- 
tional dialogue, early in 1990, the Catholic bishops produced a 
memorandum that was sweeping in its condemnation of Mobu- 
tu's autocratic system of rule. 

Monsignor Etsou, bishop of Mbandaka, was named archbishop 
of Kinshasa in 1990, then raised to the rank of cardinal, succeed- 
ing Malula in both posts. These decisions doubtless were motivated 



242 



Government and Politics 



by the needs of the church; however, ''Mobutu's bishop" appeared 
to have been chosen by the church over other potential successors. 
This impression was strengthened, early in 1991, when Etsou can- 
celled a proreform march in Kinshasa, and he ordered priests to 
keep out of politics. 

Yet other currents in the church clearly still oppose Mobutu and 
have been in the forefront of democratization efforts. Monsignor 
Laurent Monsengwo Pasinya, archbishop of Kisangani, was elected 
president of the CNS in April 1992 and, as head of the HCR, has 
continued to lead negotiations aimed at political reform. Moreover, 
in December 1993, Zaire's Catholic bishops once again issued a 
public condemnation of the Mobutu regime, accusing Mobutu of 
using state terrorism, ethnic cleansing, and economic sabotage to 
destabilize the country and maintain control of the state apparatus. 

The Protestants 

Zaire's Protestant leaders were less resistant than the Catholics 
to the excesses of Mobutu's Second Republic. The Protestant 
churches, claiming about 24 to 28 percent of the population as com- 
municants, acquiesced to the 1971 government-imposed merger 
of the various Protestant groups (analogous to the unification of 
the trade union movement, discussed above). The result was the 
Church of Christ in Zaire (Eglise du Christ au Zaire — ECZ), an 
umbrella organization. Some Protestants welcomed this action be- 
cause it gave them equal standing with the Catholics. Conserva- 
tive Protestant churches and missions refused to join, only to be 
faced by a government law recognizing the ECZ as the only legal 
framework for Protestant activity in the country. Sixty- two Prot- 
estant denominations were recognized as "communities" within 
the ECZ. Numerically, the most important were the Baptists, the 
Congregationalists, the Methodists, and the Presbyterians. 

Leaders of the ECZ seem to have decided that the Mobutu re- 
gime's authenticity campaign offered them an historic opportunity. 
Unlike the Catholics, they embraced authenticity and its leader, 
Mobutu. The clash between Cardinal Malula and President Mobutu, 
culminating in the nationalization of Lovanium University and the 
exile of the cardinal, seemed to compensate for the advantages 
Catholicism had enjoyed under Belgian colonialism. Even though 
they lost their own newly established university, the Free Univer- 
sity of the Congo (Universite Libre du Congo — ULC), the Prot- 
estants apparently considered that what was bad news for the 
Catholics necessarily was good news for them. 

The Protestants remained committed to the regime until after 
Mobutu's announcement of a process of popular consultation. 



243 



Zaire: A Country Study 



Then, in February 1990, the ECZ's Executive committee for Kasai- 
Oriental Region submitted a memorandum in which it criticized 
the constitutional structure of the Second Republic, denounced the 
failures or abuses of the functioning of the various institutions, and 
proposed a series of changes. The memorandum was particularly 
direct in criticizing the "excessiveness of the powers held in the 
hands of only one man," i.e., the president. What is interesting 
in light of subsequent events, however, is that this memorandum 
did not demand the replacement of the regime and made no men- 
tion of multiparty ism. 

A month later, the head of the ECZ submitted a memorandum 
to Mobutu, on behalf of the entire ECZ. The memorandum recom- 
mended that the president assume the role of * 1 guarantor of na- 
tional unity and sovereignty, making the government responsible 
before the people (the parliament) for the acts it commits." The 
ECZ called for a multiparty system with a minimum of two and 
a maximum of three parties, affirmed that only Mobutu could guide 
the country through the transition to multiparty ism, and promised 
its prayers for the success of the president's efforts. 

The proposals of the Protestants were curiously similar to those 
made by Mobutu in his speech of April 24, notably the limitation 
of three parties and the placing of the president above the parties. 
Some observers concluded that the ECZ had been influential in 
shaping Mobutu's ideas, but of course it is equally possible that 
leaders of the ECZ were well enough informed as to what the presi- 
dent planned to say, three weeks later, that they were able to tailor 
their document to correspond to the president's plans. 

Following the massacre of students on the campus of the Univer- 
sity of Lubumbashi in May 1990, the national executive commit- 
tee of the ECZ met at Goma in Nord-Kivu, where Mobutu himself 
was passing a considerable period of time. The committee report- 
edly recommended that the ECZ abstain from commenting on the 
Lubumbashi affair. This position was opposed by the regional lead- 
ers from Kasai-Oriental and especially by those from Shaba (of 
which Lubumbashi is the capital). Under the pressure of these dele- 
gations in particular, the ECZ issued a pastoral letter that went 
farther than any of its earlier statements in condemning the chaotic 
state of affairs. As to what should be done, the ECZ called for "a 
general amnesty" that would make it possible for all political ten- 
dencies to participate in a national conference. 

Other Religions 

The points of view of the Kimbanguist Church and of the much 
smaller Muslim community are similar to that of the Protestants, 



244 



Government and Politics 



i.e., recognition by the Second Republic was welcome in that it 
gave the organizations far more status than they had previously 
enjoyed. As the political scene opened up in 1990, the Kimban- 
guists and Muslims were even slower than the Protestants to op- 
pose the regime to which they owed so much. 

Students 

Students of the universities and other institutes of higher edu- 
cation have been politically active and influential since indepen- 
dence. At first, their political clout derived from their elite status 
(university training virtually guaranteed access to the elite). In 
subsequent years, with the expansion of university education, the 
number of students increased rapidly, outstripping employment 
opportunities. 

Until 1968 there was a student union at each of the country's 
three universities and a national union, representing the three cam- 
puses as well as students overseas. By far the most influential or- 
ganizations were the General Union of Congolese Students (Union 
Generale des Etudiants Congolais — UGEC) and the General 
Association of Lovanium Students (Association Generale des Etu- 
diants de Lovanium — AGEL). The UGEC, whose leadership ad- 
vocated "scientific socialism," was ambivalent regarding Mobutu. 
It originally supported him out of dislike for Moise Tshombe and 
because of Mobutu's symbolically important gestures, such as the 
nationalization of the Upper Katanga Mining Union (Union 
Miniere du Haut Katanga — UMHK) and the naming of Patrice 
Lumumba as "National Hero." Some UGEC leaders in fact joined 
the presidential staff. However, many student activists viewed the 
outcome of the UMHK conflict as a surrender, in that Mobutu 
ultimately was forced to reimburse many of the original owners, 
and found the Mobutu government too closely tied to the United 
States. 

In 1968 UGEC was banned from Congolese universities by 
government order, and the youth wing of the MPR became the 
only officially recognized student organization. However, the stu- 
dent JMPR sections were allowed a degree of freedom not availa- 
ble in all party structures, in that they elected their officers. These 
elections generally pitted candidates of ethno-regional coalitions 
against each other, a key question being which blocks would align 
themselves with the favored students of Equateur, Mobutu's home 
region. 

Over the years, student discontent continued to be expressed in 
manifestos, strikes, and demonstrations. There was a serious out- 
break on June 4, 1969, which led to a clash between Lovanium 



245 



Zaire: A Country Study 

students and security forces in which about thirty students were 
killed; it was commemorated in 1971 and 1977 by protest marches. 

As the Second Republic drew to an end, students again were 
in the forefront of opposition to the regime. In February 1989, thou- 
sands of students took to the streets of Kinshasa, in reaction to the 
imposition of IMF-sponsored austerity measures including elimi- 
nation of student bus services and 80 percent hikes in tuition fees. 
The government attempted, unsuccessfully, to blame the unrest 
on the illegal opposition party, the UDPS. 

On April 6, 1990, university and high school students demon- 
strated on Kinshasa's Avenue de la Victoire and set several vehi- 
cles on fire. Far from calming the students, Mobutu's April 24 
speech stirred them up even further. On May 7, a group of univer- 
sity students stopped a bus carrying several members of parliament, 
abused them, and cut the hair of some of them. Further demon- 
strations occurred in Kinshasa the following day, especially on cam- 
pus. On May 9, the government announced a series of measures 
to deal with the wave of student unrest: expulsion of all students 
guilty of vandalism, introduction of legal sanctions against the same 
students, and organization of elections at all institutions of higher 
learning to choose student representatives. 

Two days later, students at the University of Lubumbashi took 
violent action against alleged government spies in their midst. In 
response, security forces surrounded the campus and killed a large 
number of students (up to 100 according to some reports) after 
separating and sparing those from Equateur. This incident and the 
refusal of the government to allow an inquiry into it resulted in 
the cutoff of most international aid to Zaire. 

Ethnic Groups 

According to Mobutu's diagnosis, "tribalism," or ethnic polit- 
ics, was one of the First Republic's major ills. The Manifesto of 
N'Sele and other major statements of "authentic Zairian nation- 
alism" declared overt promotion of ethnic identity to be illegal. 
Steps taken against tribalism included suppression of institutional 
arenas in which ethnicity could be mobilized, apparent exclusion 
of overt ethnic patronage within the state, and prohibition of the 
articulation of ethnic ideologies. The first step included dismantling 
electoral assemblies and political assemblies, which was accom- 
plished during the Second Republic regime's first year. The be- 
wildering assortment of political parties — more than 200 of them 
had taken part in the 1965 balloting — was swept away by the stroke 
of a pen. They were replaced by a single party, the MPR, "the 
nation politically organized." The twenty-one provincettes were 



246 



Government and Politics 



recombined, ultimately becoming eight regions (plus Kinshasa), 
which became mere administrative subdivisions of the recentral- 
ized state. 

First Republic politicians had sustained their clientele through 
the open use of the resources of the state for patronage. Particular 
ministries had become ethnic fiefdoms, both at the central and 
provincial levels. Local administrators were named at the provin- 
cial level, with ethnic criteria frequently paramount. Most of these 
practices were swept away by the new regime's total centraliza- 
tion of power. The state remained a vast patrimonial domain, but 
the distribution of benefits was above all a presidential preroga- 
tive. Functionaries in the command hierarchy of the territorial ad- 
ministration were posted outside of their ethnic zones as a matter 
of principle. Ministers were frequently rotated, inhibiting the en- 
trenchment of particular ethnic groups in given departments. 

Ethnic associations were banned early in the Second Republic. 
But it is clear that they continued to exist, as was made evident 
on each national holiday when they were among the groups send- 
ing messages of congratulations to President Mobutu. Moreover, 
Mobutu was widely regarded as favoring his own ethnic group and 
region. 

Political liberalization, following Mobutu's speech of April 1990, 
did not extend to recognition of ethnic political parties. Those 
groups denied recognition included a revived version of the Kon- 
go ethnic party, Alliance of the Kongo People (Alliance des 
Bakongo — Abako) and a new party, Anamongo, which would have 
represented the Mongo of Equateur, Tetela-Kusu of Kasai-Oriental 
and Maniema, and related groups. 

Nevertheless, ethnic rivalries and tensions continued to fester. 
Interethnic fighting in Shaba between adherents of Nguza and 
UFERI — primarily Lunda, the dominant ethnic group in Shaba — 
and Tshisekedi and UDPS supporters — primarily Luba-Kasai — 
erupted in August 1992 and continued sporadically thereafter. The 
specter of secession also arose anew, as Shaba expressed its oppo- 
sition to the Tshisekedi government. The region's governor, Gabriel 
Kyungu wa Kumwanza, a disciple of Nguza, went so far as to 
recommend the expulsion of Luba-Kasai living in Shaba, and Ngu- 
za bitterly denounced the CNS (whose investigative commission 
had recommended that he be indicted for his role in the Shaba ethnic 
violence) and refused to rule out the eventual secession of the region. 

Throughout 1993 violence continued in Shaba, and indigenous 
ethnic groups in Nord-Kivu also initiated attacks on people originally 
from Rwanda and Burundi, collectively known in Zaire as the Ban- 
yarwanda (see The Significance of Ethnic Identification, ch. 2). In 



247 



Zaire: A Country Study 

both instances of ethnic tension, there is a history of enmity and 
resentment. But most observers believe that the recent violence is 
less historical than the result of deliberate government manipula- 
tion designed to divert popular resentment of the Mobutu regime. 

In Nord-Kivu, government and security officials condoned and 
even instigated the attacks. In Shaba local government officials also 
played a major role in inciting ethnic violence. In fact, Kyungu 
launched a campaign known as "Katanga for the Katangese." Un- 
der its auspices, vigilante youth brigades, calling the Luba-Kasai 
"insects" and "foreigners" who were to blame for the misery of 
the true Katangan people, began attacking the homes and busi- 
nesses of Luba-Kasai, in effect systematically expelling them from 
Shaba. 

In several public appearances in late 1993, Kyungu, with the 
apparent approval of Nguza, reiterated calls for Shaban autonomy, 
threatening to pursue it immediately if Tshisekedi were to be 
"forced on" the nation as prime minister in a political settlement. 
He also repeated demands for Luba-Kasai to leave Shaba. 

Observers note that Kyungu and Nguza have used both the au- 
tonomy drive and the ethnic cleansing campaign to promote their 
own political agenda and the interests of UFERI, to the detriment 
of Tshisekedi and the UDPS . Some observers also see their actions 
as an indication that Nguza and Kyungu, both formerly Mobutu 
opponents but now both part of the Birindwa government, Nguza 
as first deputy prime minister in charge of defense and Kyungu 
as governor of Shaba, have been bribed or co-opted by Mobutu. 
Mobutu can thus be seen as using them to reinforce his position 
as the only one who can hold Zaire together. Indeed, few would 
argue that mineral-rich Shaba is vital to Zaire's future. 

Other Interest Groups 

Other important interest groups include the Zairian League for 
Human Rights, founded in the late 1980s, and professional associ- 
ations such as the Medical Association and Bar Association, which 
existed for decades but only acquired political significance in the 
freer political environment. By contrast, the National Association 
of Enterprises of Zaire (Association Nationale des Entreprises du 
Zaire — ANEZA) has remained in the hands of close associates of 
Mobutu and apparently has littie independent political weight. 

The Media 

Control of the mass media has long been a central element of 
Mobutu's domination of Zairian political life. Indeed, control of 
television and radio in particular has been critical to Mobutu 1 s 



248 



Government and Politics 



ability to survive and retain power in the early 1990s. In order 
to assert his authority and undercut the viability of the Tshisekedi 
government, Mobutu deployed military forces loyal to him to seize 
control of state radio and television broadcast facilities in Kinsha- 
sa, surrounding the buildings with tanks and troops. Throughout 
1992 and 1993, the military also systematically attacked the offices 
of newspapers critical of Mobutu. 

During the 1980s, "restructuring" of the press reduced the num- 
ber of newspapers being issued. In the early 1990s, there were three 
dailies: Uanalyste, Elima, and Salongo, all of Kinshasa. The Lubum- 
bashi and Kisangani papers, formerly dailies, had become week- 
lies after financial problems. 

In the aftermath of Mobutu's speech of April 24, 1990, the situ- 
ation of the press changed dramatically. While Salongo retained its 
pro-MPR position, Elima became sharply critical of the regime. 
Although Elima' s editor-publisher spent some time in jail early in 
1991, there can be littie doubt that his courage opened the field 
to an independent press. A number of other papers and news maga- 
zines appeared, mainly weeklies, and vied with one another in 
criticizing the government. Because more than half of the popula- 
tion does not speak French, there are periodicals appearing in Afri- 
can languages as well as in French. 

The only domestic news agency is the regime-controlled Agence 
Zaire-Presse (AZAP). Some foreign agencies, including Agence 
France-Presse, Xinhau, and Reuters, also have bureaus in Kin- 
shasa. 

The regime also practices censorship of foreign media, e.g., by 
forbidding sale of the issue of Jeune Afrique, in March 1990, which 
carried the text of the memorandum of the Catholic bishops on 
reforms needed in Zaire. Mobutu virtually conceded that this ban 
had been ineffective, however, by referring in his April 24 speech 
to having taken into account ' 'even" the bishops' memorandum. 

It should be noted that newspapers and magazines serve mainly 
educated Zairians. The electronic media reach many more among 
Zaire's population of some 39.1 million. The government-owned 
radio network, the Voice of Zaire (La Voix du Zaire), and region- 
al stations could be received on approximately 3.7 million radio 
receivers, as of 1990. The government-operated, commercial sta- 
tion Zaire Television broadcast from Kinshasa, and service was 
relayed by satellite to the cities of the interior. In 1990 there were 
approximately 40,000 televisions in Zaire. 

Throughout the Mobutu regime, the content of radio and tele- 
vision news broadcasts has been tightly controlled. Television news 
follows the official order of protocol, meaning that all news of 



249 



Zaire: A Country Study 

President Mobutu, however routine, comes before any news of the 
prime minister, which in turn precedes any news of other ministers. 
At the height of the cult of personality in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, each television news broadcast began with the president's 
face appearing, godlike, in a bank of clouds. 

However, the events of 1989-90, when political change swept 
the communist states of Eastern Europe and reform occurred in 
many of Africa's party-states, made it clear that the efforts of the 
Zairian regime to control the flow of information to the public were 
ineffective. When Mobutu told Zairians that perestroika was not need- 
ed in their country, and people in Kinshasa made jokes about 
"Mobutu Sesesescu," it was clear how capable the Zairians were 
of following international news. The role of Brazzaville television 
and radio, easily picked up in Kinshasa, and of various foreign 
shortwave radio stations, also heard elsewhere in Zaire, seems to 
be crucial in this respect. 

Foreign Policy 
Relations with the West 

Zairian political scientist Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja argues that 
"the United States eventually replaced Belgium as the major ar- 
biter of Zaire's destiny, but continues to deal with Zairian affairs 
within a multilateral strategy of imperialism in which Belgium and 
France are its key partners." For Crawford Young, in contrast, 
Mobutu's survival has been due in large measure to his success 
in multiplying external patrons. These two views, only partly con- 
tradictory, illuminate two aspects of the foreign relations of Mobu- 
tu's Zaire, which is both dependent and uncontrollable. 

The Mobutu regime has long enjoyed, and is perceived as de- 
pending on, the support of Western powers: first Belgium, then 
France, and then also the United States. Because of its size, min- 
eral wealth, and strategic location, Zaire was able to capitalize on 
Cold War tensions to garner support from the West. In the in- 
terest of maintaining stability in Central Africa and in exchange 
for his support for their foreign policy goals in Angola, Western 
powers rewarded Mobutu with substantial economic and military 
assistance and for the most part maintained silence in the face of 
growing evidence of the abuses of his regime. In the early 1990s, 
however, with Zaire facing severe internal turmoil, and with the 
ending of the Cold War superpower rivalry in Africa between the 
United States and the former Soviet Union, the country's main 
Western allies, reversing earlier positions, have put pressure on 



250 



Government and Politics 



Mobutu to improve his human rights record and to institute mul- 
tiparty democracy. 

Relations with Belgium 

Belgo-Zairian relations have been on a roller coaster through- 
out the Mobutu years, in part because of disputes involving the 
substantial Belgian commercial and industrial holdings in the coun- 
try. Also contributing to the tumultuous relationship are the num- 
bers of Zairian students who continue to congregate in Belgium 
and the persistent symbols of the former colonial relationship, which 
remain highly charged for both Zairians and Belgians. The coup 
of November 1965 was interpreted by some observers as having 
been actively supported by Belgian military officers in Mobutu's 
entourage. Others noted that the coup was a loss for Belgium in 
that it prevented the return to power of Moise Tshombe, the most 
reliable defender of Belgian interests in the ex-colony. 

In any case, Belgo-Congolese relations were cordial until Mobutu 
raised the question of revising the Convention of February 6, 1965, 
which supposedly setded the contentieux belgo-congolais, i.e., the bundle 
of disputes concerning assets and debts of the former colony. Bel- 
gium rejected the demand to revise the convention but agreed to 
reopen negotiations, because it had some unsatisfied demands of 
its own. When bilateral negotiations failed to produce substantive 
results, the Congo acted unilaterally on July 13, 1966, breaking 
off the negotiations, freezing the assets of certain Belgian organi- 
zations, and seizing a number of their properties in Kinshasa. 

Relations with the Belgian-controlled mining company UMHK 
also deteriorated in early 1966. On June 7, the government ruled 
that the headquarters of all enterprises operating in the country 
must be transferred to the Congo and promulgated a law, called 
the Bakajika Law, which in effect cancelled concessions granted 
before independence. All titleholders wishing to continue in the 
country were given thirty days in which to introduce a request for 
renewal of title. 

Discussions with the Belgian government and UMHK continued 
until December 1966, when the Congo decided to break off the 
talks. On December 23, when UMHK announced its refusal to 
transfer its headquarters to Kinshasa, the government suspended 
copper exports and blocked the transfer of the mining company's 
funds. On January 2, 1967, Kinshasa authorities announced for- 
mation of the state-owned company, General Quarries and Mines 
(Generale des Carrieres et des Mines — Gecamines) to replace 
UMHK. In February 1967, Gecamines signed a technical cooper- 
ation agreement with a sister company of the former UMHK, and 



251 



Zaire: A Country Study 

copper exports were resumed. Although the matter of indemnities 
for UMHK properties remained in suspense, the accord marked 
a turning point in relations. 

Belgium subsequently took a number of steps to ensure closer 
relations with the former colony. In early June 1968, President 
Mobutu and his family were received as houseguests of the Bel- 
gian king and queen, the first such visit by statesmen from the new 
nation since 1960. The two governments signed a convention for 
scientific and technical cooperation on August 23, 1968, and the 
minister of state for foreign affairs and foreign trade announced 
the release of certain Belgian funds that had been blocked in the 
Congo since 1960. During a return visit by King Baudouin and 
Queen Fabiola in June 1970, a treaty of friendship was signed. 

In the early 1970s, the relationship periodically soured over var- 
ious issues. But starting in 1976 both sides made efforts to move 
closer. A new cooperation agreement was signed in March, and 
Zaire promised to compensate Belgians who had lost assets under 
the Zairianization policy. Zaire later allowed foreigners whose 
property had been expropriated to recover 60 percent of their as- 
sets, leading to a Belgian renewal of interest in investment. Im- 
proved relations notwithstanding, Mobutu complained that students 
and exiles hostile to the regime were allowed to publish and be ac- 
tive in Belgium. 

During the second Shaba invasion in 1978, Belgium sent 
paratroopers, as did the French, to rescue the stranded Europeans 
at Kolwezi. Planning to negotiate with the FLNC rebels, the Bel- 
gians proceeded cautiously, landing their forces at Kamina, more 
than 200 kilometers away. Their hand was forced, however, when 
the French preceded them by landing directly at Kolwezi and coun- 
terattacking. Fearing the extension of French influence in their 
former domain, the Belgians promoted the formation of a joint Afri- 
can defense force to repel future attacks by Zairian dissidents. 

Despite such support, by 1989 Zaire apparendy was closer to 
a total break with its former colonial ruler than at any time since 
the crisis at independence. In November 1988, Belgium had offered 
to postpone for ten years the due dates of state-to-state loans and 
to make new arrangements concerning Zaire's guaranteed com- 
mercial debt to Belgium. However, this relatively liberal stance 
toward Zaire was criticized in the Belgian parliament and espe- 
cially in the press, where Mobutu was depicted as an autocrat who 
had led his country into economic ruin. In response, Zaire 
renounced all measures of reduction of its debt undertaken by Bel- 
gium. All Zairians with property in Belgium were to dispose of 
it or transfer it out of Belgian territory. By the end of the academic 



252 



Government and Politics 



year, every Zairian studying in Belgium would have to leave. 

Zaire then escalated the conflict by terminating the treaties 
governing Belgian aid to Zaire, calling for an inventory of all specific 
aid agreements and termination of all those that did not contrib- 
ute to the development of Zaire, and reopening the contentieux belgo- 
congolais. Belgium replied that the contentieux had been definitively 
settled and that it was suspending cooperation with Zaire, although 
pending aid projects would be completed. 

The Francophone Summit held in Dakar in late May 1989 
provided Zaire with considerable debt relief and also brought its 
dispute with Belgium nearer to resolution. The highlight of the 
meeting was French president Francois Mitterrand's announce- 
ment of the cancellation of US$2.6 billion of debts from thirty-five 
African states. Attracting less attention, but of more direct impor- 
tance to Zaire, which accounted for 80 percent of the US$500 mil- 
lion of guaranteed debt owed to Belgian banks by developing 
countries, were the debt relief plans announced by Belgium's pre- 
mier, Wilfried Martens, at the summit. 

Suddenly, in July, the crisis was over, and Belgo-Zairian rela- 
tions were back to "normal. ' ' During a ceremony in Rabat on July 
26, President Mobutu and Premier Martens signed an agreement 
that formally ended the dispute between the two countries. The 
accord wrote off nearly US$277.7 million in commercial and 
government debt and rescheduled the remaining commercial debt 
of US$296.7 million. Relations between Belgium and its former 
colony were cordial once more. They stayed that way for about 
a year, then worsened again over the killings at the University of 
Lubumbashi in May 1990, in the aftermath of which Belgium cut 
off all but humanitarian aid. Mobutu retaliated by expelling 700 
Belgian technicians and closing all but one Belgian consular office 
in Zaire. In October 1991, Belgium dispatched troops to Zaire to 
help restore order and protect foreign nationals following a muti- 
ny and rampage by paratroopers in Kinshasa in September 1991. 
But Belgium increasingly began to voice criticism of the Mobutu 
regime's human rights abuses and lack of democratization. More- 
over, there was a growing consensus among most Belgian politi- 
cians in favor of the departure of President Mobutu from office. 

In late 1992, Belgium, along with France and the United States, 
expressed official support for the Tshisekedi government, despite 
fears that its power was more apparent than real. Belgium also 
showed some cautious interest in resuming aid to Zaire if democrati- 
zation continued and if Zaire received IMF and World Bank back- 
ing for its economic program. But no such resumption appeared 
likely at the end of 1993. 



253 



Zaire: A Country Study 

In response to another wave of violence in Zaire in early 1993, 
Belgium again sent troops to Zaire to evacuate its nationals. 
However, Mobutu refused to permit the Belgian forces to enter 
Zaire, forcing them to remain in Brazzaville. In the aftermath of 
the violence, in February 1993, Belgium joined France and the 
United States in voicing continued support for the Tshisekedi 
government and democratic forces in Zaire. The three nations 
demanded that Mobutu live up to his agreement and transfer power 
to the Tshisekedi government. They subsequently refused to recog- 
nize the rival Birindwa government appointed by Mobutu in March 
1993. Nevertheless, Belgium, France, and the United States have 
stopped short of taking stronger action to oust Mobutu, such as 
confiscating his assets abroad — a measure advocated by the Euro- 
pean Parliament in early 1993 — or imposing economic sanctions 
on the regime. In July 1993, Belgium did send a pointed diplo- 
matic message to Mobutu by not including him among those in- 
vited to attend the funeral of King Baudoin I, with whom Mobutu 
had enjoyed a good relationship prior to 1990. 

Relations with France 

In recent years, Zaire has taken pride in its standing as the 
second most populous French-speaking country, after France it- 
self, and has developed its relations with France as an alternative 
to the thornier relationship with Belgium. During the First Repub- 
lic, France and its former colonies tended to side with conserva- 
tives and federalists in the former Belgian colony, against Patrice 
Lumumba and the radical, unitarist forces. In December 1963, 
after the Katangan secession had been defeated, France signed a 
treaty of cultural and technical cooperation with Zaire. 

Links with France were strengthened after Mobutu's coup of 
1965. His first major initiative in African regional policy was the 
creation of a Union of the States of Central Africa (Union des Etats 
d'Afrique Centrale — UEAC), which initially linked Zaire to the 
two least advantaged states of former French Equatorial Africa, 
namely Chad and the Central African Republic, but aimed to form 
a pole of attraction for other states. The French apparently took 
seriously the threat the new organization posed to the Customs 
Union of Central African States (Union Douaniere des Etats de 
l'Afrique Centrale — UDEAC) and launched a diplomatic coun- 
terattack. French emissaries prevailed upon the Central African 
Republic to withdraw from the UEAC , which then limped along 
for several years as a partnership of Chad and Zaire, which lack 
a common border. 



254 



Government and Politics 



Under France's President Charles de Gaulle, who had been in- 
terested in the continent for many years, African affairs became 
part of the "reserved domain" of the president. This quasi- 
constitutional arrangement continued under de Gaulle's succes- 
sors and led to the development of personal diplomacy, including 
state visits, working visits, and so-called "personal visits," a style 
of diplomacy that Mobutu found very congenial. 

At the beginning of 1971, French finance minister Valery Gis- 
card d'Estaing visited Zaire, where he met with Mobutu. This visit 
initiated a personal relationship between Mobutu and Giscard 
d'Estaing, which continued and developed after the latter became 
president. Starting in 1973, France became an important military 
partner of Zaire. Mobutu ordered Mirage jet fighters, Puma 
helicopters, and other items from France, and the following year 
the two countries signed an accord on "technical military cooper- 
ation" (see Foreign Influences, ch. 5). 

The election of Giscard d'Estaing, in May 1974, as successor 
to President Georges Pompidou, led to a reaffirmation of France's 
African role. Giscard d'Estaing visited Kinshasa a year later and 
received a triumphal welcome from over 1 million Zairians. Ob- 
servers noted that Giscard d'Estaing was being warmly welcomed 
in part because Mobutu was distancing himself somewhat from Bel- 
gium and from the United States. Speaking to the leadership of 
the MPR, the French president called for a meeting of copper 
producers and consumers. Zaire reportedly agreed to grant a French 
company new prospecting rights for copper in Zaire, in exchange 
for which France would accord Zaire a moratorium on repayment 
of debts. And France announced it would equip Zaire with an ultra- 
modern satellite telecommunications system. The radio and tele- 
vision installations of the Voice of Zaire, the largest in Africa, built 
by French companies with French government aid, opened in 1976. 
Since then, France has continued to devote a major portion of its 
aid to Zaire to the communications sector. 

When the FLNC invaded Shaba Region in 1977 and the Bel- 
gians and Americans hesitated to assist Mobutu, France stepped 
in. The French government reportedly responded to Mobutu's call 
for help by asking King Hassan II of Morocco to supply troops, 
so that the conflict would appear to be settled "among Africans. ' ' 
Obviously, however, France's role in transporting the Moroccans 
to Zaire was crucial. During the second Shaba invasion in 1978, 
France upstaged Belgium, sending its Foreign Legion paratroop- 
ers straight to Kolwezi while the Belgians landed at Kamina. There- 
after, France trained and advised two Zairian airborne brigades. 
Again in 1989, France upstaged Belgium, when President Francois 



255 



Zaire: A Country Study 

Mitterrand announced at the Francophone Summit that his coun- 
try was writing off debt totalling US$2.6 billion owed by thirty- 
five of the world's poorest countries, including Zaire. The subse- 
quent Belgian announcement that much of Zaire's debt would be 
written off or rescheduled appeared anticlimactic. 

France was slower than Belgium or the United States to con- 
demn the Mobutu regime or to cut off support. It did not, for ex- 
ample, cut off aid following the killing of students at Lubumbashi 
in May 1990 — a step taken by Belgium, the EC, Canada, and the 
United States. France and Belgium both sent troops to restore order 
and protect foreign nationals in the aftermath of a mutiny and vio- 
lence by unpaid paratroopers in Kinshasa in September 1991 . Then, 
as events unfolded in Zaire, France, too, cut off economic aid 
to Zaire in October 1991. In addition, the French government, 
together with Belgium and the United States, in 1992 put pres- 
sure on President Mobutu's government to proceed with the na- 
tional conference and to hold multiparty legislative elections that 
year. 

In August 1992, France warmly endorsed the Tshisekedi govern- 
ment, exhibiting far fewer reservations on its viability than Bel- 
gium and the United States. The prospect of renewed French aid 
to Zaire also was addressed. 

But 1993 immediately introduced new tensions into relations be- 
tween France and Zaire. During rioting by Zairian military per- 
sonnel that began in January 1993, the French ambassador to Zaire 
was killed, apparently in an act of random violence. French troops 
were sent to Zaire to evacuate French nationals. In the aftermath 
of the violence, France joined Belgium and the United States in 
demanding that Mobutu live up to his agreement and transfer pow- 
er to the Tshisekedi government. Like Belgium and the United 
States, France also has steadfastiy refused to recognize the Mobutu- 
appointed Birindwa government. But all three Western nations have 
stopped short of taking stronger action against Mobutu. Indeed, 
France, even more than Belgium or the United States, is regarded 
as unwilling to impose economic sanctions on the Mobutu regime 
or to confiscate Mobutu's assets, believing that any strong actions 
against Mobutu could harm French interests in Zaire. 

Taking advantage of the West's indecision and lack of resolve, 
Mobutu enjoyed some diplomatic successes in 1993, particularly 
at the October 1993 Francophone Summit in Mauritius. According 
to some reports, Mobutu definitely made his presence felt. Far from 
being treated as a pariah, he stood next to Mitterrand at the offi- 
cial ceremonies. Moreover, Mitterrand received him at a meeting 
along with leaders of Rwanda, Burundi, and Congo. The official 



256 



Government and Politics 



French line was that Mitterrand had agreed to the meeting only 
to encourage Mobutu to put off elections in order to allow the op- 
position more time to organize. But some observers saw the meet- 
ing as an indication of a French softening toward Mobutu. Earlier 
in the year, French permission for Mobutu to enter France in order 
to receive dental treatment was similarly viewed. But in that in- 
stance the public outcry was so great that France was forced to back 
down and denied Mobutu a visa for any subsequent visits to France. 

In September 1993, a new French ambassador arrived in Kin- 
shasa. The appointment made France one of the few Western na- 
tions to maintain normal diplomatic relations with Zaire. Most other 
countries had reduced representation to the charge d'affaires level. 

Later in 1993, there were reports that France had tired of 
Tshisekedi's "intransigence" and no longer supported him as prime 
minister. There seems to be some evidence that French support 
for the Tshisekedi government is not unequivocal. Indeed, French 
statements appeared to offer general support for transitional polit- 
ical forces rather than specific support for Tshisekedi. 

Relations with the United States 

By most accounts, the United States was involved in both the 
death of Lumumba and the coup of 1965, which brought Mobutu 
to power, although the extent of this involvement is not certain. 
In any case, because of his longstanding relations with the Ameri- 
can intelligence community, Mobutu was very aware of United 
States backing both as a resource and as a handicap. 

Zaire generally received firm American support in the late 1960s 
and found American influence helpful in various economic and po- 
litical disputes. The promulgation of a generous investment code 
in 1969 and a moderate political stance lured extensive foreign, 
including American, investment, and a substantial program of Unit- 
ed States aid was continued. Mobutu returned from a visit to the 
United States in 1970 with pledges of substantial new investment. 
Relations continued to be warm until the Zairianization decree of 
November 30, 1973, which led to the transfer of a large number 
of foreign-owned enterprises, including facilities owned by inter- 
national oil companies, into Zairian hands. Thereafter, relations 
were chilly. 

But in 1975, the United States and Zaire found themselves sup- 
porting the same faction in the Angolan civil war (see Regional 
Relations, this ch.). The United States, apparently deciding that 
it needed a stable Zaire for political and economic reasons and sens- 
ing the potential for Zaire to support United States strategic in- 
terests in sub-Saharan Africa, promoted the relationship with Zaire. 



257 



Zaire: A Country Study 



Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's first official trip to Africa in 
April 1976 included a long visit to Kinshasa. 

The Carter administration, which had declared its number-one 
foreign policy objective to be the promotion of human rights, posed 
a problem for the Mobutu regime, with its poor human rights 
record. For the first time, criticism of Mobutu by members of Con- 
gress and by voluntary agencies was met with some sympathy by 
the United States president. However, the skeptical attitude toward 
the Zairian government was partially reversed by Shaba I and Shaba 
II. On the occasion of the second invasion in 1978, President Jim- 
my Carter supported Mobutu's accusations of Cuban and Soviet 
involvement, even though no hard evidence was presented. But 
the United States refused to become involved militarily and sent 
only nonlethal military supplies, such as medical and transporta- 
tion equipment. In 1980 the House of Representatives (concerned 
over human rights violations and the misuse of United States aid) 
voted to end all military assistance to Zaire; but the Senate rein- 
stated the funds, reacting to pressure from Carter and American 
business interests in Zaire. 

The election of the more conservative Ronald Reagan as United 
States president was well received in Zaire, and in fact United States 
concerns about Mobutu's human rights record became muted. 
Moreover, Mobutu again was seen as providing useful services to 
the United States in its struggle against the Soviet Union and Soviet 
allies such as Libya and Angola. The domestic context in the United 
States had changed, however, in that an increasing number of 
American groups had become opposed to administration policy 
toward Zaire. 

As United States-Zaire relations became more visible in Washing- 
ton, Mobutu countered by becoming more active in promoting a 
positive image of himself and his country. Two Washington lob- 
bying firms with ties to the Reagan administration received hefty 
contracts from Mobutu. 

Nevertheless, in November 1990, Congress cut military and eco- 
nomic aid (except for some humanitarian aid) to Zaire, crystalliz- 
ing the longstanding division between Congress and the executive 
branch and between liberals and conservatives on Zaire policy. As 
it adjourned, Congress denied the Bush administration's request 
for US$4 million in military aid and stipulated that US$40 mil- 
lion in economic aid be funneled through humanitarian agencies 
not affiliated with the Zairian government. Its decision was based 
on human rights violations — the September 1990 Lubumbashi mas- 
sacre in particular — and accusations that Mobutu's vast wealth was 
largely stolen from the Zairian people. 



258 



Mobutu meets with President George Bush at the White House, June 1989. 

Courtesy The White House (David Valdez) 

By 1992 the United States-Zaire relationship had reached a turn- 
ing point. The end of the Cold War had diminished the strategic 
significance of Zaire to the United States, and events in Zaire since 
1990 had made it clear that Mobutu's days in power were num- 
bered. In 1991-92, the United States, together with Belgium and 
France, attempted to promote peaceful political change in Zaire, 
by pressuring Mobutu to oversee the transition to democratic 
government and to depart voluntarily. The Zairian opposition, 
however, still perceived this approach as a continued "propping 
up" of the Mobutu regime and called for an unequivocal United 
States rejection of Mobutu, which was not forthcoming. 

In October 1992, the United States joined Belgium and France 
in extending official support to the Tshisekedi government. The 
United States also reiterated its support for the national confer- 
ence and its hope that the conference would lead ultimately to fair 
and free elections. 

Since that time, the United States has continued to support the 
legitimacy of the Tshisekedi government and to insist that the 
Mobutu government live up to its promise to turn over real power 
to that government. It has consistently denounced Mobutu's ob- 
struction of the transition process and has refused to recognize the 
rival Birindwa government. Moreover, the Clinton administration 
has taken several concrete steps to show its displeasure with the 



259 



Zaire: A Country Study 



Mobutu regime. At the end of 1993, the United States still had 
not replaced its ambassador to Zaire, who was reassigned in March 
1993. The United States also refused to allow Zaire's central bank 
governor into the United States to attend a World Bank-IMF meet- 
ing and has made it clear that Mobutu is not welcome in the Unit- 
ed States. Nevertheless, the United States has stopped short of 
taking or even advocating harsher measures against the regime, 
such as the imposition of economic sanctions or the confiscation 
of Mobutu's assets abroad. As such, in the view of some observers 
the United States has put only very limited pressure on Mobutu 
to step down. Many see this policy as an indication that the Unit- 
ed States still regards Mobutu as a stabilizing factor, a viewpoint 
that would explain United States acceptance of Mobutu as part 
of the transition process in Zaire. The United States-brokered po- 
litical accord that accompanied the Transitional Act permitted Presi- 
dent Mobutu to remain as titular head of state and thus a legitimate 
institution of government, albeit with limited powers. One unin- 
tended effect of this arrangement has been to confer some legitimacy 
on Mobutu and thus allow him to obstruct the transition process 
and the functioning of the legitimate government under Tshisekedi. 

Throughout 1993 the United States continued to urge the vari- 
ous political forces in Zaire to continue negotiating, apparently 
believing that ongoing negotiations will eventually lead to a power- 
sharing compromise. It appears increasingly likely that the United 
States would accept a so-called "neutral administration" replac- 
ing both the Mobutu-appointed government and the Tshisekedi 
government. 

Relations with the Communist World 

Mobutu's Zaire had cooler relations with the Soviet Union than 
with most other major states, the coolness being a remnant of the 
First Republic, when the Soviet Union attempted to assist Lumum- 
ba in his efforts to reconquer secessionist Kasai and Katanga in 
July- September 1960. Mobutu expelled Soviet and Czechoslovak 
diplomats and personnel when he first seized power on September 
14. Nikita S. Khrushchev then tried unsuccessfully to use the ouster 
of Lumumba as the catalyst for a Soviet-Afro-Asian voting bloc 
in the UN and an assault on the position of the UN's secretary 
general, Dag Hammarskjold. After this double defeat, the Soviet 
Union was left in a marginal position, with little influence in Zaire 
(see The Crisis of Decolonization, ch. 1). 

The wave of Lumumbist " second independence" rebellions that 
swept the country in 1963-65 seemed to offer an opportunity for 
an expanded Soviet role. In January 1964, as Chinese-trained 



260 



Government and Politics 



Lumumbist Pierre Mulele began his insurgency in Kwilu, all per- 
sonnel of the Soviet embassy were expelled from Zaire, on the 
grounds of complicity (probably fictitious) with the rebellion. In 
fact, Soviet support for the insurgents was largely rhetorical. The 
Soviet Union eventually began to supply significant aid to the seces- 
sionists, overland from Sudan. But after several truckloads of arms 
had been stolen by rebels in southern Sudan and turned against 
the Sudanese government, Khartoum cut off the route to Zaire. 
During 1965 most communist aid to the rebellions came from China 
and Cuba (uncoordinated with the Soviet Union). 

The Soviet Union initially reacted very negatively to Mobutu's 
1965 coup, denouncing the "American grip on the country." 
However, the nationalization of UMHK and the reorientation of 
the new regime's African policy led to more positive assessments 
by Soviet spokesmen. 

In 1967 negotiations between Zaire and the Soviet Union led 
to the reestablishment of normal relations between the two coun- 
tries, and a new Soviet ambassador presented his credentials early 
in 1968. Formal ties with the Soviet Union were useful, as Mobutu, 
still closely linked to the United States, attempted to present an 
image of nonalignment. However, the chief utility of a Soviet 
presence was still to provide a visible scapegoat; Soviet diplomats 
were expelled in 1970 and 1971, on the grounds that they had 
fomented unrest among university students and carried out other 
"subversive activities." 

When Mobutu developed ambitions for a leadership role in Africa 
and the Third World, he turned first to China rather than the Soviet 
Union, as a symbol of his nonalignment. In a sense, this move fore- 
closed the possibility of warmer ties to the Soviets, given the level 
of animosity between the communist superpowers. There are in- 
dications that a state visit to Moscow was in the planning stages 
late in 1974 but failed to materialize when the Soviet Union declined 
to provide the extravagant ceremonials to which Mobutu was be- 
coming accustomed. Instead, the Zairian leader made a sudden 
visit to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) 
and China at the time originally announced for the visit to the Soviet 
Union. 

The Portuguese coup of 1974 and the struggle for control of An- 
gola placed Zaire and the Soviet Union in conflict once again. Not 
anticipating heavy Soviet and Cuban backing for the Popular Move- 
ment for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Liber- 
tacao de Angola — MPLA), Mobutu took the fateful decision to 
commit Zairian army units to Angola, backing the National Front 
for the Liberation of Angola (Frente Nacional de Libertacao de 



261 



Zaire: A Country Study 

Angola — FNLA) of Holden Roberto. Zairian forces probably were 
operating in Angola as early as March 1975. In November 1975, 
the Zairian-FNLA column was almost in sight of Luanda — where 
an FNLA government would have been installed — when it encoun- 
tered Cuban troops. The Cubans inflicted a crushing defeat on the 
men of Mobutu and Holden, who fled back into Zaire, and the 
MPLA governed Angola alone. 

The fact that the Soviet Union and Zaire had backed opposite 
sides in the Angolan civil war had a decisive impact on Zaire's for- 
eign policy for the next decade or more. Mobutu's claim to Afri- 
can leadership was foreclosed, as most African governments sided 
with the MPLA regime. Economic and military needs pushed 
Mobutu back into the arms of the United States and its allies, and 
Mobutu took a pro- American stance on such matters as Israel's 
position in international organizations. 

In 1977 and 1978, Zaire was invaded by a few thousand men 
of the FLNC (see External Threats to Regime Stability, ch. 1). 
These men had come from Angola, where they had been based 
since the early 1970s, and perhaps had undergone Cuban training 
there. It has been alleged that the German Democratic Republic 
(East Germany) was assigned the job of destabilizing Zaire, on be- 
half of the Soviet Union, and that the FLNC was the chosen in- 
strument. Both in 1977 and 1978, Mobutu chose to blame the 
invasions on the Soviet Union and Cuba, but no evidence sup- 
porting Soviet or Cuban involvement ever came to light. 

Since the Shaba invasions, there has been little significant shift 
in Zaire-Soviet relations. In 1986 Mobutu made an effort to "play 
the Soviet card," i.e., to promote the idea of closer relations with 
the Soviets as a ploy in his much more important struggle to main- 
tain or augment the flow of aid and investment from the West. 
In sum, the Soviet Union, before it broke up into independent 
republics, remained of symbolic importance to Zaire and occasion- 
ally served either as a scapegoat for difficulties that were entirely 
or mainly domestic or as a threat to the relationship between Zaire 
and its Western partners. 

Relations with China were cold at first because of Chinese aid 
to Mulele and other rebels, and Mobutu opposed seating China 
at the United Nations. By 1972, however, he began to view China 
as an important counterweight to the Soviet Union. Zaire recog- 
nized China along with North Korea and East Germany in Novem- 
ber 1972, and in the following year Mobutu paid a state visit to 
Beijing from which he returned with promises of US$100 million 
in economic aid. The friendship with China deepened when the 
two countries found themselves supporting enemies of the MPLA 



262 



Government and Politics 



in the Angolan civil war. During a second state visit to Beijing in 
1974, Mobutu and Chairman Mao Zedong discussed further aid 
to the FNLA. Mobutu appeared to have been so impressed by what 
he saw in China and in North Korea that his rhetoric became notice- 
ably more radical. He instituted the takeover of schools by the party 
and began advocating the establishment of agricultural cooperatives. 

After the defeat of the FNLA, China became more circumspect 
in its dealings with Zaire, but Mobutu continued to emphasize his 
ties to China as a counterpart to his close relations to the United 
States and South Africa in the eyes of the world. During the sec- 
ond Shaba invasion, China sided firmly with Mobutu, accusing 
the Soviet Union and Cuba of destabilizing Central Africa by their 
interference. In 1983 Zaire received partial relief from its massive 
debt burden, as Premier Zhao Ziyang, during his eleven-nation 
African tour, announced that China was cancelling Kinshasa's 
US$100 million debt. The money borrowed would be reinvested 
in joint Chinese-Zairian projects. In the late 1980s, China provid- 
ed Zaire with some military equipment and training. Following 
the cutoff of Western aid to Zaire in 1991, China is reported to 
have become more active in Zaire. An estimated 1,000 Chinese 
technicians reportedly were working on agricultural and forestry 
projects in Zaire in the early 1990s. 

Because of the alleged support by Cuba and East Germany of 
the Shaba invasion, Zaire suspended relations with those countries 
in the spring of 1977. Relations with Cuba were restored in 1979, 
in order to facilitate Zairian participation in the nonaligned sum- 
mit held in Havana in September of that year. Relations with North 
Korea cooled after the country recognized the MPLA regime, and 
North Korean military instructors left Zaire in the spring of 1977. 

Romania remained one of Zaire's closest foreign partners until 
the fall and execution of Nicolae Ceau§escu in 1989. Part of the 
attraction doubdess was the independence of the Ceau§escu regime 
vis-a-vis Soviet hegemony. Mobutu seems also to have admired 
the cult of personality surrounding his Balkan counterpart. Rela- 
tions were not just state-to-state but also party-to-party between 
the MPR and the Romanian Communist Party. The fall of 
Ceau§escu, vividly presented on Kinshasa television, reportedly 
made a strong impression upon Mobutu, whose announcement of 
democratization followed shordy thereafter. Popular humor in the 
capital speculated upon the future of "Mobutu Sesesescu." 

Regional Relations 

Any African state must be concerned about relations with its 
neighbors, since national borders usually divide ethnic groups, and 



263 



Zaire: A Country Study 



neighboring states often shelter opposition parties. Zaire's immedi- 
ate environment poses a particular challenge in that Zaire borders 
on nine other states. 

Following the coup of 1965, one of Mobutu's early objectives 
was to transform Zaire's position in regional politics. He dispatched 
a former Lumumbist to Ghana to explain and justify the coup. 
Kwame Nkrumah (shortly before he himself was overthrown) in- 
dicated that he was prepared to accept and support the Mobutu 
regime, if it would commit itself to nonalignment and support a 
pro- African policy. 

A series of gestures during 1966-67 reinforced the nationalist 
image of the regime. Zaire broke relations with Portugal and 
declared Lumumba a "national hero. ' ' The Bakajika Law and the 
UMHK struggle conveyed a sense of assertion of Zairian economic 
rights. These moves helped to set the stage for the Mobutu regime's 
acceptance into the African family of nations, symbolized by the 
acceptance by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) of Mobu- 
tu's invitation to meet at Kinshasa in 1967. This acceptance in turn 
guaranteed that the fragmented remnants of the rebellious forces 
would be denied sanctuary. 

By 1968 Zairian ambitions began to expand, the abortive crea- 
tion of the UEAC forming the first major initiative. Mobutu as- 
sumed an active role in African diplomacy. He served as a member 
of the multinational OAU team designed to bring about an end 
to the Nigerian civil war (1967-70) and then offered his services 
to reconcile Nigeria with the four African states that had recog- 
nized the secessionist state of Biafra. He proposed his services to 
ease the tense relations between Tanzania and Uganda in 1971. 
Mobutu also mediated disputes between Burundi and Tanzania, 
created by border violations by Burundi forces assaulting Hutu refu- 
gees in Tanzanian territory. In 1973 he spent no fewer than 150 
days outside Zaire, visiting twenty-six countries, including four- 
teen in Africa. 

Mobutu's active regional diplomacy was based on intimate per- 
sonal relationships with other heads of state. Regular "tripartite" 
consultations were held with the leaders of Rwanda and Burundi. 
The Zaire-Rwanda-Burundi relationship was formalized in 1976 
as the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (Com- 
munaute Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs — CEPGL). In 
1972-75 there were also frequent triangular summits with the lead- 
ers of Tanzania and Zambia, largely devoted to southern African 
problems. Mobutu gave strong backing to Ugandan president Idi 
Amin Dada in his quest for African recognition and opposed the 
transfer of the 1971 OAU summit from Kampala. 



264 



Government and Politics 



In the early years of the Second Republic, the only neighboring 
state with which relations were periodically troubled was Congo. 
Kinshasa did not easily forgive Brazzaville's role in harboring 
rebel headquarters and training camps. Amicable relations had 
barely been resumed when they were poisoned again by the sum- 
mary execution in Zaire of former rebel leader Pierre Mulele, who 
left Brazzaville under an amnesty guarantee. A new crisis broke 
out in 1972 when Zaire provided sanctuary and some arms for a 
small group of Congolese rebels who were largely eliminated by 
early 1973. Through the entire period, the fact that Zaire supported 
the FNLA while Congo supported the MPLA in Angola was a 
source of tension. Despite all these irritants, Mobutu developed 
a close personal relationship with Congo's Marien Ngouabi, which 
was maintained with his successors. 

Involvement in the Angolan Civil War 

The Angola crisis, set off by the Portuguese coup of 1974, was 
a turning point in Zairian foreign policy. The prospect of immi- 
nent independence for Angola represented both a threat and an 
opportunity from Mobutu's perspective. Since 1960 Zaire had had 
close ties to the FNLA, whose ethnic base was among the Kongo 
of the area bordering Zaire. Many of the FNLA leaders, includ- 
ing Holden Roberto, had lived in Kinshasa most of their lives. 
Roberto had quasi-kinship ties with Mobutu through his second 
wife, who originated in the same village as Mobutu's then-spouse 
(though she was not Mama Mobutu's sister, as the press often as- 
serted). The FNLA was allowed to run military camps on Zairian 
territory. 

By contrast, Zaire's relations with the Marxist-oriented MPLA 
had been consistently hostile. Since 1963 the MPLA's main exter- 
nal headquarters had been in Congo. The MPLA guerrilla effort 
was seriously handicapped by Mobutu's denial of transit rights from 
its Congo bases into the main part of Angola. 

These relationships had developed in the context of the Cold War. 
The FNLA had received sporadic United States support, which 
resumed after the Portuguese coup. The Soviet Union had sup- 
ported the MPLA, although the relationship was in abeyance in 
April 1974. Zaire's close relations with China, beginning in 1973, 
and China's anti-Soviet orientation, led to a substantial Chinese 
military and diplomatic commitment to the FNLA. 

The dominant African diplomatic position was that only a coa- 
lition among the three major liberation movements — MPLA, 
FNLA, and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola 
(Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola — UNITA) — 



265 



Zaire: A Country Study 

could bring a peaceful transition to Angolan independence. While 
formally supporting the consensus, Zairian diplomacy really aimed 
at excluding the MPLA from a share of power, thus ensuring a 
friendly Angolan regime. 

In 1974, when Mobutu's strategy took form, he held what looked 
like considerable advantages. The FNLA, with 2,000 guerrillas in- 
side Angola and 10,000 to 12,000 in the Zairian camps, had the 
largest military force. The new Chinese alliance could be used to 
rapidly augment FNLA armaments, and by mid-year a large flow 
of Chinese equipment to the FNLA camps was under way. The 
MPLA was divided, and one of its factions might be (and was) 
wooed away. Although Zambia and Tanzania could not be expected 
to support the FNLA, they might be attracted to some combina- 
tion including UNITA and an MPLA faction. The lethal compe- 
tition between UNITA and MPLA forces in eastern Angola seemed 
to offer a possible Zaire-FNLA-UNITA alliance. The United States 
had a long-standing antipathy to the MPLA and could be counted 
upon to mount an effort to block its bid for power. South Africa 
also was disposed to assure a flow of military supplies to UNITA 
and the FNLA to prevent an MPLA victory. Finally, Zaire had 
a long common border with Angola and a large army that it could 
employ on the side of the FNLA. 

Most of the supposed advantages proved illusory. The FNLA 
and Zairian forces were ineffective in the decisive phases of the war. 
The Soviet Union, unwilling to see an easy American and Chinese 
victory, began armed deliveries at an accelerating rate from early 
1975. The unforeseen Cuban military intervention began with ad- 
visers in the summer of 1975, but involved combat troops in the 
crucial months of November and December 1975. Meanwhile, the 
exposure of CIA involvement and especially the full-scale invasion 
by South African military units in October 1975 led to OAU back- 
ing for the MPLA. By mid- 1975, the Chinese apparendy concluded 
the risks were too high and pulled out. 

Diplomatically as well as militarily, Zaire's defeat could hardly 
have been more complete. The MPLA was in power in Angola, 
buttressed by a strong Soviet-Cuban presence, which had been 
legitimated in African eyes by United States and South African 
intervention. Zaire again was a pariah state in tropical Africa. 
The residual costs of the Angolan adventure were illustrated when 
Zaire was rebuffed in its attempt to join the Southern African De- 
velopment Coordination Conference (SADCC), formed in 1980 
after Zimbabwe's independence in order to reduce regional depen- 
dency on South Africa. Subsequently, Zaire's bid to join the 



266 



Government and Politics 



Preferential Trade Area (PTA) for Central and Southern Africa 
was blocked by Angola. 

In 1983 Zaire became a charter member of an alternative eco- 
nomic union, the Economic Community of the States of Central 
Africa (Communaute Economique des Etats de l'Afrique Cen- 
trale — CEEAC), which brought together the five members of the 
UDEAC (Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic, Congo, and 
Gabon), the three members of the CEPGL (Burundi, Rwanda, 
and Zaire), and two mini-states, Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome 
and Principe. Angola sent a minister to the founding meeting but 
declared itself unable to join because of the civil war. As late as 
its sixth summit (in Kigali, Rwanda, in January 1990), the CEEAC 
had little to show in the way of concrete accomplishments. The 
conference authorized the free circulation of certain categories of 
citizens (mainly researchers, students, and residents of border areas) 
within the CEEAC community, approved measures aimed at 
strengthening cooperation between airlines, and gave priority to 
improving the roads linking Burundi and Rwanda to the Congo 
River port of Kisangani. 

In contrast to the snub by the SADCC, a slow recovery of Zaire's 
reputation was reflected in its election to the UN Security Council 
in 1981 and again in 1989, with support from the African caucus. 
Zaire's troops were part of an OAU peacekeeping force in Chad 
in 1981-82 (and returned, at Chadian invitation, in 1983). Zaire 
sent 3,000 troops to Chad in July 1983 to support the French-backed 
government of Hissein Habre. The two countries signed a mili- 
tary cooperation agreement in July 1985. 

Relations with Angola since the War 

Relations between Mobutu's Zaire and the MPLA government 
in Angola have ranged from formally correct to openly hostile. An 
initial move toward normalization, in 1976-77, was set back by 
the two invasions of Shaba Region by the FLNC from bases in 
Angola. After the collapse of the FNLA, Zaire had been support- 
ing Jonas Savimbi's UNITA, also supported by South Africa, 
against the MPLA government. Starting in 1985, the air base at 
Kamina in southeastern Zaire served as a transit point for Ameri- 
can aid to UNITA fighters. In May 1986, Zambia charged that 
the United States was covertly supplying weapons to UNITA via 
Zaire, but Mobutu denied these allegations, and in July 1986, he 
visited Angola and declared his support for the MPLA government. 

In April 1987, Zaire, Angola, and Zambia signed a declaration 
of intent to restore cross-border traffic on the Benguela Railway, 
providing an outlet to the Atlantic that is crucial to the copper 



267 



Zaire: A Country Study 

industries of both Zambia and Zaire. The railroad's international 
functions had been effectively shut down since 1975 by UNITA 
operations. UNITA reportedly agreed to the resumption of traffic 
on condition that the railroad not be used to move arms or troops. 
However, continuing insecurity made it difficult to rehabilitate the 
rail line. 

By 1988 international efforts to end the impasse over Namibian 
independence had led to linkage of South African withdrawal from 
Namibia to a phased Cuban withdrawal from Angola. But no agree- 
ment had been reached to end the fighting within Angola itself. 
When Mobutu went to Zambia in August to attend a conference, 
he found himself in an informal summit of southern African lead- 
ers, including those of Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Mozambique, and 
Uganda. Apparendy it was put to Mobutu that his continued logisti- 
cal support for UNITA was retarding progress toward Namibian 
independence. That same month, the chairman of the OAU called 
together the heads of state of Angola, Congo, Gabon, and Zaire 
to find a solution to the Angolan problem. 

Over the next nine months, a series of meetings, bilateral as well 
as regional, took place, often at the level of heads of state. In the 
course of these meetings, Mobutu improved his relations with An- 
gola's president, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, and distanced himself 
somewhat from UNITA. Early in May 1989, the heads of Ango- 
la, Congo, Gabon, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe, Zaire, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe met in Luanda and announced their com- 
mitment "to end the interference in Angola's internal affairs" and 
"guarantee security and stability" on Angola's frontiers. They were 
to meet again in August. 

Suddenly, however, came the Gbadolite Summit of June 22, at 
the time a triumph for Mobutu. The Angolan peace process seemed 
to have slowed, with the Luanda government still refusing to negoti- 
ate with Savimbi in person. Some days before June 22, Mobutu 
began inviting African heads of state to Gbadolite; eventually, 
seventeen of them took part. Dos Santos and UNITA 's Jonas 
Savimbi shook hands at Gbadolite, and a declaration was signed 
endorsing a cease-fire and integration of UNITA leaders into the 
Luanda government. With the successful Gbadolite meeting be- 
hind him — and with his difficulties with Belgium and the IMF 
resolved at least temporarily — Mobutu flew to Washington, where 
he was the first African head of state to be received at the White 
House by President George Bush. Soon thereafter, the agreement 
collapsed, when it became apparent that Mobutu had misrepresent- 
ed the positions of the Angolan rivals. It took another year of negoti- 
ations, this time mediated by Portugal, before UNITA and the 



268 



Government and Politics 



MPLA government were able to reach an agreement on ending 
their struggle of nearly two decades. 

Relations with Other Neighbors 

During the 1980s, the closest threats to Zaire seemed to lie to 
the east, because relations with Zambia and Tanzania had sunk 
to the lowest point since the first years of the Mobutu regime, 
and Burundi and Sudan seemed open to anti-Mobutu activity 
as well. The ' 'rebel" attacks on Moba, on the Zairian shore of Lake 
Tanganyika, in 1984 and 1985 led to harsh Zairian criticism of 
Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi, which were alleged to have per- 
mitted, if not encouraged, the attacks. 

Relations with Zambia were at least as bad, with several shoot- 
ing incidents taking place along the frontier. In August 1984, long- 
standing tensions heated up when Zaire rounded up Zambians 
(mostly in Shaba) and announced they would be deported, in reac- 
tion to Zambia's expulsion of immigrants from Zaire and West 
Africa in July. Mobutu revoked the expulsion orders on August 
25 and ordered government officials to release all detained Zam- 
bians, but reportedly hundreds had already fled across the border. 
Lusaka radio alleged that Zairian officials had tricked the Zambi- 
ans by calling them to stadiums on the pretext of disseminating 
important information from Lusaka; they then were detained, and 
many were beaten. 

The strains in the Zambia-Zaire relationship are linked to Zaire's 
position in the global economy. Smuggling from Zambia into the 
isolated Shaba Region of Zaire has long caused considerable ten- 
sion between the two countries. In 1983 Zambia stationed troops 
on the border to stem the flow of contraband. Since then there 
reportedly have been occasional border incidents involving ex- 
changes of gunfire between Zairian and Zambian soldiers. Late 
in 1984, Zaire announced creation of a Civil Guard to patrol the 
frontier so that such incidents would not lead directly to confron- 
tations between the two armies. The smuggling problem remained, 
and in 1 988 the two countries introduced strict visa controls in an 
attempt to deal with it. In 1989 Zaire and Zambia signed an agree- 
ment defining their common border. In early November 1991 , rail 
traffic between Zaire's Shaba Region and Zambia resumed, fol- 
lowing an incident reportedly provoked by Zairian troops deployed 
along the border. 

Relations with Congo and Uganda, also continued to cause 
problems. In 1989 Congo expelled a large number of Zairians whose 
status was "irregular," and Zaire responded in kind. It was thought 
unlikely that Congo would close the border, however, since it was 



269 



Zaire: A Country Study 

so dependent upon goods imported (or smuggled) from Zaire. In 
the early 1990s, Congo undertook an operation designed to deport 
15,000 illegal Zairian immigrants. In February 1993, a breach in 
relations between Zaire and Congo occurred following a ferry ac- 
cident on the Congo River that resulted in the deaths of nearly 
150 Zairians being deported from Congo. 

Historically, Ugandan-Zairian relations have been complicated 
by border problems, including cross-border smuggling and disputes 
over fishing rights in the lakes along the border. Border incidents 
caused by Zairian rebel groups operating from bases in Uganda 
increased the strain between the two countries, as did an appear- 
ance in Zaire by former Ugandan president Idi Amin Dada in Janu- 
ary 1989. He apparently intended to return to Uganda with an 
estimated 500 armed supporters who were to meet him in north- 
eastern Zaire. Uganda requested the former president's extradi- 
tion, intending to try Amin for atrocities committed during his 
eight-year reign. Kinshasa rejected this request because there was 
no extradition treaty between Uganda and Zaire. Instead, the 
Mobutu regime detained Amin in Kinshasa and expelled him from 
the country nine days later. Thereafter, relations between Kam- 
pala and Kinshasa were cool, leading to the mutual expulsion of 
ambassadors. On September 8, 1989, however, the two countries 
restored full diplomatic ties. 

Throughout 1990 Ugandan and Zairian officials worked to stabi- 
lize their common border, but the failure of these meetings to 
achieve any progress has prompted Zaire to close the borders peri- 
odically. The border between the two countries appears likely to 
remain unstable for the foreseeable future. 

Unrest in Zaire arising out of economic deterioration and a stale- 
mate over political reform also contributed to the security crisis 
in southwestern Uganda in 1992 and 1993. Ugandan officials 
claimed that more than 20,000 Zairian refugees had entered Ugan- 
da, seeking refuge from marauding Zairian troops and antigovern- 
ment rebel banditry. By contrast, Zaire served as a refuge to 
thousands of Burundians fleeing ethnic violence in their country 
in 1993. 

Zaire has fostered close relations with Rwanda. In October 1990, 
when Rwanda was invaded by Uganda-based forces of the Rwan- 
dan Patriotic Front, Belgium, France, and Zaire intervened militar- 
ily to protect the lives of foreigners and to back the Rwandan 
government. In February 1991 , Mobutu was mandated by a region- 
al meeting of presidents and the secretary general of the OAU to 
initiate a dialogue leading to a cease-fire agreement between the 
Rwandan government and the rebels. Representatives of the OAU, 



270 



Government and Politics 



along with officials from Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, and Zaire, 
met several times in 1991 and 1992 and urged the warring parties 
to observe the cease-fire agreed to in March 1991 , but fighting con- 
tinued. 

Relations with North Africa 

During the 1980s, Mobutu's most bitter rival was undoubtedly 
Libya's Colonel Muammar Qadhafi. Speaking in Burundi in May 
1985, the Libyan leader called on the Zairian population to "phys- 
ically eliminate" Mobutu. On June 9, Zairian authorities an- 
nounced they had dismantled a "pro-Libyan terrorist network" 
operating in the country and arrested four people carrying pass- 
ports issued by unidentified neighboring states. Zaire's informa- 
tion minister said two of the four suspects were "closely linked" 
with bombings in March 1984, at the Voice of Zaire and the cen- 
tral post office in Kinshasa. The other two suspects allegedly were 
among twelve "Zairian terrorists trained in Libya" who had been 
identified by local authorities. 

Libya urged the OAU, the African states, and all African na- 
tionalist forces and organizations "to adopt a serious position 
regarding the Mobutu regime which, it is now confirmed, is a hire- 
ling regime that conspires directly with the two racist regimes in 
South Africa and occupied Palestine against the security, safety, 
and stability of our African continent." In fact, Zaire had taken 
a leading role among sub-Saharan African states in breaking rela- 
tions with Israel in 1973, but once Egypt and Israel had signed 
a peace agreement and Israel had withdrawn from the Sinai and 
thus from Africa, Mobutu renewed his relations with the Jewish 
state (in May 1982). Israel, anxious to secure a bridgehead in Africa, 
became a significant supplier of foreign aid to Zaire, including train- 
ing and directing the Special Presidential Brigade (later the Spe- 
cial Presidential Division), which guards the president. Mobutu 
also maintained commercial ties with South Africa at least as early 
as 1989, although diplomatic relations were not established until 
September 1993. 

In 1975, when Zaire intervened on the side of the FNLA, Libya 
favored the victorious MPLA. In Chad Mobutu favored Hissein 
Habre (who also was backed by Egypt and Sudan) against former 
President Goukouni Oueddei (backed by Libya). Zaire's contin- 
gent was small and played an inconsequential role compared to that 
of France, but had Zaire not intervened, the French would have 
appeared to be the lone bakers of Habre. Nevertheless, the Mobutu 
regime was acting in its own interest, because a Libyan-dominated 
Chad would menace both Sudan and the Central African Republic, 



271 



Zaire: A Country Study 

states contiguous with Zaire. In June 1992, Zaire and Libya dis- 
cussed normalizing relations between the two countries. 

Mobutu was a close ally of the Sudanese regime of Jaafar an 
Nimeiri, which Libya opposed. The overthrow of Nimeiri, and his 
replacement by a regime more friendly to Libya, apparently 
represented a further threat to Mobutu. By 1990, however, he was 
on good enough terms both with the Arab-dominated government 
in Khartoum and John Garang's Sudanese People's Liberation 
Army to be able to undertake mediation between the two. 

On a continental level, Mobutu took the lead in articulating the 
dissatisfaction of moderate sub-Saharan African states with the 
OAU. In July 1984, he called on those states to break away from 
the OAU and form a new regional organization. Although nega- 
tive reactions led him to soften his position, claiming that the pro- 
posed new group would not conflict with the OAU (just as North 
African states can belong to the OAU and the Arab League), 
Mobutu continued to promote the idea for several years, even 
though it was anathema not only to the North Africans but also 
to "progressives" south of the Sahara. There is no evidence that 
Mobutu was promoting the split between North Africa and sub- 
Saharan Africa because of his ties to Israel and/or South Africa, 
but such a split was in the perceived interest of the latter countries. 

In contrast to the apparently anti-Arab initiative of promoting 
a sub-Saharan African organization, Mobutu has maintained close 
relations with Egypt and especially with Morocco. The latter sent 
troops to Shaba in 1977 to suppress the FLNC invasion, and 
Mobutu apparently paid back this assistance by supporting Moroc- 
co's claim to the Western Sahara. In fact, Zaire boycotted the OAU 
from 1984 to 1986 in protest over its admission of the Saharan Arab 
Democratic Republic. Mobutu visited both Egypt and Morocco 
in April 1992 in an apparent attempt to improve ties with Arab 
states in the face of deteriorating relations with the West. 

* * * 

The best sources on politics and government in Zaire continue 
to be the various works of Thomas M. Callaghy, Michael G. Schatz- 
berg, Thomas E. Turner, and Crawford Young. Of particular note 
are Callaghy 's The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspec- 
tive and Culture and Politics in Zaire; Schatzberg's The Dialectics of Op- 
pression in Zaire, Politics and Class in Zaire, and Mobutu or Chaos? The 
United States and Zaire, 1960-1990; and Young and Turner's The 
Rise and Decline of the Zairian State. 



272 



Government and Politics 



The Zairian human rights record, as well as its legal system, 
have been investigated in Makau wa Mutua and Peter Rosenblum's 
Zaire: Repression As Policy — A Human Rights Report, published by the 
Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights, as well as in specialized 
reports by Amnesty International and the United States Depart- 
ment of State's annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. 

Up-to-date information about Zaire can be found in the annual 
editions of Africa South of the Sahara; the Economist Intelligence Unit's 
quarterly Country Report: Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi and annual Coun- 
try Profile: Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi; issues of Current History; and print 
and broadcast articles reproduced in the Foreign Broadcast Infor- 
mation Service (FBIS), Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa. (For fur- 
ther information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



273 



Chapter 5. National Security 



Kuba wooden cup 



THE ZAIRIAN ARMED FORCES (Forces Armees Zairoises— 
FAZ) are responsible for Zaire's national security. The FAZ con- 
sists of an army, navy, air force, and gendarmerie. Zaire also has 
a Civil Guard that is technically not part of the FAZ, although it 
does play an integral security role. The army is the most impor- 
tant branch; the other forces are either small (navy and air force) 
or marginal factors in the area of national defense (gendarmerie 
and Civil Guard). The FAZ totalled approximately 49,100 in 1993: 
the army consisted of 25,000 personnel; the navy, 1,300 (includ- 
ing 600 marines); the air force, 1,800; and the gendarmerie, 21,000. 
The Civil Guard had an estimated strength of 10,000 personnel 
in the early 1990s. 

The stated mission of both the army and the gendarmerie is to 
secure Zaire against external threats, but in practice these forces 
mainly fulfill an internal security role and serve to bolster the rule 
of President Mobutu Sese Seko. During the chaotic and anarchic 
period of the early 1990s, this role has degenerated into occasional 
looting and violence against the population by armed forces ele- 
ments that have not been paid. In view of the role of parts of the 
military (and the security services) in lootings and various muti- 
nies in the early 1990s, it is unclear what de facto or de jure chain 
of command exists within the FAZ. Observers speculate, however, 
that Mobutu has shrewdly retained the loyalty of key units by paying 
them regularly. Continued loyalty on the part of at least some mili- 
tary and security forces is apparent from their role in suppressing 
political dissent and thus bolstering the Mobutu regime. 

Lack of coherence in the armed forces and security services, of 
which there is a confusing array, is not new. For example, since 
the dissolution of the national police force in 1972, the National 
Gendarmerie has functioned as a de facto police force, and its ability 
to perform its paramilitary role is virtually nonexistent. The Civil 
Guard was formed to function as a national police force in order 
to permit the gendarmerie to resume its stated mission as the coun- 
try's first line of defense. The interaction between these two or- 
ganizations has, however, never been fully defined. As a result, 
Zaire in essence has two competing police organizations with over- 
lapping responsibilities. 

The FAZ's lack of coherence has at times degenerated into chaos. 
This situation did not start at independence but was rooted in the 
history of the Belgian colonial armed forces, the Force Publique. 



277 



Zaire: A Country Study 

The Zairian military's lack of discipline was first displayed shortly 
after independence when the Force Publique mutinied against its 
Belgian officers. Despite the removal of the Belgian officers, and 
the renaming of the force as the Congolese National Army (Ar- 
mee Nationale Congolaise — ANC), the disintegration of the armed 
forces continued. 

Throughout the first five years of independence, the armed forces 
fragmented into several competing power centers, working for var- 
ious ethnic political leaders as well as their own interests. A combi- 
nation of ineffective national leadership and a chaotic political and 
social environment limited the ANC's ability to operate in a profes- 
sional manner. As a result, the ANC was a national armed force 
in name only. It was not only incapable of protecting the country, 
but at times even threatened its existence. Only the performance of 
the United Nations (UN) forces in ending the 1960-63 secession 
of Katanga Province (now Shaba Region) kept Zaire intact. 

A succession of governments proved unable to restore calm to 
the country until Joseph-Desire Mobutu (subsequendy Mobutu Sese 
Seko) seized power in a bloodless coup d'etat in November 1965. 
From 1965 until 1970, Mobutu consolidated and expanded his pow- 
er by pacifying the countryside, eliminating political and military 
rivals, and consolidating coercive power in his hands. Although 
Mobutu used the military to gain power, he did not establish a 
military dictatorship; instead, he relegated the armed forces to a 
secondary supporting role. 

Throughout the early 1970s, Mobutu continued to build up his 
military with significant United States and Belgian assistance. 
Despite this effort, the armed forces, known as the FAZ from late 
1971, were not much improved when Mobutu decided to commit 
them to support the National Front for the Liberation of Angola 
(Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola — FNLA) in 1975 dur- 
ing the Angolan civil war. Mobutu hoped to prevent the Soviet- 
backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimen- 
to Popular de Libertacao de Angola — MPLA) from gaining pow- 
er. Despite initial advances, the Zairian force was routed by Cuban 
and MPLA forces. Mobutu's bold adventure with a demonstra- 
bly weak force would prove disastrous eighteen months later, when 
a Zairian dissident group, the Front for the National Liberation 
of the Congo (Front pour la Liberation Nationale du Congo — 
FLNC), backed by the now victorious MPLA, invaded Zaire in 
the first of two incursions of Zaire's mineral-rich Shaba Region. 
These invasions, in 1977 and 1978, highlighted the political and 
military weakness of the Mobutu regime, and only foreign inter- 
vention kept the Zairian state intact. 



278 



National Security 



Zaire responded to this demonstrated lack of capability during 
the Shaba crises by an extensive reorganization of the military. This 
process, however, improved neither the discipline nor the perfor- 
mance of the FAZ. For example, in November 1984, the FAZ was 
unable to prevent a small armed band from the People's Revolu- 
tionary Party (Parti Revolutionnaire du Peuple — PRP) from tak- 
ing the town of Moba on the shore of Lake Tanganyika. Although 
the town was retaken two days later, this action demonstrated that 
some portions of the country still escaped government control. Moba 
was again occupied by PRP partisans in June 1985, but govern- 
ment forces quickly retook the town. Reprisals against civilians in 
Moba after these incidents, particularly in 1984, were condemned 
by Amnesty International and served as further examples of the 
FAZ's lack of discipline. 

Once again, Mobutu responded to the FAZ's poor performance 
by reforming and reorganizing the military. He forced many senior 
officers to resign, established the post of inspector general, and creat- 
ed a Civil Guard. Despite these changes, low and irregular pay, 
corruption, and poor morale continued to plague the armed forces 
and undermine their capabilities. The widespread political, eco- 
nomic, and social disintegration that characterized Zaire in the early 
1990s further undermined military coherence and capabilities. As 
a result, the status of the FAZ in the early 1990s is uncertain. 

National Security Environment 

Through the mid-1980s, Mobutu had characterized Zaire as sur- 
rounded by a "red belt" of radical states supported by the Soviet 
Union and Libya. Except for Angola, however, these countries lack 
either the motivation or the militarily means to threaten Zaire seri- 
ously. In the early 1990s, Zaire's relations with even its most hostile 
neighbors had improved. As a consequence, Zaire does not face 
any serious external threats, although border flare-ups, cross-border 
smuggling, refugees, and mutual support of insurgent groups have 
caused strains between Zaire and many of its neighbors (see fig. 
1; Regional Relations, ch. 4). Militarily, the most serious strains 
have occurred in Zaire's relations with Uganda, Tanzania, Zam- 
bia, and Angola. 

Relations with Uganda at times have approached open conflict. 
Uganda's instability since the 1971 rise to power of Idi Amin Dada 
concerns Zaire, particularly because the border region between the 
two countries is remote and mountainous, and neither side exer- 
cises effective control over the area. A considerable amount of smug- 
gling also occurs along the border, often resulting in violence. In 
response to this violence, Zaire announced in June 1988 that it 



279 



Zaire: A Country Study 

would set up a naval unit on the Zairian side of Lake Edward to 
reinforce security and to stop smuggling and piracy. Despite the 
intent to keep this force on the Zairian side of the border, observ- 
ers feared that Uganda might regard the measure as provocative. 

Another contentious issue between the two countries is their per- 
ceived mutual support of insurgent groups. Zaire's alleged ties to 
Amin concerned successive Ugandan administrations. In January 
1989, the Zairian government rejected an attempt by the former 
Ugandan president to establish residence in Zaire. Amin was ex- 
pelled from Zaire, bound for Saudi Arabia, although Uganda had 
earlier requested his extradition to Kampala. Zaire's conflict with 
Uganda also concerned the activity of the Zairian insurgent group, 
the Congolese Liberation Party (Parti de Liberation Congolaise — 
PLC), which operated primarily out of bases in the Ruwenzori 
Mountains along the Zaire-Uganda border. The organization be- 
gan insurgent attacks in 1985, and during the next three years at- 
tacked several small towns along the Zairian side of the border. 
Although the PLC was unable to take and hold any terrain, it 
demonstrated Zaire's inability to control the area effectively, and 
the PLC's rout of small FAZ detachments highlighted the mili- 
tary's deficiencies. 

Zaire's relations with Tanzania have been similarly strained be- 
cause of Kinshasa's belief that Tanzania supported and harbored 
Zairian insurgents, specifically the PRP. This organization caused 
extreme embarrassment to the Zairian government in 1984 and 
again in 1985 when it captured the Zairian town of Moba along 
the shores of Lake Tanganyika. Although in both instances Zair- 
ian government forces were able to recapture the town a few days 
later, their demonstrated lack of control in integral parts of Zair- 
ian territory and the poor performance of the Zairian troops who 
fled before the PRP were sore points for Kinshasa. Nevertheless, 
although the Zairian government accused Tanzania of active com- 
plicity in these attacks, observers believed it unlikely that Dar es 
Salaam did more than provide safe haven for the PRP. 

Much of the distrust centered on the poor relations between 
Mobutu and Tanzania's former president, Julius Nyerere. Mobutu 
opposed Nyerere 's socialist orientation, and Nyerere considered 
Mobutu a puppet of the United States. However, Mobutu's rela- 
tions with Nyerere's successor, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, seem much 
better, particularly because the latter stated that he would not 
permit insurgents to use his country as a springboard for attacks 
against a neighboring country. Observers believe that this remark, 
along with Tanzanian support for President Mobutu's efforts to 



280 



National Security 



mediate national reconciliation in Angola, might presage greater 
cooperation between the two countries. 

Relations with Zambia have also been tense because of the ex- 
tensive smuggling activity along the border. Also, the FLNC's use 
of Zambian territory during its 1978 invasion of Zaire's Shaba 
Region proved an irritant to bilateral relations, as did a century- 
old border dispute over the area between Lake Tanganyika and 
Lake Mweru. 

In the late 1980s, however, relations between the two countries 
improved. Although smuggling continued to be an irritant, Zaire 
and Zambia settled their border dispute on September 18, 1989. 
In addition, Zambian support for Mobutu's efforts to mediate 
an end to the Angolan civil war contributed to improved relations. 

Angola has presented the gravest potential threat to Zaire's na- 
tional security. This threat has its roots in the support each country 
gave to the other's insurgent groups. Zaire supported the Ango- 
lan insurgent group, the FNLA, against the communist-backed 
MPLA, and after the FNLA's demise, Kinshasa transferred its sup- 
port to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola 
(Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola — UNITA). 
Angola, on the other hand, supported the FLNC and its invasions 
of Zaire's Shaba Region in 1977 and 1978. Although relations im- 
proved periodically during the late 1970s and early 1980s, Zairian 
support for UNITA, particularly the alleged use of Kamina's mili- 
tary base in Shaba Region as a transit point for supplies from the 
United States, kept relations somewhat tense. 

Zaire's concern was based on the size and strength of Angola's 
armed forces. Angola had the largest military (more than 100,000 
personnel) of all of Zaire's neighbors. Its services were also the best 
equipped, possessing large quantities of sophisticated Soviet 
weapons. Moreover, because of the experience gained in its long- 
running civil war against UNITA, the Angolan military's capa- 
bility easily surpassed that of the FAZ. This imbalance, along with 
the long land border between the two countries, made Luanda loom 
large in Kinshasa's national security concerns. 

Several factors, however, limited the Angolan government's abil- 
ity to threaten Zaire. The ongoing UNITA insurgency forced Lu- 
anda to orient its military toward this internal threat. Furthermore, 
past Western support for Kinshasa, especially during the Shaba 
crises, had not gone unnoticed in Luanda. There were also close 
military ties between Zaire and the United States. Reportedly, the 
United States had supplied weapons through Zaire to UNITA in 
the late 1980s. 

Relations between Angola and Zaire started to improve somewhat 



281 



Zaire: A Country Study 

in late 1988 when negotiations began over repatriation of refugees 
to their respective countries. Although the repatriations stalled be- 
cause of mutual suspicions, negotiations resumed, and on Septem- 
ber 27, 1989, the first refugees returned home. Approximately 
310,000 displaced Angolans remained in Zaire in 1992. 

Also during this period, President Mobutu arranged for a sum- 
mit of African leaders to discuss Angolan national reconciliation. 
The summit, which took place in Gbadolite, Zaire, on June 22, 
1989, led to a temporary cease-fire in the Angolan civil war and 
also called for subsequent negotiations on national reconciliation. 
Known as the Gbadolite Declaration, this agreement both neces- 
sitated and resulted in improved negotiations between Kinshasa 
and Luanda. Although the Gbadolite Declaration agreement was 
short-lived, the 1991 cease-fire agreement between Luanda and 
UNITA and resultant attempts to form a new broad-based Ango- 
lan government were expected to reduce potential conflict between 
Angola and Zaire. 

As for relations with other African states, Zaire's support for 
Western initiatives and conservative regimes in Africa has had 
mixed consequences. Actions such as training Chadian soldiers at 
the Zairian Commando Training Center and sending troops to 
Chad to support United States and French policy in that country 
helped Zaire secure Western economic and military assistance, but 
they also earned Mobutu the enmity of many African leaders. Par- 
ticularly important in this regard was Zaire's support for the 
UNITA insurgency in Angola. 

Evolution of the Armed Forces 
The Colonial Period 

The FAZ traces its lineage back to the late nineteenth-century 
creation of the Force Publique in the area then known as the Con- 
go Free State (see The Colonial State, ch. 1). In October 1885, 
King Leopold II of Belgium directed the organization of a govern- 
ment for the Congo Free State and charged the Ministry of Interi- 
or to create necessary police and military forces. In 1886 Belgium 
sent Captain Leon Roget to the Congo Free State with a small group 
of European officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to or- 
ganize a military force, although the Force Publique was not for- 
mally constituted until 1888. 

From its inception, the Force Publique was an ethnically mixed 
African army although officered by Europeans. It was both a defense 
force, for counterinsurgency operations, and a gendarmerie. The 
repressive measures employed by the Belgian colonial authorities 



282 



National Security 



to attain the quiescence of the local African population ultimately 
produced relative stability in the Congo Free State. There were, 
however, a number of mutinies, and during the early 1890s, bat- 
tles were fought against Arab invaders who had entered the coun- 
try from the east looking for slaves and ivory and had established 
control over much of the eastern part of present-day Zaire. By 1894, 
however, the Belgian colonial administration had eliminated Arab 
control of this region. 

Some of the worst tendencies of the present-day FAZ are trace- 
able to the early organization and practices of the Belgian colonial 
force. Particularly evident during the colonial period prior to World 
War II was the extensive autonomy of territorial administrators, 
who operated virtually independent fiefdoms. These administra- 
tors often used the military to gain their own ends, diverting sol- 
diers to various nonmilitary activities and treating local military 
units as private armies. Although this practice contravened colonial 
policy, the state proved unable to control its own coercive instru- 
ments. The practice of scattering military personnel among numer- 
ous small garrisons in the hinterland compounded the problem. 
The soldiers at isolated posts received little military training and 
were at times no more than undisciplined armed bands. A short- 
age of officers and the practice of diverting them from military to 
administrative duties further aggravated this situation, because the 
Force Publique was inadequately supervised. 

The organization of the Force Publique remained unchanged 
throughout the period of the Congo Free State (1885-1908) and 
the pre- World War I Belgian Congo (as Zaire was called from 1908 
to 1960). By the beginning of World War I, the Force Publique 
was not a coherent, well-organized army but more of a police force 
designed to aid civilian authorities in occupying the territory. As 
a result, the force initially assumed a defensive posture against 
German forces in German East Africa (later Tanganyika) and was 
virtually incapable of offensive action during the first eighteen 
months of the war. In fact, in most of the country the highest 
echelon of command in the Force Publique was the company; be- 
yond that there was no semblance of military command. Special- 
ized units such as artillery or engineering did not exist. Only in 
Katanga were there battalion- size units with an autonomous com- 
mand structure. 

These organizational problems continued to plague the Force 
Publique throughout the war, hindering effective operations. Bel- 
gian colonial forces in East Africa, however, did enjoy limited 
tactical success as part of a half-hearted cooperation with the Brit- 
ish against the hopelessly outnumbered German East Africa Force 



283 



Zaire: A Country Study 

known as the Shutztruppe. Ironically, one reason for the force's 
success may have been its reputation for cannibalism. Historian 
Charles Miller notes that many Africans in German areas believed 
that the Belgians economized on pay and food by serving their por- 
ters to the troops when the loads they carried had been used. 
Nevertheless, although the Force Publique's reputation for can- 
nibalism may have been of peripheral concern to German forces, 
Belgian success in East Africa resulted mostly from the greater num- 
bers of Allied forces, not from superior tactical skills. 

The problems experienced in World War I led the Belgian ad- 
ministration to reorganize the army along lines that would better 
fulfill the dual missions of external defense and internal security. 
A commission convened to study this matter recommended that 
units of the force be organized for army or police duties. The coloni- 
al administration eventually adopted this recommendation and es- 
tablished the Garrison Troops (Troupes Campees) as a general 
military force oriented against external threats and the Territorial 
Service Troops (Troupes en Service Territorial) to handle police 
and gendarme duties, both under the commandant of the Force 
Publique. Troops performing police duties would rotate periodi- 
cally with soldiers garrisoned in military units. 

This reorganization did littie to improve professional competence 
during the interwar years and in fact laid the base for many of the 
problems that continued to plague the FAZ in the 1990s. The Ter- 
ritorial Service Troops, which became known for their lack of dis- 
cipline, were particularly derelict. In 1929 even the commandant 
of the Force Publique noted that the Territorial Service Troops 
were poorly trained and of little value. In 1933 the commandant 
commented again that command of the Territorial Service Troops 
was "more often a fiction than a reality" and that they were in- 
capable of conducting "serious operations of whatever scope, or 
even coping with local riots. ' ' These problems continued throughout 
the interwar period and even (though to a lesser extent) through 
World War II and forced the local administrators to use the Gar- 
rison Troops to provide internal security. This diversion, however, 
proved destructive to the troops' cohesion, training, and discipline. 
The colonial government attempted to rectify these problems on 
numerous occasions, with little effect. A 1946 commission to study 
the reorganization of the Force Publique actually found itself fac- 
ing the same concerns that had plagued the force prior to World 
War I. 

Despite these internal difficulties, the Force Publique performed 
adequately during both world wars when employed outside the 
boundaries of the colony. As early as 1914, a detachment was 



284 



National Security 



deployed to the Cameroons to join French forces in operations 
against German forces there. 

The Force Publique again mobilized in 1940, when Belgium was 
overrun by Germany. In early 1941, Congolese troops deployed 
to Italian East Africa (present-day Ethiopia) to help eliminate the 
last Italian centers of resistance, and in the next year, other Con- 
golese troops joined forces with the West African Frontier Force 
in British colonial Nigeria. Later, Congolese soldiers went to Egypt 
where they guarded supply dumps and prisoner-of-war camps. Dur- 
ing both wars, Allied leaders commended the actions of these 
representatives of the Force Publique. 

During the early postwar period, Belgium, like other colonial 
powers, failed to recognize the strengthened desire of the Congo- 
lese elites to have a hand in shaping their own political destiny, 
especially following the successful deployment of Congolese soldi- 
ers among Allied units in World War II. Even in the late 1950s, 
the Belgian authorities had no intention of granting independence 
to the Belgian Congo in the near future. As a result, the composi- 
tion and organization of the Force Publique remained unchanged 
(except that the Territorial Service Troops were known as the gen- 
darmerie from 1959) from the end of World War II until indepen- 
dence. The Force Publique remained officered by Belgians, and 
only in the late 1950s did the colonial administration take steps 
to institute a military education system to prepare Congolese for 
commissioned service. In 1958 Belgium accepted only twenty-three 
Congolese for enrollment in the military secondary school. At this 
rate, it would have taken generations to completely Africanize the 
military. This approach was based on the premise that Europeans 
would continue to staff key institutions, such as the military, for 
a prolonged period after independence. 

At independence in 1960, none of the top military leaders were 
African. Moreover, Belgium's attitude toward the Congo (or, more 
formally, Republic of the Congo and then Democratic Republic 
of the Congo), as Zaire was known from 1960 to 1971, was little 
different than it had been throughout the colonial period. An 
excellent example of this posture occurred a few days after inde- 
pendence. When Lieutenant General Emile Janssens, Belgian com- 
mander of the Force Publique, heard grumbling by the Congolese 
soldiers and NCOs who saw little chance to advance in an army 
still controlled by expatriates, he called a meeting of the Leopold- 
ville (now Kinshasa) garrison on July 5, 1960, to remind them of 
their oaths of loyalty and obedience. In addition, he wrote on a 
blackboard, ''After independence equals before independence." 
The indignation aroused in the Congolese soldiers by this comment 



285 



Zaire: A Country Study 

led to a mutiny by the end of the day. At a meeting that evening, 
the mutineers called for Janssens's removal and the immediate 
Africanization of the officer corps. This mutiny set off political tur- 
moil that embroiled the newly independent republic for the next 
several years (see The Crisis of Decolonization, ch. 1). 

The Congolese National Army 

The mutiny quickly spread throughout the country; soon the 
Force Publique was in full-scale revolt. Prime Minister Patrice Lu- 
mumba promised a one- grade promotion for all army personnel, 
but this action failed to mollify the mutineers. As reports circulated 
concerning ugly incidents perpetrated by mutinous black soldiers 
against European residents, panic gripped the white population, 
and several thousand fled the country. Brussels put its military on 
alert and decided that it must act unilaterally. Early on the morn- 
ing of July 10 — the tenth day of independence — Belgian troops in- 
tervened in Elisabethville (now Lubumbashi), where they quickly 
brought the situation under control, but disorder spread to other 
parts of the country. Belgian paratroopers dropped into several key 
areas to restore order. Although temporarily effective, the greatest 
impact of this intervention was to convince the newly independent 
country that Belgium was trying to reassert its colonial control. 

Within days Lumumba removed the more than 1 ,000 European 
officers from the command structure, although a few remained as 
advisers, and replaced them with Congolese NCOs. These new 
officers were chosen mainly on the basis of seniority, but some were 
elected. Lumumba appointed two political followers with prior mili- 
tary experience to head the army. Victor Lundula was promoted 
to major general and named commander of the army to replace 
General Janssens, and Mobutu was promoted to colonel and made 
chief of staff. Lumumba also changed the name of the Force Pu- 
blique to the Congolese National Army (Armee Nationale Congo- 
laise — ANC). But within two weeks of independence, the newly 
named army had degenerated, in many cases, into armed gangs 
of renegades whose loyalties were to local strongmen, ethnic groups, 
or regions rather than to the national government. 

This process was aggravated further when eleven days after in- 
dependence, Katanga, the country's richest province, seceded. 
Although Belgium declined to grant diplomatic recognition to the 
new state, it did supply military assistance and may have seconded 
officers and NCOs to Katanga's military force, the Katangan 
Gendarmerie (Gendarmerie Katangaise). In addition, other Bel- 
gian functionaries remained at their posts, and the European sec- 
tor in general lent crucial support to the rebels. Soon after, the 



286 



National Security 



southeastern portion of the diamond-producing province of Kasai, 
corresponding to the southern portion of what is now the Kasai- 
Oriental Region, also seceded. As a result, by August 1960 the 
new state had lost the two areas that had produced over half its 
revenues and foreign exchange and faced the threat of permanent 
disintegration. 

Because of the general breakdown of law and order and to pre- 
vent the complete overthrow of authority, President Joseph Kasa- 
vubu and Lumumba appealed for United States, United Nations 
(UN), and Soviet assistance in July 1960. An uneasy internation- 
al accord arranged that the UN would provide assistance, and 
within three months the UN had established a force in the country 
that numbered 20,000 at its peak. Once the UN force was present, 
the Congo in effect had several armies competing for power: the 
UN force, two secessionist forces, and the ANC. Furthermore, the 
splintered loyalties of the ANC meant that there were a variety 
of other competing military organizations as well. 

The armed forces became as much a threat to state authority 
as an instrument of it. The various units were, at best, uncertain 
weapons in the hands of various contenders for power. In the cap- 
ital and the surrounding area, Mobutu, rather than the central 
government, commanded the loyalty of ANC personnel. The ANC 
troops in Kasai supported the secessionist movement led by Al- 
bert Kalonji. Lumumba, dismissed by the president in Septem- 
ber, later fled toward the northeastern Congo, but was captured 
en route and subsequently killed by Katangans. The February 1961 
announcement of his death sparked an uprising in the northeast 
Congo and particularly in the Stanleyville (now Kisangani) area 
where the ANC and General Lundula backed Antoine Gizenga, 
who claimed to represent the only legitimate government of the 
republic (see fig. 5; The Center No Longer Holds, ch. 1). In Katan- 
ga, Moise Tshombe had his own force of Belgian- advised gen- 
darmes. Since these forces were concerned primarily with 
maintaining the positions of their patrons, the UN provided the 
main element of security in the country. Furthermore, in this com- 
petition, the capacity to pay troops was instrumental to any sem- 
blance of control. Here Mobutu had a major advantage, primarily 
because he had access to the disorganized national treasury. 

The central government defeated the Kasai secession — as well 
as the northeastern regime led by Gizenga, which sought national 
power — relatively quickly, but the larger insurgency in Katanga 
proved more difficult. It was not until January 1963 that UN forces 
were able to end the Katanga secession. Peace was, however, short- 
lived. A wave of rebellions broke out again in various parts of the 



287 



Zaire: A Country Study 

republic in late 1963. Soon after the departure of UN forces in June 
1964, these rebellions controlled roughly one-third of the country 
(see fig. 6; Rural Insurgencies: The "Second Independence," ch. 1). 

The most interesting of these rebellions was the Kwilu uprising 
in the area around Kikwit, led by Pierre Mulele. Mulele is credit- 
ed with organizing the first large-scale peasant insurrection in an 
independent African state, espousing a combination of Marxism 
and Maoism heavily imbued with magico-religious overtones. The 
Kwilu revolt continued until December 1965, and the threat of Mu- 
lele to the central government did not end until his execution in 
October 1968. 

To help deal with the insurgencies, former Katangan secessionist 
leader Moise Tshombe was brought back as national prime minister 
in mid- 1964. Tshombe mobilized his Katangan gendarmes, recall- 
ing them from exile in Angola, recruited white mercenaries, and 
obtained aid from Belgium and the United States to turn back the 
insurgents. Although the latter received Chinese and Soviet as- 
sistance and also, for several months in 1965, help from a Cuban 
contingent under Ernesto "Che" Guevara, government forces 
eventually gained the upper hand. Nevertheless, several months 
passed before the government could reestablish a tenuous authority 
in many affected areas. 

The defeat of these rebellions took a great toll on both the govern- 
ment and the military. The army had performed poorly and was 
clearly unable to maintain order without external reinforcement. 
After defeating the insurgents, the army took out its humiliation 
on those it suspected of aiding them. These episodes combined to 
implant in the populace an indelible fear of disorder and insecuri- 
ty and a deeply ingrained suspicion and distrust of the military, 
which continued in the early 1990s. 

During 1965 the political situation deteriorated. General Mobutu 
had become commander in chief of the ANC, and, as the individual 
controlling the largest number of loyal troops, he staged a blood- 
less coup d'etat on November 24, 1965, becoming president of the 
country (see Mobutu's Second Coming, ch. 1). 

The Military under Mobutu 

Mobutu did not initially establish a military dictatorship; the 
ANC continued in its role as the government's armed force rather 
than becoming the government. Mobutu stated that he had seized 
power in order to end the chaos and anarchy that had existed since 
the country had gained independence. He sought also to extract 
the country from its perennial government stalemate, largely caused 
by a power struggle between President Kasavubu and Prime 



288 



Marshal Mobutu Sese Seko, president of Zaire and 
supreme commander of the FAZ 
Courtesy Agence Zaire Presse 

Minister Tshombe, as well as to eliminate Kasavubu's threat to 
get rid of the white mercenaries at a time when they were needed 
to crush the Lumumbist rebellions. He also initiated efforts to en- 
courage foreign assistance to reequip and train the ANC along 
modern lines. Belgian and United States involvement in these ob- 
jectives became particularly important. Meanwhile, the ANC, aided 
by white mercenaries, continued to fight against insurgents around 
Kikwit and in Kivu. 

Another threat to national security occurred in July 1 966 when 
former Katangan gendarmes, who had joined the ANC during 
Tshombe 's comeback, mutinied and took over the city of Stan- 
leyville (see Toward Political Reconstruction, ch. 1). The rebels 
managed to hold out for two months, but the ANC, spearheaded 
by white mercenaries, finally retook the city. Again the next year, 
the ANC found itself fighting against a combined force of Katan- 
gans and mercenaries who had captured Bukavu, near the Rwan- 
dan border. The rebels held off a much larger ANC force for more 
than three months before United States air logistic support forced 
the insurgents to negotiate for safe passage out of the country. 

While relying on the military to stay in power, Mobutu based 
his legitimacy on the country's only legal political party, the Popular 



289 



Zaire: A Country Study 

Revolutionary Movement (Mouvement Populaire de la Revolu- 
tion — MPR), which he created in 1967 (see The Party-State as a 
System of Rule; Managing the Military, ch. 4). Thus, despite his 
rank as field marshal, Mobutu rarely appeared in uniform. To 
safeguard his authoritarian rule, he staffed a high proportion of 
the top echelons of the military with people of his own ethnic group, 
while at the same time shuffling high-ranking personnel to weaken 
the army's professional independence or the emergence of any ele- 
ments within the military that might threaten his rule. At the same 
time, he obtained foreign support to improve the capabilities of 
his military forces, particularly in counterinsurgency. Mobutu and 
his supporters maintained their hold over the defense ministry, 
which meant control of the army and the security forces. 

Over the years, Mobutu took a number of steps to improve the 
military's capability. In 1969 he established the National Security 
Council to provide coordination over external and internal securi- 
ty responsibilities. During the same period, he created military 
schools to train young Congolese at home rather than having them 
sent off to Belgium or another foreign country. By 1969 this effort 
had succeeded to the point that recruits from other African coun- 
tries were trained in the Congo (see Military Schools, this ch.). 

Despite this progress, the military still relied heavily on foreign 
aid programs to train its soldiers during the early 1970s. Ameri- 
cans, Belgians, and Israelis provided assistance with various aspects 
of military training and invited Zaire (as the country was called 
from October 1971) to send officers and NCOs to train in their 
countries. By expanding and diversifying the sources of military 
assistance, Mobutu hoped to reduce Zaire's reliance on any one 
source of aid. This process would give him greater flexibility and 
could also provide more assistance as the various donors compet- 
ed for access. The wide variety of sources of military education 
assistance, however, did have negative consequences. First, it 
produced a kaleidoscope of military education that at times made 
it difficult for officers in the same unit to interact effectively. It 
also created pockets of competing pressure groups that believed 
that their source of training was superior to the others. For exam- 
ple, until the mid-1980s, officers trained in Belgium and, to a less- 
er extent, France, had an advantage over United States-trained 
officers when it came to promotions and high-level assignments. 

Creation of the Zairian Armed Forces 

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Mobutu inaugurated his 
authenticity (see Glossary) campaign, which was intended to re- 
ject European values and develop a Zairian identity (see The Quest 



290 



National Security 



for Legitimacy, ch. 1). As part of this initiative, Mobutu changed 
the name of the country to Zaire, dropped his Christian name and 
ordered his countrymen to do the same, and changed the name 
of the military to the Zairian Armed Forces (Forces Armees 
Zairoises — FAZ) . 

During the mid-1970s, the FAZ experienced extensive turmoil. 
The army was shaken in mid- 19 75 when several generals, colonels, 
and lower-ranking officers were arrested and accused of plotting 
to overthrow the government. In August forty-one alleged plot- 
ters, including nine civilians, were tried in secret by a military court 
that handed down death sentences to three generals and four other 
army officers. One of the generals, Fallu Sumbu, was considered 
one of the brightest young officers in the military. Again in 1978, 
the government executed eight officers and five civilians alleged 
to have plotted against Mobutu. Although it is uncertain whether 
or not these plots ever existed, according to Zaire specialist Thomas 
Turner, what is certain, "is that the purges reflected both genera- 
tional and ethnoregional cleavages. Those eliminated in 1975 were 
mainly Tetela and others from Kasai-Oriental and Kivu regions, 
while those eliminated in 1978 were mainly Luba from Kasai- 
Oriental." These purges also had a significant negative impact on 
a military whose performance was characterized by gross incompe- 
tence during this period. In an interesting sidenote that reflects the 
sometimes bizarre policies of the Mobutu regime, a decree issued 
following the coup forbade marriage between officers and foreign 
women and ordered officers already married to foreigners to give 
up either their wives or their commissions. 

Involvement in Angola 

Despite the deficiencies of the FAZ, during the early 1970s 
Mobutu was viewed as a major player in Africa, and the Zairian 
military was considered to have improved. As a result, Mobutu 
sought to acquire the image of power broker by involving himself 
in the Angolan civil war. Anxious to prevent the victory of the 
Soviet- and Cuban-backed MPLA, Mobutu sent several battalions 
of the Zairian army into Angola to support anti-MPLA forces. 
These units advanced south toward Luanda with FNLA elements 
and also entered Cabinda with forces of the Front for the Libera- 
tion of the Enclave of Cabinda (Frente para a Libertacao do Enclavo 
de Cabinda— FLEC). During October 1975, FAZ/FNLA forces 
advanced in the direction of Luanda, encountering gradually stiffen- 
ing resistance from MPLA units defending the city. MPLA forces 
received assistance from Zairian exiles and Cuban units. This com- 
bined force routed the Zairian/FNLA soldiers and counterattacked, 



291 



Zaire: A Country Study 

sending them fleeing toward the Zairian border. As the FAZ retreat- 
ed, it disintegrated into disorganized bands looting the country- 
side. According to historian Crawford Young, the result for Mobutu 
could hardly have been worse: "humiliating defeat for the army; 
the entrenchment of his enemies in Luanda; and the exposure of 
Zaire as a junior partner" to the United States and South Africa. 

Shaba I 

Mobutu's ill-considered involvement in Angola returned to haunt 
him in March 1977 when the Front for the National Liberation 
of the Congo (Front pour la Liberation Nationale du Congo — 
FLNC) invaded Zaire's Shaba Region. Included in the invading 
force was a small remnant of the Katangan gendarmes. When 
Kasavubu recalled Tshombe from exile in 1964, elements of this 
force had been incorporated into the ANC to help fight the insur- 
rections simmering throughout the country. After Tshombe dis- 
appeared from the political scene, the Katangan contingent 
mutinied in 1966 and again in 1967. When these uprisings failed, 
most of the contingent left for Angola under Nathaniel Mbumba's 
leadership. During the late 1960s, the former gendarmes began 
to congregate in Angola along Zaire's southern border, and dur- 
ing the late 1960s and early 1970s, they fought for the Portuguese 
against Angolan nationalist movements. After the Portuguese 
departed in 1975, the MPLA enlisted the rebel Zairians in their 
cause and, with Cuban assistance, continued to arm and train them. 
It was the remnants of this force, augmented by other Zairian dis- 
sidents from Shaba and elsewhere, and still led by Mbumba, which 
invaded Shaba in 1977. 

The invaders launched a three-pronged attack on March 8, 1977. 
Within weeks the FLNC had captured several towns and controlled 
the railroad to a point thirty kilometers from the copper-mining 
town of Kolwezi. Shortly after the invasion began, the dissidents 
made it clear that they were not merely a reincarnation of the earlier 
Katangan secessionist movement but instead aimed to take over 
the entire country and depose Mobutu. After their initial success, 
the rebels stalled on their way to Kolwezi; nevertheless, Mobutu's 
position seemed dire. This rapid advance and the threat to Kolwezi 
forced Mobutu to appeal for international assistance. 

Belgium, France, and the United States responded to Mobu- 
tu's request by immediately airlifting military supplies to Zaire. 
Other African states also supported Zaire during this crisis, and 
Egypt and Morocco joined Belgium, France, and the United States 
by providing assistance. Egypt provided fifty pilots and technicians. 
The pilots flew the French-built Mirage jets of the Zairian air force 



292 



National Security 



throughout the conflict. Morocco provided 1,500 combat troops. 
French aircraft airlifted these soldiers to Kolwezi on April 9, and 
on April 14, a combined Zairian and Moroccan force counter- 
attacked. This reinforcement immediately improved the FAZ's 
morale, and by the end of May the joint force had regained con- 
trol of Shaba. In addition to the recapture of Shaba, the Moroc- 
can presence had the added benefit of permitting Mobutu to keep 
his elite airborne units in Kinshasa, ready to respond to a crisis 
elsewhere in the country. 

The invading force had expected a general uprising in support 
of its operation; however, because of the fragmentation of Zairian 
opposition groups, as well as the FLNC's distinctive ethnic base 
(Lunda and Ndembu), this uprising did not materialize. The FLNC 
was prevented from consolidating its gains and became suscepti- 
ble to the Zairian-Moroccan counterattack. Nevertheless, during 
what came to be known as the Eighty-Day War, the FLNC suffered 
no serious defeats, its troop strength had not diminished signifi- 
cantly, and its capability to conduct insurgent operations remained 
intact. The FLNC withdrew to Angola, and possibly to Zambia, 
and began to regroup for another attack. Thus, although to a limited 
extent the crushing of Shaba I might be regarded as a model of 
international cooperation, the victorious forces failed to complete 
the job. Probably more significant, however, was Zaire's failure 
to follow up its military success with political and economic reforms 
to ensure long-term stability. Government reprisals after Shaba I 
drove 50,000 to 70,000 refugees to Angola. Also, Zaire's continued 
support for Angolan dissident groups ensured continued Angolan 
government support for the FLNC. 

The poor performance of Zaire's military during Shaba I gave 
evidence of chronic weaknesses. One problem was that some of 
the Zairian soldiers in the area had not received pay for extended 
periods. Senior officers often kept the money intended for the sol- 
diers, typifying a generally disreputable and inept senior leader- 
ship in the FAZ. As a result, many soldiers simply deserted rather 
than fight. Others stayed with their units but were ineffective. 

During the months following the Shaba invasion, Mobutu sought 
solutions to the military problems that had contributed to the army's 
dismal performance. He implemented sweeping reforms of the com- 
mand structure, including wholesale firings of high-ranking officers. 
He merged the military general staff with his own presidential staff 
and appointed himself chief of staff again, in addition to the posi- 
tions of minister of defense and supreme commander that he al- 
ready held. He redeployed his forces throughout the country instead 
of keeping them close to Kinshasa, as had previously been the 



293 



Zaire: A Country Study 

case. The Kamanyola Division, at the time considered the army's 
best unit and referred to as the president's own, was assigned per- 
manently to Shaba. In addition to these changes, the army's 
strength was reduced by 25 percent, presumably to eliminate dis- 
loyal and ineffective elements. Also, Zaire's allies provided a large 
influx of military equipment, and Belgian, French, and American 
advisers assisted in rebuilding and retraining the force. 

Shaba II 

In contrast to the first Shaba invasion, where the FLNC had 
launched an outright invasion of Zairian territory, Shaba II started 
with an infiltration of Zaire. Then during early May 1978, ten 
FLNC battalions entered Shaba through northern Zambia, a sparse- 
ly populated area inhabited by the same ethnic groups (Lunda and 
Ndembu) that made up the FLNC . A small element headed toward 
Mutshatsha, about 100 kilometers west of Kolwezi, to block the 
path of Zairian reinforcements that might attempt to move into 
the area. During the night of May 11-12, the remainder of the 
force moved to Kolwezi, where it linked up with the rebels who 
had infiltrated the town during the previous six months. Although 
the FAZ had picked up many intelligence indicators pointing to 
an invasion, the town of Kolwezi was lighdy defended. 

The FLNC struck at dawn on May 13 and took Kolwezi by 10 
A.M.; FLNC forces also captured Mutshatsha. Unlike the previ- 
ous year, the insurgents did not disperse their force. The FLNC 
invasion of 1978 differed from Shaba I in another important respect. 
In 1977 the insurgents had done little physical damage. Although 
their forces had occupied nearly a third of Shaba, they had stopped 
short of the strategically important Kolwezi, not interfering with 
mining operations or endangering Europeans. In 1978 the rebels 
aimed directiy at Kolwezi. By immediately striking this economi- 
cally vital area, and by threatening Europeans, the FLNC provoked 
a much different international response than in 1977. This attack 
was a bold maneuver and might have succeeded were it not for 
the arrival within a week of 700 French and 1,700 Belgian sol- 
diers, supported logistically by the United States Air Force. 

The FAZ performed little better than it had done the previous 
year. Indeed, as Zaire specialist Thomas Callaghy notes, Mobu- 
tu's harsh suppression of an attempted military coup in February 
1978 (in which he dismissed, imprisoned, or executed 250 officers, 
including many foreign- trained officers) "clearly had a detrimen- 
tal effect on military performance during Shaba II, in which Zairian 
troops performed only marginally better than during Shaba I." 
Units of the Kamanyola Division collapsed immediately. Many 



294 



National Security 



took refuge in the European residential area, where most of the 
expatriate casualties were later suffered. Many Zairian troops re- 
moved their uniforms and took part in the general mayhem that 
occurred. In fact, most of the senior and mid-ranking officers had 
vanished prior to the attack, leaving junior officers and NCOs to 
lead the defense of the area. The small Kolwezi defense force (about 
300 strong) was quickly overrun. The airport also fell to the insur- 
gents in the initial onslaught, so Kolwezi was effectively under ene- 
my control. In the attack on the airport, two helicopters and four 
Aermachi counterinsurgency jets belonging to the Zairian air force 
were destroyed on the ground, and two other Aermachis were 
damaged. Thus, Zaire was unable to use even the relatively limit- 
ed amount of modern combat equipment that would have given 
the FAZ a significant tactical advantage over the FLNC. 

Shortly after taking Kolwezi, the invaders' discipline broke down, 
which led to widespread drunkenness, looting, pillaging, and mur- 
der. Although initial reports reaching the outside concerning the 
slaughter of Europeans turned out to be somewhat exaggerated, 
the white community was undoubtedly under assault, and many 
local Zairians were also murdered. 

The FLNC was unable to retain control of Kolwezi 's airport, 
however. On May 17, Zairian regular units reinforced by a para- 
troop company and supported by air strikes counterattacked, forcing 
the rebels to withdraw. The FLNC claimed that white soldiers also 
participated, but this claim is dubious. Although the airborne unit 
was trained and advised by the French, French policy precluded 
the deployment of advisers in combat, and Paris denied that mem- 
bers of the French advisory mission participated. 

Determining the number of rebels involved in Shaba II is difficult. 
Some sources have offered a figure of 4,000, although they differ 
on the percentage of this force that infiltrated prior to the com- 
mencement of hostilities. However, probably no more than 500 
seasoned FLNC troops took part in the actual attack, with the 
balance consisting of infiltrators and other personnel recruited 
locally. 

On May 19, a 700-member battalion of the French Foreign 
Legion parachuted into Kolwezi under orders to rescue the hostages 
held by the FLNC and to prepare to evacuate all whites from the 
war zone. The Belgians sent a paratroop regiment to Kamina (more 
than 200 kilometers north of Kolwezi) and proceeded by road to 
Kolwezi with orders to use their weapons only if fired on first by 
the rebels. The Belgian commander reportedly had disarmed his 
men (by taking away their bullets) to avoid the possibility that they 
would fire on the Legionnaires, who were committing atrocities. 



295 



Zaire: A Country Study 

This action led to strained relations between the Belgian forces and 
the Legionnaires, which continued in the early 1990s. The United 
States sent eighteen C-141 transports to fly logistics missions for 
both the French and Belgian forces. 

FLNC resistance evaporated quickly as the Legionnaires swept 
through the city streets in a house-to-house search for rebel troops, 
and the French encountered little organized resistance as they 
cleared the town. Most of the opposition they met came from 
Zairian deserters, armed looters, and FLNC irregulars. The bulk 
of the rebel forces had already withdrawn, even evacuating their 
wounded, accompanied by a good portion of the local population 
who also fled the city. 

By the end of May, the second Shaba invasion was over except 
for scattered attacks by roving bands of insurgents that had re- 
mained in the area after the departure of the main FLNC force 
to Zambia. The Belgian force started to withdraw, leaving a bat- 
talion in Kamina, and the French Foreign Legion departed by the 
end of May. 

At the Franco- African Summit in late May, Morocco (itself not 
a participant) offered to send its soldiers to Zaire again if it received 
the cooperation of other African states. By May 31, a Moroccan 
regiment had arrived in Kolwezi, followed a few weeks later by 
a Senegalese battalion, smaller units from Togo and Gabon, and 
a medical team from Cote dTvoire (Ivory Coast). These soldiers 
flew in on United States, French, and Belgian military aircraft, 
and France, the United States, and Saudi Arabia reportedly jointly 
financed this operation. This approach was a unique effort at 
peacekeeping outside the framework of an existing formal alliance 
or international organization. Most important, however, was its 
reliance on African forces to replace the departing Europeans. 

During the post-Shaba II period, Mobutu again sought foreign 
assistance to remold his military. Thomas Callaghy notes that Zaire 
went so far as to post European NCOs, known as "godfathers," 
with Zairian units to ensure that the troops were paid and fed. In 
1980 a French colonel, Maurice Mathiote, assumed command of 
the French-trained 31st Airborne Brigade. French officers essen- 
tially commanded the brigade down to the company level in peace- 
time, although they would not deploy with their units to combat. 
The Belgians trained the 21st Infantry Brigade in Shaba and re- 
mained as advisers to this unit. The Chinese were invited to train 
and equip the 41st Commando Brigade in Kisangani, and, after 
resuming diplomatic relations with Israel in 1982, Zaire request- 
ed and received Israeli military assistance focusing on training the 
Special Presidential Brigade, which expanded to a division in 



296 



National Security 



1986 — the Special Presidential Division (Division Speciale Presiden- 
tielle — DSP). Despite this concerted international effort, the FAZ 
remained largely ineffective except for the airborne brigade and 
the presidential unit. Zairian regular units demonstrated their con- 
tinued inability to counter effectively the sporadic insurgent ac- 
tivities in eastern Zaire that continued in the 1980s (see Public Order 
and Internal Security, this ch.). 

Public Attitudes Toward the Military 

By the early 1990s, the FAZ's enlisted ranks represented much 
of society. However, members of President Mobutu's own Ngbandi 
ethnic group are disproportionately represented in the military and 
security forces, particularly at the highest levels. The Ngbandi over- 
whelmingly dominate the elite DSP. Mobutu has excluded certain 
areas of the country from recruitment in the military (in the past, 
the western half of the country had provided a majority of recruits). 
The army reportedly is dominated by soldiers from the Equateur 
Region, Mobutu's home region, as well as Haut-Zaire. It has also 
been reported that soldiers from the regions of Shaba, Kasai- 
Oriental, Kasai-Occidental, Bandundu, Bas-Zaire, Nord-Kivu, 
Sud-Kivu, and Maniema are discriminated against. 

The military is highly visible in most areas of the country, but 
it is not an institution that most Zairians identify with or in which 
they have any pride or confidence. The FAZ, as a descendant of 
the colonial Force Publique, has retained an aura of separateness 
and, like the colonial force, is perceived, justifiably, as an instru- 
ment of repression. As such, the majority of the population sees 
the army as its enemy. 

There is also discontent within the military itself. Low and ir- 
regular pay is the primary cause for depredations by the FAZ. Only 
the highest-ranking officers and the DSP receive pay sufficient to 
provide a basic level of subsistence. Most officers and other ranks 
receive wages that are inadequate to feed and clothe their fami- 
lies, and they often go unpaid for months (see Conditions of Ser- 
vice, this ch.). As a result, FAZ members often prey on the local 
community in an effort to make ends meet, and to enrich them- 
selves, which breaks down trust between the military and the Zairian 
population. In September 1991, unpaid paratroopers went on a 
rampage in Kinshasa, and widespread looting ensued. France and 
Belgium ultimately sent in troops to restore order and protect for- 
eign nationals. Another wave of military-led pillaging and looting 
occurred in early 1993 following the introduction of a new Z5 mil- 
lion (for value of the zaire — see Glossary) note that many merchants 
refused to accept from the military personnel who had been paid 



297 



Zaire: A Country Study 

with it. Lower-level, routine looting has continued; people who in- 
terfere or protest are often shot on the spot. As a result, fear of 
renewed military looting is widespread, inducing many citizens to 
pay the "contributions" that soldiers demand as the price of be- 
ing left alone. 

The FAZ has played a constructive role at times, in conducting 
occasional civic-action programs, but these may, in any case, have 
been largely window dressing for foreign advisers. For example, 
during a joint Zairian- American military exercise, Zairian engineer 
units built several bridges in Shaba Region, permitting vehicular 
travel between some towns for the first time in more than ten years. 

Armed Forces Missions and Organization 

The constitution states that the president is the supreme com- 
mander of the armed forces and is also responsible for formulat- 
ing and executing defense policy. The Ministry of Defense and 
Veterans' Affairs assists him with these duties. Mobutu had served 
as minister of defense and veterans' affairs since his 1965 coup, 
relinquishing the position only in 1990, following his announce- 
ment of the Third Republic (see Proclamation of the Third Repub- 
lic, ch. 4). During the 1977 Shaba crisis, Mobutu personally took 
over as FAZ chief of staff, in effect becoming the supreme com- 
mander, minister of defense, and chief of staff of the army, a stag- 
gering array of duties for a single person to assume. He holds the 
unique rank of field marshal in the FAZ. 

Mobutu also heads the advisory National Security Council, which 
comprises the prime minister; the ministers of defense and veter- 
ans' affairs, external relations, interior and security, and justice 
and keeper of the seals; the administrators general of the National 
Service for Intelligence and Protection and the Military Intelligence 
and Security Service; the president's special adviser on security 
matters; and the chiefs of staff of the FAZ and the gendarmerie. 
Within the National Security Council, a Security Committee and 
a Secretariat were established in May 1982. 

The official mission of the FAZ is to defend the country against 
all internal and external threats. But throughout its existence, the 
mission to protect Zaire against internal threats — as well as threats 
to Mobutu's rule — has been the military's primary task. The mili- 
tary's importance in propping up the Mobutu regime is amply 
demonstrated by the role military and security forces played in 
suppressing political opposition in the early 1990s. Mobutu has 
routinely deployed loyal military units to suppress popular demon- 
strations; to harass and intimidate political opponents and news- 
papers critical of his regime; to gain and retain control of key 



298 




Zaire's small navy operates along its short coast and on its numerous lakes 
and rivers, such as this one through dense jungle in Equateur Region. 



government institutions such as state-run radio and television fa- 
cilities and the central bank; to incite ethnic violence; and to ob- 
struct the operations of the transitional government, including 
blocking access by members of that government to their govern- 
ment offices (see Subsequent Political Developments, 1990-93; Op- 
position since 1990, ch. 4). 

Until 1988 the FAZ was organized into three military regions, 
but in August of that year, President Mobutu increased the num- 
ber of military regions. They generally coincide with the country's 
administrative regions, but some military regions encompass more 
than one administrative region (see fig. 1). 

Army 

The 25,000-member army consists of one infantry division (with 
three infantry brigades); one airborne brigade (with three parachute 
battalions and one support battalion); one special forces (comman- 
do/counterinsurgency) brigade; one presidential guard division; one 
independent armored brigade; and two independent infantry 
brigades (each with three infantry battalions, one support battal- 
ion). These units are deployed throughout the country, with the 
main concentrations in Shaba Region (approximately half the force). 
The Kamanyola Division, consisting of the 1 1th Infantry Brigade, 
the 12th Infantry Brigade, and the 14th Infantry Brigade, operates 



299 



Zaire: A Country Study 

generally in western Shaba Region; the 21st Infantry Brigade is 
located in Lubumbashi; the 13th Infantry Brigade is deployed 
throughout eastern Shaba; and at least one battalion of the 31st 
Airborne Brigade stays at Kamina. The other main concentration 
of forces is in and around Kinshasa: the 31st Airborne Brigade is 
deployed at Ndjili Airport on the outskirts of the capital; the DSP 
resides adjacent to the presidential compound; and the 1st Armored 
Brigade is deployed to Mbanza-Ngungu (approximately 120 kilo- 
meters southwest of Kinshasa). 

The army is equipped with a wide variety of military equipment, 
most of which came from the United States, France, and China 
(see table 16, Appendix). In 1993 the FAZ's main military require- 
ments included new military vehicles, jeeps, and communications 
equipment, as well as foreign assistance in repairing and main- 
taining equipment already in the inventory. 

The maintenance status of equipment in the inventory has tradi- 
tionally varied, depending on a unit's priority and the presence 
or absence of foreign advisers and technicians. A considerable por- 
tion of military equipment is not operational, primarily as a result 
of shortages of spare parts, poor maintenance, and theft. For ex- 
ample, the tanks of the 1st Armored Brigade often have a nonoper- 
ational rate approaching 70 to 80 percent. After a visit by a Chinese 
technical team in 1985, most of the tanks operated, but such an 
improved status generally has not lasted long beyond the depar- 
ture of the visiting team. Several factors complicate maintenance 
in Zairian units. Maintenance personnel often lack the training 
necessary to maintain modern military equipment. Moreover, the 
wide variety of military equipment and the staggering array of spare 
parts necessary to maintain it not only clog the logistic network 
but also are expensive. 

The most important factor that negatively affects maintenance 
is the low and irregular pay that soldiers receive, resulting in the 
theft and sale of spare parts and even basic equipment to supple- 
ment their meager salaries. When not stealing spare parts and 
equipment, maintenance personnel often spend the better part of 
their duty day looking for other ways to profit. American main- 
tenance teams working in Zaire found that providing a free lunch 
to the work force was a good, sometimes the only, technique to 
motivate personnel to work at least half of the duty day. 

The army's logistics corps is to provide logistic support and con- 
duct direct, indirect, and depot-level maintenance for the FAZ. 
But because of Zaire's lack of emphasis on maintenance and lo- 
gistics, a lack of funding, and inadequate training, the corps is 



300 



National Security 



understaffed, underequipped, and generally unable to accomplish 
its mission. It is organized into three battalions assigned to Mban- 
daka, Kisangani, and Kamina, but only the battalion at Kamina 
is adequately staffed; the others are little more than skeleton or- 
ganizations. 

The army's military capability is uneven, with some units more 
capable than others. For the most part, however, the Zairian army 
is not a combat-effective organization. The typical army brigade, 
such as the 21st Infantry Brigade in Lubumbashi, has virtually no 
offensive capability and only very limited defensive capability. The 
problems are manifold: ineffective leadership detracts from tacti- 
cal and technical proficiency as well as morale; poor maintenance 
results in insufficient resources for mission accomplishment; and 
lack of funds limits the army's ability to purchase sufficient amounts 
of equipment or to pay soldiers a living wage. These conditions 
have long existed in almost all regular Zairian units and combine 
to keep capability at minimum levels. 

The DSP, numbering between 7,000 and 10,000, is an excep- 
tion to this rule. Members of the elite DSP have consistently received 
higher wages, been paid regularly, been well fed, and had better 
housing than soldiers in other units. These factors, and (in the past) 
the presence of Israeli advisers, have not only encouraged a better 
leadership environment but also produced more motivated soldiers. 

There were, however, reports that even the DSP went for weeks 
without pay in late 1993. Only a subunit, Mobutu's personal guards 
known as Les Hiboux (The Owls), were paid regularly. 

The situation in the 3 1 st Airborne Brigade was at one time simi- 
lar. Although paid the same basic salary as soldiers in other units, 
airborne personnel were once paid regularly. French advisers en- 
sured that the soldiers of the 31st Airborne Brigade were well fed, 
trained, and clothed. Also, French command of the unit's logis- 
tics battalion meant that supply and equipment maintenance were 
effective. As a result, the unit was capable of conducting effective 
combat operations. The 31st Airborne Brigade demonstrated its 
effectiveness during Shaba II and the first occupation of Moba in 
1984. That situation no longer prevailed by September 1991, 
however, when unpaid personnel from the 31st Airborne Brigade 
spearheaded mass looting and pillaging in Kinshasa. 

In the chaotic political climate prevailing in the early 1990s, the 
loyalty and effectiveness of individual military units are open to 
question. Clearly, the looting and rioting by military personnel in 
September 1991 and in early 1993 were indicative of a serious 
problem. By contrast, the DSP apparendy has continued to prosper 
relative to other military units. According to press reports, Mobutu 



301 



Zaire: A Country Study 

ensured the loyalty of this key unit by continuing to pay its mem- 
bers, despite the scarcity of funds and the failure of the regime to 
provide regular pay to civil servants and other military personnel. 
The DSP has continued to support the Mobutu regime internally, 
both protecting Mobutu and serving as his primary instrument of 
control. The DSP's violent attack on students in Lubumbashi in 
May 1990 is the most vivid manifestation of its support of Mobutu, 
but far from the only one. The DSP also was used to suppress both 
the September 1991 and the even more destructive February 1993 
incidences of military looting — although in 1993 the DSP is wide- 
ly reported to have engaged in considerable vandalism itself be- 
fore quelling the unrest. Its suppression of the violence reportedly 
included summarily executing hundreds of military looters. In ad- 
dition, the DSP is reputed to have ransacked the offices and blown 
up the presses of Elima, the leading opposition newspaper, in Oc- 
tober 1991; to have put down a "coup attempt" after some mili- 
tary personnel took over the state-run television station in February 
1992; to have interrupted numerous public demonstrations, shoot- 
ing unarmed demonstrators randomly; and to have been deployed 
to Nord-Kivu in mid- 1993 to stop ethnic violence widely believed 
to have been instigated by government and security officials in the 
first place. In all of its dealings with the populace, the DSP has 
been accused of using undue violence and torture. Its fearsome- 
ness was demonstrated graphically in February 1993 when its mem- 
bers went on a punitive rampage after civilians killed one of its 
members. 

Some DSP personnel reportedly were also deployed to Angola 
in the early 1990s and to Rwanda in October 1990 to support the 
beleaguered Rwandan government. The DSP undoubtedly is the 
only Zairian military force loyal and capable enough to be deployed 
abroad. 

Navy 

Zaire's 1,300-member navy includes 600 marines and operates 
a small ocean-going force with larger river and lake flotillas. Be- 
cause Zaire's Atlantic Coast is only about forty kilometers long, 
Lake Tanganyika is the largest body of water that the navy patrols, 
so the navy's primary mission is to control illegal entry into the 
country and to conduct antismuggling patrols as well. The navy 
has bases at Banana on the coast; at Boma, Matadi, and Kinshasa 
on the lower Congo; and at Kalemie, on Lake Tanganyika. A dry 
dock at Boma is used to repair the navy's patrol craft. The service 
reportedly has only a few vessels that can operate for short periods 
in the ocean. Its inventory includes small numbers of Chinese-made 



302 



National Security 



fast patrol craft (inshore) as well as three ex-North Korean torpe- 
do boats, without torpedo tubes, which are normally only margin- 
ally operational (see table 17, Appendix). In addition, two United 
States-made coastal patrol craft, along with as many as eighteen 
French-built patrol craft, patrol the lakes and rivers (although their 
operational status is uncertain). Naval personnel receive basic train- 
ing at the Banana Naval Base but in the past generally went to 
the United States, France, or Belgium for intermediate and ad- 
vanced training. 

Air Force 

The air force consists of approximately 1 ,800 personnel and pro- 
vides close air support, aerial reconnaissance, and transport sup- 
port for the other services. To accomplish this mission, the air force 
is organized into one fighter squadron, one counterinsurgency 
squadron, one transport wing, one helicopter squadron, and a train- 
ing element. 

The air force has had little opportunity to demonstrate its capa- 
bility; however, during the 1977 Shaba invasion, the air force's 
combat performance was reportedly no better than the army's. 
Western observers reported that Zairian pilots flying Italian train- 
ers as fighter-bombers were particularly ineffective; their muni- 
tions usually landed harmlessly wide of the targets. During Shaba 
II, the FLNC destroyed four Aermachi MB-326K counterinsur- 
gency aircraft, one Alouette helicopter, and an SA-330 Puma 
helicopter on the ground when its forces captured the airport at 
Kolwezi. The Zairians attempted to use their Mirage jets against 
the rebels, but to little effect. More recently, four Zairian air force 
pilots died when their jets collided in mid-air while returning from 
military exercises at Kamina in 1988. 

Several factors have affected air force capability. Pilots are often 
inadequately trained to fly their aircraft; even when trained, funding 
is normally insufficient to provide an adequate number of flying 
hours for the pilots to maintain their proficiency. And because of 
poor maintenance over 75 percent of the aircraft are often non- 
deployable. The air force's major equipment includes Mirage 
ground attack fighters; assorted counterinsurgency aircraft; a variety 
of transport aircraft; military helicopters; liaison aircraft; and train- 
ing aircraft (see table 18, Appendix). Future military requirements 
include additional transports and spare parts. 

National Gendarmerie 

In August 1972, the National Police was dissolved, and its func- 
tions were transferred to the National Gendarmerie (Gendarmerie 



303 



Zaire: A Country Study 

Nationale). In addition, oversight of the police was transferred from 
the Ministry of Interior to the defense portfolio. The 21,000-mem- 
ber gendarmerie functions primarily as a police force, but it also 
has a paramilitary mission, to form the first line of defense against 
an external threat (see Development of a National Police Force, 
this ch.). The 1972 transfer of oversight concentrated additional 
power in the hands of President Mobutu, while weakening the law 
enforcement role of municipal leaders at the local level who had 
previously exercised authority over a police detachment but now 
had to turn to local military commanders, who were often unrespon- 
sive, for assistance. 

To accomplish its divergent missions, the gendarmerie is or- 
ganized into two forces: a territorial force, the Territorial Gendar- 
merie (Gendarmerie Territoriale — GT) and a mobile force, the 
Mobile Gendarmerie (Gendarmerie Mobile — GM). The GT func- 
tions as the police component and the GM as a paramilitary or- 
ganization. The gendarmerie is commanded by a chief of staff, who 
reports to the head of the FAZ and the minister of defense and 
veterans' affairs. 

The gendarmerie is lightly armed with individual weapons and 
machine guns and is transported in jeeps and trucks. Although most 
of this equipment is often in disrepair, gendarmerie units in some 
parts of the country are better equipped than army units, which 
often have to borrow gendarmerie equipment to train or deploy. 
Nevertheless, the gendarmerie is normally not as well trained as 
army units and even less capable. 

Armed Forces Manpower and Training 

Recruitment and Retention 

Military service in Zaire is voluntary, although the constitution 
does provide for conscription in the event of a national emergen- 
cy. Zaire has a fairly large population in relation to the size of its 
military. For example, 1993 estimates indicated that Zaire had a 
potential military manpower pool (males fifteen to forty-nine years 
of age) of 8.9 million, about half of whom are fit for military ser- 
vice. Although this pool is in theory adequate to ensure a suffi- 
cient number of recruits, the FAZ has had problems attracting 
enough qualified personnel and retaining them in service. A major 
deficiency in this respect is that the FAZ has no formal recruiting 
organization, and prospective recruits often have to go out of their 
way to enter the military. Moreover, the service conditions inhibit 
many young people from electing to serve in the military and often 
make it difficult for the FAZ to convince them to make the service 



304 



Prior to the 1990s, some 
Zairian officers received 
United States military training, 
including the air force 
major (top left), 
army captain (top right), 
and army second lieutenant 
(bottom right) pictured here. 
Courtesy United States 
Department of Defense 



Zaire: A Country Study 

a career. The people who remain in the military are often not the 
best and most motivated soldiers, but rather those who have no 
alternative or are in a favorable position because of their ethnic 
affiliations. 

An interesting aspect of Zairian military life is the fairly signifi- 
cant presence of women, both in enlisted and officer ranks. Although 
most enlisted women have insignificant roles and often owe their 
rank to sexual favors provided to senior officers, Zairian female 
officers usually perform legitimate roles in the military, in both 
command and staff positions. In 1987 three female captains gradu- 
ated from the Command and Staff School, one of them among the 
top ten graduates. That result represented the first time women 
had attended and graduated from this elite institution and could 
signal the advancement of these women to field-grade ranks. 

Conditions of Service 

The conditions of service for most Zairian soldiers and officers 
are dismal. Even before the chaotic years of the early 1990s, in 
which the bankrupt government did not pay most troops regular- 
ly if at all, inadequate and irregular pay for the majority of per- 
sonnel meant that they must have some outside source of income. 
Such income could come from a variety of interests, ranging from 
legitimate business enterprises to stealing and reselling government 
supplies and equipment. Such practices had an obvious negative 
effect on soldiers' morale and motivation but also seriously affect- 
ed capability and readiness by forcing soldiers to spend much of 
their duty day attempting to make ends meet. As a result, train- 
ing and other service-related matters assumed second priority. 

In the early 1990s, most military units (except for the elite DSP) 
were paid so infrequently, and when paid were paid with worth- 
less zaires, that they felt compelled to loot to survive. Aside from 
the two major military looting rampages in September 1991 and 
January- February 1993, smaller-scale banditry and looting con- 
tinued routinely, both in Kinshasa and in other regions. In addi- 
tion, military personnel often resorted to extorting money from the 
citizenry or made private arrangements with local and foreign busi- 
nesses, who paid them to act as private guards. 

In the past, the situation for some mid- and senior-level officers 
tended to be better. Starting with the rank of major or lieutenant 
colonel, some Zairian officers were able to secure outside sources 
of income, which permitted them to support their families. By the 
time an officer became a colonel, he had usually guaranteed him- 
self an adequate income through involvement in business by ex- 
ploiting his military position. 



306 



National Security 



General officers traditionally were in the best financial position 
by far of all Zairian military personnel. First, they could profit from 
their duty assignments by skimming funds intended for the sol- 
diers in their organizations, but they were also well placed to capital- 
ize on contacts they made to establish business connections. For 
example, a former air force chief of staff was reportedly one of the 
wealthiest and shrewdest businessmen in Zaire. Even while he was 
chief of staff, he owned several companies, many of which did 
business with the air force and other government agencies. All these 
business interests, however, left little time to run the air force, which 
reflected this neglect. 

Aside from pay, other conditions of service are also deplorable. 
Zairian units rarely are fed two meals a day, with most only fed 
once. In the past, the presence of foreign advisers often served to 
improve this situation somewhat. For example, at the Belgian-run 
Senior Military Schools Group, Zairian personnel received three 
meals daily, which was, however, exceptional. Many other benefits 
designed to offset low salaries either do not exist or are sporadic. 
Free medical care, for example, often depends on the presence of 
foreign advisers, and free medicine, although authorized, is rare- 
ly available. Housing is also usually inadequate to meet the basic 
needs of the soldiers. Most enlisted personnel are forced to live in 
squalor, and the situation, even for company-grade officers, is often 
not much better. 

Military Schools 

Military schools traditionally played an important role in Zaire's 
military, both as a means to provide assistance to other African 
countries and to train its own officers. The FAZ has the usual com- 
plement of military schools, such as the Officers Basic Training 
Course at Kananga (formerly Luluabourg), the Naval Officers Basic 
Course at Banana, the Armor Training School at Mbanza-Ngungu, 
and a variety of other basic and specialty schools. Two schools in 
particular stand out. The Command and Staff School is a course 
taught at the Senior Military Schools Group in Kinshasa. In the 
past, Belgian instructors, with limited Zairian assistance, conducted 
the course, which was designed to prepare senior company- grade 
officers to perform duties as battalion commanders and to func- 
tion as staff officers at battalion level and higher. Although austere 
by Western standards, the training conducted in this course was 
professional, thorough, and accomplished its stated objectives. 

The Commando Training Center at Kotakoli, in northern Kasai- 
Occidental, also did an excellent job of training personnel to conduct 
basic commando operations. Again, Belgian personnel supervised 



307 



Zaire: A Country Study 

the majority of the training, which was divided into two programs. 
The first prepared personnel to serve as instructors at the school. 
This course was intensive, thoroughly trained personnel in individu- 
al survival and special operations skills, and at this level was equal 
to most Western schools of this sort. A second, abbreviated program 
trained units in commando operations. This instruction was shorter 
and less intense than the longer course. A significant shortcom- 
ing of the short course was that although it more than adequately 
trained personnel in individual skills, it offered no instruction in 
small-unit tactics. 

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia 

The uniforms and rank structure of the FAZ bear the mark of 
Belgian influence but also show evidence of long United States and 
French involvement with Zaire. Soldiers often wear fatigue uni- 
forms, solid green in color or in a camouflage pattern. While dressed 
in fatigues, army personnel wear berets, the color of which denotes 
the branch of service. Personnel also wear combat boots and web 
or cartridge belts with this uniform. 

Service uniforms are similar to those worn in the United States 
and several other countries. Army personnel wear a dark green 
uniform, the air force a light blue, the navy a dark blue, and the 
gendarmerie a forest green. Service uniforms are high collared and 
worn with visored caps, scarves rather than neckties, and low- 
quarter shoes. Officer rank insignia are worn on shoulder boards, 
enlisted rank insignia on the upper-left sleeve (see fig. 12; fig. 13). 

Foreign Military Relations 
Foreign Influences 

In the years since independence, Zaire has benefited from a var- 
iety of foreign military assistance. President Mobutu was adept at 
playing one country against the other to gain increased aid. 
Nevertheless, by the early 1990s, Zaire was receiving less foreign 
assistance as Mobutu's hold on power became increasingly precar- 
ious. In addition, the end of the Cold War superpower competi- 
tion was accompanied by a decrease in superpower involvement 
and interest in African affairs and thus in willingness to provide 
military aid to the region. 

Belgian influence predominated within the ANC after indepen- 
dence. All the arms and equipment with which the new Congolese 
force began its existence were of Belgian origin, as were the train- 
ing, organization, and military doctrine. During the early indepen- 
dence period, however, other Western influences became more 



308 



National Security 



important. After the withdrawal of UN forces in June 1964, the 
Congo established bilateral military assistance relationships with 
Belgium, the United States, Italy, Israel, and Britain. Much of 
the aid provided by these countries was in the form of grants, but 
some assistance was also provided by military technicians and ad- 
visers. The Congo's Western allies also made advanced and special- 
ized training available to Congolese military personnel. 

By the late 1960s, military assistance fit a pattern that continued 
into the early 1990s with slight modifications. Belgium directed its 
aid primarily to ground forces and military schools; Israel trained 
airborne personnel; Italy worked with the air force; and the Unit- 
ed States provided logistics support. Subsequently, France replaced 
Israel for airborne training and Italy for the air force. 

During the 1970s, China and the Democratic People's Repub- 
lic of Korea (DPRK — North Korea) also began cooperation and 
training relationships with the FAZ. In the 1980s, China provid- 
ed military equipment and spare parts to Zaire, assisted in repair- 
ing and maintaining Chinese-built T-62 medium main battle tanks 
and other armored vehicles, and maintained the navy's Chinese- 
built fast patrol craft. A Chinese military delegation arrived in Zaire 
in February 1990 to assess the work of Chinese advisers who had 
spent several years training soldiers of the 41st Commando Brigade, 
a rapid intervention unit of the FAZ in Kisangani. The North 
Koreans, who once maintained a 400-member mission in Kinsha- 
sa, withdrew during the mid-1970s, but military cooperation re- 
sumed in 1985 with the training of the Kamanyola Division. In 
October 1990, Zaire and North Korea discussed the possibility of 
upgrading the military cooperation between the two countries. 

In late 1991, unconfirmed reports circulated that South Africa 
had undertaken the training of Zairian troops. Fifteen South Afri- 
can military instructors reportedly were in Zaire, at a military base 
near Kitona in Shaba. Some reports also suggested that South Afri- 
cans were helping establish special units intended to harass Mobu- 
tu's political opponents. 

By 1992 foreign military training relationships with Zaire's major 
allies had largely dissolved because of the country's deteriorating 
political situation. In the 1980s, Belgium had provided advisers 
to the 21st Infantry Brigade and ran the Officers Basic Training 
Course, the Command and Staff School, the Naval Officers Basic 
Course, and a variety of other schools. But by mid- 1990, relations 
between the two countries had broken down over the Zairian 
government's human rights abuses, and by late 1990, there were 
no longer any formal military training relationships between Bel- 
gium and Zaire. 



309 



Zaire: A Country Study 



GENERAL 
D'ARMEE 

f! 


■* 

oc 
z 

UJ 

e> 


GENERAL 
D'ARMEE 
AERIENNE 


111 


II 


§ l 

<E 
oc s 


llll 


li 


ui 

°i 1 

Zq. — — 1 

sg 

u 


1*! 

zee 
1— z 

=>LU 

UJO 


GENERAL DE 
CORPS D'ARMEE 
AERIENNE 


til 


ill 
1 P 


< 

OC 

s 
< 


llll 


1! 


GENERAL DE 
DIVISION 


op= 
<z 

2 S 


GENERAL DE 
DIVISION 
AERIENNE 


111 


hi 


< 

oc 

s 
< 

> 


llll 


REAR ADMIRAL 
UPPER HALF 


UJ 

o uj . 

si # 

:gs v — 1 

o 


ty < 

O0C 
< UJ 

esz 


GENERAL DE 
BRIGADE 
AERIENNE 




1 yd < 

1 Q DC 

1 3g 
1 g« 


UJ —1 

oc< 

1- oc 

li 


11 


REAR ADMIRAL 
LOWER HALF 


—J 

I (#@>@>@> 

o ^— 

o 


z 

o 

o 
o 


UJ 

z 

o 

o 
u 


llll 


II 


UJ 

28 

CJ 


mi 


If 


5-J -, 

LU o 


Z —1 
< UJ 

zz 
uj O 

:5o 

uj o 


Z_l 

II 

po 


Mil 


l« 


|S 

£1 


llll 


II 


£ V - __ 


OC 

O 
< 


oc 
o 
< 
s 


Ml 




UJ 

< > 

t-cc 
E O 
<o 

O UJ 

Q 


till 


LIEUTENANT 
COMMANDER 


UJ 

i (5 ■ 

tt. V_ '¥» 

< - J 

O 


Z 
< 

Q- 
«t 

O 


z 
< 

EE 
< 
u 


H 




Z 3 
< < 

Z ,,. UJ 

uj yd co 

i-°co 

3 I 
—i 


mi 


II 




z 
< 
t-z 

COLLI 
^ LU 


< 
z 

UJ 

_■ 


11 


1 1 


ENSEIGNE DE 

VAISSEAU 
1ERE CLASSE 


VII 


LIEUTENANT 
JUNIOR GRADE 




Z 
< 

CM J±l 

LU 


z 

UJ 


11 


H 


ENSEIGNE DE 

VAISSEAU 
2EME CLASSE 




It 


li i 

a« < 


< UJ 
DC -1 
. h- 

« F 

Z) 


ii 

< oc 

N 


UJ 

< O 

LL 


^ CO 
< LU 
DC -1 

zi 


U 
< oc 

N 


>■ 
> 
< 

z 


< LU 
QC _J 
. 1- 
«? H 
3 



310 



National Security 




Zaire: A Country Study 

The French had trained and advised the 3 1 st Airborne Brigade 
and the 3 2d Airborne Brigade, ran an inter- African armor train- 
ing course, and provided technical assistance to the air force. In 
early 1989, Zaire ordered French military materiel, including twelve 
VAB armored personnel carriers and thirteen rebuilt AMX-13 light 
tanks. But by 1992, France had ended aid to Zaire. 

Israel provided military training in the form of advisers, instruc- 
tors, and technicians, and some Zairian military personnel trained 
in Israel. In a 1983 five-year agreement, Israel was entrusted with 
restructuring and upgrading the military capability of the Zairian 
armed forces and began training and equipping the newly formed 
DSP. Israel also provided Zaire with weapons systems, including 
small arms. The status of Israeli military assistance in the 1990s 
was uncertain. 

The United States had long provided Zaire with military as- 
sistance and grants, technical and training support, repair and 
maintenance of United States- supplied equipment, spare parts, as 
well as weapons. Between 1960 and 1991, Zaire reportedly received 
an estimated US$38.2 million in grants under the United States 
Military Assistance Program (MAP), an additional US$18.2 mil- 
lion under the United States International Military Education and 
Training (IMET) program (1,356 Zairian students were trained 
under this program), and US$144.7 million in Foreign Military 
Sales (FMS) agreements (US$132.7 million of that amount was 
in the form of Foreign Military Sales deliveries). Payment was 
waived for US$135.5 million of the FMS agreements. A number 
of joint American- Zairian military exercises were conducted in the 
late 1980s, according to published reports. However, in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, American military assistance was increas- 
ingly threatened by congressional opposition to the Zairian govern- 
ment's violations of human rights, as well as widespread corruption 
and maladministration. As a consequence of the worsening repres- 
sion in Zaire, in November 1990 the United States announced that 
it had decided to terminate all military and economic aid (except 
humanitarian aid) to Kinshasa. 

Zaire and Egypt entered into a military pact in February 1980. 
Egyptian military instructors trained the Zairian Civil Guard, as 
well as units of the FAZ, and Egypt provided Zaire with Fahd ar- 
mored personnel carriers and other Egyptian-manufactured mili- 
tary equipment. The status of this relationship in the early 1990s 
was, however, unclear. 

Zaire as a Military Aid Donor 

In addition to receiving military assistance from numerous 



312 



National Security 



countries, Zaire aided other African countries, often in support of 
Western interests. Zaire's relationship with Chad was preeminent 
in this respect. In 1983 President Mobutu sent approximately 3,000 
troops to Chad to help Chadian president Hissein Habre stop a 
Libyan-backed rebel offensive. France and the United States also 
aided Habre. Several Chadian commando battalions were trained 
at the Zairian Commando Training Center, and Chadian officers 
trained at Zaire's Armor Training School. In September 1986, 
Zaire sent two airborne companies to Togo to help Togolese presi- 
dent Gnassingbe Eyadema stabilize his capital city after an attempt- 
ed coup, and in late 1990 Mobutu sent elements of the DSP to 
help neighboring Rwanda fight an insurgency. Zaire also provid- 
ed training at its Armor Training School for students from several 
other African countries. 

Public Order and Internal Security 

In the early postindependence days, the new nation was beset 
by regional and tribal factionalism, tremendous violence, chaos, 
and repression. After Mobutu's 1965 coup d'etat, this unstable sit- 
uation provided an excuse for the steady growth and entrenchment 
of Mobutu's personal authority. Yet in spite of the buildup of a 
massive, centrally controlled internal security apparatus, political 
and social dissent persisted. Moreover, this apparatus was itself 
responsible for exacerbating much of the public disorder that charac- 
terized modern Zaire. 

As of 1993, no official statistics on crime had been published 
since 1959. Although general law and order and supremacy of cen- 
tral authority were largely restored under Mobutu, the incidence 
of crimes against persons has been consistently high, especially when 
general economic conditions deteriorate. Theft, robbery, mur- 
der, and rape have become increasingly common in and around 
the country's urban centers and along its main transportation 
routes, making travel dangerous. The police and security forces 
themselves commit many of these acts and frequently participate 
in armed banditry. Furthermore, both their ability and desire to 
protect the citizenry from common criminals are slight. In the early 
1990s, crime was described as endemic in many areas of the coun- 
try, including Kinshasa and both Nord-Kivu and Shaba, where 
ethnic violence was widespread. 

Prior to the 1990s, public protest and civil unrest occurred peri- 
odically, although the events were usually localized and were 
on nowhere near the scale of 1960-65 (see Opposition to the Re- 
gime prior to 1990, ch. 4). The roots of such activity lay typi- 
cally in economic hardships but were also sometimes sparked by 



313 



Zaire: A Country Study 

overzealousness or impropriety on the part of the security forces. 
The regime's response was usually harsh and violent in discouraging 
more widespread protest. University students and teachers were 
among the more frequent demonstrators. In February 1989, for 
example, students in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi went on strike to 
protest IMF-inspired austerity measures and inadequate and cosdy 
transportation. The universities were temporarily closed and army 
units quickly sent in to quell the disturbances. In the process, several 
students were killed and others wounded. However, the episode 
was brought to an effective close only after President Mobutu had 
agreed to reduce the students' bus fares and had announced the 
initiation of court martial proceedings against the officers and troops 
responsible for the killing. In May 1990, students at Lubumbashi 
were killed by the DSP in an action widely characterized as a 
massacre. 

Political resistance to the one-party regime was also accompa- 
nied by sporadic guerrilla activity. Guerrilla resistance centered 
on the activities of several insurgent groups. For example, on 
November 12, 1984, some 200 rebels belonging to the People's 
Revolutionary Party (Parti Revolutionnaire du Peuple — PRP), a 
force that had operated for years in the' rugged mountains near 
Lake Tanganyika, temporarily seized and occupied Moba, a town 
on the shores of Lake Tanganyika. Elements of the 31st Airborne 
Brigade recaptured the town two days later. Again in 1985, the 
PRP briefly occupied Moba on June 17, but its forces were quickly 
dislodged. Although Moba possessed no strategic importance, its 
capture had significant psychological importance. It demonstrated 
that the Zairian government was still unable to exercise effective 
control over portions of the country. Even more important, the 
Moba incidents vividly demonstrated the incompetence of the front- 
line Zairian units stationed in the interior, notwithstanding the 31st 
Airborne Brigade's recapture of the town. The PRP was officially 
registered as an opposition party in late 1990. 

Another organization, the Congolese Liberation Party (Parti de 
Liberation Congolaise — PLC), also officially registered in late 1990, 
operated in northern Zaire during the mid-1980s. The PLC, formed 
in 1984 with the stated purpose of toppling the Zairian govern- 
ment, operated primarily out of bases in the Ruwenzori Moun- 
tains along the Zaire-Uganda border. It staged numerous attacks 
on towns, government forces, and installations along the Zairian 
side of the border. Although the PLC was unable to take and hold 
any terrain and posed no serious threat to the Kinshasa regime, 
the rebels demonstrated the government's lack of control of this 
area. 



314 



National Security 



In the ostensibly multiparty era of the Third Republic in the 
early 1990s, opposition activity proliferated. The creation of po- 
litical parties was tolerated for the most part (except for blatantly 
ethnic groupings), but military and security forces continued to 
suppress demonstrations, often with violent results. 

The Civil Security Apparatus 

In the early 1990s, Zaire had two so-called forces of order (forces 
de Vordre) above the local level: the National Gendarmerie and the 
Civil Guard. In addition, several intelligence and security forces 
operated in support of the Mobutu regime. Their personnel ar- 
bitrarily arrest and imprison Zairians, although such responsibili- 
ties are not officially within their purview. Far from ensuring order, 
Zaire's forces of order and security forces have contributed to the 
disorder and lawlessness prevailing in the early 1990s. At his be- 
hest, security forces loyal to Mobutu — especially the Civil Guard, 
which reportedly was paid more regularly than most other units — 
continued to harass the populace and the transitional government. 
In addition, individual officials continued to prey on the populace, 
extorting money and meting out arbitrary punishment. 

Development of a National Police Force 

The development of police forces in Zaire has been anything but 
a steady, continuous process. Those elements that perform the police 
function in contemporary Zaire descend from a variety of colonial 
and postcolonial structures that have been reorganized, renamed, 
absorbed by other services, or disbanded altogether. Police duties 
are assigned to both military and civilian security organizations, 
often simultaneously, and have undergone alternating periods of 
centralization, decentralization, and transfer of authority. In all 
cases, however, the performance of the police has been mediocre 
at best and, at worst, completely dysfunctional and occasionally 
criminal. 

From its founding in 1888, the Force Publique fulfilled the ba- 
sic functions of both a police force and an army. This dual role 
caused tension within the organization and was a major factor in 
its poor discipline and lack of effectiveness. Because of the require- 
ment to act as a police force, members of the colonial army were 
dispersed throughout the country, where they normally came un- 
der the control of local civilian administrators. 

This dual role continued virtually unchanged until shortly after 
World War I, when the Belgian administration reorganized the force 
into two organizations: Garrison Troops and Territorial Service 
Troops. The Garrison Troops were intended to serve as a military 



315 



Zaire: A Country Study 

force oriented against an external threat, while the Territorial Ser- 
vice Troops assumed the role of a gendarmerie or police force. 
Although the Territorial Service Troops remained an integral part 
of the Force Publique and could revert to the control of the com- 
mander, elements were deployed throughout the country under the 
operational control of the territorial administrators. Although this 
change theoretically created two distinct organizations, the sepa- 
ration of powers was not routinely applied. Garrison Troops gradu- 
ally came under the control of the civilian administration and acted 
like a police force. In 1959 the Territorial Service Troops were 
redesignated as gendarmes, although their duties and responsibil- 
ities remained essentially unchanged. A year later, most of the gen- 
darmes were incorporated into the ANC, totaling 6,000, out of a 
25,000-member force. The remaining gendarmerie was a small, 
mostly rural police force. 

In addition to the Territorial Service Troops, two other police 
forces existed during the colonial period. The Chiefs Police, a rural 
force based in the local territories, maintained order and also func- 
tioned as messengers, jailers, and court attendants. This force served 
under the local chiefs and had no regional or national command 
structure. Although its members wore uniforms and maintained 
internal order, they did not carry weapons and received litde train- 
ing. At independence, this force totaled approximately 10,000 per- 
sonnel. 

The Territorial Police was a more structured organization, num- 
bering between 6,000 and 9,000 personnel at independence. Creat- 
ed in 1926 and placed under Belgian administrators, this force 
performed numerous functions including maintaining order, run- 
ning prisons, and guarding public buildings, as well as reinforcing 
the Chiefs Police. After independence, each province maintained 
its own force, which was officered by former Belgian policemen. 
In some cases, during the immediate postindependence period, these 
forces became, in effect, private armies. 

The chaos of the immediate postindependence period, along with 
the departure of the experienced officer corps, precipitated the dis- 
integration of the constabulary forces. The UN restored a sem- 
blance of order, but the central government faced a long and tedious 
task of rebuilding its security forces. During the next four years, 
UN personnel and other foreign advisers instituted training pro- 
grams in an effort to rehabilitate the police. Nigerian detachments 
established on-the-job training programs, and a limited number 
of Belgian police returned as advisers. The United States also in- 
itiated a broad assistance program to provide specialized training, 
arms, and equipment. 



316 



National Security 



Rebellions continuing into the mid-1960s complicated the task 
of restoring coherence to police organizations. The increase in the 
number of provinces from six to twenty-one also exacerbated this 
process. As each new provincette achieved control of its provincial 
police force, it inflated its size, and these organizations began to 
resemble provincial armies. Mobutu's assumption of power in 1965 
ended this trend, however. In December 1966, Mobutu removed 
the police from provincial control, standardized police organiza- 
tion and equipment, and centralized control under the Ministry 
of Interior (Ministry of Interior and Security in 1993). The 1966 
law establishing the National Police gave it responsibility for regular 
police functions in both urban and rural areas. This new force, 
with an authorized strength of 25,000, absorbed many personnel 
from the overgrown provincial forces, while politically unreliable 
or undesirable elements were largely culled. 

The reorganization was effective in reducing local paramilitary 
threats to the regime's authority, but it did not significantly im- 
prove the performance of basic police functions. Furthermore, the 
deployment of the National Police was limited, for the most part, 
to urban centers, with the responsibility for internal security and 
public order in the rural areas resting chiefly with the still extant 
gendarmes of the ANC. 

National Gendarmerie 

On August 1, 1972, President Mobutu dissolved the National 
Police and merged it with the largely rural gendarmerie into a sin- 
gle force, the National Gendarmerie. This move significantly in- 
creased the size of the national police force and made it an 
institutionally distinct component of the FAZ, hierarchically equiva- 
lent to the other services. By transferring the national police force 
from the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Defense (Ministry 
of Defense and Veterans' Affairs in 1993), Mobutu brought the 
police under his direct control. Key personnel from the police force 
were retained, and others were mustered out. Despite this reor- 
ganization, a large number of the local, or collectivity police, re- 
mained outside the national government's control, possibly totaling 
between 25,000 and 30,000. 

Military authorities, rather than local civilian administrators, 
normally approve all significant deployments, including those re- 
quired to perform typically civil police duties. This arrangement, 
combined with the National Gendarmerie's relatively poor train- 
ing, discipline, and equipment, sorely limits the organization's capa- 
bility to function as an effective police force. Furthermore, the 
typical gendarme is grossly underpaid, if he is paid at all, and so 



317 



Zaire: A Country Study 



often uses his position to extort resources from the very people he 
is charged with protecting. As a result, the gendarmerie has con- 
tributed little to the maintenance of law and order in Zaire. 

In August 1993, the chief of staff of the gendarmerie, on the twen- 
tieth anniversary of its founding, gave a speech in which he noted 
that the nation's roads are insecure because of widespread ban- 
ditry, much of it perpetrated by gendarmerie personnel. He also 
acknowledged that members of the gendarmerie are involved in 
murder, the illegal possession of weapons, extortion, and armed 
robbery. 

The Civil Guard 

In part as an effort to improve the state's performance of the 
police function, and in part as a redistribution of power and in- 
fluence, in 1984 Mobutu once again decentralized police powers 
and created a national civilian police organization, known as the 
Civil Guard (Garde Civile), to perform normal civilian police duties, 
as well as customs and border control. The guard's precise name 
is the General Elite Peace Force. The guard, trained and equipped 
by the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and Egypt, 
appeared initially as if it might provide more effective and ration- 
al law enforcement than that which had been provided by the gen- 
darmerie. However, it too has suffered, among other things, from 
insufficient pay and is just as ineffective and feared by the citizen- 
ry as the National Gendarmerie. Nevertheless, in the early 1990s 
the Civil Guard was regarded as loyal to Mobutu. In conjunction 
with the elite DSP, it was deployed to harass the opposition and 
transitional government on Mobutu's behalf and was generally 
paid — or at least paid more regularly than ordinary military and 
security units. 

Although the Civil Guard was designated to take primary respon- 
sibility for police matters in Zaire, it probably had no more than 
10,000 personnel in its ranks in the early 1990s, and its deploy- 
ment was limited largely to the country's urban centers. The Na- 
tional Gendarmerie was still the prominent organization in rural 
areas and a competitor for dominance in most urban areas as well. 

Local Police 

At the local level, a large number of unarmed, untrained, and 
locally recruited Zairians still perform basic police tasks in sup- 
port of local authorities. Their numbers totaled nearly 30,000 in 
1993, according to some sources. Nevertheless, some local areas 
had virtually no police left because they lacked funding to pay them. 
Where police were present, their local activities typically were not 



318 



National Security 



coordinated with the national police elements, and they probably 
were neither capable of nor motivated to support national or region- 
al security objectives. 

Local and regional authorities have the power to arrest and im- 
pose fines, and in many cases they exercise these powers with the 
help of local police. But local police are underpaid (if they are paid 
at all) and tend to extort their living from the citizens. 

The Intelligence Apparatus and Security Forces 

In the tense and authoritarian climate prevailing in modern Zaire, 
intelligence and security agencies have provided President Mobutu 
with much of his support. All Zairian security organizations main- 
tain their own prisons, networks of informers, and resources, much 
of the latter being the product of extortions and theft. 

The Surete Nationale, a small, special-purpose police and in- 
vestigative unit originally established by the Belgian colonial ad- 
ministration, continued after independence and was responsible 
for several diverse functions in the national security field. Prior 
to independence, the Surete 's mission was to protect state security 
by controlling immigration, supervising resident aliens, and pro- 
tecting key government leaders. Shortly after independence, the 
Surete came under the Ministry of Interior, but by mid- 1961, the 
first director, Victor Nendaka, had turned it into a semiautono- 
mous organization under his personal control. President Mobutu 
soon took steps to eliminate Nendaka as a power broker, however. 

In 1969 the Surete became the National Documentation Center 
(Centre National de Documentation — CND). During the next few 
years, Mobutu played ' 'musical chairs" with the directorship of 
this organization, as he attempted to maintain close personal con- 
trol. During the early 1970s, the CND was reorganized into inter- 
nal and external sections, and its agents reportedly had wide latitude 
in arresting, interrogating, and detaining people they considered 
a threat. Thereafter, Mobutu continually sought to improve his 
personal control over the intelligence apparatus and instituted sever- 
al more reorganizations. In the early 1980s, the service gained the 
new title of National Documentation Agency (Agence Nationale 
de Documentation — AND). The national security service was re- 
named the National Service for Intelligence and Protection (Ser- 
vice National d' Intelligence et de Protection — SNIP) in August 
1990. 

The SNIP has separate branches for internal and external intel- 
ligence functions, with the internal role receiving a substantially 
higher priority. It is Zaire's primary intelligence service and, as 
such, provides liaison with foreign services. Although there is no 



319 



Zaire: A Country Study 

information available to clarify further the organization or personnel 
strength of the SNIP, it almost certainly consists of a relatively small 
corps of agents who gain their information through a widespread 
network of informers and from other arms of the state apparatus. 
The SNIP communicates directly with the president. Its agents do 
not report to the local or regional administrators, nor are they sub- 
ject to their authority. Indeed, other arms of state power such as 
the military and police forces are prime targets for surveillance. 

In addition to gathering intelligence and conducting surveillance, 
the SNIP exercises almost unchecked powers of arrest, imprison- 
ment, and interrogation. It has used these powers to intimidate 
individuals or groups posing a real or imagined challenge to the 
regime's authority. In the 1980s and 1990s, it played an impor- 
tant role in repressing political activists. In the past, the SNIP also 
had foreign agents operating in Europe to infiltrate anti-Mobutu 
exile groups. As with the other elements of the internal security 
apparatus, abuses are widespread and personal aggrandizement 
a primary motivator. It has been reported that the security ser- 
vices have engaged in extensive looting and plundering in the early 
1990s. 

The intelligence service is heavily politicized. Its assessments are 
not thought to be highly reliable, but it has been an effective if 
ruthless intimidator of potential opposition groups. 

As well as the usual military intelligence roles, the intelligence 
arm of the FAZ, the Military Intelligence and Security Service 
(Service d 'Action et de Renseignements Militaire — SARM), is 
tasked with internal surveillance and intelligence gathering on the 
general population as well as members of the armed forces them- 
selves. It has not enjoyed nearly the prominence or freedom of ac- 
tion of its civilian counterpart, but it does possess a fairly sizeable 
and widespread network of informants among Zaire's soldiers, 
sailors, and airmen. 

Other internal security agencies include the National Immigra- 
tion Agency, which is responsible for border security, and in 1990 
it was reported that a secret special operations force had been es- 
tablished within the security services to carry out abductions and 
other types of intimidation against political dissidents. The unit was 
popularly known as Les Hiboux (The Owls), which is also a name 
of a DSP subunit providing protection to Mobutu, but the existence 
of the force within the National Immigration Agency was not offi- 
cially acknowledged by the government. There are additional intelli- 
gence units within the Civil Guard and the National Gendarmerie. 

President Mobutu has also relied on various personally estab- 
lished networks to provide him with alternative intelligence and 



320 



National Security 



assessments that he can then fuse with information he receives from 
the official services. These operatives can also be used to spy on 
the services themselves. Little is known of these networks, but in 
the past they were reported to be large and well funded, given the 
president's tremendous personal wealth and unusual access to the 
Zairian treasury (see Patrimonial Politics and Corruption, ch. 3). 

The Party Security Apparatus 

Any discussion of Zaire's civil security apparatus would be in- 
complete without considering the Youth of the Popular Movement 
of the Revolution (Jeunesse du Mouvement Populaire de la 
Revolution — JMPR) and its disciplinary arm, the Corps of Ac- 
tivists for the Defense of the Revolution (Corps des Activistes pour 
la Defense de la Revolution— C ADR). Although the JMPR was 
a spin-off of Zaire's single, ruling political party (until the legali- 
zation of multiple parties in the early 1990s), it played a role in 
state security, limited, however, by the poor quality of its person- 
nel, who were typically unemployed youths. The JMPR's main 
tasks were maintaining party discipline and vigilance and provid- 
ing information to the state. JMPR directors had arrest powers, 
which CADR members also exercised from time to time. CADR 
members could act alone or in support of local operations by the 
gendarmerie or Civil Guard. Municipal administrators sometimes 
called on CADR elements to perform in place of the often unrespon- 
sive gendarmes, who were part of the FAZ. At the same time, like 
the members of Zaire's other security elements, the typically un- 
paid and untrained young men of the CADR frequently used their 
positions to extract money and other resources from the local citizen- 
ry. The total strength of the CADR was unknown, but its presence 
was widespread, and elements of some size probably existed in near- 
ly every municipal region prior to 1990. 

Popular Attitudes Toward the Civil Security Apparatus 

Given the predilection of the various internal security and police 
elements for preying upon citizens they are charged with protect- 
ing and their often negligible contribution to law and order, it is 
no wonder that Zairians hold them in low esteem, viewing them 
as no better than common bandits and thieves. Citizens fear to 
challenge their authority directly, although there have been numer- 
ous demonstrations and rioting against the Mobutu regime in the 
early 1990s. Extreme abuses by security forces also have resulted 
in occasional violent reprisals by angry villagers, especially against 
unarmed or poorly armed police elements. It is not apparent that 
any one service is uniformly more disliked than another. Indeed, 



321 



Zaire: A Country Study 

the formal distinctions among them are often not readily apparent 
to the common citizen because of the lack of uniforms and the ten- 
dency of personnel engaged in illicit acts to misidentify themselves. 
The relationship is further complicated by the fact that criminals 
sometimes pose as members of the official services in order to in- 
duce fear and acquiescence in their victims. 

The Legal and Penal Systems 
Criminal Law and the Penal Code 

Contemporary Zairian law still embodies most of the principles 
established during the Congo Free State and the Belgian Congo 
eras. These elements do not reflect a simple adoption of existing 
Belgian law but, rather, a unique combination of royal decrees, 
administrative and legislative ordinances, native customs, and a 
body of judicial decisions based on the above as well as "general 
principles of law equity." The various constitutions before and after 
independence for the most part recognized the continued legitimacy 
of earlier laws, except where they conflicted with more recently de- 
veloped ones. Two important trends have, however, characterized 
Zairian law during the Mobutu era. First, the official role of non- 
Western "customary" law dwindled significantly in the process 
of centralizing and personalizing authority, although local custom 
and belief can still be considered in establishing punishment. Sec- 
ond, an often confusing and ill-defined body of codes emerged as 
a result of a 1972 ordinance giving all the public statements of Presi- 
dent Mobutu the force of law. For the most part, however, these 
codes concerned only crimes against the state or the president. 

The penal code adopted by the Congo Free State in 1888 re- 
mained in force until it was finally abrogated and replaced by the 
penal code of 1940. This later code was not abandoned at indepen- 
dence but has since undergone a variety of amendments, the most 
important of which was the creation in 1 963 of a set of crimes con- 
cerning public order and state security. Unlike the penal codes of 
other French-speaking states, the nomenclature of the Zairian code 
does not distinguish among different classifications of criminal 
offenses and refers to all of them as "infractions." 

It has been on the basis of political infractions that the state has 
most often invoked the death sentence and other severe penalties. 
By contrast, it has tended to be somewhat lenient in its punish- 
ment of common criminals, preferring, at least in theory, to at- 
tempt their rehabilitation. Special consideration is typically given 
to juvenile offenders, who are often remanded to the custody of 
the family in lieu of imprisonment. 



322 



National Security 



The 1974 constitution imbued Zairian criminal law with certain 
fundamental principles, but in practice these principles are often 
violated, especially when other elements of the state apparatus are 
involved or interested. For example, although habeas corpus and 
bail do not exist, people arrested are supposed to be brought be- 
fore a magistrate within forty-eight hours of arrest. This principle 
is rarely adhered to, however. Often, those arrested (frequently 
arbitrarily to begin with) are held for months without a hearing. 
People who can afford bribes buy their way out of detention without 
ever having been formally charged. 

The Judicial System 

Nearly the entire corps of the Belgian Congo's 168 European 
magistrates departed during the exodus that occurred in 1960. Na- 
tive court clerks filled many of their positions and kept the justice 
system running, but the impact was severe and long-lasting. A fully 
functioning magistrature was never fully restored in Zaire. Magis- 
trates have suffered generally from a lack of basic legal texts and 
documents, poor facilities, and insufficient transportation and staff 
support. These inadequacies led to a magistrates' strike in 1991, 
completely paralyzing the country's judicial system. Although the 
strike ended in December of that year, litde was done to ameliorate 
the conditions giving rise to the work stoppage. 

At independence, the new republic inherited a judicial structure 
comprising a dual system of courts — those that applied so-called 
customary law and those that applied the official codes (influenced 
by Belgian law). This situation persisted until the enactment in 
1968 of a new Code of Judicial Organization and Competence that 
provided for the unification of the judiciary and the abolition of 
all customary courts. The magistrature itself was divided into dis- 
tinct branches for the prosecution and judgement of cases. However, 
many Zairian magistrates moved freely between the two areas of 
responsibility, sometimes serving as public prosecutors and at other 
times as sitting judges. 

The 1974 constitution established the national court structure 
that was, for the most part, still in existence in 1993 (see The 
Judiciary and the Courts, ch. 4). It consists, in descending order 
of importance, of the Supreme Court of Justice in Kinshasa; three 
courts of appeal in Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, and Kisangani, each 
of which has jurisdiction in several regions; a regional court in each 
of the ten regions and Kinshasa; and numerous urban and rural 
subregional tribunals with jurisdiction over trying most offenses. 
In 1987 President Mobutu also ordered the establishment of a sys- 
tem of juvenile courts, although the order did not appear to have 



323 



Zaire: A Country Study 

been fully implemented. In addition, a Court of State Security han- 
dles crimes involving national security, armed robbery, and smug- 
gling, while military courts try cases involving military personnel. 
In times of declared emergency or during military operations (such 
as in the first Moba crisis in 1984), the president can grant mili- 
tary courts jurisdiction over civilians as well. 

In theory, defendants in Zaire are provided by the constitution 
with the right to a public trial and defense counsel; indigent defen- 
dants are to be provided with court-appointed defense counsel paid 
for by the state. In addition, the right of appeal is provided in cap- 
ital cases, except for cases involving state security, armed robbery, 
and smuggling, all of which are to be adjudicated by the Court 
of State Security. There also is no appeal from military court de- 
cisions. 

In practice, however, according to various human rights reports, 
these constitutional provisions are not evenly applied. Most citizens, 
for example, are not aware of their right to legal counsel or to ap- 
peal. In any case, Zaire does not have enough lawyers to provide 
adequate counsel to defendants. 

The Zairian judiciary also lacks independence from the govern- 
ment and the presidency. Although it is a product of a colonial 
heritage of neutrality and independence, these qualities have 
diminished in a variety of ways since 1960. For example, the magis- 
trature is by no means assured freedom from executive interfer- 
ence because the constitution empowers the president to appoint 
and dismiss all judges and to promulgate law. Furthermore, prior 
to 1990, all magistrates were automatically MPR party cadres and, 
as such, were responsible for promoting national party policy. 
District administrators were actually charged with submitting an- 
nual reports on the party * 'militancy" and loyalty exhibited by the 
magistrates in their area. The result was that although judges and 
prosecutors might perform independently and without political in- 
terference in the great majority of cases, in those of a political na- 
ture, or involving other members of government, property, or labor 
disputes, they were severely limited. 

In addition, magistrates suffer from inadequate pay and are there- 
fore susceptible to bribery and corruption. As a result, trials in Zaire 
are often far from fair by objective standards. People unable to 
pay bribes are disproportionately subjected to the full rigors of the 
judicial system. 

The Prison System 

The administration of prisons is the responsibility of the Minis- 
try of Justice and Keeper of the Seals. Central prisons are located 



324 



National Security 



in the regional capitals and large urban centers, with district pris- 
ons, territorial prisons, detention centers, and informal lockups 
scattered among other towns and villages at lower administrative 
levels. In addition, some of the rural prison camps established to 
handle mass arrests and political detainees during the turbulence 
of the 1960s have occasionally been reactivated for similar purposes. 
A small number of juvenile detention centers exist, but they are 
not common, and most young offenders are released to their fami- 
ly's custody. 

Prison facilities are grossly inadequate; living conditions are harsh 
and unsanitary, and prisoners are poorly treated. The system is 
marked by severe shortages of funds, equipment (including medi- 
cine and medical facilities), food, and trained personnel. Over- 
crowding and corruption are widespread. Reports of prisoners being 
tortured, beaten to death, deprived of food and water, or dying 
of starvation are common. Prison officials and guards typically steal 
from the often meager provisions of food and supplies available, 
and many prisoners are wholly dependent on family and friends 
for their survival. In 1993 there were reports that there was little 
food for inmates at the central prison in Kinshasa; the Red Cross 
was supplying some food to supplement the meager rations. 

An 1 1 inspector corps" was formed by the government in 1987 
to oversee prison conditions and operation. However, it lacks ade- 
quate manpower, transport vehicles, and government support to 
realize its mission. Also, it has no jurisdiction over the secret 
detention centers used by security forces for interrogation and 
imprisonment. Although persons arrested for political crimes tra- 
ditionally have not been placed in prisons, they nevertheless are 
unlawfully detained by nonjudicial means, their cases are rarely 
brought to trial, and they are held incommunicado in detention 
centers or in internal exile. 

Civil and Human Rights 

Fundamental civil liberties, such as freedom of speech and press, 
peaceful assembly and association, and political rights, although 
nominally guaranteed to Zairians by the constitution, have been 
seriously infringed upon by the Mobutu regime. This deprivation 
has been compounded by the fact that the Zairian people have 
received very little information over the years concerning their civil 
and legal rights. 

Several independent human rights organizations are active in 
Zaire, including the Voice of the Voiceless, the Zairian League 
for Human Rights, and the Zairian Association for the Defense of 
Human Rights. They are reported to operate freely, and generally 



325 



Zaire: A Country Study 

have not been harassed by the government despite their critical 
reports documenting human rights abuses by the regime. Neverthe- 
less, the Mobutu government has refused to permit governmental 
or private international human rights organizations to investigate 
cases of human rights abuses in Zaire. Complaints against the 
government have included political repression and imprisonment 
of the political opposition; curtailment of religious freedoms; in- 
timidation, theft, killings, and other excesses by security forces; 
and inhumane treatment of prisoners. A 1991 report on human 
rights in Zaire by Amnesty International indicated that political 
imprisonment, security force violence, and other abuses were preva- 
lent. The United States Department of State's 1991 publication 
on human rights practices reported that "Human rights in Zaire 
remained seriously restricted .... Zairians remained subject to 
arbitrary detention and physical mistreatment. " According to that 
report, key sources of the problem include the authoritarian na- 
ture of the regime, the size of the security apparatus and its free- 
dom of action, and pervasive and widespread corruption. The 
instruments of law and order are also the chief abusers of human 
rights, greatly diminishing their legitimacy. Another important fac- 
tor is that although the armed forces receive their general authori- 
ty from the central government, they are often not within its firm 
control, especially at the local level. Efforts by Mobutu to improve 
the human rights situation are typically in response to Western 
threats to diminish foreign economic or military aid and have gener- 
ally been ineffective. This situation prevails despite the fact that 
Zaire is a signatory of the United Nations International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights and the African Charter of Human 
and People's Rights. 

There had been some hope in the early 1990s that the human 
rights situation in Zaire would improve, following Mobutu's an- 
nouncement in 1990 of political reforms, ostensibly intended to lead 
to a new constitution and multiparty elections. But in 1993 the po- 
litical situation remained chaotic, with a beleaguered Mobutu cling- 
ing to power and continuing to repress dissent and block genuine 
progress toward political reform. 

In March 1993, the United Nations Commission for Human 
Rights condemned Zaire's violations of human rights and basic 
freedoms. The commission's report cited in particular the wide- 
spread use of torture, inhuman conditions of detention, "disap- 
pearances," summary executions, and failure to ensure fair trials. 
It also deplored the regime's systematic and forceful repression of 
peaceful demonstrations and accused the regime of deliberately in- 
citing ethnic violence in Shaba. 



326 



National Security 



In September 1993, Amnesty International rated the human 
rights situation in Zaire as worse than it has been since the chaos 
following independence in 1960. In support of this assessment, it 
cited widespread deliberate violations of human rights by regional 
authorities loyal to Mobutu, ethnic murders in Nord-Kivu and Sha- 
ba instigated by government security personnel, the arrest and de- 
tention of the editor of an opposition newspaper, and the obstruction 
of transitional government meetings. Given the extent of random 
banditry throughout the country, Zaire in the early 1990s was a 
country in which lawlessness prevailed and human rights were sys- 
tematically trampled. 

* * * 

Although no single book deals exclusively with Zaire's national 
security, several works serve as excellent sources of information 
on various aspects of national security. These include: The Rise and 
Decline of the Zairian State by Crawford Young and Thomas Turner; 
The Dialectics of Oppression in Zaire by Michael G. Schatzberg; and 
Thomas M. Callaghy's The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Compara- 
tive Perspective. Several other studies recount aspects of Zaire's past 
national security environment, especially the immediate postin- 
dependence period. These include: The Congo Cables: The Cold War 
in Africa — From Eisenhower to Kennedy by Madeleine G. Kalb and 
Crawford Young's Conflict in the Congo. Also, annual editions of 
Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents provide use- 
ful information on recent developments within the armed forces 
as well as a detailed listing of military equipment. The Military 
Balance, published annually by the International Institute for Stra- 
tegic Studies, also provides a detailed listing of military equipment, 
service strength, and military budgets. The magazine African Defence 
Journal provides a wealth of information about current developments 
in the Zairian armed forces. Current information on the internal 
security and police forces can be gleaned from George Thomas Ku- 
rian's World Encyclopedia of Police Forces and Penal Systems, as well 
as periodic and annual reports on human rights and judicial sys- 
tems issued by Amnesty International, Africa Watch, and the Unit- 
ed States Department of State. (For further information and 
complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



327 



Appendix 



Table 

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 Population Estimates and Projections, Selected Years, 1940- 

2010 

3 Average Annual Population Growth Rate, Selected Years, 

1950-92 

4 Demographic Indicators, Selected Years, 1965-92 

5 Area, Population, and Inhabitants per Square Kilometer, by 

Region, 1970 and 1984 

6 Annual Population Growth Rates per Thousand, by Region, 

1938-48 to 1970-84 

7 Population of Major Cities, 1970 and 1985 

8 Number of Students, Teachers, and Classes or Institutions, 

by Level of Education, 1983-84, 1984-85, and 1985-86 

9 Number of Health Facilities and Personnel by Region, 1985 

10 Methods of Contraception Used in Urban Areas, 1984-87 

Agricultural Production, 1988-91 

11 Agricultural Production, 1988-91 

12 Trade and Current Account Balance, 1985-91 

13 Value of Principal Exports, 1990 

14 Value of Principal Imports, 1988 

15 Main Trading Partners, 1990 

16 Major Army Equipment, 1993 

17 Major Navy Equipment, 1993 

18 Major Air Force Equipment, 1993 



329 



Appendix 



Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 



When you know Multiply by To find 



Millimeters 0.04 inches 

Centimeters 0.39 inches 

Meters 3.3 feet 

Kilometers 0.62 miles 

Hectares (10,000 m 2 ) 2.47 acres 

Square kilometers 0.39 square miles 

Cubic meters 35.3 cubic feet 

Liters 0.26 gallons 

Kilograms 2.2 pounds 

Metric tons 0.98 long tons 

1.1 short tons 

2,204 pounds 

Degrees Celsius 1.8 degrees Fahrenheit 

(Centigrade) and add 32 



Table 2. Population Estimates and Projections, 
Selected Years, 1940-2010 
(in millions) 



Year Population 



1940 10.4 

1950 13.1 

1960 16.2 

1970 21.4 

1980 27.4 

1984 1 29.7 

1986 2 31.5 

1987 2 32.5 

1988 2 33.5 

1989 2 34.5 

1990 35.6 

1991 37.8 

1992 39.1 

2000 43.0 

2010 54.1 



1 As per last census, July 1984; exact count was 29,671,407. 

2 Official mid-year estimate. 

Source: Based on information from Encyclopedia of the Third World (4th ed.) (Ed., George 
Thomas Kurian), New York, 1992, 2134; United States, Central Intelligence 
Agency, The World Factbook 1991, Washington, 1991, 345; and United States, Central 
Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 1992, Washington, 1992, 379. 



331 



Zaire: A Country Study 



Table 3. Average Annual Population Growth Rate, Selected Years, 1950-92 

(in percentages) 

Years Growth Rate 

1950-55 2.3 

1955-60 2.4 

1960-65 1.9 

1965-70 2.1 

1970-75 2.8 

1975-80 3.3 

1980-85 3.0 

1985-90 3.2 

1991 3.3 

1992 3.3 

Source: Based on information from Encyclopedia of the Third World (4th ed.) (Ed., George 
Thomas Kurian), New York, 1992, 2134; United States, Central Intelligence 
Agency, The World Factbook 1991, Washington, 1991, 345; and United States, Central 
Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 1992, Washington, 1992, 379. 



Table 4. Demographic Indicators, Selected Years, 1965-92 

Indicator 1965 1975-80 1980-85 1985-90 1991 1992 
Crude Birth Rate 

(per 1,000 population) .. . 47.0 45.8 45.3 45.6 46.0 45.0 
Crude Death Rate 

(per 1,000 population) .. . 21.0 17.2 15.8 14.2 13.0 13.0 
Infant Mortality Rate 

(per 1,000 live births) . . . 140.0 n.a. n.a. 103.0 * 99.0 97.0 
Total Fertility Rate 

(Number of children 

born/woman) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 6.2 6.1 

Life Expectancy (in years) 

Males n.a. n.a. n.a. 51.0 * 52.0 52.0 

Females n.a. n.a. n.a. 55.0 * 56.0 56.0 

n.a. — Not available. 

* Estimate for 1990 only. 

Source: Based on information from United Nations, World Population Prospects as Assessed 

in 1990, New York, 1990; United States, Central Intelligence Agency, The World 
Factbook 1991, Washington, 1991, 345; and United States, Central Intelligence 
Agency, The World Factbook 1992, Washington, 1992, 379. 



332 



Appendix 



Table 5. Area, Population, and Inhabitants per Square 
Kilometer, by Region, 1970 and 1984 



Population Inhabitants per 

Area (in thousands) square kilometer 

Region (in square kilometers) 1970 1984 1970 1984 



Bandundu 295,658 2,601 3,683 8.8 12.5 

Bas-Zaire 54,078 1,504 1,972 27.8 36.5 

Equateur 403,292 2,432 3,406 6.0 8.4 

Haut-Zaire 503,239 3,356 4,206 6.7 8.4 

Kasai-Occidental 156,967 2,434 2,287 15.5 14.6 

Kasai-Oriental 168,216 1,872 2,403 11.1 14.3 

Kinshasa 9,965 1,323 2,654 132.8 266.3 

Kivu 256,803 3,362 5,188 13.1 20.2 

Shaba 496,877 2,754 3,874 5.5 7.8 



Source: Based on information from Federal Republic of Germany, Statistisches Bundesamt, 
Landerbericht Zaire 1990, Wiesbaden, 1990, 24; and Zaire, Departement du plan, 
Institut national de la statistique, Le Zaire en chiffres, Kinshasa, 1988, 14. 



Table 6. Annual Population Growth Rates per Thousand, by Region, 
1938-48 to 1970-84 1 



Region 1938-48 1948-58 1958-70 1970-84 2 



Bandundu 0.6 2.7 2.7 2.5 

Bas-Zaire 1.9 1.7 3.8 2.5 

Equateur 0.2 1.2 2.3 2.7 

Haut-Zaire -0.4 1.0 2.1 2.1 

Kasai-Occidental -0.4 1.7 2.7 2.3 

Kasai-Oriental -0.4 1.0 4.2 3.4 

Kinshasa 12.2 11.4 9.8 6.2 

Kivu 1.6 3.6 3.2 3.4 

Shaba 1.8 2.9 3.7 3.2 



TOTAL ZAIRE 0.6 2.2 3.2 3.0 



1 Based on data from censuses of 1938, 1948, 1958, 1970, and 1984. 

2 Projected. 

Source: Based on information from Joseph Boute and Leon de Saint Moulin, Perspectives 
demographiques regionales, 1975-1985, Kinshasa, 1978. 



333 



Zaire: A Country Study 

Table 7. Population of Major Cities, 1970 and 1985 
(in thousands) 



City 1970 1985 



Bukavu 135 418 

Kananga 429 938 

Kikwit 112 346 

Kinshasa 1,323 2,796 

Kisangani 230 557 

Lubumbashi 318 765 

Matadi , 110 216 

Mbandaka 108 294 

Mbuji-Mayi 256 625 



Source:Based on information from Federal Republic of Germany, Statistisches Bundesamt, 
Landerbericht Zaire 1990, Wiesbaden, 1990, 25. 



Table 8. Number of Students, Teachers, and Classes or Institutions, 
by Level of Education, 1983-84, 1984-85, and 1985-86 



Level 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 



Primary 





2,663,903 


2,736,515 


2,810,707 


Girls 


1,990,710 


2,084,051 


2,182,816 


TOTAL 


4,654,613 


4,820,566 


4,993,523 




.... 112,077 


156,631 


161,925 




112,056 


141,943 


149,753 


Secondary 










1,541,526 


1,864,117 


2,528,000 


Girls 


610,374 


756,258 


940,051 


TOTAL 


2,151,900 


2,620,375 


3,468,051 


of which 










365,823 


445,464 


543,668 




215,190 


262,037 


319,205 




1,570,887 


1,912,874 


2,334,578 




43,459 


47,086 


47,952 




27,609 


26,844 


29,213 


Higher Education 








Students 










12,896 


13,540 


16,239 




10,670 


10,338 


10,928 




14,814 


14,778 


13,711 


TOTAL 


38,380 


38,656 


40,878 




2,568 


2,581 


3,803 


Institutions 










3 


3 


3 




14 


14 


14 




18 


18 


18 


TOTAL 


35 


35 


35 



* As published. 

Source: Based on information from Zaire, Departement du plan, Institut de la statistique, 
Le Zaire en chiffres, Kinshasa, 1988, 19. 



334 



Appendix 



eOOOliflONCO(N(£l 



co" vo co oT m" c*f m" t>T cr> 



II 

3 

C t» 
PQ « 



N 



- 1 8 

S n 9 o .. 

W DC * ^ ^ fed £ 



£ 
C 
a 

P 



335 



Zaire: A Country Study 



Table 10. Methods of Contraception Used in Urban Areas, 1984-87 
(in percentages) 



Method 


1984 


1985 


1986 


1987 


Pill 


41 


40 


45 


38 




.... 24 


25 


23 


17 




.... 8 


8 


9 


7 




11 


11 


10 


25 




.... 3 


1 


2 


1 




.... 12 


13 


10 


11 


Other 


1 


2 




1 



Source: Based on information provided by the Project for Planned Birth Services (Projet 
des Services des Naissances Desirables — PSND), Bureau of Statistics, Kinshasa, 
1988. 



Table 11. Agricultural Production, 1988-91 
(in thousands of tons) 



Product 


1988 


1989 


1990 


1991 


Grains 












816 


846 


870 * 


906 


Millet 


30 


31 


31 * 


31 




329 


341 


345 * 


365 




45 


47 


50 * 


49 


Wheat 


35 


35 


n.a. 


n.a. 




1,255 


1,300 


1,296 * 


1,351 


Tubers 












17,000 


17,400 


17,600 * 


18,227 




32 


33 


33 * 


34 * 




368 


373 


375 * 


377 * 




37 


38 


40 * 


42 * 




265 


266 


280 * 


300 * 




17,702 


18,110 


18,328 * 


18,980 * 


Vegetables 












25 * 


25 * 


27 * 


28 * 




29 


30* 


31 * 


31 * 




420 


425 


430 * 


435 




40 * 


40 * 


40 * 


42 * 




38 


39 


40 


40 * 




552 * 


559 * 


568 * 


576 * 


Oils 












50 * 


50 * 


50 * 


50 




74 * 


74 * 


74 * 


75 * 




178 


178 


n.a. 


n.a. 




302 * 


302 * 


124* 


125 * 



336 



Appendix 



Table 11. — Continued 



Product 1988 1989 1990 1991 



Fruits 

Avocados 44 45 45 * 46 * 

Bananas 403 404 404 * 405 * 

Grapefruit 12 * 13* 13 * 14 * 

Mangoes 205 208 208 * 210 * 

Oranges 150 * 152* 153 * 155 * 

Pineapples 136 142 143 * 145 * 

Plantains 1,799 1,800 1,800 * 1,820 * 

Total fruits 2,749 * 2,764* 2,766 * 2,795 * 

Beverages 

Cocoa beans 6 7 5* 4 

Coffee (green) 99 107 120 * 102 * 

Tea 3 3 3 * 3 * 

Total beverages 108 117 128 * 109 * 

Other 

Cotton (lint) 26 * 26 * 26 * 26 * 

Rubber 17 24* 10 * 10 * 

Sugarcane 1,150 * 1,150* 1,180 * 1,180 * 

Tobacco 3 3 4 * 4 * 

Total other 1,196 * 1,203* 1,220 * 1,220 * 



n.a. — not available. 
* Estimate. 

Source: Based on information from Africa South of the Sahara, 1993, London, 1992, 927; Africa 
South of the Sahara, 1994, London, 1993, 957; and Europa World Yearbook, 1993, 2, 
London, 1993, 3258. 



Table 12. Trade and Current Account Balance, 1985-91 
(in millions of United States dollars) 

1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 



Exports * 1,853 1,844 1,731 2,178 2,201 2,138 1,500 

Imports * 1,247 1,283 1,376 1,645 1,683 1,539 1,200 

Trade balance 606 561 355 533 518 599 300 

Current account 

balance -215 -400 -644 -62 -611 -643 -850 



* Free on board (f.o.b.). 

Source: Based on information from various issues of Economist Intelligence Unit, Country 
Report: Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi, London, 1987-92. 



337 



Zaire: A Country Study 



Table 13. Value of Principal Exports, 1990 
(in millions of United States dollars) 



Product Value * 



Copper and cobalt 1,001 

Crude petroleum 227 

Diamonds 240 



* Does not include informal-sector exports and smuggling. 

Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Zaire, Rwan- 
da, Burundi, No. 2, London, 1992, 3. 



Table 14. Value of Principal Imports, 1988 
(in millions of United States dollars) 



Product Value 



Imports for Gecamines * 362 

Petroleum products 169 

Food, beverages, and tobacco 147 

Transport equipment 95 



* Gecamines — General Quarries and Mines (Generate des Carrieres et des Mines). 

Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Zaire, Rwan- 
da, Burundi, No. 2, London, 1992, 3. 



Table 15. Main Trading Partners, 1990 
(in percentage of total value) 

Percentage 



Destination of exports 

Belgium/Luxembourg 56.0 

United States 12.9 

France 7.1 

Germany 6.4 

Other 20.6 

Total * 100.0 

Origin of imports 

Belgium/Luxembourg 27.6 

France 12.3 

Germany 10.8 

United States 10.6 

Other 38.7 

Total * 100.0 



* Totals may not add to 100 because of rounding. 

Source: Based on information from various issues of Economist Intelligence Unit, Country 
Report: Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi, London, 1990-92. 



338 



Appendix 



Table 16. Major Army Equipment, 1993 

Description Country of Origin Inventory 



Main battle tanks 





China 


40 




-do- 


20 




United States 


10 


AMX-13 light 1 


France 


13 


Armored reconnaissance vehicles 






a i it r r\ r~\ i ] 


-do- 


5\j 


AML-90 


-do- 


30 


FERRET 


. . Britain 


28 


Armored personnel carriers 






M-113/M-113A 


United States 


12 


M-3A1 


-do- 


60 




n.a. 


12 


K-63 


. . China 


12 




(former) Soviet Union 


15 


BTR-152 


-do- 


250 


Fahd 2 


Egypt 


n.a. 


VAB 1 


. . France 


12 


Towed artillery 






75mm: M-116 


United States 


30 




China 


20 


122mm: M-1938/D-30 


. . (former) Soviet Union 


20 


T-60 


China 


15 


130mm: T-59 


-do- 


8 


Multiple rocket launchers 






107mm: T-63 


. . China 


20 


122mm: BM-21 , 


n.a. 


10 


Mortars 








Belgium 


n.a. 


107mm: M-30 


United States 


n.a. 




France 


50 


Recoilless launchers 






57mm: M-18 


United States 


n.a. 




-do- 


n.a. 




-do- 


n.a. 


Antiaircraft guns 






14.5mm: ZPU-4 


. . China 


n.a. 


20mm: 


n.a. 


n.a. 


37mm: M-1939/Type 63 


China 


40 


40mm: L/60 


Canada 


n.a. 


Surface-to-air missiles 






SA-7 Grail 


. . (former) Soviet Union 


n.a. 


Surface-to-surface missiles 






SS-11 Gadfly 


-do- 


n.a. 




-do- 


n.a. 



n.a. — not available. 

1 Ordered in 1989; status undetermined in 1993. 

2 Used by Civil Guard. 



Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1993-1994, 1993 , 221. 



339 



Zaire: A Country Study 



Table 17. Major Navy Equipment, 1993 



Description 



Country of Origin 



Inventory 



Fast Patrol Craft (Inshore) 

Shanghai II PFI 

Huchuan 

Torpedo Boats 

P-4 

Coastal Patrol Craft 

Swift Mkll 

Arcoa 

n.a. — not available. 



China 
-do- 
North Korea 

United States 
France 



Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1993-1994, 1993, 22: 



Table 18. Major Air Force Equipment, 1993 



Description 



Country of Origin 



Inventory 



Fighters Ground Attack 

Mirage 5M 

Mirage 5DM7 

Counterinsurgency aircraft 

MB-326 GB 

MB-326 K 

AT-6G 

FTB-337 Cessna 

Transport aircraft 

Boeing 707-320 

Boeing 727-30 

BN-2A Islander 

C-46 Commando .... 

C-47 Dakota 

C-130H Hercules 

DHC-5D Buffalo 

DHC-6 Twin Otter . . 

C-54 Sky master 

DC-6 

MU-2J 

Merlin III 

Mystere-Falcon 20 .... 

F-27 Friendship 

Helicopters 

AS-332L Super Puma . 

SA-319 Alouette 

SA-330 Puma 

SA-321 Super Frelon . 

SA-350 Ecureuil 

Bell 47G 



France 


7 


-do- 




Italy 


8 


-do- 


6 


United States 


6 


-do- 


20 


-do- 




-do- 


1 


Britain 


1 


United States 


2 


-do- 


8 


-do- 


5 


Canada 


3 


-do- 


1 


United States 


4 


-do- 


2 


Japan 


2 


United States 


1 


France 


1 


Netherlands 


3 


France 


1 


-do- 


4 


-do- 


4 


-do- 


1 


-do- 


n.a. 


United States 


6 



340 



Appendix 



Table 18. — Continued 



Description Country of Origin Inventory 
Liaison aircraft 

Cessna 31 OR -do- 6 

Training aircraft 

Cessna 150 -do- 12 

Cessna 310 -do- 3 

SF-260MC/MZ Warrior Italy 9 

n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1993-1994, 1993, 221. 



341 



Bibliography 



Chapter 1 

Anstey, Roger. "Belgian Rule in the Congo and the Aspirations 
of the Evolue Class." Pages 194-225 in L.H. Gann and Peter 
Duignan (eds.), Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960. London: Cam- 
bridge University Press, 1969. 

. Britain and the Congo in the Nineteenth Century. Oxford: Claren- 
don Press, 1962. Reprint. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood 
Press, 1981. 

King Leopold's Legacy. London: Oxford University Press, 

1969. 

Ascherson, Neil. The King Incorporated. London: Allen and Unwin, 
1963. 

Birmingham, David. Trade and Conflict in Angola. Oxford: Claren- 
don Press, 1966. 

Birmingham, David, and Phyllis M . Martin (eds.). History of Cen- 
tral Africa. (2 vols.) New York: Longman, 1983. 

Bobb, F. Scott. Historical Dictionary of Zaire. (African Historical Dic- 
tionaries Series, No. 43.) Metuchen, New Jersey: Scarecrow 
Press, 1988. 

Brausch, Georges. Belgian Administration in the Congo. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1961. Reprint. Westport, Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press, 1986. 

Bustin, Edouard. Lunda under Belgian Rule: The Politics of Ethnicity. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975. 

Callaghy, Thomas. The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Per- 
spective. New York: Columbia University Press, 1984. 

Chome, Jules. L' ascension de Mobutu: du Sergent Joseph Desire au General 
Sese Seko. Brussels: Editions Complexe, 1974. 

Curtin, Philip, Steven Feierman, Leonard Thompson, and Jan 
Vansina. African History. Boston: Little, Brown, 1978. 

Dayal, Rajwshwar. Mission for Hammarskjold. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1976. 

Ekwe-Ekwe, Herbert. Conflict and Intervention in Africa: Nigeria, An- 
gola, Zaire. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990. 

Fabian, Johannes. Language and Colonial Power. Cambridge: Cam- 
bridge University Press, 1986. 

Gerard- Libais, Jules. Katanga Secession. (Trans., Rebecca Young.) 
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966. 

Gerard- Libais, Jules, and Benoit Verhaegen. Congo 1960. Brussels: 



343 



Zaire: A Country Study 



Centre de recherche et d'information socio-politique, 1961. 

Gibbs, David N. ' 'Dag Hammarskjold, the United Nations, and 
the Congo Crisis of 1960-1: A Reinterpretation," Journal of 
Modern African Studies [London], 31, No. 1, 1993, 163-74. 

The Political Economy of Third World Intervention: 

Mines, Money, and U.S. Policy in the Congo Crisis. Chicago: Univer- 
sity of Chicago Press, 1991. 

Gould, David. Bureaucratic Corruption and Underdevelopment in the Third 
World: The Case of Zaire. Elmsford, New York: Pergamon Press, 
1980. 

Hodgkin, Thomas. Nationalism in Colonial Africa. New York: New 
York University Press, 1957. 

Kalb, Madeleine G. The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa — 
From Eisenhower to Kennedy. New York: Macmillan, 1982. 

Kalele-ka-Bila. 4 'La culture obligatoire du coton au Congo beige," 
Africa [Rome], 47, No. 1, March 1992, 83-92. 

Kamitatu-Massamba, Cleophas. La grande mystification du Congo- 
Kinshasa. Paris: Editions Maspero, 1971. 

Kanza, Thomas. The Rise and Fall of Patrice Lumumba: Conflict in 
the Congo. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Schenkman, 1977. 

Kinder, Hermann, and Werner Hilgemann. The Anchor Atlas of 
World History, 2. (Trans., Ernest A. Menze.) Garden City, New 
York: Anchor Books, 1978. 

Lefever, Ernest. Crisis in the Congo: A United Nations Force in Action. 
Washington: Brookings Institution, 1965. 

Lemarchand, Rene. "The Bases of Nationalism among the Bakon- 
go," Africa [Rome], 31, No. 4, 1961, 344-54. 

"Congo-Leopoldville." Pages 560-96 in James S. Cole- 
man and Carl Rosberg (eds.), Political Parties and National Integra- 
tion in Tropical Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1964. 

"The Limits of Self-Determination: The Case of Katan- 
ga,." American Political Science Review, 61, No. 2, 1962, 404- 
16. 

Political Awakening in the Belgian Congo. Berkeley: Univer- 
sity of California Press, 1964. 

Martens, Ludo. Pierre Mulele and the Kwilu Uprising in Zaire. (Trans., 
Michael Wolfers.) Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Zed Books, 
1992. 

Nguza Karl-i-Bond. Mobutu ou V incarnation du mat zairois. London: 
Collings, 1982. 

Nzongola-Ntalaja, Georges. "The Continuing Struggle for Na- 
tional Liberation in Zaire, "Journal of Modern African Studies [Lon- 
don], 17, No. 4, 1979, 595-614. 



344 



Bibliography 



Peemans, J. P. "The Social and Economic Development of Zaire 
since Independence," African Affairs, 74, No. 295, 1975, 422-35. 

Ryckmans, Pierre. Dominer pour servir. Brussels: Editions Nouvelles, 
1948. 

Rymenam, Jean. "Classes sociales, pouvoir et economie au Zaire, 
ou comment le sous-developpement enrichit les gouvernements,' , 
Geneve-Afrique [Geneva], 19, No. 1, 1980, 43-53. 

Schatzberg, Michael G. The Dialectics of Oppression in Zaire. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988. 

Politics and Class in Zaire: Bureaucracy, Business, and Beer in 

Lisala. New York: Africana, 1980. 

Slade, Ruth. King Leopold's Congo. London: Oxford University 
Press, 1962. 

Stengers, Jean. "The Congo Free State and the Belgian Congo 
Before 1914." Pages 251-92 in L.H. Gann and Peter Duignan 
(eds.), Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960. London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1969. 

Thornton, John K. The Kingdom of Congo: Civil War and Transition, 
1641-1718. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983. 

Vansina, Jan. Kingdoms of the Savanna. Madison: University of Wis- 
consin Press, 1968. 

Paths in the Rainforests: Toward a History of Political Tradition 

in Equatorial Africa. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990. 

"The Peoples of the Forest." Pages 75-118 in David Bir- 
mingham and Phyllis M. Martin (eds.), History of Central Africa, 
1. New York: Longman, 1983. 

Willame, Jean-Claude. Patrice Lumumba: La crise congolaise revisi- 
tee. Paris: Editions Karthala, 1990. 

Patrimonialism and Political Change in the Congo. Stanford: 

Stanford University Press, 1972. 

"La seconde guerre du Shaba," Geneve-Afrique [Geneva], 

16, No. 1, 1977-78, 87-89. 

Young, Crawford. "The Colonial State and Post-Colonial Crisis." 
Pages 1-31 in Prosser Gifford and W. Roger Louis (eds.), 
Decolonization and African Independence. New Haven: Yale Univer- 
sity Press, 1988. 

Politics in the Congo. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 

1965. 

"The Politics of Separatism: Katanga 1960-63." Pages 

167-208 in Gwendolen M. Carter (ed.), Politics in Africa. New 
York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1966. 

"Rebellion and the Congo." Pages 209-45 in Robert I. 

Rotberg (ed.), Rebellion in Black Africa. London: Oxford Univer- 
sity Press, 1971. 



345 



Zaire: A Country Study 



Young, Crawford, and Thomas Turner. The Rise and Decline of the 
Zairian State. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985. 



Chapter 2 

Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1988-1989. 

(Ed., Marion E. Doro.) New York: Africana, 1992. 
Africa South of the Sahara, 1992. (21st ed.) London: Europa, 1991. 
Africa South of the Sahara, 1993. (22d ed.) London: Europa, 1992. 
Africa South of the Sahara, 1994. (23d ed.) London: Europa, 1993. 
Berkeley, Bui. ' 4 Zaire: An African Horror Story," Atlantic Monthly, 

272, No. 2, August 1993, 20-28. 
Boute, Joseph, and Leon de Saint Moulin. Perspectives demographiques 

regionales, 1975-1985. Kinshasa: Zaire, Departement du plan, 

1978. 

Boyle, Patrick M. "Beyond Self-Protection to Prophecy: The 

Catholic Church and Political Change in Zaire," Africa Today, 

39, No. 3, 1992, 49-66. 
Coquery- Vidro vitch, Catherine, Alain forest, and Herbert Weiss 

(eds.). Rebellions-revolution au Zaire, 1963-1965. Paris: Harmat- 

tan, 1987. 

Davis-Roberts, Christopher. "Kutambuwa Ugonjuwa: Concepts 
of Illness and Transformation among the Tabwa of Zaire. ' ' Pages 
376-92 in Steven Feierman and John M. Janzen (eds.), The So- 
cial Basis of Health and Healing in Africa. (Comparative Studies of 
Health Systems and Medical Care, No. 30.) Berkeley: Univer- 
sity of California Press, 1992. 

Encyclopedia of the Third World. (4th ed.) (Ed. , George Thomas Ku- 
rian.) New York: Facts on File, 1992. 

Federal Republic of Germany. Statistisches Bundesamt. Lander- 
bericht Zaire, 1990. (Statistik des Auslandes Series.) Wiesbaden: 
1990. 

Feierman, Steven, and John M. Janzen (eds.). The Social Basis of 
Health and Healing in Africa. (Comparative Studies of Health Sys- 
tems and Medical Care, No. 30.) Berkeley: University of Califor- 
nia Press, 1992. 

Goovaerts, Leo. "L'eglise et l'etat au Zaire a l'epreuve de 1' authen- 
ticity, " Cultures et Developpement [Lou vain, Belgium], 7, No. 2, 
1975, 243-84. 

Gould, David J. Bureaucratic Corruption and Underdevelopment in the 
Third World: The Case of Zaire. Elmsford, New York: Pergamon 
Press, 1980. 



346 



Bibliography 



Guthrie, Malcolm. The Classification of the Bantu Languages. Lon- 
don: Oxford University Press, 1948. 

Harms, Robert W. River of Wealth, River of Sorrow: The Central Zaire 
Basin in the Era of the Slave and Ivory Trade, 1500-1891. New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1981. 

Hart, T.B. "The Ecology of a Single Species-Dominant Forest and 
Mixed Forest in Zaire." (Ph.D. dissertation.) Ann Arbor: Michi- 
gan State University, 1985. 

Hoffman, Dan C. "Zaire's Protestants in Search of Social Legiti- 
macy," Africa Today, 39, No. 3, 1992, 69-76. 

Jewsiewicki, Bogumil, and David Newbury (eds.) African Histori- 
ographies: What History for Which Africa? Beverly Hills: Sage, 1986. 

Kabongo-Mbaya, Ph.B. "Protestantisme zai'rois et declin du 
Mobutisme," Politique Africaine [Paris], 41, 1991, 72-89. 

Leonard, Charles. Profils de Veconomie du Zaire: Annees 1955-1987 . 
Kinshasa: Zaire, Departement de l'economie nationale et de l'in- 
dustrie, 1987. 

Matondo, Kunsunga. Developpement inegalitaire et disparites regionales 
dans les pays du Tiers-monde: Cas du Zaire. Kinshasa: Universite 
de Kinshasa, Faculte des sciences economiques, 1986. 

MacGaffey, Janet. Entrepreneurs and Parasites: The Struggle for Indigenous 
Capitalism in Zaire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. 

"Evading Male Control: Women in the Second Econo- 
my in Zaire." Pages 161-76 in Sharon B. Stichter and Jane L. 
Parpart (eds.), Patriarchy and Class: African Women in the Home and 
the Work Force. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988. 

"Initiatives from Below: Zaire's Other Path to Social and 

Economic Restructuring." Pages 243-61 in Goran Hyden and 
Michael Bratton (eds.), Governance and Politics in Africa. Boulder, 
Colorado: Rienner, 1992. 

MacGaffey, Janet (ed.). The Real Economy of Zaire: The Contribution 
of Smuggling and Other Unofficial Activities to National Wealth. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991. 

MacGaffey, Wyatt. Astonishment and Power. Washington: Smithso- 
nian Institution Press, 1993. 

"The Policy of National Integration in Zaire," Journal of 

Modern African Studies [London], 20, No. 1, 1982, 87-105. 

Religion and Society in Central Africa: The BaKongo of Lower 

Zaire. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986. 

Manwana Mungongo. "Les droits de la femme travailleuse au 
Zaire," Zaire-Afrique [Kinshasa], 163, 1982, 165-80. 

Miracle, Marvin P. Agriculture in the Congo Basin: Tradition and Change 
in African Rural Economies. Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1967. 



347 



Zaire: A Country Study 



Mwene-Batende. "Le Kitawala dans revolution socio-politique 
recente: Cas du groupe Belukela dans la ville du Kisangani," 
Cahiers des Religions Africaines [Kinshasa], 10, 1976, 81-105. 

Newbury, Catharine. "Ebutumwa Bw'Emiogo: The Tyranny of 
Cassava, A Women's Tax Revolt in Eastern Zaire," Canadian 
Journal of African Studies [Ottawa], 18, 1984, 35-54. 

"Survival Strategies in Rural Zaire: Realities of Coping 

with Crisis." Pages 99-1 12 in Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja (ed.), 
The Crisis in Zaire: Myths and Realities. Trenton, New Jersey: Africa 
World Press, 1986. 

Newbury, Catharine, and Brooke G. Schoepf. "State, Peasantry, 
and Agrarian Crisis in Zaire: Does Gender Make a Difference?" 
Pages 91-110 in Jane L. Parpart and Kathleen A. Staudt (eds.), 
Women and the State in Africa. Boulder, Colorado: Rienner, 1989. 

Newbury, David. Kings and Clans: Ijwi Island and the Lake Kivu Rift, 
1780-1840. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991. 

N sonde, Jean. "Christianisme et religion traditionelle en pays kon- 
go aux dixseptieme-dixhuitieme siecles," Cahiers d' Etudes Afri- 
caines [Paris], 128, Nos. 32-34, 1992, 705-11. 

Nzongola-Ntalaja, Georges. "The Continuing Struggle for Na- 
tional Liberation in Zaire, "Journal of Modern African Studies [Lon- 
don], 17, No. 4, 1979, 595-614. * 

Nzongola-Ntalaja, Georges (ed.). The Crisis in Zaire: Myths and Real- 
ities. Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press, 1986. 

Packard, Randall M. Chief ship and Cosmology: An Historical Study of 
Political Competition. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981. 

Parpart, Jane L., and Kathleen A. Staudt (eds.). Women and the 
State in Africa. Boulder, Colorado: Rienner, 1989. 

Roberts, Renee G. Inducing the Deluge: Zaire's Internally Displaced Peo- 
ple. (U.S. Committee for Refugees, Issue Paper.) Washington: 
American Council for Nationalities Service, 1993. 

Saint Moulin, Leon de. Atlas des collectivites du Zaire. Kinshasa: Pres- 
ses universitaires du Zaire, 1976. 

Schatzberg, Michael G. The Dialectics of Oppression in Zaire. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988. 

Politics and Class in Zaire: Bureaucracy, Business, and Beer in 

Lisala. New York: Africana, 1980. 

Schildkrout, Enid, and Curtis A. Keim. African Reflections: Art from 
Northeastern Zaire. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1990. 

Schoepf, Brooke G., and Claude Schoepf. "Food Crisis and Agrar- 
ian Change in the Eastern Highlands of Zaire," Urban Anthro- 
pology, 16, No. 1, Spring 1987, 5-37. 

Schoepf, Brooke G., and Walu Engundu. "Women's Trade and 
Contributions to Household Budgets in Kinshasa." Pages 124-51 



348 



Bibliography 



in Janet MacGaffey (ed.), The Real Economy of Zaire: The Contri- 
bution of Smuggling and Other Unofficial Activities to National Wealth. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991. 

Scott, James C . The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Sub- 
sistence in Southeast Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976. 

The Statesman's Yearbook, 1991-1992. (Ed., Brian Hunter.) New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1991. 

The Statesman's Yearbook, 1992-1993. (Ed., Brian Hunter.) New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1992. 

The Statesman's Yearbook, 1993-1994. (Ed., Brian Hunter.) New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1993. 

Thornton, John K. The Kingdom of Kongo: Civil War and Transition, 
1641-1718. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983. 

United Nations. World Population Prospects as Assessed in 1990. New 
York: 1990. 

United States. Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook, 

1991. Washington: GPO, 1991. 
Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook, 1992. 

Washington: GPO, 1992. 
Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook, 1993. 

Washington: GPO, 1993. 
Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. World 

Population Profile: 1994. (Report WP/94.) Washington: GPO, 

1994. 

U.S. Committee for Refugees. World Refugee Survey, 1992. Washing- 
ton: American Council for Nationalities Service, 1992. 

Vansina, Jan. "The History of God among the Kuba," Africa 
[Rome], 28, No. 1, 1983, 17-39. 

Introduction a I'ethnographie du Congo. Kinshasa: Editions 

universitaires du Congo, 1966. 

_. "Knowledge and Perceptions of the African Past." Pages 

28-42 in Bogumil Jewsiewicki and David Newbury (eds.), Afri- 
can Historiographies: What History for Which Africa? Beverly Hills, 
California: Sage, 1986. 

Paths in the Rainforests: Toward a History of Political Tradition 

in Equatorial Africa. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990. 

"Western Bantu Expansion," Journal of African History, 

25, No. 2, 1984, 129-45. 

Verhaegen, Benoit. "L'enseignement superieur: Vers 1' explosion," 
Politique Africaine [Paris], 41, 1991, 72-89. 

Verhaegen, Benoit, Muamba Ngalula, and Kinsangani Endenda. 
"La marginalite, le mariage, et 1' instruction a Kinsangani," 
Canadian Journal of African Studies [Ottawa], 18, No. 1, 1984, 
131-37. " 



349 



Zaire: A Country Study 

Vwakyanakazi, Mukohya. "Import and Export in the Second 

Economy in North Kivu." Pages 43-71 in Janet MacGaffey 

(ed.), The Real Economy of Zaire: The Contribution of Smuggling and 

Other Unofficial Activities to National Wealth. Philadelphia: University 

of Pennsylvania Press, 1991. 
Willame, Jean-Claude. "L'automne d'une monarchic," Politique 

Africaine [Paris], 41, 1991, 72-89. 
Witte, John. "Deforestation in Zaire: Logging and Landlessness," 

Ecologist, 22, March- April 1992, 58-68. 
World Bank. Social Indicators of Development, 1993. Baltimore: Johns 

Hopkins University Press, 1993. 
Young, Crawford. The Politics of Cultural Pluralism. Madison: 

University of Wisconsin Press, 1976. 
Young, Crawford, and Thomas Turner. The Rise and Decline of the 

Zairian State. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985. 
Zaire. Departement du plan, Institut national de la statistique. Le 

Zaire en chijfres. Kinshasa: 1988. 

(Various issues of the following publications were also used in 
the preparation of this chapter: African Affairs; African Studies Review; 
Africa Research Bulletin (Political, Social, and Cultural Series) [Lon- 
don]; Amnesty International, Urgent Action; Anthropus; Cahiers du 
CEDAF [Brussels]; Canadian Journal of Political Science [Ottawa]; Cul- 
tures et Developpement [Lou vain, Belgium]; Ethnology; Etudes zairoises 
[Kinshasa]; Executive News Service; Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service, Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa; Journal of African History; 
Journal of African Religions; Journal of Modern African Studies [London]; 
Kongo ya Sika [Kinshasa]; Marches Tropicaux et Mediteraneens [Paris]; 
Revue des Forces Armees Zairoises [Kinshasa]; Revue Nouvelle [Paris]; 
Telex Africa [Brussels]; and Zaire-Afrique [Kinshasa].) 



Chapter 3 

Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1988-1989. 

(Ed., Marion E. Doro.) New York: Africana, 1992. 
Africa South of the Sahara, 1993. (22d ed.) London: Europa, 1992. 
Africa South of the Sahara, 1994. (23d ed.) London: Europa, 1993. 
Blumenthal, Erwin. "Zaire: Rapport sur sa credibilite flnanciere 

internationale," Revue Nouvelle [Paris] , 77, No. 11, 1982, 360-78. 
Bobb, F. Scott. Historical Dictionary of Zaire. (African Historical 

Dictionaries Series, No. 43.) Metuchen, New Jersey: Scarecrow 

Press, 1988. 



350 



Bibliography 



Callaghy, Thomas M. "The Ritual Dance of the Debt Game," 

Africa Report, September-October 1984, 22-24. 
The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective. New 

York: Columbia University Press, 1984. 
The Europa World Year Book, 1993. London: Europa, 1993. 
Federal Republic of Germany. Statistisches Bundesamt. Lander- 

bericht Zaire, 1990. (Statistik des Auslandes Series.) Wiesbaden: 

1990. 

Gould, David. Bureaucratic Corruption and Underdevelopment in the Third 
World: The Case of Zaire. Elmsford, New York: Pergamon Press, 
1980. 

Gran, Guy, and Galen Hull (eds.). Zaire: The Political Economy of 

Underdevelopment. New York: Praeger, 1979. 
International Monetary Fund. Zaire: Use of Fund Resources. Washing- 
ton: April 30, 1987. 
International Petroleum Encyclopedia, 1992. (Ed., Jim West.) Tulsa, 

Oklahoma: Pennwell, 1992. 
Kronsten, Gregory. Zaire to the 1990s: Will Retrenchment Work? (A 

Special Report of the Economist Intelligence Unit.) London: 

Economist, March 1986. 
Leonard, Charles. Conjoncture economique. Kinshasa: Zaire, Departe- 

ment de l'economie nationale et de l'industrie, October 1987. 
Leslie, Winsome J. The World Bank and Structural Transformation in 

Developing Countries: The Case of Zaire. Boulder, Colorado: Rien- 

ner, 1987. 

MacGaffey, Janet. "Initiatives from Below: Zaire's Other Path 
to Social and Economic Restructuring. ' ' Pages 243-61 in Go- 
ran Hyden and Michael Bratton (eds.). Governance and Politics 
in Africa. Boulder, Colorado: Rienner, 1992. 

MacGaffey, Janet (ed.). The Real Economy of Zaire: The Contribution 
of Smuggling and Other Unofficial Activities to National Wealth. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991. 

Mokoli, Mondonga M. State Against Development: The Experience of 
Post-1965 Zaire. New York: Greenwood Press, 1992. 

Morgan, George A., Kevin Connor, and Ben A. Kornhauser. Zaire. 
(Mineral Perspectives.) Washington: Department of the Interi- 
or, Bureau of Mines, 1985. 

Peemans, J. P. "The Social and Economic Development of Zaire 
since Independence,'' African Affairs, 74, No. 295, 1975, 422-35. 

Riddell, James C, Jeswald W. Salacuse, and David Tabachnick. 
"The National Land Law of Zaire and Indigenous Land Ten- 
ure in Central Bandundu, Zaire." (Research paper.) Madison: 
Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin, 1987. 

Rymenam, Jean. "Classes sociales, pouvoir, et economie au Zaire, 



351 



Zaire: A Country Study 



ou comment le sous-developpement enrichit les gouvernements," 
Geneve-Afrique [Geneva], 19, No. 1, 1980, 43-53. 

Simons, E., B. Verhaegen, andJ.C. Willame. Transfert de technologie 
et emploi en Afrique, 2: Endettement, technologies, et industrialisation 
au Zaire (1970-1981). Brussels: CEDAF, 1981. 

Turner, Thomas E. ' ' Decline or Recovery in Zaire?" Current His- 
tory, 87, No. 529, May 1988, 213-16, 230. 

United States. Department of State. United States Embassy, Kin- 
shasa. Economic Trends Report, Zaire. Washington: June 1989. 

Department of State. Investment Climate Statement, Republic 

of Zaire. Washington: February 1988. 

Vengroff, Richard. Development Administration at the Local Level: The 
Case of Zaire. Syracuse: Maxwell School of Citizenship and Pub- 
lic Affairs, Syracuse University, 1983. 

Willame, Jean-Claude. Zaire: L } epopee dTnga. Paris: Harmattan, 
1986. 

Witte, John. "Deforestation in Zaire: Logging and Landlessness," 

Ecologist, 22, March-April 1992, 58-68. 
World Bank. Staff Appraisal Report: Zaire, Second Power Project. 

Washington: June 1986. 
Young, Crawford, and Thomas Turner. The Rise and Decline of the 

Zairian State. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985. 
Zaire. Departement du plan. Institut national de la statistique. Le 

Zaire en chiffres. Kinshasa: 1988. 

(Various issues of the following publications were also used in 
the preparation of this chapter: Africa Confidential [London]; Africa 
Economic Digest [London]; Africa Report; Economist [London]; Econo- 
mist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi [Lon- 
don]; Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Zaire, Rwanda, 
Burundi [London]; Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily 
Report: Sub-Saharan Africa; Marches Tropicaux et Mediteraneens [Paris]; 
New York Times; Wall Street Journal; and Washington Post. ) 



Chapter 4 

Adelman, Kenneth Lee. "The Church-State Conflict in Zaire," 
African Studies Review, 18, No. 1, April 1975, 103-16. 

"The Political Party in Zaire as a Religious Surrogate," 

Africa Today, 23, No. 4, October-December 1976, 47-58. 

Africa South of the Sahara, 1992. (21st ed.) London: Europa, 1991. 

Africa South of the Sahara, 1993. (22d ed.) London: Europa, 1992. 

Africa South of the Sahara, 1994. (23d ed.) London: Europa, 1993. 

352 



Bibliography 



Amnesty International. Political Imprisonment in Zaire: AnAI Special 

Briefing. New York: 1983. 
Askin, Steve. ' 'Amid Stench and Decay, Professors and Students 

in Zaire Struggle to Keep Their Impoverished University Alive," 

The Chronicle of Higher Education, 34, No. 20, January 27, 1988, 

Al, A42-43. 

Asch, Susan. L'eglise du prophete Kimbangu: De ses origines a son role 
actuel au Zaire (1921-1981). Paris: Editions Karthala, 1983. 

Badibanga, Andre. "Je suis le 'pere de la nation,' " Le Mois en 
Afrique [Paris], Nos. 180-81, December 1980-January 1981, 
103-16. 

... ~ ~ — * 

Bayart, J.F. La politique africaine de Frangois Mitterrand. Paris: Edi- 
tions Karthala, 1984. 

Berkeley, Bill. "Zaire: An African Horror Story," Atlantic Month- 
ly, 272, No. 2, August 1993, 20-28. 

Bianga, Waruzi. "Peasant, State, and Rural Development in Post- 
Independent Zaire: A Case Study of 'Reforme Rurale,' 
1970-1980, and Its Implications." (Ph.D. dissertation.) Madi- 
son: University of Wisconsin, 1981. 

Blumenthal, Erwin. "Zaire: Rapport sur sa credibilite financiere 
international, " Revue Nouvelle [Paris] , 77, No. 11, 1982, 360-78. 

Brausch, Georges. Belgian Administration in the Congo. We^tport, Con- 
necticut: Greenwood Press, 1986. 

Buana Kabue. Citoyen president: Lettre ouverte au President Mobutu Sese 
Seko . . . et aux autres. Paris: Harmattan, 1978. 

Bustin, Edouard. "The Foreign Policy of the Republic of Zaire," 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 489, 
January 1987, 63-75. 

Buyseniers, Rob. L } eglise zairoise au service de quelle nation? Brussels: 
Cahiers A.F.R.I.C.A., 1980. 

Callaghy, Thomas M. Culture and Politics in Zaire. (Politics and Cul- 
ture Series.) Ann Arbor: Center for Political Studies, Institute 
for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1987. 

"Internal and External Aspects of Repression by a Lame 

Leviathan." Pages 95-125 in George A. Lopez and Michael Stohl 
(eds.), Dependence, Development, and State Repression. Westport, Con- 
necticut: Greenwood Press, 1988. 

- "The Ritual Dance of the Debt Game," Africa Report, 
September-October 1984, 22-24. 

The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective. New 

York: Columbia University Press, 1984. 

Zaire. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986. 

Chome, Jules. L 'ascension de Mobutu: du Sergent Joseph Desire au General 
Sese Seko. Brussels: Editions Complexe, 1974. 



353 



Zaire: A Country Study 



Mobutu et la contre-revolution en Afrique. Waterloo, Belgium: 

Tiers-monde et revolution, 1967. 

Comite Zaire. "(Les) Syndicats beiges et le syndicat du guide," 
Info-Zaire [Brussels], No. 34, January-March 1982, 3-20. 

Zaire: Le dossier de la recolonisation. Paris: Harmattan, 1978. 

Crabb,JohnH. The Legal System of Congo-Kinshasa. Charlottesville, 
Virginia: Michie, 1970. 

De Vos, Pierre. La decolonisation: Les evenements du Congo de 1959 
a 1967. Brussels: Editions ABC, 1975. 

Goovaerts, Leo. "L'eglise et l'etat au Zaire al'epreuve de 1' authen- 
ticate, " Cultures et Developpement [Lou vain, Belgium], 7, No. 2, 
1975,243-84. 

Gould, David J. Bureaucratic Corruption and Underdevelopment in the 
Third World: The Case of Zaire. Elmsford, New York: Pergamon 
Press, 1980. 

Gran, Guy. Development by People: Citizen Construction of a Just World. 

New York: Praeger, 1983. 
Gran, Guy, and Galen Hull (eds.). Zaire: The Political Economy of 

Underdevelopment. New York: Praeger, 1979. 
Jackson, Robert H., and Carl G. Rosberg. Personal Rule in Black 

Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant. Berkeley: University of 

California Press, 1982. 
Jewsiewicki, Bogumil (ed.). Etat independent du Congo, Congo beige, 

Republique democratique du Congo, Republique du Zaire? Saint- Foy, 

Canada: SAFI Press, 1984. 
Kwitney, Jonathan. Endless Enemies: The Making of an Unfriendly 

World. New York: Congdon and Weed, 1984. 
Laidi, Zaki. The Super-Powers and Africa: The Constraints of a Rivalry, 

1960-1990. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990. 
Lemarchand, Rene. "The State, the Parallel Economy, and the 

Changing Structure of Patronage Systems." Pages 149-70 in 

Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan (eds.), The Precarious 

Balance: State and Society in Africa. Boulder, Colorado: Westview 

Press, 1988. 

"Zaire: The Unmanageable Client- State." Pages 145-64 

in Rene Lemarchand (ed.), American Policy in Southern Africa: The 
Stakes and the Stance. (2d ed.) Lanham, Maryland: University Press 
of America, 1981. 

Leslie, Winsome J. The World Bank and Structural Transformation in 
Developing Countries: The Case of Zaire. Boulder, Colorado: Rien- 
ner, 1987. 

Zaire: Continuity and Political Change in an Oppressive State. 

Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993. 
"Lettre ouverte au citoyen president, fondateur du Mouvement 



354 



Bibliography 



Populaire de la Revolution, president de la Republique par un 
groupe de parlementaires," Politique Africaine [Paris], 1, No. 3, 
September 1981, 94-140. 
Mabi Mulumba and Mtamba Makombo. Cadres et dirigeants au Zaire: 
Qui sont-ils? Dictionnaire biographique. Kinshasa: Editions du 
C.R.P., 1986. 

MacGaffey, Janet. ' ' Initiatives from Below: Zaire's Other Path 
to Social and Economic Restructuring." Pages 243-61 in Go- 
ran Hyden and Michael Bratton (eds.), Governance and Politics 
in Africa. Boulder, Colorado: Rienner, 1992. 

MacGaffey, Wyatt. "The Policy of National Integration in Zaire," 
Journal of Modern African Studies [London], 20, No. 1, 1982, 
87-105. 

Makau wa Mutua and Peter Rosenblum. Zaire: Repression as 
Policy — A Human Rights Report. New York: Lawyers' Commit- 
tee for Human Rights, 1990. 

Naipaul, V.S. "A New King for the Congo: Mobutu and the Ni- 
hilism of Africa." Pages 183-219 in V.S. Naipaul (ed.), The 
Return of Eva Peron, with the Killings in Trinidad. New York: Ran- 
dom House, 1981. 

Nguza Karl-i-Bond. Mobutu, ou Vincarnation du mal zairois. London: 
Collings, 1982. 

Nimer, Benjamin. "The Congo in Soviet Policy," Survey [Lon- 
don], 86, No. 1, Winter 1973, 184-210. 

Nzongola-Ntalaja, Georges. Class Struggles and National Liberation 
in Africa: Essays on the Political Economy of Neocolonialism. Roxbury , 
Massachusetts: Omenana, 1982. 

"The Continuing Struggle for National Liberation in 

Zaire,' 1 Journal of Modern African Studies [London], 17, No. 4, 1979, 
595-614. 

"Mobutu's Dirty Tactics," West Africa, No. 3979, De- 
cember 27, 1993-January 9, 1994, 2345. 

Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Africa: Essays in Contem- 
porary Politics. London: Zed Books, 1987. 

"United States Policy Towards Zaire." Pages 225-88 in 

Gerald J. Bender, James S. Coleman, and Richard L. Sklar 
(eds.), African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy. Berkeley: Univer- 
sity of California Press, 1985. 

Nzongola-Ntalaja, Georges (ed.). The Crisis in Zaire: Myths and Real- 
ities. Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press, 1986. 

Odier, Jeannick. "La politique etrangere de Mobutu, ' ' Revue Fran- 
gaise d' Etudes Politiques Africaines [Paris], No. 120, December 1975, 
25-41. 

Pachter, Elise Forbes. "Our Man in Kinshasa: U.S. Relations with 



355 



Zaire: A Country Study 

Mobutu, 1970-83, Patron-Client Relations in the Internation- 
al Sphere." (Ph.D. dissertation.) Washington: School of Ad- 
vanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 1987. 

' ' Pile et face: Bilan de la cooperation belgo-zairoise," Revue Nou- 
velle [Paris], Special issue, March 1989. 

Rymenam, Jean. "Classes sociales, pouvoir, et economie au Zaire, 
ou comment le sous-developpement enrichit les gouvernements," 
Geneve-Afrique [Geneva], 19, No. 1, 1980, 43-53. 

Schatzberg, Michael G. The Dialectics of Oppression in Zaire. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988. 

"Ethnicity and Class at the Local Level: Bars and 

Bureaucrats in Lisala, Zaire," Comparative Politics, 13, No. 4, 
July 1983, 461-78. 

- "Military Intervention and the Myth of Collective Secu- 
rity: The Case of Zaire, "Journal of Modern African Studies [Lon- 
don], 27, No. 2, 1989, 315-40. 

- Mobutu or Chaos? The United States and Zaire, 1960-1990. 
Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1991. 

Politics and Class in Zaire: Bureaucracy, Business, and Beer in 

Lisala. New York: Africana, 1980. 

"Zaire." Pages 283-318 in Timothy M. Shaw and Olajide 

Aluko (eds.), The Political Economy of African Foreign Policy: Com- 
parative Analysis. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984. 

Schoepf, Brooke G. "Man and Biosphere in Zaire." Pages 269-90 
in Jonathan Barker (ed.), The Politics of Agriculture in Tropical Africa. 
Beverly Hills, California: Sage, 1984. 

Shaw, Timothy M. "Beyond Neo-Colonialism: Varieties of Cor- 
poratism in Africa," Journal of Modern African Studies [London], 
20, No. 2, 1982, 239-61. 

Simons, E., B. Verhaegen, andJ.C. Willame. Transfert de technologie 
et emploi en Afrique, 2: Endettement, technologies, et industrialisation 
au Zaire (1970-1981). Brussels: CEDAF, 1981. 

Stockwell, John. In Search of Enemies. New York: Norton, 1978. 

Turner, Margaret A. "Housing in Zaire: How the System Works 
and How the People Cope." (Ph.D. dissertation.) Madison: 
University of Wisconsin, 1985. 

Turner, Thomas E. "The Case of Zaire: Is Mobutu a Cor- 
poratist?" Pages 129-47 in Julius E. Nyang'oro and Timothy 
M. Shaw (eds.), Corporatism in Africa. Boulder, Colorado: West- 
view Press, 1989. 

"Chiefs, Bureaucrats, and the MPR of Zaire." Pages 

370-91 in Kay Lawson (ed.), Political Parties and Linkage. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1980. 

"Decline or Recovery in Zaire?" Current History, 87, No. 



356 



Bibliography 



529, May 1988, 213-16, 230. 

' 'Mobutu's Zaire: Permanently on the Verge of Collapse?" 

Current History, 80, No. 463, March 1981, 124-27, 130. 

"Zaire: Stalemate and Compromise," Current History, 84, 

No. 501, April 1985, 179-83. 

Tutashinda, N. "Les mystifications de 1' authenticity, " Pensees 
[Paris], 175, May-June 1974. 

United States. Congress. 102d, 1st Session. Senate. Committee 
on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on African Affairs. The Sit- 
uation in Zaire. (Hearing, November 6, 1991.) Washington: GPO, 
1992. 

Congress. 102d, 2d Session. Senate. Committee on For- 
eign Relations. Emergency Situation in Zaire and Somalia. (Hear- 
ing, February 5, 1992.) Washington: GPO, 1992. 

Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Prac- 
tices for 1991. (Report submitted to United States Congress, 102d, 
2d Session, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, and Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations.) Washing- 
ton: GPO, 1992. 

Vanderlinden, Jacques (ed.). Du Congo au Zaire 1960-1980: Essai 
de bilan. Brussels: Centre de recherche et d' information socio- 
politiques, 1980. 

Vansina, Jan. "Mwasi's Trials," Daedalus, 111, No. 2, Spring 
1982, 49-70. 

Verhaegen, Benoit. L'enseignement universitaire au Zaire: De Lovani- 
um a rUnaza, 1958-1978. Paris: Harmattan, 1978. 

"Les mouvements de liberation en Afrique: Le cas du Zaire 

en 1978," Geneve-Afrique [Geneva], 17, No. 1, 1979, 173-81. 

Weissman, Stephen R. "CIA Covert Action in Zaire and Ango- 
la: Patterns and Consequences," Political Science Quarterly, 94, No. 
2, Summer 1979, 263-86. 

Willame, Jean-Claude. L'automne d'un despotisme: Pouvoir, argent, et 
obeissance dans le Zaire des annees quatre-vingt. Paris: Editions Kar- 
thala, 1992. 

Patrimonialism and Political Change in the Congo. Stanford: 

Stanford University Press, 1972. 

Zaire: L } epopee d'Inga. Paris: Harmattan, 1986. 

Wilson, Francille Rusan. "Reinventing the Past and Circumscrib- 
ing the Future: Authenticity a.nd the Negative Image of Women's 
Work in Zaire." Pages 153-70 in Edna G. Bay (ed.), Women 
and Work in Africa. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982. 

Young, Crawford. "Elections in Zaire: The Shadow of Democra- 
cy." Pages 187-212 in Fred M. Hayward (ed.), Elections in In- 
dependent Africa. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987. 



357 



Zaire: A Country Study 



. "Ethnic Politics in Zaire." Pages 163-215 in Crawford 

Young (ed.), The Politics of Cultural Pluralism. Madison: Univer- 
sity of Wisconsin Press, 1976. 

"Zaire and the Soviet Union." Pages 202-24 in Dennis 

L. Bark (ed.), The Red Orchestra, 2: The Case of Africa. Stanford, 
California: Hoover Institution Press, 1988. 

"Zaire: The Unending Crisis," Foreign Affairs, 57, No. 

1, Fall 1978, 169-85. 

"The Zairian Crisis and American Foreign Policy." Pages 

209-24 in Gerald J. Bender, James S. Coleman, and Richard 
L. Sklar (eds.), African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy. Berke- 
ley: University of California Press, 1985. 

Young, Crawford, and Thomas Turner. TTie Rise and Decline of the 
Zairian State. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985. 

Zartman, I. William. Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in 
Africa. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. 

(Various issues of the following publications were also used in the 
preparation of this chapter: Africa Confidential; Cahiers du CEDAF 
[Brussels]; Current History; Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: 
Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi [London]; Economist Intelligence Unit, Coun- 
try Report: Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi [London]; Foreign Broadcast In- 
formation Service, Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa; Jeune Afrique 
[Paris] ; Le Monde [Paris] ; New York Times; and Washington Post. ) 



Chapter 5 

Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1988-1989. 

(Ed., Marion E. Doro.) New York: Africana, 1992. 
Africa South of the Sahara, 1992. (21st ed.) London: Europa, 1991. 
Africa South of the Sahara, 1993. (22d ed.) London: Europa, 1992. 
Africa South of the Sahara, 1994. (23d ed.) London: Europa, 1993. 
Africa Watch. Zaire: Two Years Without Transition. New York: July 

1992. 

Amnesty International. Amnesty International Report, 1991. New York: 
1991. 

Amnesty International Report, 1992. New York: 1992. 

Amnesty International Report, 1993. New York: 1993. 

Human Rights Violations in Zaire. London: 1980. 

The Ill-Treatment and Torture of Political Prisoners at Detention 

Centers in Kinshasa. London: 1980. 
Political Imprisonment in Zaire: An AI Special Briefing. New 

York: 1983. 



358 



Bibliography 



Report on Cases of Nineteen People Tried by the Court of State 

Security in Kinshasa, June 1982. London: 1982. 

Student Arrests in Zaire During the First Half of 1980. Lon- 
don: 1980. 

Summary of Concerns in the Republic of Zaire. London: 1987. 

Zaire: Amnesty International Concerns Between January 1987 and 

January 1988. New York: 1988. 
Zaire: Reports of Torture and Killings Committed by the Armed 

Forces in Shaba Region. London: 1986. 
Berkeley, Bill. "Zaire: An African Horror Story," Atlantic Month- 
ly, 272, No. 2, August 1993, 20-28. 
Bobb, F. Scott. "Another Rescue Operation," Africa Report, 

March- April 1979, 16-20. 
Callaghy, Thomas M. The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative 

Perspective. New York: Columbia University Press, 1984. 
Coquery- Vidro vitch, Catherine, Alain Forest, and Herbert Weiss 

(eds.). Rebellions-revolution au Zaire, 1963-1965. Paris: Harmat- 

tan, 1987. 

Crabb, John H. The Legal System of Congo-Kinshasa. Charlottesville, 
Virginia: Michie, 1970. 

Fungula, Fumu Ngondji. "Une reflexion sur 1' opposition politique 
zairoise." Pages 115-24 in Bogumil Jewsiewicki (ed.), Etat in- 
dependent du Congo, Congo beige, Republique democratique du Congo, 
Republique du Zaire? Saint Foy, Canada: SAFI Press, 1984. 

Gerard- Libais, Jules. Katanga Secession. (Trans., Rebecca Young.) 
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966. 

Gildea, Tara. "A Case Study of Zaire's Foreign Policy: Shaba I 
and II." (M.A. thesis.) Geneva: Institut universitaire de hautes 
etudes internationales, 1990. 

Gould, David J. Bureaucratic Corruption and Underdevelopment in the 
Third World: The Case of Zaire. Elmsford, New York: Pergamon 
Press, 1980. 

"Patrons and Clients: The Role of the Military in Zairian 

Politics." Pages 465-506 in James Isaac Mowoe (ed.), The Per- 
formance of Soldiers as Governors. Columbus, Ohio: University Press 
of America, 1980. 

Grundy, Kenneth W. Guerrilla Struggle in Africa: An Analysis and 
Review. New York: Grossman, 1971. 

Hoare, Michael. Congo Mercenary. London: Hale, 1967. 

International League for Human Rights. Zaire's Human Rights 
Record: Comments on the Government of Zaire's Official Report to the 
Human Rights Committee. New York: 1987. 

Jackson, Robert H., and Carl G. Rosberg. Personal Rule in Black 
Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant. Berkeley: University of 



359 



Zaire: A Country Study 

California Press, 1982. 

Jewsiewicki, Bogumil. "Pour une histoire comparee des revokes 
populaires au Congo." Pages 130-57 in Catherine Coquery- 
Vidrovitch, Alain Forest, and Herbert Weiss (eds.), Rebellions- 
revolution au Zaire, 1963-1965. Paris: Harmattan, 1987. 

Kalb, Madeleine G. The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa — 
From Eisenhower to Kennedy. New York: Macmillan, 1982. 

Kengo-wa-Dondo. "Le pouvoir judiciare sous la deuxieme repub- 
lique zairoise," Studia Diplomatica [Brussels], 28, No. 5, 1975. 

Kilch, Ignacio. "Israel Returns to Africa," Middle East International, 
No. 176, June 4, 1983, 11-12. 

Kitchen, Helen (ed.). Footnotes to the Congo Story. New York: Walk- 
er, 1967. 

Kurian, George Thomas. World Encyclopedia of Police Forces and Penal 
Systems. New York: Facts on File, 1989. 

Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights. Zaire: Repression as Poli- 
cy: A Human Rights Report. New York: 1990. 

Lefever, Ernest. Crisis in the Congo: A United Nations Force in Action. 
Washington: Brookings Institution, 1965. 

Spear and Scepter. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1970. 

Malu, Malutamidi. The Shaba Invasions. Fort Leavenworth, Kan- 
sas: United States Army Command and General Staff College 
Press, 1988. 

Mangold, Peter. "Shaba I and Shaba II," Survival [London], 

May-June 1979, 107-15. 
Meason, James E. "African Navies South of the Sahara," U.S. 

Naval Institute Proceedings, March 1987, 56-64. 
The Military Balance, 1993-1994. London: International Institute 

for Strategic Studies, 1993. 
Miller, Charles. Battle for the Bundu: The First World War in East Africa. 

New York: Macmillan, 1974. 
"Mobutu's Batde for Survival," Africa [London], 91, March 1979, 

16-20. 

"Mobutu's Secret War," New African [London], No. 191, August 
1983, 11-14. 

Mockler, Anthony. The New Mercenaries: The History of the Hired Soldier 
from the Congo to the Seychelles. New York: Paragon House, 1987. 

O'Brien, Connor Cruise. To Katanga and Back: A U.N. Case Histo- 
ry. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962. 

Odom, Thomas P. Dragon Operations: Hostage Rescues in the Congo, 
1964-1965. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: United States Army 
Command and General Staff College Press, 1988. 

Shaba II: The French and Belgian Intervention in Zaire in 1978. 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: United States Army Command and 



360 



Bibliography 



General Staff College Press, 1992. 

Ogunbadejo, Oye. "Conflict in Africa: A Case Study of the Sha- 
ba Crisis, 1977," World Affairs, Winter 1979, 219-34. 

Paulus, Jean-Pierre. Droit publique du Congo beige. Brussels: Universite 
libre de Belgique, 1959. 

' 'Republic of Zaire, "Journal of Defense and Diplomacy, October 1986, 
28-37. 

Salacuse, Jeswald W. Introduction to Law in French-Speaking Africa. 
Charlottesville, Virginia: Michie, 1969. 

Schatzberg, Michael G. The Dialectics of Oppression in Zaire. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988. 

"Military Intervention and the Myth of Collective Secu- 
rity: The Case of Zaire," Journal of Modern African Studies [Lon- 
don], 27, No. 2, 1989, 315-40. 

Shaw, Bryant P. Force Publique, Force Unique: The Military in the Bel- 
gian Congo, 1914-1939. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1987. 

Turner, Thomas E. "Decline or Recovery in Zaire?" Current His- 
tory, 87, No. 529, May 1988, 213-16, 230. 

' ' Zaire' s Armed Forces, ' ' Journal of Defense and Diplomacy, 

October 1986, 38-41. 

United States. Agency for International Development. Economic De- 
velopment vs. Military Expenditures in Countries Receiving U.S. Aid. 
(Report submitted to Congress, 96th, 2d Session, House of 
Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, and Senate, 
Committee on Foreign Relations.) Washington: GPO, 1980. 

Department of Defense. Security Assistance Agency. For- 
eign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales, and Military 
Assistance Facts. Washington; September 1991. 

Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Prac- 
tices for 1989. (Report submitted to United States Congress, 101st, 
2d Session, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, and Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations.) Washing- 
ton: GPO, February 1990. 

Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Prac- 
tices for 1990. (Report submitted to United States Congress, 102d, 
1st Session, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, and House 
of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs.) Washing- 
ton: GPO, 1991. 

_. Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Prac- 
tices for 1991. (Report submitted to United States Congress, 102d, 
2d Session, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, and Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations.) Washing- 
ton: GPO, 1992. 



361 



Zaire: A Country Study 



Verhaegen, Benoit. "La rebellion muleliste au Kwilu: Chronologie 
des evenements et essai d' interpretation (Janvier 1962-Juillet 
1964)." Pages 120-46 in Catherine Coquery- Vidro vitch, Alain 
Forest, and Herbert Weiss (eds.), Rebellions-revolution au Zaire, 
1963-1965. Paris: Harmattan, 1987. 

"Le role de l'ethnie et de l'individu dans la rebellion du 

Kwilu et dans son echec. " Pages 147-67 in Catherine Coquery- 
Vidrovitch, Alain Forest, and Herbert Weiss (eds.), Rebellions- 
revolution au Zaire, 1963-1965. Paris: Harmattan, 1987. 

Wagoner, Fred E. Dragon Rouge: The Rescue of Hostages in the Congo. 
Washington: National Defense University, 1980. 

Weiss, Herbert, and Adrienne Fulco. "Les partisans au Kwilu: 
Analyse des origines sociales des membres et cadres des equipes 
de base." Pages 168-81 in Catherine Coquery- Vidro vitch, Alain 
Forest, and Herbert Weiss (eds.), Rebellions-revolution au Zaire, 
1963-1965. Paris: Harmattan, 1987. 

Weissman, Stephen, R. American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 
1960-1964. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974. 

"CIA Covert Action in Zaire and Angola: Patterns and 

Consequences," Political Science Quarterly, 94, No. 2, Summer 
1979, 263-86. 

Willame, Jean-Claude. "Political Succession in Zaire or Back to 
Machiavelli," Journal oj Modern African Studies [London], March 
1988, 37-49. \ 

Wright, John B. Francophone Black Africa since Independence. (Conflict 
Studies Series.) London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1981. 

. Zaire since Independence. (Conflict Studies Series.) London: 

Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1983. 

Young, Crawford. Conflict in the Congo. Princeton: Princeton Univer- 
sity Press, 1965. 

"Elections in Zaire: The Shadows of Democracy." Pages 

187-212 in Fredrick M. Hayward (ed.), Elections in Independent 
Africa. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987. 

"The Portuguese Coup and Zaire's Southern African Poli- 
cy." Pages 195-212 in John Seiler (ed.), Southern Africa since the 
Portuguese Coup. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980. 

. "Zaire and Cameroon." Pages 120-49 in Peter Duignan 

and Robert Jackson (eds.), Politics and Government in African States. 
Stanford, California: Hoover Institution, 1986. 

Young, Crawford, and Thomas Turner. The Rise and Decline of the 
Zairian State. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985. 

(Various issues of the following publications were also used in 
the preparation of this chapter: Africa Confidential [London]; African 



362 



Bibliography 



Defence Journal [Paris]; Amnesty International, Urgent Action; Brit- 
ish Broadcasting Corporation, Monitoring Service, Summary of World 
Broadcasts, Pt. 4: The Middle East, Africa, and Latin America [Lon- 
don]; Christian Science Monitor; DMS Market Intelligence Reports: Mid- 
dle East/Africa; Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: 
Sub-Saharan Africa; Military Technology; New York Times; Washington 
Post; and World Defense Almanac. ) 



363 



Glossary 



abacost — Name for the male attire favored by Mobutu and promoted 
as part of the authenticity (q.v.) campaign, consisting of a short- 
sleeved suit worn without a tie. The word abacost is derived from 
the French a bas le costume, or "down with the suit." 

authenticity — An official state ideology of the Mobutu regime that 
emerged in the late 1960s and 1970s. Emphasizing the value 
of authentic Zairian culture, authenticity was a reaction against 
the lingering vestiges of colonialism and the continuing influence 
of Western culture. As implemented, the policy resulted in 
numerous changes in both public and private life; for exam- 
ple, the name of the country was changed to Zaire, and Zair- 
ian names were given to cities, regions, streets, bridges, boats, 
and other public facilities. Individuals were encouraged to drop 
Western, Christian names in favor of Zairian names; to adopt 
the abacost (q.v.) and its female equivalent in place of Western 
attire; and to address each other as "citizen" instead of using 
the standard French monsieur or madame. The policy began to 
wane in the late 1970s. 

clan — A group whose members are descended in the male line from 
a putative common male ancestor (patrician) or in the female 
line from a putative common female ancestor (matriclan). Clans 
may be divided into subclans organized on the same principle 
or into lineage (q. v. ) groups believed to be linked by descent 
from a remote common ancestor. 

descent group — A group having political, economic, or social func- 
tions. Formation of the group is based on actual or putative 
descent through persons of one sex from a common ancestor 
of the same sex, and therefore called a unilineal descent group 
(clan — q.v. or lineage — q.v.), or through persons of both sexes 
from a common ancestor of either sex (cognatic descent group). 

evolue — A French term (literally, "evolved," or "developed") used 
in the colonial era to refer to Africans who had "evolved" 
through education or assimilation and accepted European values 
and patterns of behavior. Evolues spoke French, usually held 
white-collar jobs, and were primarily urban. 

fiscal year (FY) — In Zaire, the calendar year. 

gross domestic product (GDP) — A measure of the total value of 
goods and services produced by a domestic national economy 
during a given period, usually one year. Obtained by adding 
the value contributed by each sector of the economy in the form 



365 



Zaire: A Country Study 

of profits, compensation to employees, and depreciation (con- 
sumption of capital). Only domestic production is included, 
not income arising from investments and possessions owned 
abroad, hence the use of the word domestic to distinguish GDP 
from the gross national product (GNP — q. v.). Real GDP is the 
value of GDP when inflation has been taken into account. In 
countries lacking sophisticated data- gathering techniques, such 
as Zaire, the total value of GDP is often estimated. 

gross national product (GNP) — The total market value of all final 
goods and services produced by an economy during a year. 
Obtained by adding gross domestic product (GDP — q. v. ) and 
the income received from abroad by residents and then sub- 
tracting payments remitted abroad to nonresidents. Real GNP 
is the value of GNP when inflation has been taken into account. 

immatriculation — In the colonial era, the process by which an evolue 
(q.v.) was given the same legal status as Europeans. 

import substitution — An economic development strategy that em- 
phasizes the growth of domestic industries, often by import pro- 
tection using tariff and nontariff measures. Proponents favor 
the export of industrial goods over primary products. 

International Monetary Fund (IMF) — Established along with the 
World Bank (q.v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency 
affiliated with the United Nations that is responsible for stabiliz- 
ing international exchange rates and payments. The main busi- 
ness of the IMF is the provision of loans to its members 
(including industrialized and developing countries) when they 
experience balance of payments difficulties. These loans fre- 
quently carry conditions that require substantial internal eco- 
nomic adjustments by the recipients, most of which are 
developing countries. 

lineage — A group whose members are descended through males 
from a common male ancestor (patrilineage) or through females 
from a common female ancestor (matrilineage) . Such descent 
can in principle be traced. Lineages vary in genealogical depth 
from the ancestor to living generations; the more extensive ones 
often are internally segmented. 

Mobutism — An official state and party ideology encompassing and 
glorifying the thoughts, visions, and policies of Mobutu. In- 
cludes such major Mobutu initiatives as Zairianization (q.v.) 
and authenticity (q.v.). 

parastatal — A semi-autonomous, quasi- governmental, state-owned 
enterprise. 

Paris Club — The informal name for a consortium of Western cre- 
ditor countries (Belgium, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, 



366 



Glossary 



Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the 
United States) that have made loans or have guaranteed ex- 
port credits to developing nations and that meet in Paris to dis- 
cuss borrowers' ability to repay debts. Paris Club deliberations 
often result in the tendering of emergency loans to countries 
in economic difficulty or in the rescheduling of debts. Formed 
in October 1962, the organization has no formal or institutional 
existence. Its secretariat is run by the French treasury. It has 
a close relationship with the International Monetary Fund (q. v. ), 
to which all of its members except Switzerland belong, as well 
as with the World Bank (q. v. ) and the United Nations Confer- 
ence on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The Paris Club 
is also known as the Group of Ten (G-10). 

patrimonialism (adj., patrimonial) — A traditional political system 
in which government is personal, and government adminis- 
tration is an extension of the ruler. In such a system, the in- 
dividual national leader controls the political and economic life 
of the country, and personal relationships with the leader play 
a crucial role in amassing personal wealth or in the rise and 
decline of members of the political elite. 

retrocession — The official name given to the policy of reversing 
Zairianization (q.v.). Under the policy, announced on Decem- 
ber 30, 1974, up to 40 percent of ownership of Zairianized 
properties could be returned to foreign owners. The propor- 
tion was increased to 60 percent in late 1975. 

special drawing rights (SDRs) — Monetary units of the International 
Monetary Fund (q. v. ) based on a basket of international cur- 
rencies including the United States dollar, the German deutsche 
mark, the Japanese yen, the British pound sterling, and the 
French franc. 

World Bank — Informal name used to designate a group of four 
affiliated international institutions that provide advice and as- 
sistance on long-term finance and policy issues to developing 
countries: the International Bank for Reconstruction and De- 
velopment (IBRD), the International Development Associa- 
tion (IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and 
the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). The 
IBRD, established in 1945, has as its primary purpose the pro- 
vision of loans at market- related rates of interest to develop- 
ing countries at more advanced stages of development. The 
IDA, a legally separate loan fund administered by the staff of 
the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to furnish credits to the poorest 
developing countries on much easier terms than those of con- 
ventional IBRD loans. The IFC, founded in 1956, supplements 



367 



Zaire: A Country Study 

the activities of the IBRD through loans and assistance designed 
specifically to encourage the growth of productive private en- 
terprises in the less developed countries. The president and cer- 
tain senior officers of the IBRD hold the same positions in the 
IFC. The MIGA, which began operating in June 1988, insures 
private foreign investment in developing countries against such 
noncommercial risks as expropriation, civil strife, and noncon- 
vertibility of currency. The four institutions are owned by the 
governments of the countries that subscribe their capital. To 
participate in the World Bank Group, member states must first 
belong to the International Monetary Fund (q-v.). 

zaire (Z) — Zairian currency unit, introduced on June 24, 1967, 
replacing the Congolese franc. Consists of 100 makuta (sing., 
likuta), designated by the symbol k. From June 24, 1967, 
through March 11, 1976, Zl equaled US$2. On March 12, 
1976, the zaire was pegged to special drawing rights (q.v.), 
thereby establishing an effective value of Zl equaled US$1 .15. 
The rate between the zaire and the dollar was subject to mar- 
ket forces thereafter. In recent years, the zaire has been devalued 
numerous times (e.g., 1983, 1988, 1989, and 1991), and its 
value has plummeted. In terms of the dollar, the average an- 
nual exchange rate declined from Z50 in 1985 to Z719 in 1990, 
to Z15,587 in 1991, and Z645,549 in 1992. In early 1993, the 
exchange rate was estimated at Z8 million to the dollar, and 
in December 1993, Z110 million equaled US$1. 

Zairianization — Name given to the policy, announced in Novem- 
ber 1973, requiring the transfer of foreign enterprises in stra- 
tegic sectors of the economy, such as agriculture, commerce, 
and transport, to Zairians. The inefficient management of the 
enterprises thus transferred led to a partial retrocession (q. v. ) 
of ownership to original holders beginning in 1975. 



368 



Index 



abacost, 50, 212 

Abako. See Alliance of the Kongo People 
ACPC. See Association of Coffee Produc- 
ing Countries 
acquereurs, 98, 144 

acquired immune deficiency syndrome 

(AIDS), liv, 128 
Actualites Africaines, 45 
Adamawa-Eastern language family, 

80-81 

Adoula, Cyrille, 25; as prime minister, 38 
Adoula government, 38-39; opposition 
to, 39; revision of districts under, 
38-39; resignation of, 37-38, 42 
Afco. See Association of Women Mer- 
chants 

African Charter of Human and People's 
Rights, 326 

African Development Bank, 191 

African Solidarity Party (Parti Solidaire 
Africain— PSA), 33 

Agence Nationale de Documentation. See 
National Documentation Agency 

agricultural production, 150; quotas for, 
17, 75-76, 102, 108, 140, 174 

agricultural products (see also under in- 
dividual crops), 171-74; bananas, 5; cash 
crops, 110, 139, 167, 172; cereals, 5; 
for export, 102, 196; imported, 168; oil 
palm, 5; smuggling of, 167, 168; sub- 
sistence, 167; yams, 5 

agriculture, 167-76; Chinese advisers in, 
197; colonial, 139-40, 168; corruption 
in, 168; enterprises, 168; inputs, 167; 
as percentage of gross domestic 
product, 156, 167; portion of budget al- 
located to, 162; potential of, 167, 168; 
precolonial, 5, 94, 138-39; privatiza- 
tion in, 150; slash-and-burn, 167, 175; 
subsistence, 167, 168; women in, 110- 
12, 172; work force in, 167; under 
Zairianization, 167, 168 

Agrifor: privatization of, 150 

AIDS. See acquired immune deficiency 
syndrome 

air force, 277, 303; capabilities of, 303; 
materiel, 303; mission, 303; number 
of personnel in, 277, 303; organiza- 



tion of, 303 
airlines, 108, 192 

Air Transport Union (Union de Trans- 
ports Aeriens— UTA), 192 

Air Zaire, 108, 192; government owner- 
ship of, 152; management of, 192 

Alliance des Bakongo (Abako). See Alli- 
ance of the Kongo People 

Alliance of Patriotic Forces, li, 215-16 

Alliance of the Kongo People (Alliance 
des Bakongo — Abako) (see also Associ- 
ation for the Maintenance, Unity, and 
Expansion of the Kikongo Language), 
3, 22, 23-24; in elections, 24; manifesto 
of, 23; recognition of denied, 247 

Alur people, 82 

Amin Dada, Idi, 279, 280 

Amnesty International, 279, 326, 327 

ancestors, 121 

AND. See National Documentation 
Agency 

ANC. See Congolese National Army 
Angola: armed forces of, 281; involve- 
ment in, xlvii, 265-67, 291-92; migra- 
tion to Zaire from, 71; refugees from, 
71, 73; refugees to, 293; relations with, 
267-69, 279, 281-82; support for inva- 
sions of Shaba, 281 ; troops deployed to, 
302 

Angolan civil war: Cuban intervention in, 
278; Zairian intervention in, 55-56, 
278, 281 

ANL. See National Liberation Army 

Armee Nationale Congolaise. See Congo- 
lese National Army 

Armee Nationale de Liberation. See Na- 
tional Liberation Army 

Arabs, 77; trade with, 9-10, 14, 139, 283; 
military campaigns against, 14, 283 

armed forces (see also under military), 277; 
in Angolan civil-war, 55-56; attitudes 
toward, 297-98; buildup of, 278; civic- 
action role of, 298; under colonial rule, 
282-86; conditions in, 304, 306-7; con- 
trol of, by Mobutu, 232-33; corruption 
in, 279, 306; development of, under 
Mobutu, 288-90; discontent in, 297; 
discrimination in, 297; evolution of, 



369 



Zaire: A Country Study 



282-91; food for, 307; housing for, 307; 
lack of coherence in, 277-78; manpow- 
er, 304-8; manpower pool, 304; medi- 
cal care for, 307; missions of, 298-304; 
number of personnel in, 277; organi- 
zation of, 298-304; pay withheld from, 
137, 277, 279, 293, 300, 306; portion 
of budget allocated to, 162; president 
as supreme commander of, 298; purge 
of, 291; recruitment for, 304-6; regions 
of, 299; restructuring of, 279; retention, 
304-6; rioting by, 137, 160, 161, 177, 
215, 218, 297-98, 301; support of, for 
Mobutu, 298-99, 302; training, 296, 
304-8; uniforms, ranks, and insignia 
of, 308; violence by, 277, 297-98, 302, 
306; weaknesses in, 293, 294-95, 301; 
women in, 306 
Armee Nationale Congolaise. See Congo- 
lese National Army 
Arm of the Ngala. See Liboko Ya Bangala 
Armor Training School, 307, 313 
army, 277, 299-302; capabilities of, 301; 
deployment of, 299-300, 302; human 
rights abuses by, 288; logistics corps, 
300-301; loyalty of, 301-2; materiel of, 
300; mission of, 277; number of per- 
sonnel in, 277, 299; organization of, 
299-300; pay, 300; reforms in, 293-94; 
restructuring of, 284; uniforms, ranks, 
and insignia of, 308; weaknesses in, 301 
Asia: foreign residents from, 97 
Association des Baluba du Katanga. See 
Association of the Luba People of 
Katanga 

Association des Femmes Commercantes. 
See Association of Women Merchants 

Association des Lulua Freres. See Associ- 
ation of Lulua Brothers 

Association for the Maintenance, Unity, 
and Expansion of the Kikongo Lan- 
guage (Association pour le Maintien, 
1' Unite, et T Expansion de la Langue 
Kikongo) {see also Alliance of the Kon- 
go People), 22 

Association of Coffee Producing Coun- 
tries (ACPC), 173 

Association of Lulua Brothers (Associa- 
tion des Lulua Freres), 52 

Association of the Luba People of Katan- 
ga (Association des Baluba du Katan- 
ga — Balubakat), 27; in elections, 27- 
28; secession of, 35 



Association of Women Merchants (Associ- 
ation des Femmes Commercantes — 
Afco), 111 

Association pour le Maintien, 1' Unite, 
et 1' Expansion de la Langue Kikongo. 
See Association for the Maintenance, 
Unity, and Expansion of the Kikongo 
Language 

associations (see also under individual types 
of association): ethnic, 22, 52; secret, 94; 
women's, 51, 111 

Association Zairoise pour le Bien-Etre 
Familial. See Zairian Association for 
Family Weil-Being 

authenticity policy, xlii, 45, 50, 105, 206, 
290-91; abandoned, 212; address terms 
in, 107, 212; name changes in, xliii, 50, 
114, 206, 242 

AZBEF. See Zairian Association for Fam- 
ily Well-Being 

Bakajika Law (1966), 171, 264 
Bakwanga Mining Company (Societe 

Miniere de Bakwanga — Miba), 181, 

196 

balance of payments, 149, 194-96 
balance of trade: decline in, 144-45 
Balese people, 81 

Balubakat. See Association of the Luba 
People of Katanga 

Banana: naval base, 302, 303; port of, 192 

Banda people, 6, 81 

Bandundu Region: forests in, 174; min- 
ing in, 181; uprising in, xlvii 

Bangala people, 90 

Bangu-Bangu people, 86 

banking, 164-65; collapse of, 138, 151, 
165; informal, 165 

Bank of Zaire (Banque du Zaire), xlvi, 
165; attempts to audit, xlvi, 146; bank- 
ruptcy of, 138, 165; functions of, 165 

banks, 165; commercial, 165 

Banque du Zaire. See Bank of Zaire 

Bantu-speaking peoples, 4, 79, 82-90; ar- 
rival of, 4; expansion of, 4; setdements 
of, 4-5 

Banyarwanda people (see also Hutu people; 
Tutsi people): attacks on, 1, 74; popu- 
lation of, 74; resentment of, 92 

Bas-Congo to Katanga Railroad Compa- 
ny (Compagnie du Chemin de Fer du 
Bas-Congo au Katanga— BCK), 140 



370 



Index 



Bas-Uele Subregion: ethnic groups in, 81 

Bas-Zai're Region: agribusiness in, 168; 
agriculture in, 174; electricity produc- 
tion in, 187; forests in, 174; free-trade 
zone in, 197-98; logging in, 69, 174; 
petroleum in, 177; population density 
in, 73; refugees in, 73; religion in, 119 

Baudouin I (king), 24 

BCK. See Bas-Congo to Katanga Railroad 
Company 

Belgium: advisers from, 35, 96, 294, 309, 
316; aid from, 191, 197; aid suspend- 
ed by, 214; expansion of, in Africa, 13; 
exports to, 178, 196; humanitarian aid 
from, 197; intervention by, 30, 286; in- 
vestment by, 186, 198; links to, 104; 
military assistance from, 57, 215, 278, 
286, 288, 289, 292, 294, 295-96, 297, 
309; military training by, 290, 296, 
303, 307, 308; Mobutu in, 45-46; pres- 
sure from, for democratization, 216-17; 
relations with, 204; residents from, 97; 
treaties with, 30 

Bemba cluster, 85 

Benguela Railway (Angola), 189; closure 

of, 146, 179, 191 
Biebuyck, Daniel, 84 
Binji people, 86 
Binza Group, 46, 1, li, lii, 205 
Birindwa, Faustin, 1, li, lii, 204 
Birindwa government, 1, li, 204, 219, 220; 

members of, 224 
birth control, 131-32; acceptance of, 132; 

distribution of, 131-32 
Black Arrow troops (see also Front for the 

National Liberation of the Congo), 56 
Blumenthal, Erwin, xlvi, 146 
Bobangi people, 6, 82 
Bolikango, Jean, xxxviii, 46 
Boma: naval base, 302; port of, 192 
Boma-Sakata cluster, 88 
Bomboko, Justin-Marie, 32 
border problems, xxxv, xlviii, 269-70, 

279 

border security, 318, 320 

bribes, 54, 59, 100, 105-7, 129, 323; 
vocabulary for, 106-7 

Britain: currency printed in, 163, 165; 
military assistance from, 309 

budget, government, 98, 162-63; distri- 
bution of, 162; expenditures, 162; for 
fiscal year 1987, 162; revenues, 162 

budget deficit, 146, 151, 162-63; as per- 



centage of gross domestic product, 149 
Bukavu, lv, lvi 

bula matari, xxxvii, 3,16; resurrection of, 
44 

Bureau of the Presidency of the Repub- 
lic, 222 

Burundi: migration to Zaire from, 71; 

refugees from, 71, 73; relations with, 

269, 270-71 
Bushong people, 88 

business enterprises: of Roman Catholic 
Church, 112; of foreign residents, 
96-97; government involvement in, 18, 
151; welfare services provided by, 140 



cabinet (see also Council of Ministers; Na- 
tional Executive Council), 211-12; un- 
der constitution of 1967, 48 

CADR. See Corps of Activists for the 
Defense of the Revolution 

Caisse Nationale d'Epargne et de Credit 
Immobilier. See National Savings and 
Real Estate Fund 

Callaghy, Thomas, 152, 153, 294, 296 

Canada: aid suspended by, 214; invest- 
ment by, 198 

cannibalism, 284 

Cao, Diogo, xxxvi, 11 

capitas (native supervisors), 14 

cassava (manioc), 167, 171-72 

Catholic Church, Roman, 112-16; under 
colonial rule, xxxvii, 114; conflict of, 
with Mobutu, xliii-xliv, 51-52, 114, 
115, 125, 241-43; health care by, 130; 
and Jamaa movement, 120; mission- 
aries of, 89-90; Mobutu's rejection of, 
45; privileges in, 116; radio network of, 
194; recognition of, 51; rivalries of, in 
Africa, 11; tensions within, 115-16 

Catholicism, Roman: influence of, 89-90 

Catholic missions. See missions 

Catholics, Roman: attacks on, 114, 115; 
percentage of, in population, 112 

Ceausescu, Nicolae, 213, 263 

Centre National de Documentation. See 
National Documentation Center 

centres extracoutumiers, 20 

Chad: military support for, 271, 282, 313 

Chevron Oil, 186 

chiefdoms, 95-96 

chiefs, 94-95 



371 



Zaire: A Country Study 



Chiefs Police, 316 
children: malnutrition of, 111, 127 
China: advisers from, 197; aid from, 197; 
materiel from, 300, 302, 309; military 
assistance from 288; military training 
by, 296, 309; relations with, 204, 
262-63 

Chokwe people, 86, 88; expansion of, 9, 
89 

Christian missions. See missions; mis- 
sionaries 

churches: membership of, 63; recognized, 

51; stripped of power, 51 
Church of Christ in the Congo, 116-17 
Church of Christ in Zaire (Eglise du 

Christ au Zaire— ECZ), 51, 116-17, 

243-44 

Church of Christ of the Ubangi (Eglise 
du Christ de l'Oubangi), 117 

Church of Jesus Christ on Earth by the 
Prophet Simon Kimbangu (Eglise de 
Jesus-Christ sur Terre par le Prophete 
Simon Kimbangu— EJCSK). See Kim- 
banguist Church 

Civil Guard (Garde Civile), 277, 312, 
315, 318; created, 279, 318; intelligence 
units in, 320; interaction of, with Na- 
tional Gendarmerie, 277; materiel of, 
318; mission of, 277, 318; number of 
personnel in, 277; training of, 318 

civil rights, 325-27; violations of, 59 

civil servants, 63; killed in rural insurgen- 
cies, 100; status of, 99 

civil service, 19 

clans, 79 

class (see also under individual classes), 

96-102; and identity, 92, 96 
Clemens, Rene, 35 

clergy: attacks on, 114, 115; status of, 97, 
99 

climate, 4, 68-69; rainfall, 69; seasons, 

69; temperature, 69 
CNECI. See National Savings and Real 

Estate Fund 
CNL. See National Liberation Council 
CNS. See Sovereign National Conference 
coal, 177, 187 

cobalt, 179; earnings from, 194, 196; ex- 
port of, 177, 194, 199; mining of, 141, 
176, 177, 179; prices, 148, 179; smug- 
gling of, 108 

Code of Judicial Organization and Com- 
petence (1968), 323 



coffee, 172-73; earnings from, 194, 196; 

export of, 194, 199; production, 173; 

quotas for, 160; smuggling of, 108, 

159-60, 167, 172; varieties of, 172 
Cold war, xxxv, xxxix, xl, xlvii, lv, 250, 

259 

College of Commissioners, 32-33, 46; 
conflict in, 32-33; dissolved, 33; rela- 
tions of, with United Nations, 33 

Colonial Charter, 227 

Colonial Council (see also Legislative 
Council), 28 

colonial rule, xxxvii; 13-28; agriculture 
under, 17, 168; apparatus of control 
under, 18-20, 229; armed forces under, 
xxxviii; 282-86; brutality of, xxxvii; 
Catholic Church under, xxxvii, 114; 
centres extracoutumiers under, 20; civil 
service of, 19; corruption under, 282; 
economy under, 139-41; ethnic distinc- 
tions under, 83; human rights abuses 
under, 14-16; impact of, 16; judicial 
system under, 226-27; local govern- 
ment under, 229-30; migration con- 
trols in, 75, 94; native tribunals under, 
19; paternalism under, 16-18; peasants 
under, 101-2; political organization un- 
der, 17-18; political parties banned by, 
21; resistance to, 23, 120; subsidies un- 
der, 18; taxes under, 101, 109; trans- 
portation under, 189; welfare under, 
16; women under, 109 

Comite Special du Katanga. See Special 
Committee of Katanga 

Command and Staff School, 306, 307, 
309 

Commando Training Center, 307-8, 313 
commercial class, 98-99; business enter- 
prises of, 1 10; as provider of infrastruc- 
ture, 99 

commodities (see also under individual com- 
modities), 137 

communications. See telecommunications 

Compagnie du Chemin de Fer du Bas- 
Congo au Katanga. See Bas-Congo to 
Katanga Railroad Company 

Compagnie Zairetain. See Zaire Tin Com- 
pany 

Comprehensive Political Agreement 
(Compromis Politique Global), xlix, 
217; rejected by Mobutu, 218 

Compromis Politique Global. See Com- 
prehensive Political Agreement 



372 



Index 



Conaco. See National Confederation of 
Congolese Associations 

Conakat. See Confederation of Katanga 
Associations 

conclave, xlix-1, 218-20; negotiations of, 
with Sacred Union, 219-20 

Concordat of 1906, 18 

Confederation des Associations du Katan- 
ga. See Confederation of Katanga As- 
sociations 

Confederation Nationale des Associations 
Congolaises. See National Confedera- 
tion of Congolese Associations 

Confederation of Katanga Associations 
(Confederation des Associations du 
Katanga — Conakat), 27; in elections, 
27-28; threats to, 27 

Conference Nationale Souveraine. See 
Sovereign National Conference 

Conference of Berlin (1884-85), xxxvi, 
13-14; economic goals of, 139 

Congo, Belgian: annexation of, xxxvi, 
15-16, 139; foreign investment in, 139; 
land law in, 170; local government re- 
form in, 18; political organization un- 
der, 17-18 

Congo, French: created, 13 

Congo Free State, xxxvi, 14, 139; armed 
forces in, 282; government of, 282; land 
law in, 170; penal code in, 322; religion 
in, 116; uprisings against, 23 

Congo (Brazzaville): relations with, 269- 
70 

Congolese Liberation Party (Parti de 
Liberation Congolaise — PLC), 314; in- 
surgent attacks by, 280; officially 
registered, 314 

Congolese National Army (Armee Na- 
tionale Congolaise — ANC) (see also 
armed forces; army; see also under mili- 
tary), 30, 278, 286-88; armed opposi- 
tion group, 235; Belgian influence in, 
308; Mobutu as commander in chief of, 
32, 288; number of personnel in, 316 

Congolese National Movement (Mouve- 
ment National Congolais — MNC): xlii; 
formed, 25; platform of, 25; schism in, 
46 

Congolese National Movement-Kalonji 
(Mouvement National Congolais- 
Kalonji— MNC-Kalonji), 25, 46 

Congolese National Movement- Lumum- 
ba (Mouvement National Congolais- 



Lumumba — MNC-Lumumba), 25, 
46; request for recognition of, 213; in 
elections, 27-28; Mobutu in, 46 
Congo Reform Association, 15 
Congo River, 67, 191; exploration of, 
xxxvi, 13 

Congo River basin, 64, 67; elevation of, 
67; ethnic groups in, 82-83; population 
density in, 73; settlement of, 4-5; so- 
cial structure in, 82-83 

Conscience Africaine, 23 

Conseil National de Liberation. See Na- 
tional Liberation Council 

constitution, draft, 220, 223 

constitution, provisional. See Transition- 
al Act 

Constitutional Court, 217 
Constitution of Luluabourg (1964), xli; 

221; judiciary under, 227; legislature 

under, 224-25 
constitution of 1960. See Fundamental 

Law 

constitution of 1967, 222; approved, 48; 
judiciary under, 227; legislature under, 
225; provisions of, 48-49 

constitution of 1974: courts under, 323; 
executive under, 222, 225; law under, 
323; legislature under, 225 

consumer goods: increase in, 151; indus- 
tries established for, 141; manufacture 
of, 182; shortages of, 144 

Continental Grains, 182 

copper, 177-79; earnings from, liv, 194, 
196; export of, 177, 194, 199; mining 
of, 141, 163, 176, 177; price decrease 
of, 55, 144, 146, 148; prices of, 137, 
144; production, 177-78 

Coquilhatville Conference (1961), 38 

corn, 167, 171, 172 

corporatism, 205 

Corps des Activistes pour la Defense de 
la Revolution. See Corps of Activists for 
the Defense of the Revolution 

Corps des Volontaires de la Republique. 
See Corps of Volunteers of the Republic 

Corps of Activists for the Defense of the 
Revolution (Corps des Activistes pour 
la Defense de la Revolution— C ADR), 
321 

Corps of Volunteers of the Republic 
(Corps des Volontaires de la Repu- 
blique— CVR): expansion of, 208; 
formed, 48, 207-8; platform of, 48, 208 



373 



Zaire: A Country Study 



corruption, 117, .152-54, 197, 198; in 
agriculture, 168; in armed forces, 306; 
attempts to moderate, 106; causes of, 
142; in civil service, 76, 100, 102; 
denounced by Catholic Church, 115; 
effect of, on economy, 137, 162, 163; 
in government, 64, 74, 152, 153, 229; 
in health care, 129; in manufacturing, 
182; by Mobutu, xlvi, lv, 59; opposi- 
tion to, 312; in parastatals, 150, 
151-52, 189; as percentage of national 
budget, 98; in police force, 318, 319; 
in prisons, 325; routineness of, 153-54, 
203; in security services, lv, lvi, 320; 
to supplement income, lv, 96, 98; 
among teachers, 125-26; types of, 106; 
under Zairianization, 54, 142-44 

Cote d'lvoire (Ivory Coast), 296 

cotton, 102, 172; export of, 174, 196; quo- 
tas for, 108, 174; processing, 168; pro- 
duction of, 102, 174; smuggling of, 108 

Coton-Zai're, 150 

Council of Ministers, 211-12 

Council of the Judiciary, 227 

coup d'etat of 1960, 32, 46 

coup d'etat of 1965, 43-44, 46, 206, 278, 
288, 313, 317; announcement of, 206-7 

Court of State Security, 324 

courts, 226-28; administration of, 228; of 
appeal, 226, 323; constitutional, 228; 
juvenile, 323; regional, 323; tribunals, 
226, 323 

crime, 313 

Cuba: intervention of, in Angolan civil 
war, 278; military assistance from, 57, 
288 

cultures: assimilation in, 6-7; centralized, 
6-7; in forests, 84; fragmentation of, 
6; mix of, 5; in savannas, 5; segmen- 
tary, 5-6 
current account balance, 194-96 
currency, 159-61; depreciation of, 164; 
devaluation of, 142, 146, 147, 149, 159, 
163; exchange rate, 149, 159, 160-61, 
167; fixed rate for, 147, 148; and for- 
eign exchange, 150, 160, 165; hard, 
160; opposition to new, 160-61, 218; 
overvaluation of, 159, 167; printing of, 
liv, 138, 163, 165; replaced, 142, 
160-61, 218; shortages of, 159 
customary law, 226, 227, 322, 323 
customs, 318; as source of revenue, 162, 
163 



CVR. See Corps of Volunteers of the 
Republic 

Davidson, Bocheley, 39 
Davister, Pierre, 45 
death, 127 

debrouillardise (coping), 105 

debt, external, 163-64, 205; amount of, 
164, 199; increase in, 142; payments, 
147, 149; as percentage of gross domes- 
tic product, 163 

debt rescheduling, 164, 199; with Inter- 
national Monetary Fund, 146-47; with 
Paris Club, 146-47, 148; program of 
1981, 147; program of 1983, 147-48 

debt service: payments, 163, 164; ratio, 
164 

decolonization, 28-37; government struc- 
ture during, 28-29 
defendants, 324 

Democratic and Social Christian Party 
(Parti Democrate et Social Chretien — 
PDSC): founded, 213; Nguza govern- 
ment boycotted by, 216; opposition to 
Mobutu by, xlviii, 214 

democratization: Mobutu's sabotage of, 
218; move toward, 210; pressure for, 
210, 211 

demonstrations. See political demon- 
strations 

Denard, Bob, 47 

Denmark: investment by, 198 

Department of Land Management, 
Mines, and Energy, 186 

Development Finance Company (Societe 
Financiere de Developpement — So- 
nde), 165 

diamonds, 163, 181-82; earnings from, 
liii, 194; export of, 150, 159, 177, 182, 
194, 199; illicit mining of, 108; min- 
ing of, 141, 176, 177; production, 
181-82; smuggling of, 108, 159, 181, 
182 

diet, 130-31, 176 
disease, liv, 70, 126-28 
Division Speciale Presidentielle. See Spe- 
cial Presidential Division 
DSP. See Special Presidential Division 

EC. See European Community 
economic development, 141, 162; 



374 



Index 



prospects for, 198-99 
economic policy: liberalization of, 182, 
192 

economic reform: attempts at, 137, 
140-41; opposition to, 148; prices un- 
der, 168-70; program of 1983, 147-48, 
161; program of 1987, 148-49; pro- 
gram of 1989, 149-51, 161 

economy {see also economy, informal): and 
cost of living, 142; deterioration of, 
liii-liv, 137-38, 145-47; effects of cor- 
ruption on, 137, 152-54; effects of in- 
dependence on, 141-42; effects of 
nationalization on, 141; efforts to re- 
vive, 137; government regulation of, 
146, 152; official languages of, 76; 
precolonial, 138-39; second, 156-59; 
under Zairianization, 55, 142-45 

economy, informal, lv, 101, 156-59; ac- 
tivities in, 158, 165; attempts to regu- 
late, 104; black market in, 147, 149, 
159, 160, 161; cost-benefit analysis of, 
158-59; growth of, 63; manufacturing 
in, 184; members of, 101, 102; occu- 
pations in, 101; as percentage of gross 
domestic product, 158; size of, 63, 137, 
158; status of, 100, 158; women in, 
110, 158, 166 

education {see also schools), 122-26; 
abroad, 126; access to, 123; colonial, 
140; foreign personnel in, 97; growth 
in, 122, 123; official languages of, 76; 
portion of budget allocated to, 162; 
postsecondary, 122; religious, 114-115; 
and social advancement, 92, 104, 123 

Eglise de Jesus-Christ sur Terre par le 
Prophete Simon Kimbangu. See Kim- 
banguist Church 

Eglise du Christ au Zaire. See Church of 
Christ in Zaire 

Eglise du Christ de POubangi. See Church 
of Christ of the Ubangi 

Egypt 271 ; electricity sold to, 188; judges 
from, 227; military assistance from, 
292, 312, 318; relations with Zaire, 272 

Eighty-Day War, 293 

EJCSK. See Kimbanguist Church 

elections: of 1957, 24; of 1960, 27-28, 
29-30; of 1982, 225; promises of, 210; 
scheduled for 1995, lvii 

electric power, 187-88; consumption of, 
187; disintegration of, 138; generation, 
187; government involvement in, 152; 



investment in, 154; transmission 
abroad, 188 

electric power, hydro, 188; installed ca- 
pacity, 187; potential, 63-64, 67, 187; 
sites, 187-88 

Elisabethville {see also Lubumbashi): eth- 
nic associations in, 22 

elite class, 63; education of, 126; medi- 
cal care of, 129 

embezzlement, 106 

employment: benefits, 166; percentage of, 
76; statistics on, 165 

energy {see also under individual energy 
sources), 184-88; constraints on develop- 
ment of, 184-86; exploitation of, 184; 
government involvement in, 184 

English Baptist Mission Church, 118 

environment, 64-70 

Equateur Region: agriculture in, 171, 
174; bias toward, 91-92, 224; ethnic 
groups in, 80, 121; forests in, 174, 175; 
malnutrition in, 130; mining in, 181; 
reorganization of, 232 

ethnic: associations, 22, 52; conflict, 1, liv, 
lvii, 22, 42, 64, 74, 91, 92, 313, 327; 
consciousness, 84-85, 91; distinction, 
22 

ethnic groups {see also under individual 
groups), 79-92; boundaries between, 79; 
conflict among, 24; living standards in, 
63; political competition among, 24; 
political role of, 246-48 

ethnic identity, 83; construction of, 90; 
European emphasis on, 22; and politi- 
cal participation, 91; significance of, 
90-92 

ethnicity: common view of, 92 
Europe: exports to, 175, 178, 196 
Europe, Eastern: diplomats of, expelled, 
32 

European Community (EC): aid suspend- 
ed by, 214 

evolues {see also intellectuels), 20, 97; oppor- 
tunities for, 98 

exports {see also under individual products): 
of crops, 139, 196; of diamonds, 150, 
159, 177, 182, 194; under economic re- 
form, 147; of forest products, 175; in- 
come from, 137, 148; of minerals, 177, 
180, 194; of petroleum, 194; as source 
of revenue, 163, 196; transport of, 
191-92 

external estate. See foreign residents 



375 



Zaire: A Country Study 



extortion, 76, 102, 321 
Eyadema, Gnassingbe, 313 



Family Health International, 132 
FAO. See Food and Agriculture Organi- 
zation of the United Nations 
farming setdements, 17 
FAZ. See Zairian Armed Forces 
Fedeka. See Federation of Kasai 
Federal Republic of Germany. See Ger- 
many, Federal Republic of 
Federation Kasaienne. See Federation of 
Kasai 

Federation of Kasai (Federation Ka- 
saienne — Fedeka), 27 
Fina Oil, 184 

Fiote language (Kituba, Monokutuba), 
77 

First Republic (1960-65), 37-43; legacy 
of, xl-xli; local government under, 229, 
230; politics in, xxxix, xl; proclaimed, 
xxxix, 3 

fishing, 186; catch from, 176; precoloni- 
al, 138 

FLEC . See Front for the Liberation of the 
Enclave of Cabinda 

FLNC. See Front for the National Liber- 
ation of the Congo 

FNLA. See National Front for the Liber- 
ation of Angola 

food: for armed forces, 307; distribution 
of, 111; import of, 150, 167-68, 176; 
prices, 75; in prisons, 325; processing, 
168, 182; production patterns, 5; short- 
ages of, 144; smuggling of, 167; sup- 
ply, growth of, 167; transportation for, 
167, 168 

Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO), 130-31 

Force Publique, 277-78; brutality in, 19; 
conscripts in, 14; creation of, 282, 315; 
mission of, 282-83, 315; mutinies of, 
xxxviii, 23, 30-31, 278, 283, 286; or- 
ganization of, 283; role of, xxxviii, 19 

Forces Armees Zairoises. See Zairian 
Armed Forces 

foreign aid agencies, 74, 97, 111-12 

foreign assistance (see also foreign donors), 
196-97, 205; amount of, 196-97; cut 
off, 138, 163, 164, 192, 197, 214, 215, 



308, 312, 312; humanitarian, 197, 312; 
plans, 145-46 
foreign borrowing, xlv, 137, 142, 161, 
199 

foreign companies, 175 

foreign donors: Belgium, 197; China, 

197; France, 197; Germany, 197; 

Italy, 197; lack of coordination among, 

145-46; manipulation of, 145-46, 

308 

foreign economic relations, 194-98 
foreign exchange, 150, 160; lack of, 182 
foreign investment, 154-55, 197-98; 

amount of, 197; in Belgian Congo, 139; 

code of 1986, 198; inducements for, 

140; lack of, 182; by United States, 

198 

foreign military relations, 308-13; dis- 
solved, 309, 312 

foreign residents, 74, 96-97, 102; exodus 
of, 137, 177, 215; occupations of, 
96-97; origins of, 96; population of, 
71-72, 96; role of, 104 

forestry, 174-75; Chinese advisers in, 
197; products, demand for, 175, 187 

forests, 174-75; area of, 174; in Congo 
River basin, 67; ethnic groups in, 
80-82, 83-84; exploitation of, 69, 174, 
175; logging in, 69, 175; temperatures 
in, 69; in uplands region, 68 

forests, rain, 174; destruction of, 69; set- 
tlements in, 4-5 

forgery, 106 

Forminiere. See International Forest and 
Mining Company 

France: advisers from, 186, 192, 294, 
295, 312; aid from, 191, 197; end of aid 
from, 215; humanitarian aid from, 197; 
investment by, 198; links to, 104; 
materiel from, 300, 303, 312; military 
assistance from, 57, 215, 292, 294, 297; 
military training by, 295, 296, 301, 
303; pressure from, for democratiza- 
tion, 216-17; relations with, 204; resi- 
dents from, 97; support for Mobutu by, 
lvii 

Franco- African Summit (1978), 296 

free-trade zone, 197-98 

Free University of the Congo (Universite 

Libre du Congo— ULC), 124 
French Foreign Legion, 296; atrocities by, 

295 

French language, 76 



376 



Index 



Frente National de Libertacao de Ango- 
la. See National Front for the Libera- 
tion of Angola 

Frente para a Libertacao do Enclavo de 
Cabinda. See Front for the Liberation 
of the Enclave of Cabinda 

Front for the Liberation of the Enclave 
of Cabinda (Frente para a Libertacao 
do Enclavo de Cabinda— FLEC), 291 

Front for the National Liberation of the 
Congo (Front pour la Liberation Na- 
tionale du Congo — FLNC) {see also 
Black Arrows), 56; discipline in, 295; 
invasions of Shaba by, 57, 278, 281, 
292, 294, 295-96; number of person- 
nel in, 295; origins of, 56; strategy of, 
294; support for, 281 

Front pour la Liberation Nationale du 
Congo. See Front for the National 
Liberation of the Congo 

Fundamental Law (Loi Fondamentale), 
28, 29, 221; judiciary under, 227; legis- 
lature under, 224 

Furiiru people, 84 



Gabon, 296 

Garde Civile. See Civil Guard 
Garrison Troops (Troupes Campees), 

315-16; established, 284 
Gbadolite, 205; development of, 231; 

summit in, 282 
Gbadolite Declaration, 282 
Gbemani, Alberic, 44 
Gbenye, Christophe, 39, 213; exiled, 42 
GDP. See gross domestic product 
Gecamines. See General Quarries and 

Mines 

Gemena: development of, 231 
gendarmerie {see also National Gendar- 
merie; Territorial Service Troops), 285 
Gendarmerie Mobile. See Mobile Gen- 
darmerie 

Gendarmerie Nationale. See National 

Gendarmerie 
Gendarmerie Territoriale. See Territori- 
al Gendarmerie 
General Act of Berlin (1885), 14 
General des Carrieres et des Mines. See 

General Quarries and Mines 
General Elite Peace Force. See Civil Guard 
General Holding Company of Belgium 



(Societe Generale de Belgique — SGB), 
140, 178 
General Motors, 182-84 
General Property Law (1973), 171 
General Quarries and Mines (Generale 
des Carrieres et des Mines — Gecam- 
ines), 151, 159, 177; bankruptcy of, liii, 
177; copper production by, 177-78; 
electricity consumption by, 187; em- 
ployees of, 166; formed, xliv, 141, 152; 
funds diverted from, 177; health care 
by, 130, 132; imports for, 194; as 
source of revenue, 162, 196; turnover 
in, 100-101 
General Secretariat of the Presidency, 222 
General Union of Congolese Students 
(Union Generale des Etudiants Con- 
golais— UGEC), 48, 207-8 
gens d'eau (water people), 6 
geographic regions, 67-68 
geography, 64-70; land area, 64 
Germany (East): relations with, 262-63 
Germany, Federal Republic of: aid from, 
191, 197; currency printed in, 163, 165; 
investment by, 198; military assistance 
by, 318 

Gizenga, Antoine, 33, 287; dismissed, 32 
GM. See Mobile Gendarmerie 
gold, 180; artisanal mining of, 180; earn- 
ings from, 180, 194; export of, 177, 
180, 194; illicit mining of, 108; min- 
ing of, 141, 177, 180; production of, 
180; smuggling of, 108, 180 
Goma, lv, lvi 
Goodyear, 182-84 
Gould, David, 106 

government: bankruptcy of, 163; central- 
ization of, 52; control of business 
by, 18, 151; corruption in, 64, 74, 
152, 153; de facto decentralization 
of, lv; during decolonization, 28-29; 
economic regulation by, 146; human 
rights abuses by, 326; involvement in 
energy, 184; official languages of, 76; 
portion of budget allocated to, 162; re- 
structuring of, 47, 52; revenue, 137, 
147, 153, 177; rotation of posts in, 205; 
structure of, 220-32 

government, local, 21, 228-32; autono- 
my of, 231; under colonial rule, 229- 
30; under First Republic, 229; function 
of, 228-29; reform in, 18, 19 

government, provisional, 33 



377 



Zaire: A Country Study 



government, transitional. See Tshisekedi 

government 
government agencies: foreign personnel 

in, 97 

Government Council, 28 

government of national salvation. See Bi- 

rindwa government 
government spending, 197; excessive, 

149; untraceable, 162 
Great Rift Valley, 64 
Greece: business enterprises of, 96-97; 

foreign residents from, 96; judges from, 

227 

gross domestic product (GDP), 155-56; 
decline in, 146, 151, 155; growth of, 
148, 155; increase in, 155; regional, 
156; sectoral composition of, 156 

gross domestic product fractions: agricul- 
ture, 156, 167; budget deficit, 149; 
debt, 163; informal economy, 158; 
manufacturing, 182; mining, 156; 
per capita, 130, 155; service sector, 
156 

GT. See Territorial Gendarmerie 
Guevara, Ernesto "Che," 288 
Gulf Oil, 186, 196 



Habre, Hissein, 313 
Haiti: judges from, 227 
Hammarskjold, Dag, 31, 36; killed, 27 
Haut Conseil de la Republique. See High 

Council of the Republic 
Haut-Katanga cluster, 85 
Haut-Shaba Subregion, 85 
Haut-Uele Subregion: ethnic groups in, 

81 

Haut-Zai're Region: agriculture in, 171; 
ethnic groups in, 81; malnutrition in, 
130; mining in, 179, 181; population 
density in, 73; refugees in, 73, 74 

HCR. See High Council of the Republic 

health care: access to, 129; for armed 
forces, 307; colonial, 140; immuniza- 
tion, 127; for internal refugees, 74 

health care professionals, 129; strikes by, 
166 

health care system, liv, 64, 126-32; por- 
tion of budget allocated to, 162 

health facilities, 102, 129; closed, 64; of 
missions, 63, 112; private, 130 

Hemba cluster, 85 



High Council of the Republic (Haut Con- 
seil de la Republique— HCR), 203-4, 
217, 218; created, 226; rejected by 
Mobutu, 218; role of, 218 

High Council of the Republic-Parliament 
of the Transition (HCR-PT), xlix, lii, 
226 

highlands, 67, 68; economic conditions in, 
110; ethnic groups in, 81-82, 84-85; 
livestock in, 176; logging in, 69; occu- 
pations in, 84; political organization in, 
84; population density in, 73 

Hider, Adolf, xxxvi 

housing: for armed forces, 307 

human rights, 25-27 

human rights abuses, 59, 309, 325, 326; 
by army, 288; under colonial rule, 
14-16; by French Foreign Legion, 
295; under legal system, 324; in Moba, 
279; under Mobutu, 197; opposition to, 
312 

hunting: precolonial, 138, 139 
Hutu people, 74 



identity cards, 229 

Ileo, Joseph {see also Ileo Nsongo Amba), 
xlviii, 25, 213; as prime minister, 32 

Ileo government, 33 

Ileo Nsongo Amba, Joseph {see also Ileo, 
Joseph), 213, 216 

IMF. See International Monetary Fund 

immatriculation decree (1952), 21; pro- 
visions of, 21 

imports, 150; of food, 150, 167-68, 176; 
of oil, 145; value of, 194 

import substitution, 141, 182-84 

income {see also wages): per capita, 146, 
151; of teachers, 125-26; of workers, 
101, 108 

independence: Belgian declaration of in- 
tent for, 24; crisis related to, xxxv, 
28-37; date of, 29; effect of, on econo- 
my, 141-42; factors behind, 21 
India: foreign residents from, 96 
industrial development: exploitation of 
mineral wealth for, 141; investment in, 
154 

industrialization, xlv, 137; plans for, 141 
Industrial and Mining Development 
Company (Societe de Developpe- 
ment Industriel et Minier de Zaire — 



378 



Index 



Sodimiza), 178-79 
industrial output, 150 
industry, 182-84; import- substitution, 

141; nationalized, 147 
inefficiency, 203 

inflation, 137, 146, 161; attempts to 
reduce, 54, 197; increase in, 151; rate 
of, 148, 163 

infrastructure: commercial class as 
provider of, 99; disintegration of, 138, 
146; transportation, 102, 167, 168 

Inga hydroelectric plants, 152, 188; 
financing for, 154; generating capaci- 
ty, 188; output of, 155; plans for, 154; 
problems with, 154-55 

Institut Pedagogique National-Bukavu. 
See National Teaching Institute-Bukavu 

Institut Pedagogique National-Kinshasa. 
See National Teaching Institute-Kin- 
shasa 

intellectuels, 97-98 

intelligence- gathering agencies, 58-59, 
319-21 

internal security, 313-15 

International Association of the Congo (see 
also Belgian Congo; Congo; Congo Free 
State): founded, 13; recognized, 14 

International Coffee Organization, 172 

International Covenant on Civil and Po- 
litical Rights, 326 

International Forest and Mining Compa- 
ny (Societe Internationale Forestiere et 
Miniere — Forminiere), 140 

International Monetary Fund (IMF): 
auditor appointed by, 146; debt re- 
scheduling with, 145; declaration of 
noncooperation, 164; economic reform 
programs of, xlv-xlvi, 141-42, 146-47, 
148-49, 150, 152; insistence by, on eco- 
nomic reform, 137, 237; loan from, 
147-48, 149; pressure from, for 
democratization, 210; Zaire expelled 
by, xlv 

International Planned Parenthood Feder- 
ation, 131 

Introduction a I'ethnographie du Congo (Van- 

sina), 79 
investment, 150 

Israel: military assistance by, 296, 309; 

military training by, 290, 296, 301, 

312; relations with, 204 
Italian East Africa, 285 
Italy: aid from, 197; foreign residents 



from, 96; investment by, 154; military 
assistance from, 309 
Ituri Forest, 70 

ivory: smuggling of, 108; state monopoly 
on, 15; suppression of trade in, 14; 
trade in, 9, 89, 283 

Ivory Coast (Cote d'lvoire), 296 



Jamaa movement, 119-20 
Janssens, Emile, 30285 
Japan: exports to, 175; residents from, 97 
Jehovah's Witnesses (Watch Tower Bible 

and Tract Society), 120 
Jeunesse du Mouvement Populaire de la 

Revolution. See Youth of the Popular 

Revolutionary Movement 
judges: appointment of, 324; careers of, 

227; foreign, 227, 323; strike by, 

323 

judicial system, 323-24; changes in, 21; 
under colonial rule, 226-27; structure 
of, 226; traditional, 227-28 

judiciary, 226-28; intimidation of, 228; 
reforms of, 228 

juvenile detention centers, 325 



Kalemie: naval base, 302 

Kalombo, Kasongo (king): alliance of, 
with Arab traders, 10 

Kalonji, Albert, xxxviii, 25, 33, 287 

Kalundwe people, 86 

Kamanda wa Kamanda, 208 

Kamanyola Division, 294 

Kamina air base, xlvii, 57; armed forces 
in, 300, 301 

Kananga (see also Luluabourg): employ- 
ment rate in, 76; population in, 75 

Kaniok people, 86 

Kaonde people, 85 

Kasai: ethnic groups in, 86-88; influences 
on, 86; secession of, xxxix, 31-32, 33, 
38, 287 

Kasai-Occidental Region (see also Kasai 
Province): diamond mining in, 177, 
181; livestock in, 176 

Kasai-Oriental Region (see also Kasai 
Province): diamond mining in, liii, 
177, 181; as home region of Tshise- 
kedi, liii; massacre of miners in, xlvii, 



379 



Zaire: A Country Study 



225; population density in, liii; lvii, 73; 
population growth in, 73 
Kasai Province (see also Kasai-Occidental 
Region; Kasai-Oriental Region): eth- 
nic conflict in, 91; mining in, 152 
Kasavubu, Joseph, xxxviii, 23; conflict of, 
with Lumumba, xxxix-xl; power strug- 
gle of, with Tshombe, 43, 288-89; as 
president, xxxix, 25, 29, 32, 287 
Kashamura, Anicet, 32 
Katangan Gendarmerie, 35, 286; muti- 
ny of, 289 
Katanga Province (see also Shaba Region): 
administration of, 33-34; demograph- 
ics of, 26; ethnic conflict in, 91; in- 
dependence of, declared, 35; problems 
in, 35; settler politics in, 25-28 
Katanga secession, xxxvii, 28, 30, 31-32, 
33-37, 91, 286; attempt to end, 36-37; 
end of, xl, 37, 278, 287 
Kazembe Kingdom, 9, 85, 139 
Kengo wa Dondo, Leon, Hi, liii, lvii 
Kikongo language, xxxvii, 76, 77, 89 
Kilo-Moto Gold Mine Board (Office des 
Mines d'Or de Kilo-Moto— Okimo), 180 
Kiluba language, 86 
Kimba, Evariste, 43; executed, 47 
Kimbangu, Simon, 23, 118; arrested, 118 
Kimbanguist Church, 118-19; banned, 
118; doctrines of, 118; founded, 23; 
health care by, 130; members of, 112; 
popularity of, 118; recognized, 51, 118; 
relations of, with government, 119 
Kimbanguists, 114 

Kisangani (see also Stanleyville): armed 
forces deployed in, 301; language in, 
78 

Kinshasa (see also Leopoldville): armed 
forces deployed in, 300; armed forces 
looting in, 301; crime in, 313; demon- 
strations in, 214; electricity consump- 
tion in, 187; manufacturing in, 182; 
migration to, 73; naval base, 302; 
population in, 75; population density 
in, 73; population growth in, 73; port 
of, 192; share of gross domestic prod- 
uct, 156; unemployment in, 166 
kinship system, 79, 94; descent groups in, 

94-95; obligations in, 95 
Kisenge Mining Company, 179 
Kiswahili language, 76, 77, 78 
Kitawala movement, 23, 120-21; doc- 
trines of, 120-21; repression of, 120 



Kituba language. See Fiote language 
Kivu Mining and Industrial Company 

(Societe Miniere et Industrielle du 

Kivu— Sominki), 180 
Kivu rebellion, 41-42; atrocities in, 42; 

problems in, 41-42; task of quashing, 

42-43 

Kivu: agribusiness in, 168; crime in, 313; 
ethnic violence in, 1, 74, 92, 247-48, 
327; mining in, 179; population den- 
sity in, 73; population growth in, 73; 
subdivision of, xli, 232 

Kolwezi: captured, 294 

Kongo Kingdom: disintegration of, 
11-12; expansion of, 11; political sys- 
tem of, 11; Portuguese invasion of, 
10-11 

Kongo people, 6, 79, 89-90; influence of, 
89, 91 ; ivory trade by, 89; language of, 
77, 89; political movement of, 23-24; 
political patterns of, 89; slave trade by, 
89; traits of, 90-91 

Korea, Democratic People's Republic of 
(North Korea): materiel from, 303, 
309; military training by, 309 

Kuba people, 6, 88 

Kutu people, 6 

Kwese people, 88 

Kwilu: rebellions in, xl, 37, 40-41, 288 
Kyungu wa Kumwanza, Gabriel, 1, li, 
247 



labor, 165-67 

labor, forced (see also Salongo): ended, 17; 

under colonial rule, 14, 17, 70, 116, 

140; resistance to, 120 
labor unions, 166, 240-41; power of, 101; 

role of, 51 
Lac Kivu, lvi, 64, 67 
Lac Mai-Ndombe, 67 
Lac Tumba, 67 
Lake Albert, 64, 67 
Lake Edward, 64, 67 
Lake Mweru, 64, 67 
Lake Tanganyika, 64, 67; naval patrols 

on, 302 
land area, 64 

land law system, 170-71; basis for, 170; 
categories in, 170-71; registration un- 
der, 170, 171; tenure under, 171 

language (see also under individual languages), 



380 



Index 



63, 76-79; choice of, 78; indigenous, 

78-79; multilingualism, 78; officially 

recognized, 76-78 
League of Young Vigilantes (Ligue des 

Jeunes Vigilants), 207 
Lebanon: judges from, 227 
Leele people, 88 

legal system (see also customary law), 
322-23; attempts to reform, 227; 
bribery in, 323; penalties in, 322 

Legislative Council (see also Colonial 
Council), 28; member of, 28 

legislature, 224-26; under constitution of 
1964, 224-25; under Fundamental 
Law, 224; under Transitional Act, 226 

Lengola language, 84 

Leopold II (king), xxxvi, xxxvii, 13, 116, 
282 

Leopoldville (see also Kinshasa): ethnic as- 
sociations in, 22; founded, 13; Mobutu 
government in, 33; riots in, xxxix, 24, 
28 

Leopoldville Round Table (1961), 38 
Lia people: political systems of, 83 
Liboke Iya Bangala (Arm of the Ngala), 
52 

Libya: relations with, 271-72 

life expectancy, 71, 126 

Ligue des Jeunes Vigilants. See League of 

Young Vigilantes 
lineages, 79 

Lingala language, 76, 77-78; expansion 

of, 77-78 
literacy rate, 122, 123 
livestock, 168, 176; cattle, 176; goats, 

176; pigs, 176; precolonial, 138; sheep, 

176 

living standards, 63, 137, 156; decline in, 
liii, 145, 150; factors determining, 63, 
155 

Livingstone, David, xxxvi, 13 
Lobala people, 6 

Loi Fondamentale. See Fundamental Law 

Lomongo language, 77 

Lomotwa people, 86 

Lovanium University, 114, 124 

Lualaba River, 67 

Lualaba Subregion, 85 

Luba kingdoms, 7; occupations in, 139; 
organization of, 9 

Luba people, xxxviii, 1, 6, 79; discrimi- 
nation against, 27; ethnic conflicts of, 
91; expelled from Shaba, 74, 91, 92, 



247-48; influence of, 91; language of, 
77, 86; massacre of (1960), 32; traits 
of, 90-91 

Lubumbashi: armed forces deployed in, 
300; mining in, 179; population in, 75; 
student massacre, xlvii, 164-214, 302 

Lulua people, 86; ethnic conflicts of, 91 

Lumumba, Patrice, 25, 213; assassinat- 
ed, xxxviii, xxxix, 33; conflict of, with 
Kasavubu, xxxix-xl; conflict of, with 
United Nations, 32; dismissal of 
Kasavubu by, 32; dismissed, 32; and 
Mobutu, 46; placed under house arrest, 
33; as prime minister, xxxix, 25, 29, 
286, 287; travel by, 32 

Lumumba government, 31; martial law 
declared by, 32; opposition to, 31; poli- 
cies toward secessionists, 31-32; prob- 
lems of organizing, 31 

Lunda Bululu, 214 

Lunda cluster, 88 

Lunda Empire, 7, 85, 85, 89; indirect rule 
under, 7; succession in, 7 

Lunda Kingdom, 7-9; expansion of, 7-9, 
89; occupation of, 9 

Lunda people, 6, 79; ethnic conflicts of, 
91, 247-48; occupations of, 139; polit- 
ical activities of, 27 

Lunda Region: ethnic groups in, 85-86 

Lundula, Victor, 30, 46, 286, 287 

Luntu people, 86 



MacGaffey, Janet, 106, 110, 111, 129, 
158 

MacGaffey, Wyatt, 89 

Makanda Kabobi Institute, 50 

malnutrition, liv, 111, 127, 131 

Malula, Joseph (cardinal), 114; exiled, 
xliii, 114 

Mamvu people, 81 

manganese, 177, 179 

Mangbetu people, 6, 79, 81 

Mangutu people, 81 

Maniema Region: creation of, 232; popu- 
lation density, 73 

Manifesto of N'Sele, 49, 51, 208 

manioc. See cassava 

manufacturing: capacity, 184; cessation 
of, 184; neglect of, 156; obstacles to, 
182; as percentage of gross domestic 
product, 182; products of, 182 



381 



Zaire: A Country Study 



MAP. See United States Military As- 
sistance Program 
marketing offices, 152 
marriage, 94, 291 
martial law, 32 

massacres: of Luba people, 32; of students 
at Lubumbashi, 164, 214, 302; in Sha- 
ba, 57 

Massif du Ruwenzori. See Ruwenzori 
Mountains 

Matadi: naval base, 302; port of, 191-92 

materiel: air force, 303; army, 300; from 
China, 300, 302; from France, 300, 
303, 312; gendarmerie, 304; main- 
tenance of, 300; navy, 302-3; from 
North Korea, 303; procurement of, 
294; from United States, 300, 303 

Mathiote, Maurice, 296 

Mayombe Forest, 174 

Mbala cluster, 88 

Mbandaka: armed forces deployed in, 301 
Mbanja people, 81 

Mbanza Kongo Dia Ntotila (Great City 

of the King), 11 
Mbanza-Ngungu: armed forces deployed 

in, 300 
Mbole people, 6 

Mbuji-Mayi: demonstrations in, 214 
Mbumba, Nathaniel, 40, 292 
Mbun people, 89 
media: intimidation of, 228 
mercenaries, 42; attempts to expel, 36, 

289; for Katanga, 35, 36, 288; mutiny 

by, 47-48 
Metoko language, 84 
Miba. See Bakwanga Mining Company 
middle class: development of, 141 
Middle East: foreign residents from, 96; 

relations with, 204 
migration, 94, 109; under colonial rule, 

75, 94; to Kinshasa, 73; to Shaba 

Region, 74; to Zaire, 71, 73 
Military Action and Intelligence Service 

(Service d'Action et de Renseignements 

Militaire — SARM), 59 
military assistance: from Belgium, 57; 

from France, 57; from Morocco, 57; 

reliance on, 104; from United States, 

57; by Zaire, 282, 312-13 
military conscripts: in Force Publique, 14; 

students as, 124 
Military Intelligence and Security Ser- 
vice, 298, 320 



military officer corps: Africanized, 30, 
286; Belgians in, 285; purged, 293 

military officers: discipline of, 295; finan- 
cial position of, 306-7; marriage of, 
291; social status of, 99; uniforms, 
ranks, and insignia of, 308 

military personnel, 99; foreign, 296 

military schools {see also under individual 
schools), 285, 307-8; created, 290 

Miller, Charles, 284 

mineral rights, 171 

minerals: export of, 176-77; location of, 
177-78, 179, 180, 181; monopolies on, 
140; prices for, 196 

miners: massacre of, 225; strikes by, 20 

mining, 176-82; colonial, 139-40; gov- 
ernment control of, 151, 152; illicit, 
108; loans for, 150; as percentage of 
gross domestic product, 156, 176 

ministers, 223-24 

Ministry of Defense and Veterans' Af- 
fairs, 298, 304, 317 

Ministry of Interior, 304, 317, 319 

Ministry of Justice and Keeper of the 
Seals, 324 

Ministry of National Economy and Indus- 
try, 156, 184 

missionaries: arrival of, 11, 116; attacks 
on, 40, 114; influence of, 89-90, 97; 
role of, 97 

missions, Christian, 16-17; administra- 
tion of, 116; activities of, 17; health care 
by, 84, 130, 140; health services of, 
117; schools of, 18, 117, 140; subsidies 
for, 18 

MNC. See Congolese National Movement 

MNC-Kalonji. See Congolese National 
Movement-Kalonji 

MNC-Lumumba. See Congolese National 
Movement-Lumumba 

Moanda oil refinery, 186-87 

Moba: human rights abuses in, 279; in- 
vasion of, lvii, 280, 301 

Mobayi-Mbongo hydroelectric power sta- 
tion, 188 

Mobile Gendarmerie (Gendarmerie Mo- 
bile— GM), 304 
Mobil Oil, 184 

Mobutism, xlii; 49-51, 105, 206; courses 
in, 115 

Mobutu, Joseph-Desire {see also Mobutu 
Sese Seko): appointed head of army, 
32; as armed forces chief of staff, 30, 



382 



Index 



46, 286; as armed forces commander 
in chief, 288; consolidation of power by, 
204, 221; coups d'etat by, xl, 32, 
43-44, 46, 232, 278, 288; education of, 
45; ethnic affiliation of, 82; and Lu- 
mumba, 46; military service of, 45; po- 
litical activities of, 46; rejection by, of 
Catholic Church, 45; residence abroad, 
45-46; writings of, 45 

Mobutu Nyiwa, 205 

Mobutu Sese Seko (see also Mobutu, 
Joseph-Desire): armed forces support 
for, 232-33, 298-99, 302; armed forces 
under, 232-33, 288-90; clients of, 58, 
63, 224; corruption under, 106, 177, 
203, 229; embezzlement by, 59, 153; 
governing style of, xli-xlii, 58, 213; as 
head of MPR, 211; influence of, 44, 
203; opposition to, 212-20, 233-39, 321; 
political "religion" of, 204; political 
skill of, li-lii; as presidential monarch, 
xlii, 220-21 ; rejection by, of transitional 
government, 218, 223; relations of, 
with Julius Nyerere, 280; rival govern- 
ment of, 204; sabotage by, of democ- 
ratization, 218; succession to, 205; sup- 
port for, 58-59, 117, 219, 238, 319; as 
supreme command of armed forces, 
298; threat to impeach, 218; United 
States support for, xl, 257-60; wealth 
of, 59, 205 

Mongala Subregion: ethnic groups in, 80 

Mongo people, 6, 79, 83 

Monokutuba language. See Fiote language 

Mongsengwo Pasinya, Laurent, xliv, 
xlix, 99, 216, 218, 226 

Morocco: military assistance from, 57, 
272, 292-93, 296; relations with Zaire, 
272 

Mouvement National Congolais. See Con- 
golese National Movement 

Mouvement National Congolais-Kalonji. 
See Congolese National Movement- 
Kalonji 

Mouvement National Congolais-Lu- 
mumba. See Congolese National Move- 
ment-Lumumba 

Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution. 
See Popular Revolutionary Movement 

Mouvement Populaire pour le Renou- 
veau. See Popular Movement for the 
Revival 

Movimento Popular de Libertacao de An- 



gola. See Popular Movement for the 

Liberation of Angola 
Mpama people: political systems of, 83 
Mputu people, 86 

Mulamba, Leonard: dismissed, 221; as 

prime minister, 44, 207, 221 
Mulele, Pierre, 288; background of, 40; 

executed, 288 
Mulumba Lukoji, 214 
Mungul-Diaka, Bernardin: as prime 

minister, li, 215 
music, popular, 77-78 
mutinies: by mercenaries, 47-48; by 

Force Publique, 23, 30-31 
Mvuba people, 81 
Mwinyi, Ali Hassan, 280 



National Assembly (see also legislature), 
48, 225 

National Confederation of Congolese As- 
sociations (Confederation Nationale des 
Associations Congolaises — Conaco): in 
elections, 43; organized, 43 

national conference. See Sovereign Na- 
tional Conference 

National Documentation Agency (Agence 
Nationale de Documentation — AND), 
59, 319 

National Documentation Center (Centre 
National de Documentation — CND), 
319 

National Electric Company (Societe Na- 
tionale d'Electricite— Snel), 184, 187 

National Energy Commission, 186 

National Executive Council, 211-12, 221, 
223-24; control of, 224; reshuffles of, 
224; role of, 223 

National Front for the Liberation of An- 
gola (Frente Nacional de Libertacao de 
Angola— FNLA), 56; support for, 265- 
66, 278, 281 

National Gendarmerie (Gendarmerie Na- 
tionale), 277, 303-4, 315, 317-18; cor- 
ruption in, 318; intelligence units in, 
320; interaction of, with Civil Guard, 
277; limits on, 317; mission of, 277; 
number of personnel in, 277, 304; or- 
ganization of, 304; pay for, 317; uni- 
forms, ranks, and insignia of, 308 

National Institute for Social Security, 165 

nationalist movement, 23-28 



383 



Zaire: A Country Study 



nationalization, 137, 145, 205; effect of, 
on economy, 141, 146; of mines, 152; 
of oil companies, 186; of schools, 125; 
of universities, 124; under Zarianiza- 
tion, 54, 142-45 

National Legislative Council, 162, 210, 
222; under constitution of 1974, 225 

National Liberation Army (Armee Na- 
tionale de Liberation — ANL), 41, 42 

National Liberation Council (Conseil Na- 
tional de Liberation — CNL): members 
of, 225; organized, 39; terms of, 225 

National Police (see also National Gendar- 
merie): crimes committed by, 313; de- 
velopment of, 315-18; dissolved, 303, 
317; mission of, 317 

National Route (Voie Nationale), 191 

National Savings and Real Estate Fund 
(Caisse Nationale d'Epargne et de 
Credit Immobilier— CNECI), 165 

National Security Council, 298; estab- 
lished, 290; Secretariat, 198; Security 
Committee, 298 

National Service for Intelligence and Pro- 
tection (Service National d' Intelligence 
et de Protection— SNIP), 298, 319-20; 
politicization of, 320; powers of, 320 

National Teaching Institute-Bukavu (In- 
stitut Pedagogique National-Bukavu), 
124 

National Teaching Institute-Kinshasa 
(Institut Pedagogique National-Kin- 
shasa), 124 

National Transport Board of Zaire (Office 
National des Transports au Zaire — 
Onatra), 190 

National Union for the Total Indepen- 
dence of Angola (Uniao Nacional para 
a Independencia Total de Angola — 
UNITA): assistance to, 57-58, 281, 
265-66, 282 

National Union of Zairian Workers (Uni- 
on Nationale des Travailleurs Zairois — 
UNTZA), 166, 240-41; created, 51 

National University of Zaire (Universite 
Nationale du Zaire — UNAZA), xliii, 
99, 124, 210 

Naval Officers Basic Course, 307, 309 

navy, 277, 302-3; deployment of, 280, 
302; materiel, 302-3; mission of, 302; 
number of personnel in, 277, 302; 
training of, 303; uniforms, ranks, and 
insignia of, 308 



Ndembu people, 86 
Ndjili Airport: armed forces deployed in, 
300 

Nendaka, Victor, 43, 319 
Netherlands: attempts to control land in 

Africa, 11; investment by, 198 
Newbury, Katharine, 111 
newspapers {see also journalists; media), 

249; harassment of, 298 
Ngala people, xxxviii, 83, 90 
Ngbaka people, 6, 81 
Ngbandi people, 6, 81, 82 
Ngiri people, 6 
Ngombe people, 6, 83 
Nguza Karl-i-Bond, Jean, xlviii-xlix, 

214; as prime minister, li, 215-16 
Nguza government: boycotted, 216, 247, 

248; CNS suspended by, 216; role in 

Shaba violence, 1, li, 248 
Nigeria, 316; oil imported from, 187 
Nile Basin, 67 
Njembe people, 88, 89 
N'Kanza Dolomingu, 208 
Nku people, 88 

Nord-Kivu: creation of, 232; ethnic vio- 
lence in, 74, 92, 247-48, population 
density, 73 

North Africa: relations with, 271-72 

North Kete people, 86 

North Korea. See Korea, People's Demo- 
cratic Republic of 

Ntomba people, 6 

nutrition (see also malnutrition), 111, 

130-31 
Nyamwezi people, 85 
Nyerere, Julius, 280 
Nzongola-Ntalaja, Georges, 96 



OAU. See Organization of African Unity 

Office des Mines d'Or de Kilo-Moto. See 
Kilo-Moto Gold Mine Board 

Office des Routes, 108 

Office National des Transports au Zaire. 
See National Transport Board of Zaire 

Officers Basic Training Course, 307, 309 

oil (see also petroleum): consumption of, 
186; export of, 155; import of, 145, 
155, 186, 187; price increase, 55; 
production, 186; refineries, 155; short- 
ages of, 186; as source of revenue, 162 

Okimo. See Kilo-Moto Gold Mine Board 



384 



Index 



Onatra. See National Transport Board of 
Zaire 

Operation Dragon Rouge, 42 
Operation Morthor, 36-37 
Operation Rumpunch, 36 
OPIC . See Overseas Private Investment 

Corporation 
Ordinance of July 10, 1968, 228 
Organization of African Unity (OAU), 

264, 267, 271, 272 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation 

(OPIC), 198 



Pakistan: foreign residents from, 96 
palm oil, 172, 173; smuggling of, 108 
paramilitary agencies, 58-59, 304 
parastatals, 16, 151-52; corruption in, 

150, 151-52, 189; marketing for, 152 
Paris Club: debt rescheduling with, xlvi, 

146, 148, 149, 150; debt restructuring 

by, 145 

Parlement de la Transition. See Parlia- 
ment of the Transition; High Council 
of the Republic-Parliament of the Tran- 
sition 

parliament: under constitution of 1964, 
224-25; dissolved, 39; powers of, 47, 
210; restored, 210 

Parliament of the Transition (Parlement 
de la Transition— PT), 226 

Parti de Liberation Congolaise. See Con- 
golese Liberation Party 

Parti Democrate et Social Chretien. See 
Democratic and Social Christian Party 

Parti Revolutionnaire du Peuple. See Peo- 
ple's Revolutionary Party 

Parti Solidaire Africain. See African 
Solidarity Party 

paternalism, 16-18; as cause of corrup- 
tion, 142; political control under, 17; 
rationale for, 16 

patrimonialism, xlvi, 152-54, 198, 203, 
220; effect of, on economy, 137, 142, 
148; windfalls from, 153 

patron-client relationship, 58-59, 92, 107 

PDSC. See Democratic and Social Chris- 
tian Party 

peasants, 63, 101-2, 110; political con- 
sciousness of, 120; resettlement of, 17; 
status of, 100; taxes on, 76, 205 

penal code, 322-23 



Pende cluster, 88 
Pende people, 40, 89 
People's Bank, 165 

People's Revolutionary Party (Parti 
Revolutionnaire du Peuple — PRP), 
279, 280, 314; officially registered, 314 

petroleum {see also oil), 186-87; earnings 
from, 194; exploration for, 186; export 
of, 194; government control of, 152; 
import of, 186, 187; location of, 177; 
reserves, 186 

PetroZaire, 186 

Philip Barrat Kaiser Company, 179 

plantains, 167, 171 

PLC. See Congolese Liberation Party 

police, local {see also National Police, Na- 
tional Gendarmerie), 318-19; number 
of, 318 

political activity: banned, 47, 206-7; in 
MPR, 208, 210; permitted, xlviii, 210, 
211-12 

political demonstrations, 207, 215, 314; 

suppression of, 213, 214, 298, 302, 315; 

by UDPS, 213 
political opposition movements, xlviii- 

xlix, 212-13, 214, 313, 315; crackdown 

on, 213-14; intimidation of, 228, 318 
political participation: steps toward, 21, 

211-12 

political parties {see also under individual par- 
ties), 236-39; banned, 21, 47, 91, 207; 
created, xlviii-xlix, 212-14, 315; and 
ethnic identity, 91; official, 207; per- 
mitted to register, xlviii, 203, 212 

political protest, 167, 313; against exces- 
sive taxes, 111, 120; hopelessness of, 
108; against Mobutu, 321; source of, 
313-14 

political reform, 211-20 

political unrest, 74, 317; rebellions of 
1963, 287-88; riots of 1959, 24, 28; 
riots of 1979, 120-21; riots of 1991, 
215, 306; riots of 1993, 306 

politico-commercial class, 97-98, 102; 
business enterprises of, 110; corruption 
of, 153; members of, 99; opposition by, 
to economic reform, 148; origins of, 97; 
status of, 97; under Zairianization, 144 

Popular Movement for the Liberation of 
Angola (Movimento Popular de Liber- 
tacao de Angola— MPLA), 56, 265-66, 
278 

Popular Movement for the Revival 



385 



Zaire: A Country Study 



(Mouvement Populaire pour le Renou- 
veau— MPR), 238 

Popular Revolutionary Movement 
(Mouvement Populaire de la Revo- 
lution— MPR), 51, 203, 210, 212, 222, 
290; Central Committee, 210, 225; 
control of press by, 51 ; control of wom- 
en's associations by, 51; control of work- 
ers by, 51 , 166; control of youth by, 51 ; 
created, xl, 49, 91, 207; Mobutu as 
head of, 21 1 ; opposition of, to economic 
reform, 148; pervasiveness of, 208-10, 
324; Political Bureau, 51, 210, 222; 
powers of, 223, 225; renamed, 238; 
structure of, 208; youth group, 51, 210 

population, 64, 70-76; age distribution in, 
7 1 ; birth rate, 7 1 ; death rate, 7 1 ; densi- 
ty, 73; distribution of, 72-74, 75; ethnic 
distribution in, 79; of foreign residents, 
71-72; growth rate, 64, 70, 73, 132, 
155, 166, 167; infant mortality rate, 71; 
life expectancy, 71, 126; in 1960, 70; 
in 1984, 70; percentage of, in poverty, 
64; percentage of Catholics in, 112; 
percentage of Kimbanguists in, 112; 
percentage of Protestants in, 112; pro- 
jected, 70; rural, 75; sex ratio, 71; size 
of, 64, 70; urban, 75 

Portugal: attempts to control land in Af- 
rica, 11; foreign residents from, 96; 
Kongo Kingdom invaded by, 10-11; 
missionaries from, 11 

Portuguese Empire, 11 

Postal and Telecommunications Board, 
192 

postal service, 192 

poverty: percentage of population in, liv, 
64; extent of, 138, 151 

president (see also executive branch), 
220-23; conflict of, with prime 
minister, 31; under constitution of 
1967, 48-49; under constitution of 
1974, 225; as head of MPR, 222-23; 
judges appointed by, 324; legislative 
powers of, 225; maison militaire of, 222; 
slush fund of, 59; as supreme com- 
mander of armed forces, 298; under 
Transitional Act, 203, 217 

presidential brotherhood, 58 

presidential monarch, xlii, 205, 220-21 

press (see also journalists; media; news- 
papers): control of, by party, 51 

prices (see also inflation): controls on, 54, 



167, 168; decontrol of, 147, 150-51; in- 
creases in, 148 

prime minister: conflict of, with president, 
31; eliminated, 47, 221-22; role of, 29; 
under Transitional Act, 204, 224 

prison camps, 325 

prisons, 319, 324-25; administration of, 
324; conditions in, 325; corruption in, 
325; locations of, 324-25 

privatization, 150 

PRP. See People's Revolutionary Party 
Project for Planned Birth Services (Projet 
des Services des Naissances Desira- 
bles— PSND), 131, 132 
Project SIDA, 128 

Projet des Services des Naissances Desi- 
rables. See Project for Planned Birth 
Services 

Protestant churches, 116-17; Africaniza- 
tion of, 117; health care by, 130; polit- 
ical activity by, 243-44 

Protestants, 114, 116-17; percentage of, 
in population, 112 

provinces: under constitution of 1968, 48; 
under First Republic, 230; under Sec- 
ond Republic, 230 

provincettes, xli, 28-39, 230 

provincial councils, 28-29 

PSA. See African Solidarity Party 

PSND. See Project for Planned Birth 
Services 

public order, 313-15 



radicalization, 54; nationalization under, 

xliv-xlv, 54 
radio, 194, 248-49 

railroads, 189-91; construction of, 14; dis- 
integration of, 138, 186, 190-91; forced 
labor on, 14, 140; government owner- 
ship of, 152; maintenance of, 191; net- 
work of, 189 

Red Cross, 325 

reforms: of local government, 18, 19; of 
national government, 52; political re- 
forms in the 1990s, 211-12; postwar, 
20-22 

refugees, 71-72, 73-74, 109, 279, 293; in- 
ternal, 64, 74; number of, 71; policy 
toward, 72; repatriation of, 282 

regions: government of, 230-31; restruc- 
turing of, 232 



386 



Index 



religion {see also under individual sects), 
112-22; and identity, 92, 112; in- 
digenous, 121-22; overlapping affilia- 
tions with, 112; political role of religious 
groups, 241-45; popularity of, 63 

religious instruction: banned, 114-15 

religious publications: banned, 114 

resistance, 107-109; to colonial rule, 14; 
forms of, 108; government reaction to, 
107; language of, 108-9; to one-party 
regime, 314 

Restored Sacred Union (Union Sacree 
Renovee), li, 238 

retrocession, xlv, 54-55, 145 

rice, 167, 171, 172 

rivers, 67, 84 

roads: disintegration of, 138, 186; main- 
tenance of, 189; network of, 189 
Roget, Leon, 282 

Roman Catholic Church. See Catholic 
Church, Roman 

Romania: relations with, 263 

Round Table Conference (1960), 29, 46 

rubber, 172, 174; processing, 168; state 
monopoly on, 15; trade in, 9 

rural areas: AIDS in, 128; development 
in, 144; family planning in, 131; insur- 
gencies in, 39-43, 84, 100; living stan- 
dards in, 63; neglect of, 154; population 
in, 75; reorganization of, 231-32; 
schools in, 102; women in, 110 

Rural Health (Sante Rurale— Sanru), 131 

Ruund people, 86 

Ruwenzori Mountains, 68; climate in, 69; 

ethnic groups in, 83 
Rwanda: migration to Zaire from, 71; 

refugees from, lv-lvii, 73; relations 

with, 264, 270-71; support for, lvii; 

troops deployed to, 302 
Ryckmans, Pierre, 16 
Rymenam, Jean, 96 



Sacred Union (Union Sacree), xlix, li, Hi, 
215, 216; negotiations of, with con- 
clave, 219-20; pressure from, for 
democratization, 216-17; wings of, Hi 

Salongo (obligatory civic work): in- 
troduced, 52-53; resistance to, 53, 
120 

Sango language, 77 



sanitation, 130 
Sanru. See Rural Health 
Sante Rurale. See Rural Health 
SARM. See Military Action and Intelli- 
gence Service 
savannas, 68; cultures in, 5; ethnic groups 
in, 80-82, 85-86; political structures in, 
7; settlements in, 4-5 
Savimbi, Jonas, 57 

Schatzberg, Michael G., 96, 99, 112, 123, 

206, 228, 229 
Schoepf, Brooke, 111 
schools, 122-26; closed, 64; dropout rates, 

123; enrollment rates in, 122, 123; fees 

for, 126; of missions, 63, 90, 102, 112, 

123; nationalized, 125; number of, 122; 

primary, 124; private, 126; public, 126; 

quality of, 102, 104, 125-26; rural, 

102; secondary, 124 
Scibe Airlift, 192 

Second Republic, 44-59; conflict of, with 
Catholic Church, 51-52, 114; consoli- 
dation of, 48; decentralization under, 
231; economy under, 152; end of, 
211-12; ethnic bias in, 91-92; family 
planning under, 131; foreign relations 
of, 265; internal conflicts in, 55-58; op- 
position to, 47; organization of, 230- 
31; proclaimed, 3; relations of, with 
Kimbanguist Church, 1 19; turnover in, 
98 

security forces: organization of, 315-21; 

popular attitudes toward, 321-22 
Sendwe, Jason, 27 
Senegal, 296 

Sengele people: political systems of, 83 
Senior Military Schools Group, 307 
Service d' Action et de Renseignements 
Militaire. See Military Action and In- 
telligence Service 
Service National d' Intelligence et de Pro- 
tection. See National Service for Intel- 
ligence and Protection 
service sector: as percentage of gross 

domestic product, 156 
Sese Seko Nkuku wa za Banga, 45 
SGB. See General Holding Company of 
Belgium 

Shaba I, 56-57, 278, 292-94; armed 
forces in, 293, 303; government 
reprisals following, 293; invasions 
of, xlvii, 281; military assistance for, 
57 



387 



Zaire: A Country Study 



Shaba II, 57, 278, 294-97; armed forces 
in, 294-95, 301, 303; invasions of, 
xlvii, 281; military assistance for, 57; 
origins of, 294 

Shaba Region (see also Katanga Province), 
68; agriculture in, 172; armed forces 
deployed in, 299-300; autonomy for, 
li; crime in, 313; electricity production 
in, 187; ethnic groups in, 85-86; eth- 
nic violence in, 1, li, 74, 247-48, 327; 
livestock in, 176; manufacturing in, 
182; migration to, 74; mining in, 152, 
177, 179-80, 187; as percentage of 
gross domestic product, 156; popula- 
tion density in, 73; population growth 
in, 73, 74; recapture of, 293; threatened 
secession of, li, 247 

Shell Oil, 184 

Shi people, 84, 85 

Shilango River, 67 

Simba rebels, 41, 42 

slavery: precolonial, 95 

slaves: competition for, 12 

slave trade, 9, 77, 89; abolished, 12; or- 
ganization of, 12; precolonial, 139; 
rivalries for control of, 11, 283; as 
source of instability, 12; suppression of, 
14 

smuggling, 101, 108, 158, 159-60, 196, 
279, 281; of cash crops, 167, 168; 
of cobalt, 108, 196; of coffee, 160, 
167, 196; of cotton, 108; of diamonds, 
108, 160, 181, 182, 196; of gold, 108, 
180, 196; income from, 96; of ivory, 
108, 196; of palm oil, 108; of tea, 
108 

SNCZ. See Zairian National Railroad 
Company 

Snel. See National Electric Company 

SNIP. See National Service for Intelli- 
gence and Protection 

social conflict, 102-4 

social polarization, 102-4 

social systems, 92-96 

Societe de Developpement Industriel et 
Minier de Zaire. See Industrial and 
Mining Development Company 

Societe Financiere de Developpement. See 
Development Finance Company 

Societe Generate de Belgique. See Gener- 
al Holding Company of Belgium 

Societe Internationale Forestiere et 
Miniere. See International Forest and 



Mining Company 

Societe Miniere de Bakwanga. See Bak- 
wanga Mining Company 

Societe Miniere et Industrielle du Kivu. 
See Kivu Mining and Industrial Com- 
pany 

Societe Nationale de Chemins de Fer 
Zairois. See Zairian National Railroad 
Company 

Societe Nationale d'Electrcite. See Nation- 
al Electric Company 

Societe Zairoise de Commercialisation des 
Minerais. See Zairian Commerce Com- 
pany 

Societe Za'iro-Italienne de Raffinage. See 
Zairo-Italian Society Refinery 

Sodimiza. See Industrial and Mining De- 
velopment Company 

Sofide. See Development Finance Com- 
pany 

Sominki. See Kivu Mining and Industri- 
al Company 

Songye people, 86 

Soonde people, 88 

Soumialot, Gaston, 41; exiled, 42 

South Africa: exports through, 191; in- 
volvement in Angolan civil war, 166, 
267; military training by, 309; trade 
with, 176, 196 

Sovereign National Conference (Confe- 
rence Nationale Souveraine — CNS), 
216; boycotted, 215; conflicts in, 203; 
convened, xliv, xlix, 203, 214-15; dis- 
solved, 218, 226; members of, 214-15; 
role of, 217; suspended, 215, 216; tran- 
sitional government formed by, 203-4, 
217 

Soviet Union (see also Russia): aid from, 
xl, 32; diplomats of, expelled, 32; mili- 
tary assistance from, 57, 287; relations 
with, 260-62 

Sozacom. See Zairian Commerce Com- 
pany 

Sozir. See Zairo-Italian Society Refinery 
Spain: rivalry of, with Portugal, 11 
Special, 45 

Special Committee of Katanga (Comite 

Special du Katanga), 34 
Special Presidential Brigade, 222 
Special Presidential Division (Division 
Speciale Presidentielle— DSP), 58- 
59, 125, 222, 297; conditions of ser- 
vice, 301; deployment of, 302, Israeli 



388 



Index 



training of 2 7 1 , 3 1 2 ; number of troops 
in, 301; support by, for Mobutu, 1, 233, 
302, 314 

Stanley, Henry Morton: exploration by, 
xxxvi, 13; search by, for Livingstone, 
13; treaties signed by, 13 

Stanleyville {see also Kisangani), 13; mu- 
tiny, 289; rival national government in, 
33 

Stone Age cultures, 4 

strikes, 101, 107-8, 166, 167; general, 
218; by miners, 20; by students, 314; 
by teachers, 107-8, 116, 125 

structural adjustment programs, 149; at- 
tempts at, 137 

student demonstrations, 108, 124, 313 

students: killed in demonstrations, 124, 
125, 164, 214, 302, 314; mass conscrip- 
tion of, 124; number of, 122; protests 
by, 237; women, 126 

subbourgeoisie, 99-100, 102; members 
of, 99; status of, 100 

subsidies: under colonial rule, 18; for re- 
ligious schools, 123 

Sudan: migration to Zaire from, 71; refu- 
gees from, 71 , 74; relations with Zaire, 
269, 272 

Sud-Kivu: creation of, 232; population 

density, 73 
suffrage, 29, 210 
Suku people, 88 
Sumbu, Fallu, 291 

Supreme Court of Justice, 228, 323; as 
Constitutional Court, 217, 228 

Surete Nationale, 319 

survival strategies, 105-9; bribery, 105-7; 
debrouillardise (coping), 105; flight, 109; 
resistance, 107-9; theft, 105-7 

Sweden: investment by, 154 

Switzerland: investment by, 198 

Syria: judges from, 227 



Tabwa people: ethnic conflicts of, 91 
Tananarive Conference (1961), 38 
Tanzania: relations with, 269, 271, 279, 
280-81 

taxes: collection of, 138, 153, 163; eva- 
sion of, 158; fines as, 102; illegal, 106; 
increases in, 148; local, 229; paid by 
elite, 148; paid by women, 109, 111; 
on peasants, 76, 101, 102, 205; protests 



against, 111, 120; as source of revenue, 
162 

tea, 172, 173-74; smuggling of, 108 
teachers: corruption among, 125-26; 

number of, 122, 165; quality of, 125; 

recruitment of, 123; salaries of, 100, 

125; status of, 125; strikes by, 107-8, 

116, 125, 166, 313 
telecommunications, 192-94 
telephones, 192 

telephone system, 192-94; cellular, 194; 
disintegration of, 138, 194 

television, 194, 248-50 

Tempels, Placide, 119 

Territorial Gendarmerie (Gendarmerie 
Territoriale— GT), 304 

Territorial Police, 316 

Territorial Service Troops (Troupes en 
Service Territorial) (see also gendar- 
merie), 315-16; duties of, 284; estab- 
lished, 284; problems in, 284 

Tetela people, xxxviii 

Third Republic, liii, 211-12; opposition 
to, 315; proclamation of, xlviii, 211-12, 
298 

Thirteen, 225-26; imprisoned, 226; xlviii, 
UDPS formed by, 226 

Thirty- Year Plan for the Political Emancipa- 
tion of Belgian Africa (Van Bilsen), 23 

tin, 177, 179-80; deposits, 180; produc- 
tion, 180 

Tio cluster, 86-88 

Tio Kingdom, 88; political organization 

of, 88 
Togo, 296, 313 

trade (see also balance of trade; exports; 
imports; slave trade), 138-39, 194-96; 
under colonial rule, 140; in copper, 
139; in ivory, 9, 15, 139; precolonial, 
138-39; restrictions, 140; in rubber, 9, 
15, 139; in wax, 9 

Transitional Act (1992), xlix, 203-4, 217, 
220, 223, 228; cabinet under, 224; 
judiciary under, 228; legislature under, 
226; passed, 217, 226; president under, 
223; rejected by Mobutu, 218, 223 

transitional government. See Tshisekedi 
government 

transportation, 188-94; air, 192; under 
colonial rule, 189; deterioration of, 102, 
138, 174, 182, 186; development of, 
102; of food, 167, 168; of freight, 189; 
infrastructure, 102, 167, 174, 182; on 



389 



Zaire: A Country Study 



inland waterways, 191; loans for, 149; 
neglect of, 154, 156, 188-89; network, 
14; of passengers, 189 

treaties: with Belgium, 30; of chiefs with 
Stanley, 13 

Troupes Campees. See Garrison Troops 

Troupes en Service Territorial. See Ter- 
ritorial Service Troops 

tsetse fly, 176 

Tshiluba language, 76, 77, 86 

Tshisekedi wa Mulumba, Etienne, 197, 
204, 213; conflict of, with Mobutu, 
218; plot against, liii; as prime minister, 
215, 224; as transitional first state com- 
missioner, xlix, Hi, 217, 224 

Tshisekedi government, 204, 211, 220; 
dismissed by Mobutu, 1, 218; harassed 
by Mobutu, 315, 318; members of, 
224; recognition of, 219 

Tshombe, Moise, xxxix, 27, 28, 33, 47; 
power struggle of, with Kasavubu, 43, 
287, 288-89; as president of Katanga, 
37-38, 91; as prime minister of Zaire, 
42, 288 

Tshombe government (Katanga), 31, 33; 
declaration of independence by, 35; and 
United Nations intervention, 36-37 

Tshombe government (Congo), 42-43 

Tulane University, 131 

Turner, Thomas, 54, 96, 291 

Tutsi people, 74 



Ubangi Subregion: ethnic groups in, 80 
Ucol-Katanga. See Union for the Coloni- 
zation of Katanga 
UDPS. See Union for the Colonization of 
Katanga 

UFERI. See Union of Federalists and In- 
dependent Republicans 

Uganda: migration to Zaire from, 71; 
refugees from, 71, 74; relations with, 
269, 279-80 

UGEC. See General Union of Congolese 
Students 

ULC. See Free University of the Congo 
Ulindi River, 84 

UMHK. See Upper Katanga Mining 
Union 

UNAZA. See National University of Zaire 
unemployment: extent of, 138, 151, 166; 



in urban areas, 166 

Uniao Nacional para a Independencia 
Total de Angola. See National Union 
for the Total Independence of Angola 

Union de Transports Aeriens. See Air 
Transport Union 

Union des Democrates Independants. See 
Union of Independent Democrats 

Union des Federalistes et des Republi- 
cains Independants. See Union of Fed- 
eralists and Independent Republicans 

Union for Democracy and Social Progress 
(Union pour la Democratic et le 
Progres Social— UDPS), xli, 236-39; 
authorized, 212; demonstrations by, 
213; formed, 226; Nguza government 
boycotted by, 216; opposition to 
Mobutu by, xlviii, 214 

Union for the Colonization of Katanga 
(Union pour la Colonisation du Ka- 
tanga — Ucol-Katanga), 26 

Union for the Republic and Democracy 
(Union pour la Republique et la De- 
mocratic— URD),^ Hi 

Union Generate des Etudiants Congolais. 
See General Union of Congolese Stu- 
dents 

Union Miniere du Haut-Katanga. See 
Upper Katanga Mining Union 

Union Nationale des Travailleurs Zairois. 
See National Union of Zairian Workers 

Union of Federalists and Independent 
Republicans (Union des Federalistes et 
des Republicains Independents — 
UFERI), xlviii, li, 214, 238 

Union of Independent Democrats (Union 
des Democrates Independants — UDI), 
Hi 

Union pour la Colonisation du Katanga. 
See Union for the Colonization of 
Katanga 

Union pour la Democratic et le Progres 
Social. See Union for Democracy and 
Social Progress 

Union pour la Republique et la Demo- 
cratic See Union for the Republic and 
Democracy 

UNITA. See National Union for the To- 
tal Independence of Angola 

United Nations: conflict of, with Lumum- 
ba, 32; intervention by, in Katanga 
secession, xxxix, 36-37, 278, 287; mili- 
tary assistance from, 31, 287, 316; 



390 



Index 



relations of, with College of Commis- 
sioners, 33; special envoy, 219; support 
by, for legal system, 227 

United Nations Commission for Human 
Rights, 326 

United Nations Credentials Committee, 
33 

United Nations Security Council: resolu- 
tion of February 21, 1961, 35-36 

United States: advisers from, 294, 316; 
aid suspended by, 214; exports to, 175, 
196; investment by, 198; links to, 104; 
materiel from, 300, 303, 312; military 
assistance from, xlvii, 57, 215, 278, 
287, 288, 289, 292, 294, 296, 309, 312; 
military training by, 290, 303; pressure 
from, for democratization, 210, 216- 
17; relations with, lvii, 204, 257- 
60; residents from, 97; support from, 
44 

United States Agency for International 

Development, 128 
United States Committee for Refugees, 71 
United States Department of State, 326 
United States Export-Import Bank, 154 
United States Military Assistance Pro- 
gram (MAP), 312 
Universite de Kananga. See University of 
Kananga 

Universite de Kinshasa. See University of 
Kinshasa 

Universite de Kisangani. See University 
of Kisangani 

Universite de Lubumbashi. See Univer- 
sity of Lubumbashi 

Universite Libre du Congo. See Free 
University of the Congo 

Universite Nationale du Zaire. See Na- 
tional University of Zaire 

Universite Officielle du Congo (UOC), 
124 

universities: closed, 124, 125, 314; 
degrees awarded by, 124; nationaliza- 
tion of, 124; quotas for admission to, 
92, 126; status of staff in, 99 

University of Kananga (Universite de 
Kananga), 124 

University of Kinshasa (Universite de 
Kinshasa), 124; nationalized, 51 

University of Kisangani (Universite de 
Kisangani), 117, 124; nationalized, 
51 

University of Lubumbashi (Universite de 



Lubumbashi), 124; students killed at, 
164, 214, 302 
UNTZA. See National Union of Zairian 
Workers 

UOC . See Universite Officielle du Congo 
uplands region, 67; elevation of, 68; eth- 
nic groups in, 86; forests in, 68; tem- 
peratures in, 69 
Upper Katanga Mining Union (Union 
Miniere du Haut-Katanga— UMHK): 
formed, 140; nationalized, xliv, 53, 
141, 152 

urban areas: AIDS in, 127; family plan- 
ning in, 131; living standards in, 63; 
percentage of population in, 75; popu- 
lation in, 75; unemployment in, 166 

urbanization, 22, 75-76; causes of, 75-76 

urban migration, 20, 109; motivation for, 
63, 109; by women, 76 

UTA. See Air Transport Union 

U Thant Plan, 37 



Van Bilsen, A.A.J. , 23 
Vansina, Jan, 7, 79, 82, 85, 86 
villages: political structure of, 83-84; 

squatters', 75 
Virunga Mountains, 64-65, 68 
Vivi: founded, 13 
Voice of the Voiceless, 325-26 
Voice of Zaire (Voix du Zaire), 194 
Voie Nationale. See National Route 
Voix du Zaire. See Voice of Zaire 
volcanos, 64, 68 
Vwakyanakazi, Mukdrya, 108 



wages, 166; delay of, 76; increases in, 
140-41, 148; nonpayment of, 76, 137, 
215, 306, 319; protests about, 166, 215 

Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society. See 
Jehovah's Witnesses 

wax: trade in, 9 

welfare, 64; under colonial rule, 16 
West African Frontier Force, 285 
Western influences, 3, 12-13, 91; on 

armed forces, 308-9; exposure to, 12; 

impact of, 12-13 
West Germany. See Germany, Federal 

Republic of 
women: in agriculture, 110-12, 172; in 



391 



Zaire: A Country Study 



armed forces, 306; under colonial rule, 
109; constraints on, 109, 110; educa- 
tion of, 126; employment of, 110, 166; 
in informal economy, 110, 158, 165, 
166; living standards of, 63; migration 
to cities by, 76; rural, 110; status of, 
109-12; taxes paid by, 109 
women's associations, 111; control of, by 
party, 51 

workers, 63, 102; foreign, 166; incomes 
of, 101; status of, 100; strikes by, 101 

working class, 100-101; members of, 100 

working conditions, 100 

World Bank: aid from, 165; debt restruc- 
turing by, 145; economic reform pro- 
grams of, 148-49, 152; insistence by, 
on economic reform, 137; Kinshasa 
office of, closed, xlv; loans from, 149, 
164, 191; structural adjustment pro- 
gram, 149 

World Council of Churches: membership 
of, 118-19 

World Health Organization (WHO), 
128 

World War I, 283-84 
World War II, 285 



Yaka cluster, 88 
Yans-Mbun cluster, 88 
Yeke Kingdom, 85 
Yeke people, 27 

Young, Crawford, 54, 76, 96, 292 
youth groups, 207; banned, 114 
Youth of the Popular Revolutionary 
Movement (Jeunesse du Mouvement 
Populaire de la Revolution — JMPR), 
208-10, 321; created, 51; role of, 114, 
115 



Zaire- Afrique, 125 

Zairetain. See Zaire Tin Company 
Zaire Tin Company (Compagnie 

Zairetain — Zairetain), 180 
Zairian Armed Forces (Forces Armees 
Zairoises — FAZ): creation of, 290-91; 
manpower, 304-6; mission, 298-99; 
named, 50; organization, 299; schools, 
307-8; uniforms, ranks, and insigia, 
308; women in, 306 
Zairian Association for Family Well- 
Being (Association Zairoise pour le 
Bien-Etre Familial— AZBEF), 131 
Zairian Association for the Defense of Hu- 
man Rights, 325-26 
Zairian Coffee Board, 152, 172 
Zairian Commerce Company (Societe 
Zairoise de Commercialisation des 
Minerais — Sozacom), 151 
Zairian Commando Training Center, 282 
Zairian Commercial Bank, 165 
Zairianization, 53-54, 98, 137, 142-45; 
agriculture under, 167, 168; allocations 
under, 144; announced, 144, 205; ef- 
fects of, xlv, 144-45; features of, xlii, 
xliv-xlv, 53-54, 144, 205-6; oppo- 
sition to, 53; results of, 54, 144-45, 
205-6 

Zairian League for Human Rights, 
325-26 

Zairian National Railroad Company (So- 
ciete Nationale de Chemins de Fer 
Zairois— SNCZ), 190 

Zairo-Italian Society Refinery (Societe 
Zairo-Italienne de Raffinage — Sozir), 
155 

Zambia: relations with, 269, 279, 
281 

Zande people, 6, 79, 81 
Zimbabwe: imports from, 176 
zinc, 177, 179 



392 



Published Country Studies 



(Area Handbook Series) 



550-65 


Afghanistan 


550-87 


Greece 


550-98 


Albania 


550-78 


Guatemala 


550-44 


Algeria 


550-174 


Guinea 


550-59 


Angola 


550-82 


Guyana and Belize 


550-73 


Argentina 


550-151 


Honduras 


550-169 


Australia 


550-165 


Hungary 


550-176 


Austria 


550-21 


India 


550-175 


Bangladesh 


550-154 


Indian Ocean 


550-170 


Belgium 


550-39 


Indonesia 


550-66 


Bolivia 


550-68 


Iran 


550-20 


Brazil 


550-31 


Iraq 


550-168 


Bulgaria 


550-25 


Israel 


550-61 


Burma 


550-182 


Italy 


550-50 


Cambodia 


550-30 


Japan 


550-166 


Cameroon 


550-34 


Jordan 


550-159 


Chad 


550-56 


Kenya 


550-77 


Chile 


550-81 


Korea, North 


550-60 


China 


550-41 


Korea, South 


550-26 


Colombia 


550-58 


Laos 


550-33 


Commonwealth Caribbean, 


550-24 


Lebanon 




Islands of the 






550-91 


Congo 


550-38 


Liberia 


550-90 


Costa Rica 


550-85 


Libya 


550-69 


Cote d'lvoire (Ivory Coast) 


550-172 


Malawi 


550-152 


Cuba 


550-45 


Malaysia 


550-22 


Cyprus 


550-161 


Mauritania 


550-158 


Czechoslovakia 


550-79 


Mexico 


550-36 


Dominican Republic and 


550-76 


Mongolia 




Haiti 






550-52 


Ecuador 


550-49 


Morocco 


550-43 


Egypt 


550-64 


Mozambique 


550-150 


El Salvador 


550-35 


Nepal and Bhutan 


550-28 


Ethiopia 


550-88 


Nicaragua 


550-167 


Finland 


550-157 


Nigeria 


550-155 


Germany, East 


550-94 


Oceania 


550-173 


Germany, Fed. Rep. of 


550-48 


Pakistan 


550-153 


Ghana 


550-46 


Panama 



393 



550-156 


Paraguay 


550-53 


Thailand 


550-185 


Persian Gulf States 


550-89 


Tunisia 


550-42 


Peru 


550-80 


Turkey 


550-72 


Philippines 


550-74 


Uganda 


550-162 


Poland 


550-97 


Uruguay 


550-181 


Portugal 


550-71 


Venezuela 


550-160 


Romania 


550-32 


Vietnam 


550-37 


Rwanda and Burundi 


550-183 


Yemens, The 


550-51 


Saudi Arabia 


550-99 


Yugoslavia 


550-70 


Senegal 


550-67 


Zaire 


550-180 


Sierra Leone 


550-75 


Zambia 


550-184 


Singapore 


550-171 


Zimbabwe 


550-86 


Somalia 






550-93 


South Africa 






550-95 


Soviet Union 






550-179 


Spain 






550-96 


Sri Lanka 






550-27 


Sudan 






550-47 


Syria 






550-62 


Tanzania 







394 



